Southern Lebanon Enters a New Phase: Escalation Precedes Negotiations and the Post-UNIFIL Order Takes Shape

Southern Lebanon is entering a more complex phase in which developments on the ground are increasingly outpacing the political track. Three interconnected issues are now shaping the next stage: Israel’s attempt to establish new military facts ahead of the eighth round of negotiations, growing U.S. pressure over Hezbollah’s weapons, and the search for a new security arrangement in southern Lebanon as UNIFIL’s current mission approaches its end.

These developments do not signal the collapse of the negotiating track. On the contrary, both Washington and Beirut remain committed to keeping it alive. However, negotiations are gradually evolving from a process ostensibly aimed at de-escalation and Israeli withdrawal into a broader framework for reorganizing the security environment in the south and redefining the relationship between Lebanon and Israel. At this stage, Israel is seeking to enter the next round with additional leverage on the ground, while Lebanon is attempting to prevent temporary military realities from becoming permanent arrangements.

The Ali al-Taher area has emerged as the most significant testing ground in the current escalation. Notably, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa indicated that attention should be paid to what would happen in the area within two days. Hours later, the Israeli military announced that Hezbollah had launched two drones there.

For Hezbollah, the move is linked to preventing Israeli forces from advancing toward the area or establishing new control over it. Israel, meanwhile, treated the incident as justification for expanding its operations, adopting a pattern of intensified airstrikes and large-scale destruction ahead of any ground advance in an effort to reduce Hezbollah’s ability to target advancing troops and minimize Israeli casualties.

The issue extends beyond control over a limited geographical point. If Israel succeeds in consolidating its presence in Ali al-Taher, it will acquire additional leverage at the negotiating table while establishing a precedent whereby the boundaries of its military deployment can be altered by force whenever it determines that the Lebanese side has failed to meet its commitments on the weapons issue.

In parallel, Israeli officials have begun circulating assessments suggesting that the “pilot zones” have failed to produce the desired results, while accusing the Lebanese Armed Forces of failing to move with sufficient speed and seriousness in removing Hezbollah’s weapons. This narrative provides Israel with political grounds for refusing to withdraw from additional areas and for conditioning any subsequent Israeli step on tangible progress toward establishing the state’s monopoly over arms.

The U.S. position has also become clearer regarding the sequencing of the required steps. Washington now places Hezbollah’s weapons at the top of its priorities and considers progress on this issue a prerequisite for exerting serious pressure on Israel to halt its operations or make concessions on the ground.

This sequencing differs from the Lebanese approach, which insists that the two tracks remain interconnected: Israeli withdrawal and the cessation of military operations on the one hand, and the completion of the process of bringing all weapons under state authority on the other. Hezbollah, for its part, refuses to discuss surrendering its weapons north of the Litani River before an Israeli withdrawal and an end to Israeli military operations.

This gap lies at the heart of the current impasse. Israel wants Lebanon’s commitments implemented first; Hezbollah wants Israel’s commitments implemented first; and the Lebanese state has yet to develop a mechanism capable of breaking this deadlock.

At the same time, Washington is working to separate the Lebanese file from its track with Iran. Hezbollah continues to closely monitor U.S.-Iranian contacts and is betting on the possibility that they could produce a political umbrella that would ease the pressure it faces in Lebanon. The United States and Israel, however, reject incorporating Lebanon into any broader bargain with Tehran and want Lebanese-Israeli negotiations to remain an independent track.

Consequently, even a U.S.-Iranian understanding would not necessarily reduce pressure on Hezbollah. The current U.S. approach is aimed at preventing Tehran from using any regional agreement to preserve Hezbollah’s previous position in Lebanon, while keeping political, diplomatic, and sanctions-related pressure in place.

The most consequential change, however, concerns the nature of the negotiations themselves. Israel no longer treats them as technical talks limited to withdrawal, the cessation of military operations, and border arrangements. Instead, it is pushing to broaden the agenda to include additional levels of security coordination, followed by economic issues and a wider framework governing relations between the two states.

The U.S. ambassador’s remarks that negotiations should continue until Lebanon and Israel reach an agreement “regardless of whether Hezbollah exists or not” reflect this direction. The U.S. objective is no longer confined to managing the crisis in southern Lebanon; it increasingly involves establishing a sustainable framework designed to prevent a return to the pre-war status quo.

