Ankara Under NATO’s Shadow: Why Are the Protests Erupting Now?

In the winter of 1950, Ankara dispatched a force of approximately 5,000 soldiers to the Korean Peninsula-a war that was not its own-for one reason alone: to convince a newly emerging Western alliance that Türkiye deserved membership. The price was steep. Nearly 700 Turkish soldiers lost their lives in exchange for an admission ticket that would not be granted until two years later. Today, exactly seventy-four years on, thousands of Turks gather in Ankara’s Kızılay Square-the very capital that once celebrated that historic accession-to demand that Türkiye withdraw from the Alliance.

As Ankara hosts the NATO Summit on 7–8 July 2026, it is hosting far more than a high-level military gathering: Türkiye, a NATO member since 1952, possesses the Alliance’s second-largest military, occupies a strategic position controlling access to the Black Sea, and seeks to present the summit as international validation of its legitimacy and stability. Yet segments of Türkiye’s left, nationalist circles, and opposition movements view the event as the latest manifestation of the country’s long-standing and deeply ambivalent relationship with the Western military order.

The demonstrations taking place in Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir therefore appear less as a broad-based uprising than as a concentrated political reflection. Those protesting against NATO are simultaneously protesting against the manner in which the Turkish state manages its external relations through the prism of security while governing its domestic sphere through judicial institutions, policing, and the discourse of sovereignty. This paper builds upon three previous studies-“Who Is Protesting, and Why Now?”, “The Revenge of Geography”, and “Ankara’s Dilemma”-and synthesizes them into a unified analytical framework that examines the current developments through three interconnected levels of analysis: Türkiye’s domestic political landscape, the regional strategic environment, and the broader transatlantic international order.

The Ankara Summit constitutes NATO’s thirty-sixth summit meeting, bringing together the heads of state and government of Allied nations within the framework of the North Atlantic Council-the Alliance’s highest political decision-making body. NATO explains that summit meetings are convened at pivotal historical junctures to define strategic priorities, launch new initiatives, expand partnerships, and consolidate deterrence and defence policies. The Ankara Summit follows the Hague Summit held on 24–25 June 2025 and marks only the second occasion on which Türkiye has hosted a NATO summit. The first was the 2004 Istanbul Summit, convened in the aftermath of the Alliance’s largest enlargement, when seven Central and Eastern European and Baltic states joined NATO.

Consequently, the Ankara Summit embodies a dual historical legacy. It recalls the 2004 summit, during which Türkiye leveraged its geopolitical position as NATO’s gateway toward the Gulf through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. At the same time, it reflects the realities of 2026, as the Alliance returns to Türkiye amid the continuing war in Ukraine, mounting instability across the Middle East, the rapid rise of Türkiye’s defence industry, and the gradual erosion of the traditional centrality of the United States as the unquestioned guarantor of Euro-Atlantic security.

The immediate trigger for the demonstrations is opposition to Türkiye’s hosting of the NATO Summit. The Communist Party of Türkiye (TKP) organized marches in Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir, while the party reported that more than one hundred demonstrators were arrested during the Ankara protest. Participants chanted anti-NATO slogans, including, “NATO the killer, get out of our country.” Yet the deeper causes extend well beyond the summit itself. The Turkish left has long cultivated a historical memory of resistance to American military bases and foreign military presence dating back to the Cold War. Within this ideological tradition, NATO is viewed as an imperial military alliance associated with the Korean War, military coups, foreign bases, and Türkiye’s security dependence on the West. The Ankara Summit therefore served less as the origin of the protests than as an opportune catalyst for reviving an enduring political discourse.

The Turkish government, by contrast, has framed the protests as part of a broader national security challenge. Ahead of the summit, the Ankara Governor’s Office imposed a comprehensive ban on public gatherings, demonstrations, banners, and the distribution of printed materials from 28 June to 10 July. These restrictions followed a sweeping wave of arrests involving 225 individuals, 178 of whom were placed in pretrial detention, according to an update by Human Rights Watch. The organization interpreted these measures as evidence of the authorities’ increasingly restrictive approach toward freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, arguing that the application of counterterrorism legislation was closely linked to preparations for hosting a major international summit. Consequently, the demonstrations constitute only one component of a broader political landscape characterized by left-wing mobilization against NATO, expansive security operations targeting activists and political groups, mounting pressure on independent media, and widening political constraints on opposition movements.

A crucial analytical distinction must be drawn between several distinct political actors whose agendas should not be conflated. The Communist Party of Türkiye opposes NATO on explicitly ideological grounds. The broader Kurdish and left-wing opposition challenges the state’s expanding interpretation of terrorism legislation. Meanwhile, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) is engaged in a legal and political confrontation that directly affects the future balance of electoral competition in Türkiye. The Turkish government, however, has increasingly subsumed these diverse political dynamics under the overarching framework of “public security.” This distinction constitutes the central analytical insight: the summit did not create Türkiye’s domestic political crisis, but it provided the state with an exceptionally favorable opportunity to manage it while incurring minimal international political costs. Western leaders arrived in Ankara primarily to discuss defence spending, the war in Ukraine, the future of NATO deterrence, and defence industrial cooperation, while concerns over democratic freedoms and civil liberties were largely relegated to the margins of the agenda. Reuters has noted that NATO allies have become increasingly reluctant to publicly criticize Türkiye’s human rights record since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as strategic engagement with Ankara has become progressively centred on security and defence priorities.

