Jordan as a Resilience State: Engineering Stability and the Limits of Adaptation in a Turbulent Regional Environment
The experiences of the past decade-from the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in 2011, through the Syrian war, the rise of jihadist organizations, global economic crises, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Gaza war, and most recently the war with Iran-demonstrate that Jordan has not existed on the margins of regional shocks, but rather at the center of their political, security, and economic repercussions. Yet despite this succession of crises, the Jordanian state has maintained a remarkable degree of institutional and social cohesion and has avoided the trajectories that drove other states in the region toward collapse, fragmentation, or the loss of control over the public sphere.
Describing Jordan merely as a stable state remains insufficient to explain this experience. Stability implies a relatively fixed condition of equilibrium, whereas the Jordanian state operates within a regional environment that continuously reproduces crises and transmits them internally through borders, refugee flows, energy dependency, markets, the Palestinian issue, and transformations in Syria and Iraq. Jordan therefore appears closer to the model of a “Resilience State,”1 namely a state that sustains itself through the capacity to absorb shocks, distribute their costs internally, and prevent them from evolving into existential crises.
The distinctiveness of the Jordanian case does not lie in the absence of fragility, but rather in the manner through which fragility is managed. The state has succeeded in developing political, economic, and security mechanisms that enabled it to endure within a constantly shifting regional environment. At the same time, however, Jordan faces a profound paradox: when resilience becomes a permanent mode of crisis management, it risks turning into a substitute for structural transformation and may postpone the resolution of underlying tensions rather than dismantling them. Here emerges the central question within the Jordanian experience: does the resilience-state model constitute a sustainable strategy for managing risk, or does it gradually accumulate a form of strategic exhaustion over time?
This paper proceeds from the hypothesis that Jordan has constructed a hybrid model of resilience based on three interconnected pillars: controlled political modernization, an adaptive economy, and a multi-tier security “layered security” capable of managing both external and internal risks. Nevertheless, the sustainability of this model remains contingent upon its ability to transform resilience from a defensive condition into a deeper trajectory of transformation capable of rebuilding trust, expanding participation, and reducing the social costs of reform. Without achieving such a qualitative breakthrough, the model may ultimately generate what can be described as “strategic exhaustion.” The central challenge facing Jordan is therefore no longer merely the ability to endure, but rather the ability to prevent resilience itself from evolving into a prolonged condition of attrition.
The Regional Environment as a Structural Condition of Resilience
The Jordanian case cannot be analyzed in isolation from its regional environment, not merely because this environment influences the Kingdom, but because it constitutes one of the principal structural determinants shaping state policy itself. Jordan confronts both internal and external threats while operating within a regional setting that continuously reproduces insecurity and reshapes it through increasingly complex dynamics. The accelerating transformations in the relations among regional and international powers have imposed a permanent condition of strategic uncertainty upon the Kingdom, making it increasingly difficult to rely on fixed patterns of alliances or stable regional balances.
Within this context, the Jordanian state adopted a model of foreign policy management grounded in high flexibility and the avoidance of sharp alignments, while simultaneously maintaining multiple channels of communication that allow it to maneuver within a highly volatile regional environment.
The American-Israeli war against Iran placed Jordan before its most complex regional test since the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2011. For the first time, the Kingdom found itself at the center of a direct confrontation affecting its strategic environment from every direction: potential disruption in energy markets, threats to air and commercial corridors, escalating security risks along the borders, and the possibility of conflict spillover into neighboring Arab arenas. The manner in which the Jordanian state managed these developments demonstrated that resilience is no longer merely the capacity to absorb crises, but has evolved into a practical framework for governing a regional environment characterized by an unprecedented degree of uncertainty.
These challenges did not emerge in isolation. Rather, they accumulated through a prolonged trajectory of regional upheavals that fundamentally reshaped the security environment surrounding Jordan, with the Syrian war representing the single most consequential turning point in this transformation.
Since 2011, Jordan’s northern border has become one of the most complex fault lines in the region. The challenges extended far beyond refugee inflows-Jordan has hosted more than 1.3 million Syrians-and expanded to include the rise of narcotics trafficking networks, the infiltration of armed groups, and the erosion of the concept of secure borders as it existed before 2011.
A growing number of analyses have further suggested that southern Syria evolved into a semi-uncontrolled environment, compelling Jordan to move from a traditional border defense strategy toward a model of preemptive cross-border security. Security management thus became part of a daily strategic equation reflecting the recognition that threats are increasingly linked not only to geography itself, but also to transnational networks operating across borders.
