Europe and Israel: Shift or Repositioning?
Against the backdrop of changes in European Israeli relations and the escalation of Israeli policies in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip particularly the use of settlement expansion as a means of undermining the two state solution, eliminating the practical possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and advancing displacement eleven European countries, led by the United Kingdom and France, together with Canada, have moved toward measures targeting trade linked to Israeli settlements, whether by imposing national restrictions or supporting similar measures at the European level[1].
These steps are particularly significant because they have emerged within the context of close economic and political relations between Europe and Israel. The European Union remains Israel’s largest trading partner, accounting for approximately 31.7% of Israel’s total trade in goods in 2025, while bilateral trade amounted to nearly €43.3 billion[2]. For years, the European approach has rested on a dual formula: rejecting settlement activity and affirming the two-state solution on the one hand, while maintaining extensive commercial and political relations with Israel on the other.
Against this background, this paper seeks to answer a central question: To what extent does the British decision reflect a substantive shift in the trajectory of European–Israeli relations, and to what extent does it remain a largely symbolic measure with limited impact, particularly amid the rise of right-wing forces in Britain and Europe? What opportunities does this change offer Jordan, and how might it build upon them?
The Drivers of the British Decision and Its Political Context
The British decision can be understood as the outcome of a political and legal process that had been accumulating before its adoption, rather than merely as a response to an isolated development on the ground. Britain increasingly found itself confronting a widening gap between its stated commitment to international law and the two-state solution, and its continued relations with Israel without employing practical measures commensurate with that position. The decision therefore represents an attempt to narrow this gap and restore a degree of coherence and credibility to British policy. Nevertheless, it remains confined to distinguishing between Israel and the settlements rather than constituting a comprehensive review of relations with Israel.
From this perspective, the decision reflects an attempt by Britain to address this inconsistency while responding to growing domestic pressure, more than it signals a comprehensive reassessment of its relationship with Israel. It also builds on a political process that began approximately a year earlier and coincided with other positions concerning recognition of the State of Palestine and the distinction between Israel and the occupied territories. Its practical value, however, will depend on how quickly it enters into force and on the instruments the British government employs. Protracted legislative and executive procedures could hollow out the decision or confine it to the realm of political messaging.
Politically, the decision forms part of a gradual recalibration of Britain’s position toward Israel. This process began with the recognition of the State of Palestine in September 2025[3], before moving toward measures more directly connected to realities on the ground through a ban on trade with settlements. The decision was preceded by mounting pressure within the Labour Party and Parliament, with approximately 140 Labour MPs calling for a ban on trade with settlements[4]. This pressure coincided with the continuing electoral repercussions of the war on Gaza for the party, after its previous position cost it several seats to candidates supportive of the Palestinian cause. The decision thus emerged at the intersection of internal party pressure, shifts in public opinion, and the government’s attempt to maintain the consistency of its position following its recognition of the State of Palestine.
At the European level, the decision reflects the choice by Britain, France, Canada, and other countries to act through a limited coalition, given the difficulty of achieving a unified European Union position on imposing measures against Israel. This gives the decision political significance beyond its British context, while simultaneously exposing the limits of the broader European shift: it remains based on action by a group of states rather than a collective reassessment of relations with Israel.
Assessments of the decision therefore diverge. Some view it as a symbolic measure intended to contain pressure, restore credibility, and advance domestic European interests. Others regard it as the first step in a cumulative process capable of gradually imposing restrictions on relations with Israel.
The British Decision from Two Perspectives: A Symbolic Step or the Beginning of a Shift?
The Decision as a Symbolic Measure with Limited Impact
The first perspective holds that the significance of the British decision is not commensurate with the political and media attention surrounding its announcement. It primarily targets commercial activities linked to settlements, which represent only a limited share of the overall economic relationship between Britain and Israel. It is therefore unlikely to generate sufficient economic pressure to compel the Israeli government to reconsider its policies in the West Bank or halt settlement expansion and settler violence.
This interpretation is reinforced by the British government’s insistence on separating measures targeting settlements from its continuing relationship with Israel. The decision affirms the continuation of cooperation with Israel within the 1967 borders. Although this distinction provides the decision with a legal basis grounded in the illegality of settlements, it simultaneously limits its capacity to influence the Israeli government, which protects the settlement enterprise and provides the political and security cover necessary for its expansion.
