The Gulf States and the Redefinition of Security and Sovereignty
The U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, which erupted on February 28, has moved far beyond the boundaries of regional military escalation. It has become a defining moment that has returned the Gulf Arab states to the very center of the regional war equation, transforming them from neighboring observers of the crisis into arenas of direct exposure and vulnerability. The war revealed that the Gulf security architecture—including foreign military bases, critical infrastructure, and energy and maritime corridors—can no longer be understood merely as instruments of protection and stability. Rather, they have become integral components of the conflict arena itself. Consequently, the central Gulf question is no longer confined to how external threats can be deterred, but extends to how protection arrangements and networks of interdependence can be prevented from evolving into sources of sovereign and security vulnerability.
This paper advances a dual argument. First, it contends that the recent war did not merely shake the assumptions underpinning traditional Gulf security; rather, it imposed a fundamental redefinition of the concepts of security and sovereignty in the region, and perhaps even of the Gulf states’ relationship with the United States, their principal ally whose security guarantees they rely upon and whose military bases they host. Second, the paper argues that this transformation cannot be adequately understood through the classical vocabulary of Westphalian sovereignty. Instead, it requires the development of a new conceptual framework that may be described as “responsible interconnected sovereignty.” The paper combines the theoretical construction of this concept with its analytical application to the Gulf region in the aftermath of February 2026, while capturing the military, economic, political, and legal dimensions of this transformation.
Introduction
Classical sovereignty, since the Peace of Westphalia, has rested on three principal assumptions: the state’s monopoly over the use of force, its control over territorial borders, and the exclusion of external interference from its internal affairs. This conception remained dominant in shaping understandings of security and international relations for decades.1 However, the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran exposed the limitations of this framework in the Gulf context. Gulf states did not lose their formal legal sovereignty; rather, they experienced a form of strategic exposure as military bases, energy corridors, civilian infrastructure, and networks of economic interdependence became spaces where protection and vulnerability intersected simultaneously. Accordingly, sovereignty can no longer be understood solely in terms of border protection, but increasingly through the state’s capacity to manage the military, economic, and security entanglements surrounding it.2
The Transformation of Security and Sovereignty Assumptions in the Gulf
The strategic impact of the war proved profoundly disruptive, shaking the very assumptions of security and sovereignty that had shaped Gulf strategic thinking for decades. It had long been taken for granted that the security partnership with the United States, reinforced by the extensive presence of American military bases, would be sufficient to deter Iran and prevent the expansion of war into the Gulf region. Yet the opposite occurred entirely: the war and its repercussions were drawn directly into the Gulf states themselves, while attempts were made to pull them into the conflict as active participants.
At the same time, a growing awareness emerged that Gulf sovereignty could no longer be regarded as absolutely protected under the assumption that hosting allied military bases as instruments of security would not simultaneously transform those states into focal points for imported threats and strategic vulnerability.3 The war revealed that hosting foreign military bases, as instruments of protection and deterrence, may simultaneously render Gulf states themselves part of the arena of targeting. As a result, it is no longer possible to separate Gulf national security from the conflicts unfolding within its immediate neighborhood or across its vital strategic domains, western analyses have already concluded that this round of conflict taught Gulf states an important lesson regarding the necessity of hard power and exposed the limits of relying solely on American security guarantees. It also highlighted the fragility of neutrality once Gulf military bases and critical infrastructure become incorporated into Iran’s target bank. 4
Redefining the Concepts of Security and Sovereignty
In this context, the concept of security in the Gulf may no longer be confined to military protection against an external threat. Instead, it is likely to be reconceptualized as the state’s capacity to prevent its territory, waters, and vital infrastructure from being transformed into platforms of targeting or arenas for the exchange of strategic messages among competing regional powers. After this war, security has become less about deterring attacks than about containing their repercussions, ensuring the continuity of the state and its economic and service functions under any circumstances or pressure, and preserving the independence of national decision-making when security commitments intersect with sovereign risks.5
For sovereignty, it has undergone an even deeper and more sensitive redefinition. The recent war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other revealed that Gulf sovereignty is increasingly measured by the state’s ability to prevent external actors from transforming its territory into an operational extension of their own conflicts, whether those actors are allies or adversaries. When a state hosts a foreign military base yet does not exercise full control over its operational use or over the consequences arising from that use, sovereignty is not legally abolished, nor is it necessarily diminished so long as such a presence functions as a strategic complement.6 Accordingly, the Iranian attacks on American bases and civilian facilities in the Gulf acquired a significance that extended far beyond their immediate military dimension. From the perspective of Gulf capitals, they appeared as a dual violation: first, an assault on national territory itself, and second, an exposure of the limitations inherent in external protection arrangements. By targeting Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, Iran effectively undermined the assumption that the Gulf states could remain outside the war while simultaneously hosting American security infrastructure. In its fiftieth extraordinary meeting held on March 1, the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council described the Iranian attacks as a blatant violation of sovereignty and a breach of international law and the principles of good neighborliness.7 The joint statement issued by the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Union on March 5, 2026, further emphasized that the security and stability of the Gulf region constitute a fundamental pillar of the global economy. The statement also called for safeguarding freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb.8
