Palestine at the Heart of the Regional Storm: Siege, Marginalization, and Replacement
The prospect of regional wars has always constituted a strategic concern for the Palestinian cause, given the sensitivity of Israeli colonial policies to regional and international responses – responses upon which Palestinians have long relied as a form of political and regional protection, particularly considering the deepening expansion of the colonial project. With the outbreak of war in February 2026 and the region’s descent into escalating instability and compounded security, economic, and political challenges, it became increasingly evident that Israel was exploiting the war as a shield for its policies on the ground. This further intensified the already difficult phase confronting the Palestinian cause, amid the accelerating decline of both regional and international attention toward issues that had previously occupied the forefront of Palestinian concerns before the confrontation – including Gaza, the West Bank, and the Palestinian question in its broader strategic dimension.
It is important to note here that the war is still ongoing, even if fought through less overtly destructive and lethal means. Politically, the war continues to occupy the highest position on the hierarchy of urgent and volatile regional issues, whose resolution constitutes a necessary gateway for restoring some degree of centrality to the Palestinian issue. This applies particularly to the two principal arenas of conflict: Iran and Lebanon. Economically, the process of strategic exhaustion affecting both the region and the wider world also remains ongoing, making the war a continuing priority for political debate and international engagement, not least because of its direct impact on citizens’ livelihoods and on the political standing of governments around the world.
The current regional war reveals that the greatest threat facing the Palestinian cause lies not solely in the escalation of Israeli violence on the ground, but in the gradual transition of Palestine from a central issue in regional discourse into a deferred file within a new regional security architecture increasingly preoccupied with Iran, strategic corridors, deterrence, and post-war arrangements. Within this transformation, Israel has acquired greater space to advance its project in Gaza and the West Bank at a significantly lower political cost, benefiting from a regional and international environment absorbed by more urgent security and economic priorities.
From this perspective, this article does not approach the war merely as an external event that has affected the Palestinians, but rather as a moment that has fundamentally reordered the position of the Palestinian issue within the regional system itself. Gaza has shifted from being the focal point of international attention in the aftermath of war to becoming marginalized within broader security bargaining processes. At the same time, the West Bank has increasingly turned into an open arena for the acceleration of settlement expansion and demographic restructuring policies, while the Palestinian Authority faces growing political and financial exposure. Accordingly, the central question is no longer simply how Israel exploited the war, but how the war itself contributed to reproducing Palestine as a postponed issue within a regional order that is actively redefining its strategic priorities.
Gaza: From the Center to the Margins
Gaza stands as the clearest example of the transformation of the Palestinian cause from the center of regional attention to its margins. While the war on Gaza had previously imposed itself upon regional and international diplomacy as a primary issue, the broader regional war has displaced it from the forefront of political priorities, granting Israel greater space to manage the sector through a framework that is politically quieter yet operationally more severe on the ground. Israeli policies toward Gaza have not ceased; rather, they have become less visible within the international arena, and this, in itself, constitutes the essence of the transformation.
On 19 February 2026, the Peace Council held its first meeting in Washington, attended by representatives of twenty-seven states that had officially joined the council, alongside twenty-one additional states participating as observers. Despite the broad European absence from the council amid disagreements over its charter, the meeting nevertheless produced pledges amounting to seven billion dollars for reconstruction efforts. It was also announced that Japan would host a subsequent donor conference in support of the council, while the President of the World Bank declared the initiation of a Gaza Reconstruction and Development Fund1.
In parallel, the National Committee for the Administration of the Gaza Strip moved to institutionalize its operations, announcing in mid-February its intention to establish a police force as a foundational step toward building a system based on the rule of law. At the same time, the committee continued to demand full empowerment and the granting of all necessary authorities required to carry out its responsibilities, amid Israel’s refusal to allow its members to enter the territory. Meanwhile, Hamas announced the completion of procedures for transferring governing powers in all areas of administration to the committee2.
