Politics in Jordanian Theatre and Drama: A Crisis of the Production System and the Limits of Expression

• Jordan’s political modernization agenda is advancing, while theatre and drama are increasingly struggling to translate political and social transformations into sustained public debate.
• Artistic works carry political significance when they address power relations, corruption, unemployment, freedoms, and citizens’ relationships with institutions, even without directly portraying political figures.
• The decline of Jordanian theatre and drama reflects interconnected weaknesses in financing, production, distribution, and legal protection, undermining artistic continuity and audience reach.
• Legal, social, and commercial concerns lead some producers and artists to exclude sensitive subjects and characters before their works even enter production.
• This transformation coincided with a narrowing of the space for freedom of expression and a rise in the legal and professional costs of public criticism, expanding self-censorship among writers, artists, and producers and pushing part of cultural production toward subjects regarded as less politically sensitive.
• Reliance on intermittent grants and seasonal festivals has reinforced a fragmented production model, limiting the development of regular performance seasons and sustained audience engagement.
• Jordan has developed incentives to attract film productions, while building a national drama industry requires parallel investment in script development, local production, and distribution.
• Jordan’s national history and contemporary social transformations call for broader dramatic interpretations grounded in research, archival access, artistic independence, and diverse narratives.
• Fragmented professional representation and weak coordination across the theatre and drama sectors constrain their ability to formulate shared demands and influence cultural and legislative policies.
• Popular and theatrical productions indicate continued engagement among segments of the audience with works reflecting their concerns, highlighting the importance of regular performance seasons and outreach beyond the capital.
• Reform priorities include sustainable and transparent funding, protection of freedom of expression, a stronger role for Jordanian television, improved production and distribution, and greater artistic independence and institutional accountability.

Executive Summary

This paper examines the declining engagement with political and social issues in Jordanian theatre and television drama at a time when political and economic modernisation initiatives are advancing and the need for cultural production capable of reflecting and interpreting social change is growing. It adopts an understanding of politics in the arts that extends beyond parties, elections and public officials to encompass citizens’ relationships with institutions, corruption, unemployment, freedoms, identity, social justice and the representation of these concerns within the national narrative. Drawing on discussions held during the session ‘Where Has Politics Gone in Jordanian Drama and Theatre?’ alongside the available historical, institutional and economic evidence, the paper investigates the factors that have weakened the Jordanian arts sector’s ability to address these issues on a sustained basis.

The paper finds that the decline of theatre and drama is associated with interacting structural deficiencies: inadequate long-term funding, fewer commissions and local productions, limited exhibition and distribution channels, rising commercial risks, legal, administrative and social constraints on freedom of expression, fragmented professional representation and weak coordination among the institutions concerned. It also identifies a gap between policies designed to attract film production and institutional investment in developing Jordanian scripts and dramatic works, as well as the limited translation of national history and contemporary social transformations into a sustained body of artistic production. The available evidence suggests that segments of the public retain an interest in works that speak to their concerns, although more systematic data are needed to measure the scale and distribution of that interest.

The paper considers four possible responses: maintaining the existing model of grants and festivals, expanding direct public-sector production, relying more heavily on commercial markets, and enabling an independent arts sector through competitive funding and institutional safeguards. It highlights the importance of a model that combines the state’s responsibility to provide resources, infrastructure and legal protection with the autonomy of artists and producers over content and implementation, supported by exhibition and distribution networks capable of reaching audiences across Jordan’s governorates.

It proposes a phased programme for rebuilding the sector, beginning with a comprehensive evidence base and a review of existing funding mechanisms, followed by the establishment of an independent, multi-year funding mechanism, a stronger commissioning and production role for Jordan Television, regular performance seasons, a review of the legal environment, improved professional organisation and programmes for script development. Restoring the political and social role of theatre and drama, the paper argues, depends on a cultural policy capable of establishing an integrated production cycle, safeguarding artistic independence, widening public participation and turning cultural investment into a means of strengthening the public sphere, creative industries and Jordan’s cultural presence.

