When Tehran Trembles: How Iranian Protests Are Reshaping Jordan’s Regional Calculations
- The article examines the protests in Iran as a pivotal moment that differs from previous waves, as they coincide with a rapid transformation in the regional environment surrounding Iran. It starts from the premise that developments inside Iran are no longer a purely domestic matter, but a regional variable capable of reshaping security balances in the Levant, particularly in arenas close to Jordan. The article links the Iranian crisis to its repercussions in Syria and Iraq, viewing them as the most immediate arenas of spillover resulting from any weakening or fragmentation of decision-making in Tehran.
- The article analyzes the nature of the protests and how they evolved from social anger into a crisis of legitimacy, driven by the interaction of economic collapse, sanctions, political deadlock, and the erosion of trust between the state and society. It identifies the Syrian arena as the most dangerous point of spillover, explaining how Iran’s retreat could reopen the Syrian file internationally and lead to the collapse of fragile arrangements in the south, thereby transferring instability directly to Jordan’s borders.
- The article also analyzes Israeli calculations, emphasizing that Israel does not view the collapse of the Iranian regime as an automatic gain, but rather fears state fragmentation and the uncontrolled spread of weapons and nuclear capabilities, which leads it to prioritize containing chaos rather than toppling the regime. It further analyzes the Jordanian position, showing that Jordan treats the Iranian scene as a high-impact indirect threat and focuses on preventing the transmission of instability from Iran to Syria and ultimately to its own borders.
What is unfolding in Iran today is not merely another wave of protests that can be added to the long record of unrest the Islamic Republic has experienced since its establishment. There is something fundamentally different about this moment-not only in the scale or intensity of public anger, but also in its timing and broader context. The protests are erupting at a time when the region surrounding Iran is undergoing rapid and unprecedented change: the war in Gaza has ended without a political resolution, Iran’s presence in Syria has receded, and the networks of influence that Tehran painstakingly built over two decades have become less cohesive and less capable of functioning as a strategic lever for the regime. This convergence transforms the events inside Iran into a distinctly regional matter, rather than a purely domestic affair that can be isolated from its surroundings.
For a long time, the Iranian regime was able to separate its internal crises from its external confrontations-and even to use the latter as a means of alleviating the former. Today, however, that separation appears far less sustainable. The protests are erupting at a moment of relative weakness, regional disorientation, and unprecedented internal doubt regarding the very meaning of the regime’s continuity.
Accordingly, this paper seeks to assess the trajectories of survival and collapse not as abstract theoretical possibilities, but as practical pathways, each carrying distinct security costs for Jordan. It aims to unpack how transformations within Iran may reverberate across the regional environment most directly affecting Amman. The analysis is grounded in the assumption that the primary risk lies not in the event itself, but in the vacuums and imbalances it may produce across regional arenas-particularly in Syria and Iraq, where networks of influence, smuggling routes, and non-state actors intersect. From this perspective, the paper seeks to move the monitoring of the Iranian scene beyond political observation toward a form of analysis that distinguishes between containable risks and those requiring early fortification, and that builds an approach centered on managing uncertainty rather than waiting for its consequences to materialize along the borders.
Drivers of the Current Protests: From Economic Distress to a Crisis of Legitimacy
To understand why the protests have erupted at this particular moment, it is not sufficient to simply enumerate their causes; rather, one must examine how these factors have converged and transformed into a rupture moment. What distinguishes the current landscape is that economic, political, and social factors no longer operate in isolation. Instead, they have merged into a single, compounded crisis that has placed the state itself under question-not merely its policies. At the core of this crisis lies the economy, not only as a source of livelihood pressure, but as a mechanism for the gradual erosion of trust between state and society. When inflation exceeds 40 percent and approaches 50 percent annually, the crisis becomes one of everyday survival. The entry of Tehran’s bazaar merchants into the protests-historically one of the regime’s pillars of social stability-signaled the collapse of a key pillar of informal control, indicating that dissent had moved from the margins into the very heart of the economic system.
