Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood: Between Settling the Question of Survival and the Dilemma of Its Future Role

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria issued a new statement on the occasion of the fifth ordinary session of its Shura Council—the second such meeting since the liberation—held, in the statement’s words, amid “highly complex regional and international circumstances.”[1]

The statement contained sixteen points: ten addressing external affairs and six focused on domestic issues, although several carried messages directed simultaneously at both domestic and international audiences. The Brotherhood reaffirmed its support for the unity of Syria, both territorially and socially; welcomed the People’s Assembly and its role in consolidating political pluralism; and stressed the importance of launching a “serious” transitional justice process.

Most significant, however, was the Brotherhood’s emphatic assertion of its continued existence, its national character, the independence of its decision-making, and its adherence to a moderate Islamic approach. This appears to represent an initial effort to consolidate its position in Syria’s political and civic life, particularly in anticipation of the post-transition period, while also adapting to the rapid rise of Salafism in the country.

On foreign affairs, the Brotherhood praised the Syrian government’s active diplomatic engagement and the resulting removal of Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. It condemned Israeli incursions and conduct in southern Syria, reiterated its support for the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination, and warned against Iran and its networks and attempts to rebuild influence through armed groups operating outside state institutions. It also condemned Iranian attacks on Gulf states and Jordan.

The statement called for respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty and non-interference in its internal affairs, welcomed the Mecca agreement on mutual defence, and concluded with particular thanks to Qatar, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan for their support for Syria and their contribution to reconstruction, as well as to all states that have supported the new Syria. It further called on the Arab and international communities to provide economic and humanitarian assistance, contribute to reconstruction, improve living conditions, and thereby strengthen Syria’s prospects for recovery and stability.

The Question of Timing—and What Is New?

Substantively, the latest statement contains relatively little that is new when compared with earlier Brotherhood documents, including the statement issued following the Shura Council’s fourth ordinary session—the first after liberation[2]—and the Document on Coexistence adopted by the Council at the time.[3]

Its principal significance lies instead in its reaffirmation that the Brotherhood intends to continue operating. This comes after nearly a year of demands and debate, from both within and outside the organisation, over whether it should dissolve itself. Most prominently, Ahmad Muwaffaq Zaidan, an adviser to the Syrian president, publicly called for the Brotherhood’s dissolution,[4] triggering considerable controversy and debate. The Brotherhood subsequently rejected the proposal through statements by its General Supervisor,[5] while signalling a degree of flexibility and openness to reviewing its organisational structures—and even to dissolution in the future—should Syria’s interests and changing circumstances require it.

The latest statement therefore settles the question of organisational survival, but leaves unresolved the more consequential issue of what that survival will actually mean. How and where will the Brotherhood operate? Will it function as a political organisation within the party system whose regulation it itself advocates? Will it retain the position it previously described as that of a “supportive, sincere and trusted adviser” to the state? To what extent can continued existence in this form satisfy the organisation itself while generating meaningful influence over the state and its policies?

Alternatively, the Brotherhood may eventually choose another model of continuity, following the path of other organisations in the Arab and Muslim worlds that have relinquished the Brotherhood name. Such transformations have ranged from tactical adaptations imposed by the imperatives of survival to genuine strategic shifts rooted in deeper ideological and organisational revisions.

The statement can also be read, particularly through the emphasis and repetition attached to certain issues, as an implicit inventory of what the new administration either should have done or has yet to accomplish. This is especially apparent in the insistence on launching a “serious” transitional justice process, alongside an implicit criticism that the new authorities have prioritised external affairs over domestic challenges.

The central conclusion is therefore straightforward: the Brotherhood has settled the question of its continued existence, but its statement does not settle the question of its function in a Syria where the political authority, religious sphere, political arena, and social constituency have all undergone profound transformation.

Drivers of Continuity: From Internal Organisational Dynamics to the Regional Context

Whether the Brotherhood continues to exist, and the form that this continuity eventually assumes, will likely depend on a combination of internal and external balances and the interaction of several factors. These include the organisation of political and civic life during the transitional period; internal dynamics within the Brotherhood itself; transformations within Syria’s contemporary Islamic and religious sphere and across the wider Arab and Muslim worlds; and, potentially, regional and international pressures capable of shaping future organisational choices.

This question acquires particular relevance when considered alongside the situation of Brotherhood-affiliated organisations in neighbouring Lebanon and Jordan, both of which face the consequences of US terrorist-designation measures,[6] although their respective legal circumstances differ. The Jordanian organisation has also been banned domestically. Egypt presents another restrictive environment, while the Brotherhood’s Iraqi branch faces challenges of its own. These branches, however, cannot simply be treated as parts of a single operational structure given the differences in their political positions, alignments, and domestic contexts.

Such regional developments have explanatory value, particularly because of what the Brotherhood “name” itself now signifies. Yet they remain insufficient for understanding the organisation’s future position without examining its actual organisational capacity and the scale of its real presence inside post-liberation Syria.