Introduction

Official discourse in Jordan increasingly places political modernisation and citizenship-building among its principal priorities, even as theatre and television drama have become less able to provide sustained artistic engagement with the political and social transformations experienced by the country. This tension reveals a gap between the ambitions of modernisation expressed in public discourse and the cultural means through which those ambitions can become a living social debate. The issues that concern Jordanians—from unemployment, corruption and bureaucracy to violence, extremism and the Palestinian question—remain prominent in public life, while fewer theatrical and dramatic works explore them beyond passing references or topical comedy.

This gap calls for a reassessment of the conditions under which political art is produced in Jordan, rather than reducing the discussion to whether artists have fallen silent or become less daring. What matters is whether the cultural ecosystem can finance works, bring them into production, deliver them to audiences and protect their creators’ independence. The retreat of politics from stage and screen can therefore be understood as a sign of dysfunction in the relationship between culture, public institutions, markets and audiences, and of the weakness of mechanisms through which public concerns can generate a cumulative body of artistic work.

The question extends beyond whether political parties and elections appear in artistic works. Politics here also encompasses citizens’ relations with institutions; corruption and bureaucracy; employment and unemployment; divorce and delayed marriage; public space; social and religious sensitivities; and the image and history of the state. A work becomes political when it prompts reflection on power relations, patterns of behaviour and the organisation of collective life, even without naming a particular official or political party.

This paper adopts an operational definition of politics in theatre and drama based on how a work addresses power relations, individuals’ interactions with public institutions, the distribution of resources and opportunities, and the boundaries of freedom, participation and accountability. Under this definition, a socially oriented work can have political content when it reveals the workings of authority or the effects of public policies on everyday life. Conversely, the presence of an official, a party or a state institution does not, in itself, constitute political engagement. This distinction makes it possible to assess the depth and character of an artistic treatment rather than simply counting explicitly political subjects or characters.

In this sense, politics has not disappeared entirely. What has receded is the sustained project that builds a body of work, develops an audience and renews the profession. This retreat is partly imposed and partly the result of choices made under prevailing conditions.

A political culture cannot mature without cultural policies that operate through the arts, theatre, television and cinema. Theatre and drama help shape the language through which society understands itself, and provide space to examine ideas and values beyond official discourse. Collective narratives, once established, are shaped through theatre and drama rather than through short-form social-media clips or ‘reels’.

The paper addresses a specific question: what factors have weakened the ability of Jordanian theatre and drama to sustain political and social engagement despite continuing public demand for discussion of shared concerns? It examines five interacting factors: funding and production conditions; the space for expression and legal protection; commissioning, performance and distribution policies; the organisational capacity of the arts sector; and relations between cultural institutions and audiences. Its purpose is to identify areas of dysfunction amenable to policy intervention and distinguish measures that address symptoms from those that rebuild the conditions for continuity.

Methodologically, the paper draws on discussions at the session ‘Where Has Politics Gone in Jordanian Drama and Theatre?’ and reorganises the issues raised into an analysis of the cultural production ecosystem and its relationship to public policy. It combines professional observations from that discussion with the historical, institutional and economic evidence cited in the paper to identify mechanisms of decline and possible areas of intervention. The examples are used to illustrate patterns of dysfunction, while distinguishing professional testimony from indicators that can be independently verified and generalised across the sector. Accordingly, the findings constitute a policy assessment grounded in the discussion and available evidence; certain conclusions still require more regular sector-wide data to establish their scale and scope.

From an Unwritten Understanding to Preventive Censorship

Jordanian theatre emerged in direct contact with politics in the early twentieth century, amid new territorial divisions, population movements and struggles over the region’s identity. Rox bin Zaid al-Uzaizi staged a play about Saladin in a church setting, signifying a sense of national belonging that transcended social and religious divisions. Productions about Algeria in the 1950s and Palestine followed. By 1936, a theatrical production team was working in the palace of King Abdullah I, suggesting that the relationship between art and the state began as one of partnership rather than censorship.

During the 1980s, Jordanian television drama expanded its presence across the Arab world, supported by institutional production capacity and a network of actors, writers and directors who helped establish a distinct local artistic identity. In theatre, the relationship with Jordanian audiences provided room to criticise corruption, public policies and social customs through productions associated with such figures as Nabil Sawalha, Hisham Yanes and Mousa Hijazin. An understanding developed among producers, authorities and audiences that allowed space for criticism within boundaries that were neither always stated nor fixed.