For the first time in decades, Tehran is facing an internal crisis that it can no longer compensate for through external success.
International sanctions, particularly those imposed by the United States, have not merely deepened the crisis but have also restructured the state’s political economy. Since 2018, Iran has suffered declining revenues and near-total exclusion from the global financial system, forcing it to sell its oil to China under unfavorable conditions while transferring the costs of endurance onto society. In this context, sanctions have shifted from being an external constraint to an internal variable that reproduces anger through rising unemployment, currency collapse, and the erosion of the middle class.
Politically, these pressures have unfolded at a moment of complete institutional closure. Since 2021, with hardliners consolidating control over the presidency, parliament, and judiciary, virtually all channels for reform or mediation have disappeared. Elections have lost their meaning, and reformist figures are either silenced or marginalized, rendering protest the only remaining avenue for political expression. At this stage, the street is no longer demanding policy change; it is increasingly questioning the system’s very capacity for reform.
In parallel, ethno-national and sectarian tensions have accelerated the dynamics of protest-not as primary drivers, but as amplifying factors that have deepened the crisis. Recurrent protests in Kurdish and Baluchi regions reflect not only economic deprivation, but also a chronic crisis of belonging to a central state perceived as exclusionary. When peripheral mobilization converges with anger in the center, the system enters a phase that transcends social unrest and moves toward a deeper legitimacy crisis.
The immediate trigger came with the removal of the preferential exchange rate for basic commodities. This decision simultaneously exposed the depth of structural corruption and revealed that the state is no longer able to distribute losses equitably, nor willing to shield the most vulnerable groups. At this point, anger transformed into collective action, and the regime’s traditional containment tools proved insufficient. The streets erupted not in protest of a single decision, but in rejection of an entire trajectory that had reached its breaking point.
The Iranian Regime’s Current Position: A State Exhausted but Not Collapsed
As 2026 begins, the Iranian regime stands in a highly sensitive grey zone: it has not collapsed, yet it is no longer functioning at full capacity. This intermediate condition is politically and securitically the most dangerous, as it generates behavior that is inherently difficult to predict. The state still retains its instruments of coercion and control, and its security apparatus remains cohesive and loyal, but it has lost the ability to manage crises through the same methods it relied upon for decades. Domestically, protests are spreading horizontally without a centralized leadership that could be contained or negotiated with, rendering them far more resistant to rapid suppression. Regionally, the regime has lost one of its most significant strategic cards through its withdrawal from the Syrian arena and the contraction of its role in the post–Gaza war order, which has reduced its capacity to externalize internal pressures or use regional theaters as balancing valves for domestic instability.
In this context, Iranian leadership faces what political science literature describes as a “regime survival stress test”-a moment in which the state’s capacity to endure simultaneous internal and external pressures is fundamentally tested. In such moments, authoritarian regimes tend to reframe protest from a social movement with legitimate demands into an existential threat driven by foreign intervention, thereby justifying a rapid shift from the logic of politics to the logic of security. Official Iranian discourse in recent weeks reflects this transformation clearly, as protests have been framed as fitna and conspiracy rather than as expressions of deep structural dysfunction, opening the door to the use of extraordinary coercive tools under the banner of protecting national security and the Islamic system.
Iran today is a state that is exhausted but not collapsed, and this intermediate condition is the most dangerous because it produces unpredictable behavior.
In practice, the regime’s behavior aligns with the model of coercive capacity maximization that authoritarian systems adopt during periods of high threat. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has been further empowered as the backbone of regime survival, and readiness levels have been raised without reaching full mobilization-a message directed primarily inward rather than as preparation for external war. The involvement of the regular army in protecting vital infrastructure is likewise intended to demonstrate unity among coercive institutions and to preempt any perception of potential fragmentation within the military establishment, a critical signal during moments of existential threat.