The time required for the measures to enter into force also creates a gap between announcement and implementation, potentially giving targeted entities an opportunity to reorganize their activities or circumvent the new restrictions. Further challenges concern the British government’s ability to verify the origin of products and trace companies and services linked to settlements, given the degree of integration between the settlement economy and the Israeli economy.
From this perspective, the decision can be viewed as a calculated response to domestic pressure rather than a transformation in Britain’s relationship with Israel. It enables the British government to regain some credibility with public opinion and political currents critical of its policies—particularly as elections approach—without bearing the cost of reassessing its broader political, economic, and security relations. Accordingly, the decision’s significance will remain confined to political messaging unless it is followed by an expansion of sanctions, stronger enforcement mechanisms, and clear conditions linking relations with Israel to concrete measures to halt settlement activity and displacement.
The decision must also be understood in the context of the reshaping of party competition in Britain, amid the declining dominance of the two traditional parties and the rise of both Reform UK and the Green Party, alongside the continuing presence of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Although the Green Party is not currently competing to form a government, its importance to Labour lies in its capacity to attract part of Labour’s progressive base, particularly younger voters and those critical of the government’s position on the war in Gaza. A poll of former Labour voters who had shifted toward other parties found that 67% of those intending to vote Green regarded Labour’s position on Gaza as a factor in changing their political preference, while 82% believed that taking a tougher stance toward Israel would improve their view of the party[5]. The decision can therefore be read, in part, as an attempt by the Labour leadership to regain some of its electoral base and narrow the competitive space that its previous position had opened for the Green Party, alongside the decision’s other legal and political drivers.
This does not mean that the decision was adopted solely for electoral purposes. It does, however, indicate that changing policy toward Israel has become capable of serving a domestic political interest, after continued unconditional support for Israel emerged as a potential source of electoral loss for the Labour Party.
The Decision as a Political Precedent upon Which to Build
In contrast to the interpretation that minimizes the decision’s importance because of its limited immediate economic impact, another perspective argues that the decision should be assessed in terms of the change it introduces to the instruments used against the settlement enterprise. Britain has moved from merely condemning settlements and warning against economic dealings with them to announcing a direct ban on settlement products and targeting companies and individuals that provide construction, financial, and real-estate services connected to their expansion. This marks a transition from a declared political position to measures of a legal and executive nature, even if their implementation requires time.
The decision is also significant because it consolidates the distinction between Israel within the 1967 borders and settlements established in the occupied Palestinian territory. This distinction moves the British position beyond non-recognition of the settlements’ legality toward preventing them from benefiting from economic relations with Britain. It also creates scope for expanding accountability to include companies and institutions that contribute to financing settlement activity or providing the services required for its continuation, rather than limiting sanctions to settlers directly involved in acts of violence.
The significance of the decision also extends beyond the British context. It formed part of an initiative involving France and Canada and received support from other European states that announced their readiness to take similar measures. Repetition of this step could transform isolated national decisions into a broader trend that imposes cumulative restrictions on the settlement economy, particularly given the difficulty of reaching a unified position within the European Union. The decision’s strength therefore lies in its potential to spread and become a model adopted by other states.
The sharp Israeli reaction reinforces this interpretation. Israel responded by closing the British Consulate in Jerusalem and taking other diplomatic measures against London[6]. This suggests that Israel’s concern is not limited to direct economic losses, but also encompasses the possibility that the decision could establish a political and legal precedent that broadens the scope of sanctions, increases the isolation of the settlement enterprise, and shifts the response to it from condemnation to the imposition of consequences.
Accordingly, this perspective does not regard the decision as a completed transformation in British–Israeli relations, but as an initial step in a process that began with recognition of the State of Palestine, continued through sanctions on certain settlers and Israeli ministers, and has now reached trade and services linked to settlements. The importance of this trajectory will depend on its ability to continue, expand, and become an institutionalized policy that is difficult to reverse when governments change.