By the early 1990s, Jordanian drama faced changes in the regional market alongside the repercussions of the 1990 Gulf crisis, shifts in funding and distribution, and the movement of part of the Arab production industry towards Syria. Analysis of this period needs to distinguish the contraction of domestic production capacity from the diminished presence of Jordanian productions in the Arab market and the changing terms of access to finance and distribution. Theatre, more dependent on domestic audiences and box-office revenues, benefited from continued demand for political and social performances during the 1990s. The comparison points to different sources of funding and conditions for sustainability that must be considered when explaining subsequent developments.

The importance of this period lies in the distinct conditions governing the sustainability of television drama and theatre. Television drama needs sufficient production and financial capacity to enter the market and reach audiences abroad, whereas theatre depends more heavily on repeated performances and a direct, continuing relationship with its audience. Their respective declines therefore cannot be explained by a single factor. Reviving them requires policies attentive to their different institutional and economic structures rather than treating them as a homogeneous production sector.

From the beginning of the 2000s, festivals and grants became more prominent sources of support for theatrical production. Yet this funding model did not necessarily create regular performance seasons or sustained relationships with audiences. Problems arise when securing a grant or participating in a festival becomes the end point of production, with no clear plan for subsequent performances, distribution or partial cost recovery. Festivals have an important role in discovering work and providing artistic platforms, but cannot on their own substitute for a durable performance network. Any assessment of this shift must distinguish their artistic contribution from their limited capacity to build a continuous theatre market when disconnected from regular seasons, marketing and touring.

The narrowing space for expression coincided with expanding administrative, legal and social constraints on production and performance decisions. In recent years, particularly since 2015 and the COVID-19 pandemic, the cost of addressing sensitive subjects has entered the calculations of some artists and producers, whether because of restrictions on gatherings and performances, concern over legal accountability, or the possibility of public and online backlash. Under these conditions, self-censorship may take hold before a script is written or funded, when a producer excludes a topic, character or interpretation expected to provoke objections or expose the work to financial loss.[1]

Understanding this development requires distinguishing outright official prohibition from administrative restrictions, legal uncertainty, social pressure and commercial concerns. These mechanisms differ in nature and impact and call for different responses. Jordan’s 2023 Cybercrime Law remains one legal variable requiring examination, specifically the effect of its relevant provisions on freedom of expression and artistic activity, rather than assuming that all forms of self-censorship have the same origin.

It is difficult to account for the transformations in Jordanian theatre and drama in recent years without considering the contraction of the space for freedom of expression in the public sphere, particularly on politically sensitive issues. The cost of public expression has risen as the legal instruments through which individuals may be held accountable for published content or publicly stated positions have expanded. The 2023 Cybercrime Law reinforced this trajectory through provisions that employ broad concepts open to multiple interpretations, alongside substantial financial and custodial penalties. These provisions have drawn criticism from human rights organizations because of both their potential and actual impact on freedom of expression and their contribution to the expansion of self-censorship. Recent years have also witnessed cases involving journalists, writers, and activists over articles, social media posts, or political positions, making the boundaries between legitimate criticism and legal accountability less clear for actors operating in the public sphere.

This environment directly affects cultural production. Artists and writers operate within the political and legal climate that surrounds them, internalizing its boundaries and recalculating them throughout the processes of writing and production. As the potential costs of addressing issues related to political authority, public policy, corruption, protest, and regional affairs increase, self-censorship becomes embedded in the production process itself. Restrictions can therefore begin well before a script reaches any formal censorship mechanism: in the choice of subject matter, the removal of particular scenes, the moderation of language, and the avoidance of characters, events, or symbols that may be interpreted politically. In this way, censorship shifts from an external institution that reviews a work after its production to an internal mechanism carried by the writer, producer, and funder from the earliest stages of creation.