Within this context, discussions are emerging over granting the “Framework Agreement” broader international standing through the UN Security Council. Should this track advance, the debate will center on how any new framework would relate to Resolution 1701 and other existing international references, as well as on the nature of the security obligations imposed on both sides.

This is particularly sensitive for Lebanon. A transition from the implementation of Resolution 1701 toward a new framework could redefine reciprocal obligations, the boundaries of military deployments, verification mechanisms, and the relationship between Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of the state’s monopoly over arms.

Alongside the negotiations, Lebanon is approaching another major security challenge concerning the future of UNIFIL. Its current mandate expires on December 31, 2026, yet no final formula has emerged for the force or mechanism that could replace it.

The challenge is not merely finding countries willing to participate in discussions, but defining the new force’s mission and guaranteeing the security of its personnel. Any new international force would require agreement within the UN Security Council, while a potential European force would require guarantees against attacks on its personnel and a clear understanding of its rules of operation.

Israel wants any new mechanism to be more effective in verifying the state’s monopoly over arms and preventing Hezbollah from rebuilding its military capabilities. Hezbollah, by contrast, is unlikely to accept a force with direct enforcement powers against it. Between these two positions, Lebanon fears the emergence of a security vacuum between the end of UNIFIL’s mission and the deployment of any successor arrangement.

Lebanese Armed Forces Commander General Rodolphe Haykal’s visit to Rome took place within this context. Part of his discussions focused on the verification mechanism and the role of countries that could potentially participate in it. The process, however, remains at the exploratory stage, and no force is currently ready for immediate deployment once UNIFIL’s mission ends.

Despite the escalation, the eighth round of negotiations remains on track and is expected to take place in Rome in September. The United States remains committed to maintaining the meetings even in the absence of a major breakthrough and wants to preserve a minimum degree of regularity to prevent the political channel from collapsing.

U.S. General Joseph Clearfield is shuttling between Beirut and Tel Aviv with this objective in mind. He is focusing in particular on border demarcation as an issue where progress may be more achievable than on more complicated questions such as Israeli withdrawal, the pilot zones, and Hezbollah’s weapons.

A verification mechanism is also expected to be placed on the agenda of the next round after the United States stepped back from assuming this role directly. Disagreements over the powers of the entity that would carry out verification, however, as well as the Israeli conditions attached to its work, will make a rapid agreement difficult.

The most likely trajectory over the coming weeks is therefore the continuation of negotiations alongside controlled but potentially expandable military escalation. Israel will seek to improve its positions before reaching any understanding and is unlikely to undertake further withdrawals without receiving something in return on the weapons issue. Hezbollah will seek to prevent changes to the lines of control without being drawn into a full-scale confrontation, while continuing to link any discussion of its weapons north of the Litani to an Israeli withdrawal and the cessation of military operations.

The Lebanese state, meanwhile, has little practical option to withdraw from negotiations. Beirut has committed before the international community to establishing the state’s monopoly over arms and deploying the Lebanese Armed Forces, while regarding negotiations as the available means to recover occupied territory, halt military operations, facilitate the return of displaced residents, and launch reconstruction. Leaving the negotiating process would weaken Lebanon’s ability to demand international pressure on Israel and could leave the management of the conflict entirely to the military balance of power.

The coming phase, therefore, is unlikely to produce a final settlement. Rather, it will be a period in which the rules governing the negotiations themselves are reshaped. The central contest is no longer simply over how much territory Israel withdraws from or where the Lebanese Armed Forces deploy. It increasingly concerns the security order that will govern southern Lebanon after UNIFIL, the relationship between the state’s monopoly over arms and Israeli withdrawal, and whether negotiations ultimately produce a limited security arrangement or a broader framework that reorganizes relations between Lebanon and Israel.

In the near term, developments on the ground will continue to set the pace. Yet the function of military escalation will increasingly be to improve negotiating positions rather than eliminate negotiations altogether. What Israel succeeds in establishing on the ground, what the Lebanese state can achieve in consolidating its monopoly over arms, and the formula that ultimately emerges to succeed UNIFIL will collectively determine the shape of the next negotiating round and the boundaries of any possible settlement in southern Lebanon.