Implications of the Decision and Opportunities for Jordan to Build upon It
The British decision holds particular importance for Jordan, not only because of its direct economic impact on settlements, but also because it creates an opportunity to recast settlement expansion and displacement as threats to regional security rather than merely as violations occurring within the occupied Palestinian territory. Settlement expansion, the E1 project, and settler violence do not only undermine the two-state solution; they also create a coercive environment that drives Palestinians from their land. This exposes Jordan to a persistent threat: the possibility that displacement could evolve from a gradual process within the West Bank into direct demographic and political pressure on Jordan’s borders and national interests.
From this standpoint, Jordan can treat the decision as a political opening that can be further developed. In its current form, the decision does not provide a sufficient guarantee against settlement expansion or displacement. It does, however, break the inertia that has surrounded European positions and partially shifts the response to settlements from condemnation to the imposition of restrictions. Jordan’s interest lies in widening this transition and turning it into a more consistent European course, rather than allowing it to remain a limited initiative vulnerable to reversal or obstruction.
Jordan can therefore frame the decision as a response to a broader, interconnected process that begins with land confiscation and settlement expansion, proceeds through the fragmentation of geographic contiguity and the weakening of Palestinian institutions, and culminates in the creation of conditions that compel residents to leave. Establishing this connection can help place the issue within the sphere of European interests by clarifying its potential consequences for the stability of Jordan and the wider region, as well as for the security and political interests of European states themselves.
At the diplomatic level, Jordan can build on the group of states that have adopted more advanced positions, led by Britain and France, rather than waiting for a consensus to emerge within the European Union. Working with a limited coalition of states whose positions are broadly aligned can facilitate the development of measures capable of expanding at a later stage and can gradually increase pressure on hesitant states. Jordan can also use its bilateral relations with these countries to press for settlement expansion and displacement to become standing items in political dialogues, rather than issues addressed only through statements issued after attacks or announcements of new settlement projects.
Alongside efforts to exert pressure on Israeli policies, Jordan can advocate a European approach that supports the ability of Palestinians to remain on their land, particularly in areas most exposed to settlement expansion and displacement. This should include financing infrastructure, housing, and essential services; providing legal support to communities threatened with eviction and demolition; and strengthening the capacity of Palestinian institutions to continue delivering services. Countering displacement requires addressing the incremental measures that make it increasingly difficult for Palestinians to remain on their land.
The prospect of right-wing forces gaining ground and governments changing across Europe also requires Jordan to broaden its engagement beyond incumbent governments. Sustaining current positions requires building relations with parliaments and political parties, as well as with research centers, trade unions, human rights organizations, and media outlets. The importance of this approach lies in transforming opposition to settlement expansion and displacement into an institutional and societal position that does not change entirely with a change in government or shifts in electoral calculations.
Jordan’s opportunity therefore lies in using this decision as an entry point for shaping a cumulative European approach that restricts the space available for settlement expansion and displacement. Success will depend on Jordan’s ability to move from issuing warnings to pursuing proactive diplomacy that identifies the measures required, builds coalitions to implement them, and links the continuation of Israeli policies to clear political, economic, and legal consequences. Although such an approach will not eliminate the threat of displacement entirely, it may help reduce its likelihood, strengthen Palestinian resilience, and prevent displacement from being treated as an option that can be imposed without regional and international consequences.
[1] Euronews، 11 European Nations and Canada Announce Trade Sanctions on Israeli Settlements in the West Bank، 8 September 2026، 11 European nations and Canada announce trade sanctions on Israeli settlements in the West Bank | Euronews
[2] European Commission, EU Trade Relations with Israel, accessed September 15, 2026, EU trade relations with Israel
[3] GOV.UK, PM Statement on the Recognition of Palestine, September 21, 2025,
PM statement on the recognition of Palestine: 21 September 2025 – GOV.UK
[4] LabourList, Over 140 Labour MPs Call for Trade Ban on Illegal Israeli Settlements, June 8, 2026, Over 140 Labour MPs call for trade ban on illegal Israeli settlements – LabourList
[5] Novara Media, Gaza Genocide a Factor for Majority of Progressive Voters Abandoning Labour, New Polling Shows, June 8, 2026, Gaza Genocide a Factor for Majority of Progressive Voters Abandoning Labour, New Polling Shows | Novara Media
[6] Reuters, Israel to Close British Consulate in East Jerusalem after UK, France and Canada Ban Imports from Settlements, September 8, 2026.