Israel exploited the decline in international attention toward Gaza along three parallel trajectories: hollowing out the framework for governing and reconstructing the sector, expanding territorial and operational control under the cover of security arrangements, and pushing the population into an increasingly coercive environment through the reduction of humanitarian assistance and the intensification of daily pressure. In this way, the marginalization of Gaza did not emerge merely as a secondary consequence of the regional war, but evolved into an Israeli opportunity to reshape realities within the sector itself.
Regarding the peace plan, the continued prevention of the National Committee’s entry into the Gaza Strip generated no meaningful international pressure or response. At the same time, United States announced its intention to close the Civil-Military Coordination Center operated by the U.S. Army in southern Israel, while also reducing the number of American personnel serving within the International Stabilization Force from 190 members to only 403.
Less than three weeks after the outbreak of the war, the number of aid trucks entering the Gaza Strip had declined by nearly 80%, falling from approximately 4,200 trucks per week to around 590 trucks during the first week of the war alone. At the same time, intensified killings and systematic targeting operations escalated sharply. Under the cover of this declining international attention, Israel expanded its buffer zone to encompass nearly 60% of the total area of the Gaza Strip, rather than the 53% stipulated in the agreement4.
Israel, therefore, exploited the war to shift Gaza Strip from the center of regional attention to the margins. In doing so, it was able to advance its strategy of consolidating the so-called “yellow zone” as a permanent area of control within a broader framework of enduring security belts. This strategy effectively confined Palestinians to roughly one-third of the territory of the Gaza Strip, while reintroducing humanitarian aid as an instrument of pressure and coercion. Simultaneously, policies of killing and targeted assassinations escalated in a gradual but systematic manner, with the rate of Palestinian fatalities increasing by nearly fivefold during the two weeks following the cessation of the war5.
In parallel, and at the present moment, Israel has placed a clear slogan on the table: “Hamas’s weapons obstruct the ceasefire and reconstruction.” This signals Israel’s success in confining the entire discussion to the issue of Hamas’s armaments as a precondition for moving toward any step – however limited – concerning the administration of the Gaza Strip, Israeli withdrawal, or reconstruction efforts. This position has also been adopted by the Peace Council, represented by its High Commissioner Nikolay Mladenov6.
These developments indicate that Gaza Strip has emerged as a principal loser in this war, amid the fragmentation of regional priorities, the declining enthusiasm of Donald Trump for his Gaza-related initiative, and the broadening freedom granted to Israel in its conduct there. The current state of political stagnation appears to serve Israel’s efforts to freeze the file and transform it into a domain governed primarily by Israeli policy calculations, particularly in the context of electoral competition and political posturing.
At this stage of the war, Israel appears to be adopting a pattern of gradual escalation with limited political cost – a form of “soft escalation strategy.” Through measured, quiet, yet cumulative steps, Israel advances incrementally toward tightening its grip over Gaza and restoring conditions resembling those that existed prior to the ceasefire. Simultaneously, however, it maintains a political and media discourse emphasizing its formal commitment to the ceasefire arrangement.
This reality has also been reflected in the discourse of Hamas, which increasingly conveys frustration and an inability to effectively confront such a situation. With the decline of international momentum in support of Gaza, the inability of the National Committee to exercise its functions, and the continuation of field operations and targeted strikes – including the recent targeting of the movement’s leading figure in the Strip, Izz al-Din al-Haddad – Hamas faces mounting pressure amid the erosion of both its political and operational room for maneuver, particularly as discussion surrounding its weapons has become the foundational threshold for any transition beyond the current state of stalemate.
The West Bank: A Different Context
The West Bank differs from Gaza in both the nature of the Israeli project and the instruments through which it is pursued. In Gaza, Israel’s strategy is centered on managing demographic density, enforcing security control, and maintaining siege conditions. In the West Bank, however, the project is based on the gradual reconfiguration of land, population, and political authority. From this perspective, the regional war did not generate a new Israeli policy in the West Bank; rather, it provided existing policies with broader operational space and reduced the international political costs associated with settlement expansion, escalating violence, and creeping annexation.