To the east, despite the relative improvement in Iraq’s security environment, the persistence of institutional fragility and the multiplicity of informal centers of power continue to generate an unpredictable strategic environment, particularly in relation to informal trade networks and threats linked to energy security. The sensitivity of this file intensified further with the American-Israeli war against Iran, as Iraq once again emerged as a potential arena for the exchange of pressure and signaling between Washington and Tehran. In Amman, this possibility is not viewed merely as an internal Iraqi matter, but rather as a factor capable of affecting border security, energy supplies, trade flows, and even the broader level of regional stability.
This environment imposes upon Jordan a condition of constant exposure to spillover effects that manifest in multiple forms. Informal economic interconnections increasingly reshape patterns of cross-border exchange outside formal regulatory frameworks, creating mounting security and monitoring challenges. At the same time, the fragility of the security environment in certain Iraqi regions renders the eastern border an open space for the risks of infiltration or the reconstitution of transnational networks, whether economic or security-oriented in nature.
In addition, instability in Iraqi energy policies, and their occasional linkage to domestic political considerations or broader regional calculations, indirectly affects Jordan, which continues to pursue diversification of its energy sources and the strengthening of its energy security. Consequently, any disruption in this domain is interpreted not only as an economic issue, but also as a factor with implications for overall national stability.
More importantly, these threats intersect within a highly complex regional environment, making their management considerably more difficult. Jordan is therefore not confronting a single source of threat that can simply be contained, but rather an interconnected system of overlapping risks that requires a flexible and multidimensional response. Within this context, security extends beyond the narrow notion of border control and evolves into a continuous process of managing cross-border interactions in ways that limit the transmission of regional crises into the domestic sphere.
In the western direction, the Palestinian issue constitutes the most sensitive and complex factor within Jordan’s security equation, not only because of its geopolitical dimension, but also due to its deep entanglement with the social and political structure of the state itself. By virtue of its geographic position, demographic composition, and political history, Jordan approaches the Palestinian issue as a structural element that directly affects its internal balances.
Major developments such as the Jerusalem uprising in 2021 and the Gaza war in 2023 demonstrated that any escalation in the Palestinian territories immediately extends into the Jordanian domestic sphere through several interconnected levels.
The first of these levels is popular pressure, as broad segments of Jordanian society interact with developments in Palestine as an issue carrying national and moral significance rather than merely an external political matter.
The second level concerns the recurring questioning of political legitimacy, whereby state positions and foreign policies are reassessed in light of developments in the conflict, placing the government under continuous public scrutiny.
The third level is reflected in the tension that may emerge between the state and society, particularly when the priorities of official policy diverge from prevailing public sentiment.
Developments in Palestine therefore generate not only conventional security threats, but also reshape the domestic political sphere, influence levels of public trust, and reactivate questions of identity and belonging. This makes the Palestinian issue a constant and structurally embedded factor within Jordan’s broader stability equation.
This regional environment has placed Jordan before a fundamentally different reality from that which existed in earlier periods. The challenge is no longer confined to protecting borders alone, but increasingly revolves around managing the repercussions of crises that rapidly penetrate the domestic sphere through the economy, energy security, public opinion, and the Palestinian issue itself. With the American-Israeli war against Iran, it became increasingly clear that the state’s ability to preserve stability can no longer be understood solely through a traditional security framework, but must also be linked to the management of the domestic political and social sphere under conditions of sustained regional pressure.
Political Modernization: Managing Pluralism Under Pressure
Since 2021, Jordan has witnessed a clear trajectory of political modernization manifested through the establishment of the Royal Committee to Modernize the Political System, amendments to the laws governing political parties and elections, and gradual efforts to move toward parliamentary governments. Unlike some states that initiate reform under the pressure of imminent breakdown, Jordan adopted a relatively preemptive approach in which political modernization emerged within the broader context of two interconnected objectives: preventing the repetition of regional instability scenarios and absorbing mounting domestic pressures.
Within this framework, Jordan developed a distinctive model for managing the domestic political sphere. The model allows a measured degree of political participation and public expression while simultaneously maintaining clear boundaries intended to prevent pluralism from evolving into sharp polarization that could threaten national cohesion.