This dynamic reveals a fundamental tension within Jordan’s cultural landscape. Official discourse promotes a project of political modernization and expanded partisan and public participation, while the existing legal and administrative framework simultaneously raises the cost of certain forms of criticism and political expression. This tension has a particularly significant effect on cultural production because theatre and drama depend on broad spaces in which to engage with society, political authority, and everyday contradictions. As that space narrows, production tends to move toward politically safer subjects, more indirect forms of political treatment, or a reduced engagement with political themes altogether.

The weakened presence of politics in parts of Jordanian theatre and drama can therefore be understood as the product of a broader structure of constraints. The issue extends beyond individual decisions to prohibit specific works; it concerns the formation of an environment in which cultural actors gradually learn where the sensitive boundaries lie and what costs may accompany efforts to approach them. Over time, such an environment can generate a culture of caution in which self-censorship becomes more effective than formal censorship itself, as creators begin removing potentially controversial material before their work ever reaches the public. The deeper problem is that the persistence of this pattern may do more than reduce the number of politically engaged works; it may alter the function of art itself, transforming it from a space for questioning society and political authority into a space that learns in advance the limits of what can be said.

The Economics of Production: When Risk Becomes a Luxury

Production costs have risen considerably compared with the industry’s period of flourishing, while financing and distribution arrangements influence which projects Jordanian producers can afford to undertake. Works dependent on a small domestic market or limited foreign sales opportunities face difficulties recovering their costs, particularly when they address political or social concerns closely tied to the Jordanian context. Commercial production consequently tends to favour subjects that can be marketed in several countries and carry a lower risk of opposition or disrupted distribution. This creates unequal prospects for production: works rooted most deeply in local experience are more likely to be excluded from funding decisions even when they have artistic or social merit.

The problem is compounded when stable funding channels are absent and production relies on sporadic commissions, short-term grants or uncertain sales. A producer bearing all financial and distribution risks has little incentive to invest in scripts requiring extended development or in projects with substantial research and production costs. The decline of politically engaged work therefore also reflects how risks are shared among the state, producers and distributors, and whether exhibition markets allow costs to be recovered and a recurring audience to develop.

The available budget figures point to problems in the allocation of priorities more than an absolute scarcity of resources. The Ministry of Culture’s 2026 budget amounts to approximately JOD 12.5 million, an increase of JOD 1.3 million, distributed among libraries, cultural centres and programmes, with little substantial provision for theatre and drama production. By contrast, in May 2025 the Cabinet approved film-industry incentives providing a cash rebate of up to 45 per cent on spending in the Kingdom, while the rebate for local productions exceeding US$500,000 was raised from 10 to 30 per cent. The measures were accompanied by expectations of more than US$32 million in annual foreign direct investment, following reported returns of over US$500 million from international film productions and tourism growth of around 20 per cent. In other words, the state has demonstrated an ability to incentivise Jordan as a filming location, yet has not developed comparable incentives for creating Jordanian narratives.[2]

A regulatory obstacle precedes the funding question. In the absence of a framework governing investment in the performing arts and dramatic production, investors remain cautious, while major cities lack cultural infrastructure. Zarqa, a city with more than 1.5 million inhabitants, has very few performance venues. Cultural infrastructure constitutes an urban and economic service rather than an ornament; artistic provision in the public budget should be treated as investment rather than a donation or a salary.

Jordan Television sits at the centre of the problem. It operates as a single state broadcaster in a region where neighbouring countries have specialist networks for news, sport and drama—networks that require programming decisions and plans for broadcasting and marketing as well as financial resources. An institution that once produced fourteen television series even under austere circumstances now commissions no regular slate and does little to market Jordanian drama. Eight Jordanian productions were presented during Ramadan 2026, most of them social comedies or Bedouin dramas. Their number does not compensate for the absence of a consistent commissioning policy serving a public purpose. The regional contrast is striking: generations across Kuwait and the Gulf once knew Jordan through television series broadcast alongside Egyptian productions, whereas countries that opened their cultural sectors only recently have expanded their reach by approaching the arts as investment rather than consumption.[3]

Comparing film-industry incentives with support for theatre and drama reveals different approaches to creative-industries policy. Incentives tied to local spending can attract film shoots and stimulate economic activity in Jordan, but they do not automatically establish a Jordanian drama industry or broaden the scope for political and social themes. Additional measures are needed to support script development, finance local productions, expand performance and distribution opportunities, and improve professional skills. The relevant policy distinction is between attracting productions to a geographical location and developing a domestic storytelling industry, which requires investment across an integrated process from script development to audience access.