This concept manifests itself in the Gulf through four practical tests. The first concerns foreign military bases: while they provide a deterrent umbrella, they also impose a persistent question upon the host state regarding the limits of their use and the costs associated with their potential targeting. The second is the Strait of Hormuz, which is not merely a maritime passage, but a strategic node where Gulf national security intersects with global energy security. The third involves civilian and economic infrastructure—from refineries and desalination plants to airports and supply chains—as these facilities have increasingly become integral components of national security rather than merely service-oriented infrastructure. The fourth relates to economic diversification projects, since any large-scale war threatens not only military security, but also investor confidence and the economic visions upon which Gulf stability and legitimacy are increasingly founded.
The Strait of Hormuz was no longer merely a vital corridor for the global economy during the war, nor is it likely to remain so in its aftermath. Rather, it evolved into a central arena for the redefinition of Gulf sovereignty itself. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day flowed through the strait, accounting for more than a quarter of global seaborne oil trade. In addition, nearly one-fifth of the world’s liquefied natural gas trade – particularly exports from Qatar – passed through it. By contrast, the available alternative capacity through Saudi and Emirati overland routes amounts to only a few million barrels per day.9 Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz following February 28, 2026, led to an estimated 70% decline in tanker traffic. The U.S. Energy Information Administration further estimated that disrupted production reached approximately 9.1 million barrels per day in April 2026.10 This reality renders the Hormuz situation far more than a mere maritime bottleneck; it has become a sovereign dilemma. Freedom of export, the stability of state revenues, and the ability of Gulf states to preserve their position within the global economy have all become tied to a passage over which they do not exercise full control.
The Dilemma of American Military Bases and the Economics of Defense
The central question produced by the war is no longer whether foreign military bases provide protection, but whether they have themselves become part of the Gulf security dilemma. The United States still maintains a significant military presence in the Middle East, making it a fundamental component of the regional deterrence architecture. Yet the war simultaneously demonstrated that this presence does not function solely as a deterrent umbrella; rather, it can also become a generator of risk when Iran perceives it as an integral part of a hostile war machine.
11 The Gulf states do not appear likely to move toward a complete security disengagement from the United States in the foreseeable future. More plausibly, they are expected to engage in a quiet renegotiation of the terms of partnership itself: who ultimately decides on the use of military bases, what limits govern operational involvement, and what guarantees are provided to host states if they are the ones expected to bear the costs of that presence. This war is unlikely to end Gulf dependence on the United States, but it may transform that dependence from a relationship grounded in strategic reassurance into one characterized by caution, conditionality, and a stronger desire to maximize national margins of autonomy.
The Middle East Council on Global Affairs has likewise argued that the Gulf states face a difficult strategic dilemma: they are unable to substantially reduce their relational dependence on Washington, while simultaneously unable to sustain an alliance structure that exposes their security to decisions made beyond their own borders. This tension is pushing them toward a new security framework aimed at strengthening indigenous defensive capabilities, renegotiating the terms of the American security umbrella, and cautiously diversifying partnerships with European, Asian, and regional actors.12 It is also important to note that this war exposed a striking economic imbalance within the air defense equation. Iran employed dense swarms of relatively low-cost drones, while the Gulf states and American forces found themselves compelled to expend highly expensive interceptor missiles in response. As a consequence, several Gulf capitals reportedly began examining lower-cost alternatives, including Ukrainian interceptor drones. This reflects a broader transition from the logic of expensive technological superiority toward a model of smart, cost-efficient defensive saturation embedded within an emerging security transformation strategy.13
The Shift from Protection-Based Security to Control-Oriented Security
The central idea here is that the Gulf is moving away from reliance on an external power tasked with preventing threats, toward the construction of a sovereign posture in which any security partner – regardless of its weight or influence – becomes part of the architecture of stability rather than a potential cause of its collapse. The Gulf states are recalibrating their security relationship with Washington, while simultaneously seeking to redefine its terms in ways that preserve wider margins for national maneuverability. In this context, the Gulf International Forum argues that the Gulf’s trajectory of strategic diversification is likely to accelerate through deeper economic, technological, and defense relations with Asian and European partners – not as a substitute for the American relationship, but rather as an additional hedge against fluctuations in U.S. policy and commitment.14 The war also revealed that the true value of alliances for the Gulf states no longer lies primarily in protection guarantees themselves, but rather in their capacity to provide states with the resources, technology, and training necessary for self-defense.