Political modernization in Jordan therefore operates within a highly delicate equation: expanding participation sufficiently to absorb pressure, while regulating the political arena in ways that prevent it from descending into destabilizing polarization. This explains the significance of the Royal Committee for Political Modernization and the amendments to the electoral and political party laws, which represented an attempt to reorganize participation, introduce new social forces into the public sphere, and prepare the ground for a gradual transition toward parliamentary governance. Yet the trajectory remained governed less by the question of legal texts and more by the question of trust. Laws may open the political space formally, but they do not by themselves guarantee that citizens will engage in politics with a genuine sense of representation and political efficacy.
The central challenge therefore lies in trust rather than institutions alone. Despite the legal reforms, surveys such as those conducted by Arab Barometer continue to indicate low levels of trust in political parties and limited political participation.2 This reveals a fundamental weakness within the reform process: institutional reform does not necessarily translate into a transformation in the relationship between state and society unless it is accompanied by a deeper reconstruction of that relationship on the basis of trust and meaningful representation.
The limited confidence in political parties further demonstrates that the Jordanian political dilemma is not solely related to the weakness of party organizations themselves, but also to a long history of mutual caution between the state and society. Citizens who do not perceive a direct impact of participation on public policy are likely to remain hesitant to treat political modernization as a substantive transformation. For this reason, the true test of political reform does not lie in the number of parties, parliamentary seats, or newly enacted laws, but rather in the ability of the process to generate a broader public perception that participation can meaningfully influence people’s lives.
From the perspective of the state, the issue is not political participation in itself, but rather how participation can be expanded without allowing it to evolve into a form of polarization that becomes difficult to manage within a highly sensitive regional environment.
Economic Modernization: Between the Imperatives of Stability and the Limits of Social Strain
Over the past decade, Jordan has faced accumulating economic pressures that compelled the state to manage the economy through a logic of continuous adaptation rather than one of structural transformation. High levels of public debt coincided with chronic unemployment-particularly among youth-alongside sluggish economic growth, rising costs of public services, and mounting pressures resulting from limited natural resources. These challenges were further intensified by an unstable regional environment marked by successive political and security crises that directly affected the Jordanian economy through refugee inflows, disruptions in regional trade, and volatility in energy and transportation markets.
Within this context, Jordanian economic policies cannot be understood solely as conventional developmental policies, because a central dimension of these policies has been linked to a political and security function concerned with preserving social stability and reducing the likelihood of internal unrest. Consequently, the state approached the economy not merely as a field of fiscal and administrative reform, but also as an instrument for managing social balances. This was reflected in the continuation of support policies for key sectors, the preservation of social protection networks, the relative expansion of cash assistance programs, and the continued reliance on public-sector employment as a mechanism for absorbing social pressures, particularly in governorates suffering from high unemployment rates.
At different stages, the state also postponed certain economic reforms carrying high social costs or implemented them gradually in order to avoid generating large-scale protest movements within a volatile regional environment. Simultaneously, external assistance played a significant role in enhancing the state’s ability to preserve financial and monetary stability, thereby allowing the continuation of essential spending and mitigating the impact of successive economic crises. In this sense, the economy became integrated into the broader system of managing domestic stability rather than remaining a purely technical file detached from political and social considerations.
The most recent regional war revived traditional Jordanian concerns related to energy security and external trade. Disruptions in regional maritime navigation, intermittent closures of the Strait of Hormuz, and fluctuations in oil prices and shipping markets once again exposed the structural sensitivity of the Jordanian economy to external geopolitical shocks. This sensitivity is not confined to the energy sector alone, but extends to transportation, tourism, investment, remittances, and cross-border trade-all sectors that depend, to varying degrees, on regional stability and the uninterrupted movement of economic flows through regional corridors.
The impact of these transformations is amplified by Jordan’s geopolitical location at the intersection of highly sensitive regional and commercial routes. Any large-scale regional disruption therefore directly affects the national economy through rising import costs, declining trade flows, disruptions in supply chains, and contractions in tourism and investment activity. For this reason, the war was not interpreted in Amman as a geographically distant military crisis, but rather as a direct test of the state’s capacity to preserve economic and social stability within an unstable regional environment.
Despite these pressures, Jordan demonstrated a relative capacity to adapt to successive crises without sliding into comprehensive economic or financial collapse. The state preserved the stability of its monetary institutions, continued fulfilling core financial obligations, and managed the consequences of refugee crises and regional trade disruptions with a degree of institutional flexibility. Yet this adaptive capacity did not reflect deep economic transformation as much as it reflected a model centered on managing fragility and preventing collapse.