The National Narrative: From Shaping the Story to Reacting to It

One gap in Jordanian dramatic production lies in its limited success in turning major episodes of national history and political change into fully developed artistic works capable of reaching domestic and Arab audiences. The Great Arab Revolt, the Battle of Karameh, and the experiences of the armed forces and wider society amid regional upheavals all carry historical, political and dramatic potential. Yet their presence in television and theatre remains limited relative to that potential. This shortfall warrants examining the cost of historical productions, barriers to archival access, the scarcity of institutional commissions and sensitivities surrounding representations of national history.

The issue extends beyond the number of historical works to the relationship between the state and the national narrative. Inadequate investment in research, archives and script development leaves national history vulnerable to fragmented circulation or reinterpretation outside its Jordanian context. At the same time, bringing history to the screen calls for production conditions that accommodate multiple treatments, draw on reliable historical sources and preserve the artist’s interpretive autonomy, rather than imposing a finished official account. This approach becomes more important when production also addresses contemporary social questions, including work, housing, education, identity and urban transformations in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, Karak and Ma’an.

Regional examples provide a point of comparison. Egypt, the first Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel, continued producing politically themed drama: The Road to Eilat was filmed in Jordan; Ashraf Marwan was portrayed as a hero despite controversy over his dual role; and prominent works explored terrorism and armed groups, from films starring Adel Imam to The Destiny, while presidents were depicted as national heroes. In Syria, Duraid Lahham offered criticism of Arab politics at an early festival, including criticism that extended to the Ba’ath Party, and continued to work without naming specific individuals. In Jordan, Bab al-Amoud, described in the discussion as the first Jordanian political television series about resistance, was produced, but the trajectory subsequently weakened to the point that Al-Qal’a was screened on a Gulf television channel rather than the national broadcaster.

An account raised during the discussion concerning the purchase of a drama about Lawrence raises questions about the relationship between the management of political risk in cultural production and the use of public or private resources to influence the circulation of works. If the details are substantiated, the incident would have implications beyond the fate of one production: it could indicate a practice whereby financial resources are used to suppress a contested narrative instead of supporting diverse national accounts. Before the episode can be treated as evidence of a consistent institutional pattern, however, the terms of the transaction, the identity of the purchaser and the stated purpose of the purchase must be documented.

The response should therefore preserve space for artists to interpret history rather than supply them with a ready-made state narrative. National narratives emerge from society and the coexistence of different accounts; artists are not employed to embellish the past. A practical distinction is needed between funding research and production on national history and prescribing a script’s conclusions. The state can open archives, finance research, facilitate access to locations and specialists, and issue competitive calls for proposals, while artistic interpretation remains independent and open to criticism. Nor should the national narrative remain confined to rural and heritage settings: younger generations live in cities and confront questions of employment, housing, education and identity. They need drama that depicts contemporary Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, Karak and Ma’an.[4]

The Sector Itself: Fragmentation and Internal Responsibility

Responsibility for the condition of Jordanian theatre and drama is shared by state institutions and the arts sector itself, whose professional landscape features numerous actors, divergent interests and weak coordination. Theatre practitioners, television drama professionals, employees of Jordan Television and private channels, independent theatres, and the Royal Film Commission work under different financing, production and distribution conditions. They do not necessarily have a common representative mechanism through which to formulate and negotiate collective demands. This fragmentation limits the sector’s capacity to translate professional problems into concrete legislative and financial proposals and weakens its contribution to debates about political and economic modernisation.

Professional organisations consequently have a responsibility to build broader representation, encompassing writers, directors, actors, technicians and independent practitioners, while distinguishing shared professional demands from the particular interests of each group. Internal responsibilities also include developing scripts, respecting intellectual-property rights, improving contractual and production standards, and building marketing and distribution capacity. Some dimensions of the decline arise from shortcomings in professional and institutional capacity; others stem from the financing, expressive freedoms and protections available to practitioners.