Islamist movements are, by their nature, socially embedded and highly contextual organisations. Their trajectories need to be understood within their specific national environments and the historical conditions under which they emerged. At the same time, another factor has become increasingly significant: the political and media narratives surrounding the Brotherhood since the Arab uprisings, particularly following the overthrow of Egypt’s post-2011 political experiment. These narratives have reinforced a powerful stereotype of the Brotherhood, accompanied by accusations of “destruction” and “terrorism.” The Brotherhood name therefore carries political costs today that extend well beyond individual national settings and into the international arena.

The Question of Presence: Between the Individual, the Organisation, and New Religious Actors

Following the liberation, considerable debate emerged over the alleged presence of Brotherhood members within the Syrian state and its institutions, particularly across the second and third tiers of government and even within the Syrian People’s Assembly.

Much of this discussion, however, requires qualification. Syria contains deeply religious and socially conservative environments whose political and religious outlook may overlap with aspects of the Brotherhood’s worldview without implying organisational affiliation. Some of these circles might be described as the “Brotherhood’s Brotherhood”—a broader milieu of individuals sympathetic to, close to, or supportive of the movement and its political, intellectual, and religious discourse without being formal members.[7] This overlaps with a much wider religiously committed social sphere, both old and new, as well as traditionally conservative environments in cities historically associated with Brotherhood influence, including Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus.

Consequently, the presence of individuals from such backgrounds within state institutions does not necessarily demonstrate the kind of organisational Brotherhood presence that some accounts suggest or amplify.

From an internal organisational perspective, the Brotherhood has spent nearly four decades in exile following the bloody Hama massacre.[8] Its membership has consequently been dispersed across multiple geographical settings. Its organisational structure underwent further fragmentation both before and during the Syrian revolution, while ageing leadership structures, generational decline, and a discourse centred heavily on the experience of persecution increasingly came to shape its organisational identity.

These conditions help explain part of the organisation’s determination to survive. At the same time, they have affected its ability to attract new generations, many of whom have gravitated instead towards different forms of Islamic activism across a wide spectrum of political, religious, intellectual, and social fields.

Against this background, the Brotherhood’s continued reliance on an essentially unchanged discourse despite a transformation in the conditions under which it operates means that reaffirming its survival can no longer provide an adequate answer to the question of its political relevance. This will inevitably shape both the form of its future existence and its capacity for political action and influence. Its actual political and organisational weight today appears considerably more modest than the symbolic power of its name and historical legacy.

Paradoxically, the political and social appeal that the Brotherhood may now seek to recover in Syria had already begun to erode before the Arab uprisings. The movement may have been among the earliest organised actors to articulate the discourse of “Sunni victimhood” that now occupies a prominent place in Syria’s political and religious landscape, yet its organisational relevance had already entered a visible process of decline for the reasons outlined above and those discussed below.

Contemporary Syria, meanwhile, is witnessing significant and highly diverse forms of religious activity—official, semi-official, and entirely independent. These range from the various currents of Salafism to Sufi orders, Ashʿari traditions, other theological schools, and hybrid formations that draw selectively from several traditions.

This landscape also includes forms of “post-Brotherhood” Islamism that have found in the new Syria a new space for activity and an arena in which to test ideas that frequently originate outside the country before being developed, experimented with, or applied within it. This is occurring at a time when public space has narrowed considerably in several other countries.

The significance of such developments extends beyond Syria. Religious and political experimentation taking place within the country can influence actors elsewhere, and in many cases draws upon a combination of experiences accumulated across different contexts. These processes can ultimately generate independent organisations or transnational currents that maintain an Islamic frame of reference in discourse, methodology, practice, and organisational tools while lacking formal organisational ties to established movements.

The contemporary religious sphere is also being transformed by the rise of the individual preacher and the “preacher-influencer,”[9] alongside networked forms of Islamism, symbolic or lifestyle Salafism, and other emerging patterns. These developments intersect with a renewed discourse of resistance and a broader revolutionary mood, particularly since 7 October and amid Syria’s dramatic transformations.

The years of the Syrian revolution and the period preceding it therefore require a wider reconsideration of what might be called “Levantine religiosity”: the relationship of Syrians to religion, patterns of religious practice, and the place of religion within Syria’s public sphere. This is particularly important given the numerous Syrian movements and currents for which Syria became a “laboratory,”[10] alongside other factors that cannot be examined fully here.

An Unclear Location and the Limits of the Relationship with the State

The Brotherhood has also refrained from identifying the location in which its meetings have been held. At a minimum, its statements could have been formally issued from “Damascus,” for example. Although this might initially appear to be a minor procedural detail, its omission leaves the nature of the Brotherhood’s public presence inside Syria unresolved.

It also raises questions about the possible continuation of clandestine organisational activity, whether the latest Shura Council meeting was in fact held on Syrian territory, and whether the ambiguity reflects calculations governing the Brotherhood’s relationship with the state. The organisation may be seeking to avoid actions that could be interpreted as generating tension with the authorities or placing the state in a politically difficult position.