For this reason, the Jordanian economy over the past decade can be described as closer to a “Survival Economy” or “Resilience Economy,” a model that does not primarily seek transformative growth, but rather the preservation of a minimum level of monetary, social, and political stability. This model aligns closely with the literature on the management of economic fragility in resource-constrained states, where the priority becomes maintaining institutional continuity and avoiding severe deterioration, even if growth rates and employment opportunities remain below societal expectations.
The strength of this model lies in its ability to absorb shocks and prevent rapid collapse, particularly within a region that has witnessed extensive economic and security disintegration in recent years. Its limitations, however, appear in its weak capacity to address the structural roots of economic and social crises. Persistently high unemployment, declining purchasing power, and expanding living pressures all gradually contribute to the production of social frustration, particularly among younger generations and segments of the middle class.
This reality reveals the complex relationship between the economy and political legitimacy in Jordan. Legitimacy does not rest solely on political representation or the continuity of state institutions, but is also tied to the state’s ability to preserve social stability and maintain a minimum degree of distributive justice. Whenever citizens perceive that economic burdens are distributed unevenly, or that the costs of reform are borne more heavily by society than by economic elites, levels of public trust gradually decline, creating a widening gap between institutional stability and societal stability.
Conversely, economic policies that take social considerations into account and balance the requirements of reform with the imperatives of internal stability can strengthen the state’s ability to preserve social cohesion, particularly within a regional environment characterized by high levels of uncertainty. The central Jordanian economic dilemma in the current phase therefore concerns how to transition from a model centered on crisis management and survival toward one more capable of generating growth, employment opportunities, and greater economic sustainability without undermining the political and social balances that have preserved state stability over the past decade.
This reality ultimately underscores a central fact: in Jordan, the economy forms an integral component of the equation of political legitimacy itself. The more citizens perceive that the costs of reform are distributed unequally, the more trust declines and the likelihood of social tension increases. Conversely, policies that preserve a strong social dimension can contribute significantly to reinforcing stability even under highly difficult conditions.
National Security: From Deterrence to the Integrated Management of Risk
In the Jordanian case, security cannot be separated from the surrounding political, economic, and social environment; rather, it is produced through their continuous interaction. Public trust in the state, the capacity of the economy to absorb social and economic pressures, and the degree of societal cohesion all directly influence national stability and determine the state’s ability to manage crises and prevent regional tensions from spilling into the domestic sphere.
This dynamic explains Jordan’s adoption of a model of “integrated security,” which combines instruments of hard security-such as border protection and the containment of direct threats-with instruments of soft security, including social management, the reinforcement of cohesion, and crisis prevention. This model is reflected in policies of containment alongside the use of political, economic, and social tools aimed at preserving stability without allowing conditions to deteriorate into disorder or fragmentation.
Security in Jordan is therefore not based solely on deterrence. It also depends on the ability of state institutions and security agencies to identify early indicators of tension, whether in the form of social protest, economic pressure, escalation in فلسطين, cross-border smuggling, or instability in neighboring states. In this sense, societal trust becomes an integral component of national security, economic performance becomes part of the broader protection framework, and public policy itself evolves into a preventive instrument rather than merely a reactive mechanism for crisis management.
More importantly, the state does not seek to eliminate threats entirely-an unrealistic objective within such a volatile regional environment. Instead, the priority lies in managing threats within controllable limits and preventing them from escalating into conditions of systemic collapse or widespread disorder. This constitutes the defining characteristic of what may be described as a “Resilience State”: a state capable of adapting to an unstable regional environment without losing its institutional continuity or governing capacity.
The significance of the war between the United States and Iran for Jordan lies in the way it transformed the concept of national security itself-from the management of traditional border threats into the management of multidimensional regional risks. The Kingdom confronted not merely the possibility of direct military threats, but rather an interconnected system of risks involving energy security, maritime trade routes, airspace management, supply chains, economic pressures, potential refugee flows, and the political and media repercussions of the conflict on domestic public opinion. As a result, Jordanian security management during the crisis increasingly resembled the governance of an interconnected risk environment rather than the containment of a single identifiable threat.
The Resilience State Model: Integration and the Limits of Balance
The strength of this model lies in the interaction among its different components:
Political modernization contributes to reducing social tension and reinforcing legitimacy,
While economic performance helps alleviate social pressures, ultimately supporting broader security stability.
In turn, security stability provides the necessary environment for the continuation of these processes.
