Book Review: America’s Middle East — The Ruination of A Region

In his latest book, America’s Middle East: The Ruination of a Region, academic Marc Lynch takes an in-depth look at the role of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East across six presidencies since 1991. Presenting a chronological overview of U.S administrations over the last thirty-five years, he highlights the remarkable endurance of the U.S’e hegemonic strategy in the Middle East. This strategy he argues is one rooted in the guarantee of U.S diplomatic and security primacy of the region, while disregarding the long history of human rights abuses that plagues many nations. This continuity of flawed foreign policy corroborates Lynch’s claim that the role of the United States in the Middle East is one that reflects a powerful and deeply institutionalized structure which has shaped the identity and politics of the Middle East since the Gulf War of 1991. Lynch argues that this institutionalized structure has consistently devolved from bold ambitions to transform the region by each U.S. president, and eventually reverts to the same patterns and relationships that guarantees U.S. primacy in the Middle East. He acknowledges the role of adversaries and allies alike in upholding the status quo to maintain regime stability. Yet, he argues that the pattern of entrenched regime stability in various nations across the region – be they friend or foe – have persisted in being tied to U.S objectives.

Throughout the book, there is an underlying theme that characterizes the role of the United States: despite the “deep political polarization” (pg. 5) in virtually all other areas within U.S foreign and domestic policy, there is a startling unwillingness of virtually every American president to fundamentally change the core of its foreign policy in the Middle East. Indeed, despite broad ambitions to bring political and economic progress, U.S dominance at all costs, remains the key objective. Rather than acknowledging it’s own complex and embedded role within Arab states, U.S policy is conditioned to point blame towards actors within the region. Failures of political and economic development or security is viewed as a “pathology” (pg. 9) of the region, an endemic issue, rather than the result of the powerfully entrenched structure of the U.S across virtually all states. Lynch points to how powerful regional actors have influenced knowledge reproduction, and in turn, regional policy to their own advantage. From the stable Gulf monarchies like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, to the U.S’s closest ally Israel – all have influenced the cultural, social, and political perceptions and understandings of the Middle East at large. Thus, while Lynch acknowledges the roles of these powerful actors, he centers the role of the U.S as one that has, for better or worse, been the most influential across the complex connections which ties the Middle East together.

The American Strategy

Throughout the text, Lynch proposes evidence to support three major objectives of the U.S and; and how it is those goals characterize the relationship of different presidential administrations with varying state actors in the region. Across an array of seemingly different presidencies throughout recent history, American interests have remained largely the same: maintaining oil flows from Gulf partners, containment of adversaries, and perhaps the most consequential to date – the security of Israel. The relationship with Israel, although initially less “politically co-dependent” developed more significantly with the Nixon Doctrine (pg. 36 & 37) which, decades later, has culminated in the horrific outcomes of the Israel genocide in Gaza and as Lynch himself admits, served as a major impetus for the writing of this text.

Different Presidents – Similar Outcomes

In the introduction of the text, Lynch lays the claim that despite the difference in tactics to approaching Middle East foreign policy, yet a commitment to maintaining the status quo has been virtually the same. Throughout the book, Lynch alludes to the knowledge production and scholarship which has informed U.S policy as one that is produced and reproduced by wealthy elites in the region and a small group of regional experts and policy analysts in government (pg 61-64). The failures to listen to the voices of the Arab public has consistently been the issue of entrenched failures in the region – and characterizes the fallacy of American logic. It was only the horrific war in Gaza – which he describes as “exceptional only in details” which painted a candid picture of the long suffering patterns of American actions in the region.