Israel activated an extensive system of closures and surveillance across the West Bank, imposing a comprehensive cordon around cities, villages, and residential communities. At the same time, Israeli settlers intensified their attacks, taking advantage of the region’s preoccupation with the war. These assaults resulted in the killing of six Palestinians during the first two weeks of the conflict through direct attacks carried out by settlers7.
These attacks, however, were not exceptional incidents, but rather an extension of an escalating strategy through which settler violence has expanded both geographically and in terms of its intensity, boldness, and levels of violence. This has unfolded amid multifaceted support provided by Israeli authorities, including – not least – the effective suspension of the enforcement of Israeli law against settlers. During the Iranian war, settler attacks occurred in successive and closely timed waves, involving large and organized incursions into Palestinian villages, live gunfire, property destruction, theft, and, notably, expanded activity in areas classified as A and B.
This policy, aimed at displacement and forcing Palestinians into retreat and confinement, has proceeded in parallel with the establishment of settlement outposts within the targeted areas, pointing to a coordinated strategy managed by an integrated settlement apparatus. At the same time, settlers pressured their government to adopt measures designed to “eradicate armed infrastructure” in the West Bank, particularly in Jenin, where settlement activity resumed intensively through rapid and expansive confiscation measures and settlement-unit construction8.
On the security level, Israel exploited the skies over the West Bank as an advanced air-defense zone, intercepting Iranian missiles above different areas of the territory. Shrapnel and debris scattered across multiple locations, leading to the deaths of several Palestinian civilians as a result of these interception operations.
The question here is whether the Iranian war can be understood as a cover that Israel exploited to advance its project in the West Bank. I am inclined to argue that it cannot, because the structure of Israeli colonial policies in the West Bank differs fundamentally from that of the Gaza Strip.
The Zionist project in the West Bank is built upon intensive settlement expansion, replacement, internal displacement, and the empowerment of a settlement structure that increasingly resembles a semi-autonomous “settler state.” This project is managed through the framework of Religious Zionism, including its representation within the government and the Knesset, its strong presence within the military establishment, and an extensive institutional network that exclusively administers the settlement enterprise according to a clear strategy largely indifferent to international public opinion or threatened sanctions.
Yet, as in Gaza, Israel today operates in the West Bank with relative freedom from international pressure. Although periodic international criticism has emerged – including some criticism from the United States – it has not altered the strategic landscape. In response to modest European sanctions imposed in May 2026 on settlement organizations and figures supporting settlement expansion, Israel instead moved toward allocating additional governmental support to the settlement project.
Here, the Palestinian Authority appears almost entirely incapable of altering this reality. It possesses neither the capacity nor the political room for maneuver necessary to change the situation. Given that the strategy of the Palestine Liberation Organization relies almost exclusively on supportive international and regional pathways, the Palestinian Authority finds itself with severely limited influence in the face of such an asymmetrical confrontation. This, in turn, has generated a broad sense of public frustration, alongside scattered individual efforts to confront settler attacks and violence.
From the Centrality of Palestine to the Centrality of Regional Security
One of the most significant consequences of the regional war has been the shift in the center of political debate in the Middle East from the question of Palestine to the question of regional security. Priorities that once revolved around ending the war in Gaza, reconstruction efforts, the future of the Palestinian Authority, and the two-state solution have increasingly been displaced by issues considered more urgent for regional and international capitals: Gulf security, the future of Iran, energy flows, maritime corridors, and post-war deterrence arrangements.
Israel has benefited from this transition because it has been able to position its policies in Gaza and the West Bank within a less scrutinized political environment. The more the region becomes preoccupied with the Iranian threat and with broader security and energy arrangements, the less capable the Palestinians become of imposing their cause as a diplomatic priority. In this context, marginalization does not appear as the complete absence of Palestine from regional discourse, but rather as a decline in its weight within the regional agenda. Palestine remains present morally and rhetorically, yet increasingly less capable of constraining Israeli policies on the ground.