Accordingly, the Jordanian case can be described as a hybrid model based on the interaction among three interconnected pillars: controlled political modernization, an adaptive economy, and an integrated security framework. This interaction enables the state to endure, adapt, and avoid collapse without requiring the achievement of an idealized form of stability that remains difficult to attain within the existing regional environment.
The strength of the Jordanian model derives from the way it links politics, economics, and security within a single governing equation. Political modernization alleviates part of the social pressure by providing broader channels for expression and participation. Economic policy supports stability when it incorporates considerations of social justice. Security institutions, meanwhile, provide the overarching framework that allows these interactions to continue without descending into disorder or institutional breakdown. Yet the relationship among these elements does not always operate harmoniously. Every expansion of political participation raises public expectations, every unbalanced economic reform increases social pressure, and every regional escalation renews the test of the state’s ability to regulate the domestic sphere.
Here emerges the central paradox of the resilience state. The model is capable of protecting the state from major shocks, yet it may gradually become accustomed to managing crises rather than resolving their structural causes. Over time, the capacity for adaptation itself may evolve into a form of exhaustion if the gap between declared reform and tangible outcomes remains wide. In this sense, resilience does not represent weakness, but neither does it constitute an end in itself.
Conclusion: Resilience as a Phase Rather Than an End State
Despite Jordan’s clear success in developing an advanced model of resilience, the true value of this model lies not merely in its ability to prevent collapse, but in its capacity to create a pathway toward transformation. The Jordanian state has succeeded in weathering major regional shocks, preserving relative stability, and maintaining its position as a credible regional actor. Yet these achievements do not mean that the model has reached a stage of completion.
Sustained resilience carries a delicate paradox. It grants the state additional time, mitigates the effects of crises, and preserves institutional cohesion, yet it can gradually evolve into a permanent mechanism for managing postponement if it is not accompanied by deeper political reform grounded in trust, a more equitable economic model, and a conception of national security that incorporates indicators of social tension into its early calculations. At this point, the risk emerges from the success of the model itself, because it may encourage the state to manage crises rather than address their structural roots.
Jordan has succeeded in developing a relatively distinctive regional model based on crisis management rather than collapse, and on adaptation rather than rigidity. However, this success should not be understood as a completed condition, but rather as an ongoing trajectory facing continuously evolving challenges.
At the same time, this model is not without limits. Its sustainability remains contingent upon the state’s ability to adapt to internal challenges that are no less serious than external threats. Continuous resilience may gradually become a substitute for structural transformation, meaning that the state may succeed in managing crises while postponing the resolution of their underlying causes. Without achieving a qualitative breakthrough, this trajectory may ultimately generate what can be described as “strategic exhaustion,” a condition in which resources gradually erode and adaptive capacity declines over time.
Moreover, rising levels of political and economic awareness may widen the gap between what the state provides and what society expects, thereby generating additional pressure on the broader stability framework. In addition, unforeseen regional transformations may place this model before increasingly difficult tests.
For this reason, the sustainability of Jordanian resilience appears dependent upon three interconnected transformations. First, political modernization must evolve from institutional engineering into meaningful participation that citizens perceive as genuinely consequential. Second, economic modernization must be reformulated around principles of social justice and a more balanced distribution of the costs of reform. Third, the concept of national security itself must expand to include public trust, social tension, and youth expectations as early-warning indicators no less important than conventional border threats.
Jordan’s strength lies in the fact that it has learned how to endure within a turbulent regional environment. The next challenge is to transform this resilience from a defensive capacity into a project of structural transformation. A state that succeeds in managing crises merely buys time, whereas a state that uses that time to rebuild trust, strengthen the economy, and deepen participation is the only kind of state capable of transforming resilience into sustainable power.
The significance of the American-Israeli war against Iran for Jordan lies in the fact that it provided a practical test of the resilience model developed by the Jordanian state over the past decade. The crisis demonstrated the capacity of Jordanian institutions to absorb the political, economic, and security pressures generated by a large-scale regional conflict, while simultaneously exposing the limitations of the model itself. The more the state relies on the continuous management of successive crises, the greater the need becomes to transform resilience from a defensive mechanism into a deeper and more sustainable political and economic project. The central question posed by the war for Jordan therefore concerns not merely the state’s ability to overcome the current crisis, but its ability to prepare for regional crises that may become more frequent and more complex in the years ahead. The fundamental challenge facing Jordan is no longer simply the ability to endure, but rather the ability to prevent resilience itself from evolving into a prolonged condition of attrition.
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