In the first two chapters, Lynch describes the rise of American primacy in the region as one that supplanted the British and French colonial frameworks of old. He traces the historical origins of the U. S’s role in the Middle East, which coincided with its global rise in the twentieth century at the end of the Cold War. During this time, Lynch details how the balance of power in the international system was one of bipolarity – where American and Soviet interests had the potential for major collisions, particularly in the Arab world. It was the Cold War framework that informed policy in the region and concerns that establishing direct dominance over local leaders (along the lines of the earlier British and French colonial systems) would trigger repercussions across the region globe (pg. 32). The U.S thus avoided expansion in the region as fears that Arab nationalism would lead state leaders to turn to the socialist principles of the Soviet Union. The core interests were economic in nature at the time and revolved around oil supplies in the Gulf region. Preventing the Soviets from disrupting oil flows that could significantly impact the U.S -led international system of Western economies meant securing a military and political presence in the Gulf (pg. 35). In the same vein of Cold War politics, Lynch also focuses on the U.S-Israel relationship and the role of Arab nations (in particular Palestine) during the Nixon and Reagan administrations. Lynch alludes to the evolving relationship between the U.S and Israel, where, despite the difficulties of Israeli leaders and negotiations throughout the decades-long “special relationship” between the two nations, and Israel has long been viewed as an asset to serve U.S interests in the region (pg. 37). In Chapter 3, Lynch highlights the roles of both the first Bush presidency, as well as the presidency of Bill Clinton attempted to remake the Middle East in their image and reach the goal of maintaining U.S primacy in the Middle East. The first Palestinian Intifada, nonviolent in nature, opened the way for fundamental changes in the region, and a step towards the two-state solution. However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent U.S actions both there, and in Iran brought to light the impacts of dual containment in the region in terms of human suffering and loss. Lynch questions U.S assumptions of taking such a leading role in the Palestinian Israeli peace process, while at the same time attempting containment of two nations. Isolating the two issues reflects the failure of both the Bush and Clinton administrations in promoting peace and democracy in the region.

In Chapter 4, From Clinton to Bush: Breaking America’s Middle East, Lynch focuses on the Global War on Terror in the wake of the September 11th attacks during the presidency of George W. Bush. Shifting from the Soviet ideology as the largest threat to America, a religious war rooted so-called Islamism and jihadism became the primary existential danger to the U.S. It was during this time that surveillance of perceived and real threats expanded, as well as the violent wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Most significant perhaps, was the “war of ideas” through the Freedom Agenda where the goal of democratizing the Middle East would support an American-led Middle East order. The Freedom Agenda was rooted in the assumption that repressive regimes that failed to address economic and political grievances, were usurped by radical and violent religious ideologies, and only democratic openings would resolve these issues. Yet, Lynch speaks candidly when he says that the Freedom Agenda was created by those who had “utter contempt for the actual people of the region;” and like autocratic allies in the region, had no interest in democratization, only containment of the traditional adversary Iran. In Chapter 5, Lynch highlights the role President Barack Obama as one that attempted to make actual change in the Middle East, yet the entrenched structural character of the region, one formed by the U.S proved to be a significant challenge. In the case of the Obama, the institutionalized structure of regional allies proved to be the major obstacle to fundamentally changing the regional and domestic political landscapes. During the Arab Spring, when there was an opportunity to make a historic difference with bottom-up democratization, Lynch points to how the Obama administration stood aside. When it came to the issue of recognition of Palestinian statehood, despite his willingness to address the issue, Israel (and Netanyahu) exerted their power in blocking efforts to peace and instead received a massive military aid package. Overall, despite Obama’s ambitions, the collusion of forces across the Middle East and within Washington prevented any change to the structures of political, economic, and military power.