Yet repression alone is insufficient to guarantee survival. The regime therefore maintains a narrow margin for maneuver through what the literature terms a repression–concession mix. On the one hand, the security grip is tightened to dismantle protest momentum; on the other, selective appeasement measures-such as limited wage increases or partial reactivation of subsidies-are introduced to prevent the spread of anger to hesitant or partially loyal social groups. This combination of stick and carrot reflects not regime strength so much as its recognition that the conflict has entered a prolonged phase of attrition, and that survival now depends on managing the crisis rather than decisively resolving it.
In this sense, the regime does not perceive itself as standing on the brink of imminent collapse, but it is acutely aware that the era of comfortable crisis management has come to an end. It is now engaged in a battle to prevent the emergence of an alternative leadership or a competing political narrative, while keeping its gaze fixed outward in anticipation of any intervention that might reshuffle the existential deck. Yet the persistence of this intermediate condition-a state strong enough to survive, yet weak enough to miscalculate-constitutes in itself the greatest source of danger for Iran and for the region in the period ahead.
Scenarios of Regime Collapse
What makes the question of the Iranian regime’s collapse relevant today is not the mere existence of protests-Iran has experienced many such waves before-but rather the fact that the state is no longer in a position to absorb shocks as it once did. The economy is in a state of effective paralysis, the currency has lost much of its value, and the capacity to purchase social peace through subsidies or public employment has largely disappeared. More importantly, the regime has lost its ability to compensate for domestic crises through external achievements: it has withdrawn from Syria, its influence has receded in the post-Gaza context, and it has lost its function as a “regional power pulling the strings”-a role that once granted it domestic weight and symbolic authority.
When anger in the periphery converges with anger at the center, the regime no longer faces social unrest but a full-fledged crisis of legitimacy.
At the same time, there is little evidence to suggest that the regime is on the verge of rapid collapse. The security apparatus remains cohesive, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continues to control the core levers of the state, and no meaningful fractures have emerged within centers of power. What we are witnessing instead is an intermediate condition: a fatigued state that has not yet broken; a regime that strikes while defending itself; an authority that preserves its survival while steadily losing the ability to impose a convincing political rationale for that survival.
This grey zone is the most dangerous of all: a regime that lacks the tools for reform yet refuses to fall, and therefore resorts to crisis management rather than crisis resolution. The realistic question, then, is not whether the regime will collapse, but how long it can sustain this condition-and what regional costs will result either from its persistence or from its slow, fragmented disintegration.
Conversely, field evidence thus far does not indicate that the Iranian regime stands on the brink of imminent collapse. Despite the widening scope of protests, the core instruments of control continue to function effectively: security institutions remain intact, the IRGC dominates the political and economic structures of the state, and no qualitative defections have been recorded within the coercive apparatus-the critical indicator that typically precedes regime breakdown, and which has yet to appear. In practical terms, the regime still possesses the capacity to repress, and more importantly, it retains the ability to enforce discipline within its own institutions.
At the same time, the Iranian opposition suffers from clear structural weakness. Popular anger is widespread but unorganized, and the street lacks unified leadership or a coherent political project. The divisions between monarchists and republicans, and between secular currents and the remnants of the reformist camp, are not minor differences but sources of effective paralysis that prevent the transformation of protest from social pressure into a political alternative. This fragmentation grants the regime room for maneuver and renders each protest wave exhaustible rather than transformative, allowing it to be worn down rather than converted into a decisive rupture.
The Potential Israeli Role
From an Israeli security perspective, the collapse of the Iranian regime would represent a rare opportunity to remove the most dangerous strategic threat Israel has faced in decades. Yet it would simultaneously carry major risks no less serious than the regime’s survival itself. Israel would approach such a development not as a celebration of an enemy’s fall, but as an operation of vacuum containment. Its primary objective would be to prevent chaos from generating new threats-particularly in relation to advanced weapons systems and the nuclear program-and to ensure that such capabilities do not fall into the hands of unregulated or non-state actors. This concern would take precedence over any ideological considerations or aspirations to reshape the political system in Tehran.