From President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s perspective, the Ankara Summit delivers three mutually reinforcing strategic benefits. First, it provides symbolic legitimacy. Hosting the leaders of NATO’s thirty-two member states in the Turkish capital reinforces the domestic narrative that Türkiye occupies a central position within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and that Erdoğan remains capable of convening the Western alliance on Turkish soil. Second, it generates diplomatic leverage. Ankara seeks expanded defence cooperation, greater technology transfers, and a gradual reintegration into Western defence procurement networks following years of friction over the acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile system, Sweden’s NATO accession, and disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Third, the summit offers domestic political advantages. During such a high-profile international event, any public protest can more readily be portrayed as a threat to the state’s international standing rather than as the legitimate exercise of civil rights. In this sense, security functions as an overarching political narrative-one that safeguards the summit, disciplines public dissent, and increasingly redefines political opposition as a liability to national stability.

The political equation, however, is not one-sided. The protesters themselves are equally exploiting the summit’s symbolic significance. They recognize that demonstrating against NATO in the heart of Ankara, only days before the arrival of Allied leaders, carries a level of political and media visibility that an ordinary protest under normal circumstances could never achieve. Consequently, the slogans articulated during the demonstrations operate simultaneously on three interconnected levels: opposition to NATO as a military alliance, rejection of perceived American dominance over Türkiye’s security policies, and resistance to what protesters regard as the government’s use of the summit as a pretext for restricting civic space. The significance of these demonstrations therefore lies not merely in their size, but in their carefully chosen timing and political setting.

From a regional perspective, Türkiye currently occupies a position of expanding strategic relevance. The war in Ukraine has transformed the Black Sea into a central theatre of European deterrence, while the Montreux Convention grants Ankara legal authority over the passage of warships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye remains directly engaged with strategic dynamics involving Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. Syria and Iraq continue to provide Türkiye with a permanent security depth, encompassing issues ranging from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and border security to energy, water resources, and refugee management. The South Caucasus extends Ankara’s geopolitical reach toward Azerbaijan and Central Asia, while the Gulf increasingly views Türkiye as a potential partner in defence cooperation and military-industrial development. This strategic geography explains why Türkiye remains one of NATO’s most complex members, yet simultaneously one of its most indispensable. As argued in one of the preceding studies, Türkiye’s influence expands whenever strategic necessity outweighs the political costs of accommodating Ankara’s often disruptive policies.

The Israeli dimension occupies a particularly sensitive place within this evolving strategic landscape. In the aftermath of the Gaza war and the broader regional transformations involving Syria and Iran, an increasingly influential current within Israeli strategic thinking has begun to portray Türkiye as a long-term security challenge. A Brookings analysis argues that Israeli security planning has gradually come to regard Türkiye as a potential strategic rival. Similarly, the Nagel Committee, in its January 2025 assessment, warned that a Syria aligned closely with Türkiye could eventually constitute a greater strategic threat than Iran itself. This narrative has been reinforced by the growing circulation of the phrase “Türkiye is the new Iran” in Israeli political discourse, particularly in statements and commentaries associated with former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett.

Yet this Israeli strategic narrative encounters a markedly different reality within the Atlantic Alliance. While Israel retains considerable political and media influence in Washington and several Western capitals, it confronts an institutional security architecture that continues to regard Türkiye as indispensable to NATO’s strategic posture. Within the Alliance, Türkiye is viewed as a cornerstone of Black Sea security, a critical barrier to Russian influence, the home of an increasingly sophisticated defence industry, and a vital geopolitical bridge linking Europe to the Middle East. The Ankara Summit therefore conveys an implicit strategic message: although NATO takes Israeli security concerns seriously within its broader regional assessments, its strategic priorities remain fundamentally structured by the imperatives of military geography rather than by Israeli threat perceptions alone. This should not be interpreted as minimizing the seriousness of Turkish-Israeli tensions. Rather, it reflects the reality that Israel has thus far been unable to transform the narrative of a “Turkish threat” into a coherent NATO policy aimed at politically or strategically isolating Ankara.

From an Arab perspective, the summit carries an additional strategic significance. The 2004 Istanbul Summit launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), opening new channels for security cooperation between NATO and several Gulf states. The Ankara Summit of 2026 effectively revisits the same strategic question in a markedly different regional context: can Türkiye once again serve as NATO’s principal gateway to its southern neighbourhood? The regional environment, however, has changed substantially. Today, the Gulf states possess far greater financial and military autonomy, while Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar simultaneously cultivate strategic partnerships with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and Ankara. Egypt continues its efforts to restore regional influence, while Pakistan has increasingly entered Israeli strategic thinking as a potential component of a broader “Sunni axis” owing to its nuclear capabilities and its close relations with both Türkiye and Qatar. Jordan occupies perhaps the most delicate geopolitical position of all, simultaneously maintaining strategic ties with the West, the Gulf, Israel, Türkiye, Syria, and Iraq. As regional transport corridors, spheres of influence, and strategic alignments continue to be reconfigured, Amman faces the increasingly complex task of preserving a careful balance among multiple, and often competing, geopolitical relationships.