The Saudi case represented a concentrated model of this emerging security transformation. Riyadh continues to view its security relationship with the United States as structurally deep due to its longstanding dependence on Washington in the fields of armament, military training, and institutional defense cooperation. Yet the Iranian attacks on Saudi civilian infrastructure and energy facilities crossed a line that could no longer be tolerated because they constituted a direct and explicit violation of sovereignty. Here, the new equation emerges in its clearest form: Saudi Arabia shows no desire for an open war, yet it is no longer able to treat the Iranian threat as one that can simply be contained beyond its borders. Consequently, its post-war definition of security is likely moving toward a formula that combines strengthened defenses, deeper internal fortification, and perhaps the preservation of diplomatic settlement channels – but from a position of greater rigidity and diminished trust in the intentions of the adversary.
The United Arab Emirates, in turn, offers a different yet complementary example of this trajectory. Statements made by Anwar Gargash in April 2026 indicated that Abu Dhabi views any settlement addressing Iran’s nuclear program, missiles, and drones as essential to preventing the emergence of a more dangerous Middle East, while also insisting that the Strait of Hormuz cannot be held hostage by any party. At the same time, Gargash emphasized that the United States would remain the UAE’s principal security partner. The paradox here is striking: the very war that exposed the limitations of American security guarantees may, in some cases, deepen the perceived need for them rather than encourage separation from them.15
Responsible Interconnected Sovereignty: A New Regional Logic
Under these complex circumstances, and given the urgent need to devise solutions capable of supporting the Gulf’s transition toward a new formula that protects both its security and sovereignty, it becomes necessary to conceptualize “a new sovereign model through which the state exercises its political independence via the conscious management of regional and international networks of interdependence, in a manner that prevents its territory, resources, proxies, or digital space from being transformed into sources of threat to collective stability, while preserving its exclusive right to strategic decision-making concerning war and peace.”
This definition rests upon three interconnected levels: a right (independence), a function (management), and a constraint (non-harm to regional stability). It draws upon Stephen Krasner’s distinction between four dimensions of sovereignty – international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty – while adding a fifth dimension: regional responsibility, meaning the state’s obligation to ensure that its external influence does not become a source of instability.16 The logic of responsible interconnected sovereignty rests upon three interconnected circles: consolidated internal sovereignty, interconnected sovereignty, and responsible cooperative sovereignty. Its central assumption is that the structure of the regional order is shaped not only by material power, but also by the idea of mutually agreed collective stability, and that regional disorder is not an immutable condition within the regional equation.
Internal Sovereignty: This form of sovereignty is reflected in the exclusive monopoly over strategic decision-making, the regulation of actors within the state, and the protection of society. It corresponds to what Kenneth Waltz described as functionally differentiated units within the international system.
Interconnected Sovereignty: This dimension revolves around managing outward influence from the state, preventing destabilizing forms of expansion, and regulating relations with non-state actors. It is linked to the state’s capacity to control the flows of individuals, ideas, information, and capital across borders.
Responsible Cooperative Sovereignty: This form of sovereignty expresses active participation in protecting shared domains, commitment to the rules of regional stability, and acceptance of coordination mechanisms without surrendering or compromising political independence.
The central hypothesis is that the more capable a state becomes in managing its regional interconnections – rather than merely controlling its territorial borders – the greater its effective sovereignty becomes, and the lower the probability that it will be transformed into a platform for conflict. Conversely, states that fail to regulate interdependence are transformed from sovereign actors into open arenas of confrontation, even if they continue to retain the formal appearance of sovereign statehood.
If the Gulf Arab states incorporate the capacity to regulate interconnectedness into their definition of sovereignty, this new conception may fundamentally reshape the structure of regional interaction.