A number of sources describe the authorities’ approach towards the Brotherhood as one of distance and marginalisation. Several factors may help explain this. Among them are earlier demands by regional states that reportedly functioned as something close to a “veto” on the Brotherhood’s return to active political life in Syria, linked to the political and financial support and regional reintegration sought by the new Syrian authorities.

Other factors are historical and ideological. There is also a dimension of political representation and competition: the current governing elite derives part of its own legitimacy from narratives of Sunni victimhood and majority representation and draws from portions of the same social, cultural, and intellectual constituencies with which the Brotherhood historically sought to engage. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood continues to maintain a visible online presence and digital activity.

A further complication is the Brotherhood’s unusual legal position. The organisation has remained formally prohibited in Syria since the Baathist era under Law No. 49 of 1980. Article 1 of that law prescribed the death penalty for anyone who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, was deemed intellectually affiliated with it, supported it, or sympathised with it, and the law was applied retroactively.[11]

This legal legacy may give the state a degree of room for manoeuvre, allowing it to restrict or suspend the Brotherhood’s activities during the transitional period until the Syrian People’s Assembly amends or repeals the legislation. Thus far, the authorities’ policy towards the Brotherhood appears to combine a degree of pragmatism with continued marginalisation.

From the Brotherhood to “Post-Brotherhood” Islamism: The Burden of Deferred Renewal

The Brotherhood today faces the need for far-reaching renewal, yet its ability to undertake such a transformation appears constrained by the bureaucratic inertia that has come to characterise its organisational machinery, as well as by the internal and external pressures outlined above.

At the same time, its determination to preserve the organisation prevents it from choosing dissolution. Its decision to continue is, in itself, a legitimate one, as it would be for any political organisation regardless of assessments of its project, its political judgement, or its contemporary relevance, so long as it operates within the framework of the state and its laws.

Between these two positions lies one of the central obstacles to the emergence of a distinctly Syrian form of “post-Brotherhood” Islamism—one that could be more flexible, dynamic, contemporary, and attractive to younger generations.

Such a development may ultimately be driven by the “Brotherhood’s Brotherhood”: former members, figures close to the organisation, and reformist currents emerging from within or around it. These actors could play an important role in constructing a new political-Islamic space and may rapidly occupy the position of a representative of mainstream moderate Islam and its broad social constituency.

Paradoxically, such an outcome could preserve a significant part of the Brotherhood’s historical social and intellectual capital, even if the organisation itself assumes that abandoning its existing form or retreating from the foreground would mean surrendering that legacy.

The central question for the coming period is therefore the extent to which Brotherhood-oriented political actors can re-enter Syria’s political arena and gain social acceptance before the question of state acceptance is even reached. Their future will depend on their ability to define a clear position and function and to demonstrate what genuinely new contribution they can make in light of their historical experience.

They will also have to operate within an increasingly crowded religious sphere populated by multiple competing actors, while confronting the question of their domestic acceptance at a moment when political leadership—at least for the transitional period—has already consolidated around the new authorities and the networks of senior cadres now occupying key positions across the emerging Syrian state.

References

[1] Official Website of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, “Statement of the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria—Fifth Ordinary Session,” 27 September 2026.

[2] Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, “Statement of the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Fourth Ordinary Session,” Official Website of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 7 August 2025.

[3] Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, “Document on Coexistence in Syria: The Vision of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria,” Official Website of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 18 October 2025.

[4] Ahmad Muwaffaq Zaidan, “When Will the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria Dissolve Itself?,” Al Jazeera Net, 22 August 2025.

[5] Official Website of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, “The General Supervisor of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria Comments on Calls to Dissolve the Organisation and Clarifies Its Position on the New Authorities,” 11 September 2025.

[6] Maryam al-Batoush, “The Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads: The New US Shift and Its Regional and Jordanian Implications,” Institute for Politics and Society, 26 November 2025.

[7] For conceptual clarification, the expression “the Brotherhood’s Brotherhood” refers, in the context in which the term emerged, to individuals who sympathise with, are close to, and—most importantly—support the Brotherhood, adopt its discourse, and broadly agree with its political, intellectual, and religious project without formally belonging to the organisation. It reflects the well-known Brotherhood saying: “How many are among us but not of us, and how many are not among us but are of us.” The broader religiously committed public sphere encompasses a much wider range of actors, many of whom differ with the Brotherhood, have broken with it, or do not favour engagement with it or its project, whether because they have withdrawn from politics, deliberately avoid political activity, or for other reasons beyond the scope of this article.

[8] Malath Qasim Agha, “44 Years after the Hama Massacre: A Memory of Blood That Has Not Been Buried,” Al Jazeera Net, 2 February 2026.

[9] Maryam al-Batoush, “‘The Preacher-Influencer’: Digital Salafism and the Transformation of Networked Religiosity,” Institute for Politics and Society, 19 May 2026.

[10] According to the description used by researcher and specialist in Islamist movements Dr Abdulrahman Alhaj.

[11] Muwaffaq al-Khawja, “Executing the Brotherhood and Criminalising Assadism: The Symbolism of Number 49,” Enab Baladi, 9 July 2026.