At the international level, the Ankara Summit takes place during a period of profound transformation within NATO, reflecting a shift from the long-standing principle of burden-sharing toward a broader process of burden-shifting. The 2025 Hague Summit raised the Alliance’s defence spending target to 5% of GDP by 2035, while policy debates on both sides of the Atlantic increasingly suggest that Washington seeks to reduce some of its direct security commitments and encourage European allies to assume greater responsibility for financing collective defence and supporting Ukraine. Within this evolving strategic framework, Türkiye’s importance continues to grow. It possesses one of NATO’s largest armed forces, a rapidly expanding defence-industrial base-particularly in unmanned systems-a decisive maritime position controlling access to the Black Sea, a unique working relationship with Russia that enables both communication and strategic bargaining, and sustained influence across Ukraine, Syria, and the South Caucasus. Collectively, these attributes render Türkiye an indispensable strategic partner. At the same time, they provide Ankara with considerable leverage, enabling it to delay Alliance decisions, elevate the terms of negotiation, link defence procurement to broader political disputes, and exploit Western strategic dependence in pursuit of domestic and foreign policy objectives.

The developments unfolding in Ankara, therefore, represent far more than opposition to a single NATO summit. They embody a broader contest over the meaning of security itself. For the Turkish government, security entails maintaining public order, protecting the summit, and projecting the image of a strong and capable state. For the protesters, genuine security cannot coexist with the presence of a foreign military alliance alongside expanding domestic repression. The political opposition argues that lasting security begins with the preservation of democratic competition and political pluralism. NATO’s Western allies, meanwhile, implicitly signal that the security of Europe and the Black Sea currently takes precedence over concerns regarding Türkiye’s democratic trajectory. Israel frames Türkiye’s expanding regional influence as a strategic challenge requiring containment, while Arab governments observe these developments closely, recognizing that Türkiye’s growing role could reshape the strategic balance across Syria, Iraq, the Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The central conclusion, therefore, is that Türkiye is returning to the core of NATO not because it has become more closely aligned with the Alliance’s political values, but because it has become increasingly indispensable to its strategic functions. This constitutes the essence of Ankara’s contemporary paradox. The more Western governments criticize Türkiye’s domestic political trajectory in principle, the more they depend upon Türkiye in practice. Conversely, although Türkiye continues to require Western technologies, advanced defence systems, and industrial cooperation, its geopolitical position, military capabilities, control of the Turkish Straits, and extensive regional networks simultaneously strengthen its bargaining power vis-à-vis its Western partners. This is the essence of what may be described as Ankara’s dilemma: a state pursuing greater strategic autonomy while remaining dependent on Western technological capabilities; an Alliance that cannot dispense with Türkiye despite persistent unease over its policies; an Israel seeking to frame Türkiye as an emerging regional threat while observing NATO reaffirm Türkiye’s strategic centrality; and a Turkish opposition attempting to expose democratic backsliding at a moment when international geopolitical priorities inadvertently provide the government with indirect political insulation.

For this reason, the Ankara Summit will resonate far beyond the meetings of 7–8 July. It represents a critical test of an emerging strategic order within NATO-one in which Europe assumes greater financial responsibility, the United States increasingly relies on negotiation rather than unilateral commitment, Türkiye expands its bargaining leverage, and normative commitments become progressively more vulnerable to the imperatives of deterrence and hard security. The demonstrations unfolding outside the summit venues expose precisely what diplomatic protocol seeks to obscure: that a city opening its doors to the leaders of the Atlantic Alliance simultaneously closes sections of its public space to its own citizens; and that an alliance founded upon the defence of freedom and security finds itself convening within a state that invokes security as a justification for restricting political freedoms. It is within this contradiction that Ankara’s contemporary significance ultimately resides. The city is no longer merely the venue for a diplomatic summit. It has become a living laboratory of an emerging international order in which geography increasingly outweighs rhetoric, strategic necessity eclipses normative commitments, and transactional bargaining assumes precedence over political principle.

References

1. User’s previous analytical papers: “Ankara: Who Is Protesting, and Why Now?”; “The Revenge of Geography in Ankara”; and “Ankara’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Legitimacy and Power in the Atlantic Moment, 2026.”
2. NATO. “NATO Summits.” Updated 22 June 2026.
3. NATO. “Overview: 2026 NATO Summit in Ankara.” Including reference to the 2004 Istanbul Summit.
4. Reuters. “More than 100 Detained as Leftist Groups Hold Anti-NATO Protests in Türkiye.” 5 July 2026.
5. Human Rights Watch. “Türkiye: Crackdown Ahead of NATO Summit.” 25 June 2026.
6. Reuters. “NATO Allies Have Grown Silent on Rights Concerns in Türkiye.” 1 July 2026.
7. Brookings Institution. “Türkiye’s Search for a Middle East Order.” June 2026.