A more effective arts sector therefore requires two parallel tracks: professional organisation capable of representing workers and holding institutions to account, and public policy that provides resources, freedom and infrastructure. Working with cultural and independent institutions, the Artists’ Syndicate could play a central role, provided its remit expands beyond day-to-day professional administration to advocacy, policy development and lasting production and performance partnerships.

The Audience Has Not Walked Away

Examples raised in the discussion—including the survival of certain popular productions and the return of older plays to the stage—suggest that sections of the public still respond to theatre when works resonate with their concerns and are accessible to them. These indications invite a reassessment of explanations that attribute theatre’s decline solely to public disengagement. On their own, however, they cannot establish that demand remains at its former level or is comparable across social groups and geographical areas.

The core question concerns the ability of the performance ecosystem to convert occasional interest into an enduring relationship between productions and audiences. The number of performances, the regularity of theatre seasons, ticket prices, venue locations, marketing and access beyond the capital all influence attendance and its continuity. The success of a particular play or popular production does not demonstrate that a stable market exists for the entire sector; it does, however, offer a basis for testing the potential for such a market through attendance data, revenues, repeat performances and the geographical distribution of audiences.

Audiences should accordingly be understood as a consideration in designing cultural policy, rather than merely as recipients of its results. Rebuilding audiences requires evidence about attendance patterns, communities currently excluded from performances and factors that influence viewing decisions. Public support can then be linked to regular programmes, appropriate marketing and wider geographical distribution. In this approach, audience reach becomes a measure of cultural-policy performance alongside the quantity and artistic quality of productions.

Political theatre does more than offer criticism and satire: it addresses social issues, behaviour and customs. The experience of the National Theatre Council, in existence since 1987, has shown how repeating performances dozens or hundreds of times on subjects such as honour, extremism and violence can turn these questions into an accumulating public debate that a single event cannot achieve. This recalls Augusto Boal’s ‘Theatre of the Oppressed’, which brings performance closer to communities normally excluded from it, transforming audiences from passive spectators into participants who think and argue. Recovering audiences is itself a political indicator: reconnecting with the public can restore politics to the stage.

Schools offer an avenue with potentially longer-lasting effects. Religiously motivated restrictions on the arts and music in education contributed to a prolonged period of marginalisation. Around a decade ago, the introduction of two weekly activity periods that included theatre, drama and the arts marked a change, but the initiative still lacks continuity and qualified trainers. Arts education can contribute to civic learning and to challenging extremism and violence. Municipalities, cultural centres and civil-society organisations can serve a similar function as platforms for access outside Amman.

Debating the Role and Limits of the State

The debate over the state’s role in theatre and drama centres on two related questions: who bears the cost of producing art as a public good, and who has the authority to determine its content? Advocates of increased public funding argue that the market alone may be unable to finance expensive works or productions with limited commercial returns, especially those addressing local or historical subjects. Others caution that dependence on official institutions could restrict artistic independence and make funding a means of direction or exclusion. The debate also concerns the sector’s own responsibility for shortcomings in quality, as well as the merits of creating new institutions compared with reforming those already in place.

These disagreements help define the policy problem more precisely. Public funding need not entail direct government production, while artistic independence need not leave producers wholly exposed to market risks. A framework could separate the funding body from those who select individual works, use published criteria and independent committees, establish channels for appeal and accountability, and protect artists’ rights and creative autonomy. Under such a model, the state would provide resources, infrastructure and legal guarantees, while producers and artists would develop and deliver works through transparent and competitive processes.

The success of such an arrangement would depend on the capacity of existing institutions to implement it and on professional representation capable of participating in its design and monitoring its results. Policy decisions should therefore assign responsibility for funding, production, oversight and distribution clearly among the relevant bodies, rather than be framed simply as a choice between state intervention and withdrawal.

Cultural policy has four broad options for addressing the decline of Jordanian theatre and drama. They differ in how responsibilities and risks are allocated among the state, the market and the arts sector.