Synthesis: Toward a Regional Charter for Responsible Interconnected Sovereignty
The synthesis between the theoretical and applied dimensions of this analysis reveals that what the Gulf states are experiencing today constitutes a practical test of the central premise underlying responsible interconnected sovereignty. When a state fails to regulate regional interconnectedness, it is transformed from a sovereign actor into an open arena of conflict. In this context, foreign military bases, maritime corridors, economic networks, and cross-border proxies are not merely operational details; rather, they constitute the precise points of leakage through which the effective sovereignty of the modern regional state is ultimately determined. Accordingly, any binding regional charter cannot be built solely upon the traditional principle of non-aggression, but must instead rest upon a deeper foundation: the prohibition of using states’ territories, military bases, proxies, or strategic corridors as instruments for destabilizing the shared regional environment. This constitutes the essential core of what may be described as a Charter of Responsible Interconnected Sovereignty.
Within this framework, the message directed toward Iran appears exceptionally clear. If Tehran continues to conceive sovereignty as the capacity for regional expansion through networks and proxies – and through penetration into the sovereignties of neighboring states under various regional justifications – then the Gulf states are increasingly compelled to advance toward an alternative understanding of sovereignty: one that moves beyond influence itself toward preventing countervailing influence and firmly halting any attempt to transform the region into a permanent arena of fire and instability. This understanding depends upon the ability of regional actors, collectively and by majority consensus, to construct a security equation that prevents neutrality from becoming a point of weakness through multilayered fortification – defensive, diplomatic, and economic alike. This is precisely the practical framework proposed by responsible interconnected sovereignty.17
The message directed toward partners – foremost among them the United States – is no less clear. Hosting military power does not imply relinquishing the right to define national interest. Future security partnerships must therefore be constructed upon new rules governing consultation, defining the limits of engagement, and providing explicit guarantees to host states when the facilities of a strategic partner become central targets in regional conflict.
It would not be entirely accurate to argue that the war pushed the Gulf states either toward deeper alignment or toward greater neutrality. More precisely, it compelled the Gulf to reconstruct the entire equation. The challenge is no longer a simple choice between two opposing camps, but rather the construction of a new security formula that combines deterrence, internal fortification, defense diversification, preventive diplomacy, and the resilience of the national economy. On this basis, it can be argued that the war of February 28 indeed constituted a decisive turning point in the redefinition of both security and sovereignty in the Gulf. Security had long been understood primarily as a relationship of external protection, while sovereignty was generally conceived as a stable legal condition. After this war, security has become a composite capacity built upon resilience, deterrence, flexibility, and strategic fortification, while sovereignty has evolved into a practical ability to prevent the state from being transformed into an unintended arena for the wars of others.
Conclusion
States that fail to master sovereignty as a delicate and balanced system will ultimately find themselves surrounded by entanglements that consume them rather than being managed by them. In this world, the weakness or strength of states increasingly appears contingent upon their ability to survive without losing the essence of themselves. In the Gulf in particular, the central question is no longer simply: who will protect the state? Rather, it has become: how can the state protect itself from the costs of protection itself when that protection becomes an entry point for the expansion of war? The redefinition of Gulf national security is moving neither toward separation from the American partnership nor toward immersion in a new axis of alignment, but toward the construction of a sovereign doctrine that recognizes that hosting power does not mean surrendering the right to define national interest.
The sovereign state in today’s Middle East is not the state that responds to every strike, but the one capable of preventing the next strike from escalating into a wider war. This is the deepest transformation of all: the Gulf no longer confronts only the question, “Who protects us?” It now faces a far more difficult and realistic question: “How do we build a security order in which the instruments of protection themselves do not become breaches in sovereignty?” At its core, this question constitutes the true title of the post-February 2026 era, and it is precisely what makes responsible interconnected sovereignty an indispensable framework for interpreting the coming phase and formulating responses to it.
Mohammad S. Alzoubi: Senior Researcher at the Gulf Research Center (GRC); President and Founder of Makamen Consulting (DEVE); author of “Hyperpolar World Orders: A Reading of Emerging Economic, Security, and Digital Patterns in the International System,” and author of “Humane Mutual Assured Deterrence: Redefining Global Security in the Era of Autonomous Intelligence” (Summer 2026). He holds a master’s degree in international policy and diplomacy from UK Staffordshire University and is a former member of the Think Tanks and Civil Society Program (TTCSP) at the Lauder Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, USA.
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