In the final two chapters, Lynch focuses on the consecutive eras of two of the oldest presidents in U.S history – Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden. The backgrounds of each president could not be more different, yet the outcome of both administrations eventually built on the policies of the other. In Chapter 6, Trump: America Without Illusions, there is a stark contrast in Lynch’s description of President Donald Trump in comparison to other presidents (in particular his predecessor). His disregard for traditional protocol in policy and diplomacy reflects the difference in tactics Lynch mentioned in his introduction, particularly his rhetoric which eschewed talk of dignity and human rights. However, at the core of the Trump foreign policy agenda, his administration adhered to the same roadmap of pushing for normalization of Arab Israeli relations, containing Iran, and creating closer economic relations with Gulf nations. Stacking his administration with seasoned conservatives, President Trump sought to form closer relationships with powerful regional allies, yet Lynch pointed to his administration’s failure to see the tenuous relationships between Saudi Arabia and UAE on the one hand, and Qatar on the other hand. The unconventionality of Trump’s political approach led to a missed opportunity to resolve a key ongoing dispute, which the Biden administration resolved immediately upon entering office. In Chapter 7, Biden: The Violent Reordering of the Middle East, Lynch was quick to point out the overconfidence of Biden in his abilities to force through change in the Middle East as a mistake, particularly in light of the fact that the Biden administration simply continued down the same path of the previous administration – including the normalization of Israeli-Arab relations and the continued sanctions against Iran. He further criticizes the entirety of the Biden foreign policy team as having not only prevented the genocide in Gaza but enabling the atrocities and human rights abuses their despite long records of championing human rights throughout their individual careers. Lynch emphasizes the waning influence of U.S primacy in the region prior to the October 7th Hamas assault on Israeli settlements along the Gaza security border. During the Trump era, many leaders, specifically those in Israel and in the Gulf, had enjoyed direct access to the U.S president. Under Biden, an attempt to return to normalcy, through traditional diplomatic protocols, as well as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, led to many long-time allies choosing to remain neutral and not join any side. By 2023, an emerging multipolarity was becoming more accepted among nations of the Global South (pg. 201-202). It was only when Biden gave Israel unmitigated support to unleash horrors upon Gaza, and subsequently Lebanon, that Lynch points to the Biden legacy as one that failed to prevent a genocide despite the power of American presence in the region.

Lynch argues that the issue of oversimplification of the Israel-U. S relationship, the continued support for autocratic leaders, and the unwillingness to bring Israel to heel in its atrocities can only be viewed against the broader backdrop of American presence in the region. From the first Bush presidency to the one-time Biden term, American entrenchment is no longer sustainable in the eyes of the Arab world. Emerging generations of youth in the Middle East are no longer accepting the status quo of foreign interference, over the possibility of economic prosperity, freedom, and dignity.

Conclusion

In the preface of the book, Lynch openly admits to beginning this work in a moment of visceral emotion. The deep emotions of rage, and guilt, was born out of the understanding that the consistent dehumanization of millions across the region over successive US presidencies ranks low on the priorities of US foreign policy.The genocide in Gaza, the legacy of the Biden administration, and the unprededented student protest movements across U.S university campuses all played a role in the motivation for this text. Centering his postion as an academic and researcher in U.S foreign policy in the region, Marc Lynch concedes to his own role through a long career in publications and policy. Speaking to his amicable relationships with many of his long-time interlocutors (those who supported the most extreme version of common pattern off violent U.S policy in the Middle East), Lynch recognizes – with unflinching honesty – an uncomfortable truth: that the people of the Middle East are full human beings with all the attached capabilities of feeling and experience the pain and hope that comes to those who live in the region.

In writing this book, Lynch puts forth an easily digestible text that brings together perspectives of Arab politics and Washington’s Middle East policies by navigating the legitimacy of the U.S. actions against hegemonic interests over the last thirty five years. By analyzing U.S. primacy in the region, and acknowledging the failures of policy that advocated for the continuation of autocratic rule and violent forever wars, Lynch does not offer a clear solution. Rather he asserts that U.S. regional supremacy is coming to an end due to the “internal contradictions” which are the result of paradoxical assumptions about the state of the Middle East. Oscillating between beliefs of the people of the Middle East as one of two extremes – from those fervently seeking U.S liberation from oppression to those bent on American destruction – has been the fallacy of hegemonic foreign policy in the region. Rather than basing U.S objectives on outdated essentialist cultural frameworks (rooted in orientalist discourse) Lynch highlights the burgeoning talent of the Arab nations that does not seek American appeasement. Indeed, he cautions against continuing down the same path of policy in the region. Instead, he proposes that future relations in the region would actively seek to promote order by not siding with those with a history of repression, and instead uphold the values and principles that the U.S has championed around the world for decades.

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