The first option would retain the current model of intermittent grants and seasonal festivals. This could maintain some activity with relatively limited budgetary commitments, but would leave continuity of production, regular performances and audience development inadequately addressed.

The second option would expand direct public-sector production through additional government commissions and in-house production by public institutions. It could direct resources towards work with public value, but would require institutional safeguards for creative independence, limits on direct control over content, and measures to prevent employment and financing opportunities from becoming concentrated among a small circle of beneficiaries.

The third option would place greater reliance on markets and commercial finance. This could strengthen responsiveness to consumer demand and commercial viability, but would risk marginalising local, historical or political productions without assured financial returns. Producers would also become more exposed to market fluctuations and the costs of production and distribution.

The fourth option would see the state enable an independent arts sector through competitive multi-year funding, targeted public commissions, durable performance and distribution infrastructure, and legal and professional safeguards for artistic autonomy. This would require careful institutional design to ensure transparent funding, a diverse group of beneficiaries, independent selection committees, and support linked to measurable outcomes, while keeping artistic decisions in the hands of creators.

The policy challenge is to identify an institutional mix able to close gaps in funding, access and protection without creating dependence on official institutions or leaving local productions at the mercy of commercial returns alone. The options should be assessed in terms of cost, sustainability, effects on expressive freedom and feasibility within existing institutions.

Table 1. Comparison of Policy Options[5]

Assessment and Course of Action

The evidence considered in this paper suggests that the diminished political role of Jordanian theatre and drama results from interacting deficiencies in the conditions of production, funding, performance and protection. Limited regular commissioning, constrained distribution channels, unequal capacity to bear commercial risks, restrictions affecting freedom of expression, and fragmented professional representation all weaken the sector’s ability to turn public issues into a sustained body of artistic work. More systematic data are needed to establish the relative contribution of each factor. Their interaction nevertheless indicates that addressing a single issue—such as increasing funding or expanding public-sector production—would be insufficient to restore continuity.

The policy priority is to rebuild an integrated production cycle, beginning with research and script development, proceeding through financing, contracts and production, and ending with performance, distribution and audience access. This requires a clear division of responsibilities among the state, cultural institutions and the arts sector; independent and transparent funding mechanisms; protections for artistic expression and production; and indicators that measure the actual outcomes of support. Such an approach would shift cultural policy away from treating activity as a succession of isolated events towards recognising a sector that needs sustained investment, clear governance and the capacity to reach audiences throughout Jordan’s governorates.

Addressing these deficiencies requires a phased programme that rebuilds the conditions for production and performance, identifies the responsibilities of relevant bodies and links public support to measurable results. The proposed intervention comprises eight interconnected areas:

First, establish sustainable funding for the performing arts and drama. A distinct budget line for the performing arts and dramatic production should be included in the public budget, linked to defined production and performance programmes and publicly available performance indicators. Funding should be structured to support continuity and a diverse range of recipients, while reflecting the different costs and functions of theatre and television drama.

Second, establish an independent competitive funding mechanism. Consideration should be given to creating a fund or independent mechanism for multi-year cultural financing, allocating support through published criteria, independent and multidisciplinary selection panels, and clear procedures for conflicts of interest and appeals. Funding decisions should be separated from artistic decisions, while intellectual-property rights and transparent contracting are protected.

Third, activate Jordan Television’s role in production and distribution. An annual commissioning window for Jordanian works should be introduced, supported by a plan for production, broadcasting, marketing and archiving, and offering competitive opportunities to writers, producers and directors. Each commission should include an audience-reach strategy, including development of digital archives and the availability of works under clear rights arrangements.

Fourth, review the legal and regulatory environment for artistic activity. Laws and procedures governing performances, assemblies, publication and filming should be reviewed to identify constraints on artistic production and ensure that any restriction has a clear legal basis, a reasoned decision and an avenue for appeal. This should be accompanied by protections against threats and intimidation, safeguards for legitimate criticism and a professional code developed with relevant sectoral stakeholders.

Fifth, shift the emphasis from individual events to regular performance seasons. A portion of public support should be redirected towards scheduled seasons and theatrical tours in the governorates, with incentives tied to the number of performances, geographical reach, actual attendance and the continuing life of a production. This support should complement festivals’ role in identifying and showcasing work while allowing productions more opportunities to reach their audiences.