The Repercussions of the Regional War on the Palestinian Cause
The Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization had been actively engaged with the international coalition supporting the two-state solution, while simultaneously working intensively to fulfill requirements related to reform and institutionalization. Parallel to this effort, they were attempting – increasingly desperately – to secure the minimum financial resources necessary to maintain essential public services and ensure the payment of public-sector salaries.
During the war, however, the transfer of Palestinian financial revenues withheld by Israel – commonly referred to as clearance revenues – was suspended. The Palestinian Ministry of Finance ceased receiving any portion of these funds, which had exceeded five billion dollars. At the same time, Israel continued to erode the authority of the Palestinian Authority, restricting its ability to move, operate, and provide support and services to its population. This escalated further when Israel seized land within areas classified as Area A for military purposes, marking the first such action since the signing of the Oslo Accords.
As the Palestinian issue continues to fade from the hierarchy of regional priorities, prospects for providing political and economic safety nets to the Palestinian Authority have also diminished. Meanwhile, the economic crisis in the West Bank has intensified to unprecedented levels, while settler violence has evolved into an existential threat for many villages and key regions. For example, the number of displaced Bedouin communities has reached thirty-three, despite the fact that these communities historically constituted the backbone of Palestinian presence in the Jordan Valley. Simultaneously, the Gaza Strip remains trapped in a prolonged and exhausting state of attrition.
Palestinian political elites believe that no meaningful horizon of security will emerge except through a comprehensive regional settlement that places all regional issues – foremost among them the Palestinian question – on a single negotiating table capable of addressing the difficult questions and imposing structural solutions. Yet the coming months, shaped by anticipation surrounding the outcomes of the war and the eventual contours of the regional order, are likely to witness a Zionist political competition driven by electoral calculations, with efforts to score gains in Lebanon and Gaza, while Religious Zionism seeks to secure even more radical gains in the West Bank.
At the same time, despite profound frustration among nearly all Palestinian political and social actors, the Palestinian Authority continues to pursue the path of the two-state coalition and Palestinian-European understandings. Local elections were held at the end of April 2026, while Fatah convened its Eighth Congress, during which elections resulted in the replacement of roughly half of its highest leadership body, the Central Committee, with the arrival of figures enjoying broader popular and social legitimacy. In parallel, draft versions of both the constitution and the political parties law were issued, alongside the completion of the first phase of the government’s comprehensive reform plan.
Despite this political activity, however, its timing, the limited visibility of its immediate effects, and the overwhelming burdens placed upon ordinary Palestinians have led many within the Palestinian public to view these measures as insufficient relative to the scale of the challenges confronting them. Public sentiment increasingly demands steps capable of producing meaningful transformations, at minimum in terms of resilience and protection.
In conclusion, The current regional war reveals that the Palestinian cause faces not only the danger of Israeli violence, but also the danger of declining within the hierarchy of regional and international priorities. As the center of attention shifts toward Iran, Gulf security, strategic corridors, and post-war arrangements, Israel acquires broader space to manage its project in Gaza and the West Bank at a lower political cost, while Palestinians confront a reality marked by greater exposure and diminished capacity to mobilize effective external pressure.
In Gaza, this transformation is reflected in the transition from a moment of intense international centrality to a prolonged condition of stagnation and exhaustion, in which reconstruction, governance, and withdrawal become deferred or heavily conditioned files. In the West Bank, marginalization manifests differently through the acceleration of settlement expansion, increasing settler violence, and attempts to reshape land and population dynamics under the cover of a region preoccupied with war. Meanwhile, the Palestinian Authority faces a multidimensional crisis combining financial suffocation, declining political capacity, and a widening gap between the demands for institutional reform and the daily threats confronting Palestinian society.
Accordingly, the most dangerous consequence of the war lies not merely in granting Israel an additional opportunity to expand its policies, but in restructuring the broader environment within which the Palestinian cause operates. Palestine remains present in political and moral discourse, yet it has become increasingly absent from the centers of regional and international decision-making. This constitutes the essence of strategic marginalization: a condition in which the cause continues to receive political and ethical recognition, while progressively losing its ability to impose tangible costs on the occupation or alter the trajectory of policies being implemented on the ground.
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