Sixth, develop scripts and professional capacities. Script-development laboratories, writers’ rooms and apprenticeship programmes should link universities, theatres and production companies, supporting research, development and training in writing, directing, production, marketing, distribution and digital rights. These programmes should be designed to provide access for writers and artists from all governorates.

Seventh, strengthen professional representation. The development of a broader professional framework should be supported, bringing together theatre and drama practitioners, writers, actors, technicians and independent artists to formulate common demands concerning legislation, budget allocations and professional rights. Such representation should be connected to regular consultations with government institutions and parliament, and equipped to monitor implementation and assess policy effects.

Eighth, establish a system of annual data collection and accountability. An annual report should document the volume of production and commissions, the number of performances and tours, attendance and revenues, employment, geographical distribution, exports and funding sources. It would allow comparison over time, assessment of budgets, grants, festivals and performance seasons, identification of the concentration of support, and policy adjustment based on observed results.

Table 2. Implementation Matrix for the Recommendations

The value of these proposals depends on data that permit their impact to be assessed, rather than on spending levels or event counts alone. An annual report should therefore include indicators covering commissioned and completed works, funding sources, performances and tours, attendance and revenues, employment, geographical distribution, and rights relating to repeat performances and distribution. It should also show how support is allocated among institutions, regions and artistic forms, the extent to which works reach audiences, and differences between the outcomes of festivals and those of sustained performance seasons.

The report should ideally include year-on-year comparisons to track the sector’s development, explain the methods and limitations of data collection, and publish findings that artists, oversight bodies and audiences can examine. This evidence base would allow funding and commissioning instruments to be adjusted, programmes with stronger reach and continuity to be identified, and imbalances in resource allocation to be exposed. Without it, the ability to assess the effects of cultural policy will remain limited, and it will be difficult to distinguish activity that generates temporary visibility from investment that establishes lasting production capacity.

Maintaining the status quo would leave successful artistic initiatives operating within a system with limited capacity for continuity and expansion, widening the gap between political and economic modernisation ambitions and cultural institutions’ ability to produce work about social change. Conversely, expanding public-sector production without safeguards for artistic autonomy could make the arts subordinate to the priorities of funding bodies, while complete reliance on the market would expose locally focused works with limited commercial returns to the risks of finance and distribution.

The priority is therefore to reconstruct the conditions of artistic activity: sustainable and transparent funding; legally protected space for expression; performance seasons that reach audiences; and professional representation capable of helping shape cultural policy and holding institutions accountable for its implementation. This entails moving from support for sporadic activities to an integrated production cycle, involving audiences in the measurement of reach and impact, and supporting research, production and multiple interpretations of the national narrative rather than treating it as a fixed body of content.

These priorities become more significant during crises and wars, when societies face economic and psychological pressures and the need grows for cultural spaces that enable expression, debate and the recovery of shared experience. Theatre and drama form part of the infrastructure through which societies develop relationships with themselves and their institutions. They also offer opportunities to expand the creative industries and strengthen Jordan’s cultural presence across the Arab region. Investment in the arts should therefore be considered a public-policy choice connected to the quality of the public sphere, society’s ability to deliberate, and the development of a living, evolving cultural memory.

[1] Assessments by international human rights organisations of the impact of Jordan’s 2023 Cybercrime Law on freedom of expression, 2024.

[2] Parliamentary Finance Committee, discussion of the 2026 budget of the Ministry of Culture and the National Library, Khaberni, November 2025. Cabinet decision approving incentives for the film industry, 11 May 2025, on a proposal by the Royal Film Commission–Jordan. Statements by the Royal Film Commission–Jordan on the economic returns of international film productions in Jordan, September 2025.

[3] “What Is Jordanian Drama Offering in Ramadan 2026?” Al Jazeera Net, February 2026, https://aja.ws/l4dzuh.

[4] Economic Modernisation Vision, creative industries driver, Jordan News Agency (Petra).

[5] This table sets out institutional trade-offs; it does not presume that every effect of each option has been empirically established in the Jordanian case.