In this context, Israel would likely focus on shaping the political environment surrounding Iran rather than intervening directly in Iran’s internal dynamics. This could include supporting media channels, strengthening selected opposition forces, pushing toward the emergence of a government less hostile to the West, and engaging in tacit coordination with the United States and regional partners to ensure that any alternative-if it emerges-is less threatening than the current regime. Such efforts, however, would be pursued with extreme caution, as any overt Israeli involvement would undermine prospects for stability and revive the “foreign conspiracy” narrative from which the Iranian regime has long derived political advantage.
The survival of a weak regime in Tehran may be less costly than an unstructured collapse of a state the size of Iran.
Most importantly, Israel does not automatically assume that regime collapse would produce a better strategic reality. The post-2003 Iraqi experience remains deeply embedded in Israeli security thinking: a regime fell, but the state collapsed, and the resulting vacuum produced actors more dangerous and less deterrable than the previous government. Consequently, Israel’s core concern is not how to bring down the regime, but how to prevent the collapse of the Iranian state itself. In cold strategic calculations, the persistence of a weak and exhausted state may be less costly than the emergence of a fragmented polity lacking a central decision-making authority.
The Jordanian Perspective: Security Before Alignment
From a Jordanian perspective, the Iranian protests are not viewed as an opportunity to weaken a regional adversary, but rather as an unpredictable variable whose consequences may prove more dangerous than the persistence of the status quo. Jordan’s experience with regional collapses over the past two decades has firmly entrenched a clear lesson among decision-makers: chaos cannot be managed-it rebounds. Accordingly, the Jordanian approach is grounded in risk management and a preference for relative stability-even if fragile-over rapid collapses whose trajectories cannot be controlled.
The most immediate security concern lies in the potential spillover of Iranian weakness into arenas adjacent to Jordan, particularly southern Syria and western Iraq. Any erosion of Tehran’s ability to control its networks or proxies creates openings for the expansion of arms and narcotics trafficking networks, which increasingly operate according to autonomous economic logic detached from central command. Conversely, it cannot be ruled out that the Iranian regime-or some of its exhausted proxies-may resort to limited external escalation as a form of “forward escape,” seeking to reassert deterrence or export internal pressure. In both scenarios, Jordan lies within the direct rebound zone: its borders become testing grounds, and the smuggling file shifts from a security challenge to a daily strategic threat.
Within the Jordanian–Israeli context after the Gaza war, the retreat of Iran’s role carries a dual effect. On the one hand, the absence of Tehran reduces pressure on Israel across the Gaza and Lebanese fronts, thereby lowering levels of military tension in Jordan’s immediate strategic environment-tensions the kingdom previously experienced during the twelve-day war. On the other hand, it grants Israel greater strategic freedom of action, expanding its maneuvering space on issues that directly affect Jordan, most notably Jerusalem, the West Bank, and post-war arrangements. As such, the weakening of Iran represents a shift in the balance of power that necessitates careful recalibration of relationships and policies, so that the disappearance of a regional rival does not translate into direct pressure on Jordanian interests.
The retreat of Iran’s regional role renders security-based engagement with the Sharaa authority temporary, as armed political Islam loses the function that once justified tolerating it with the disappearance of the threat that sustained it.
In this context, Jordan treats the Iranian scene as an indirect but high-impact security variable, embedding it within a broader equation defined by preventing the transmission of instability from distant arenas to proximate borders. Jordan fears Iran less than it fears what might unravel from Iran’s periphery, and it places little faith in the collapse of regimes-focusing instead on fortifying itself against their repercussions.
Does Jordan Fear the Collapse of the Iranian Regime?
Jordan’s primary concern is centered on the scenario of an unmanaged collapse that could unleash cross-border waves of chaos. An Iran that collapses without a clear alternative may become a source of instability far more dangerous than a weakened but cohesive Iran. For this reason, the Jordanian approach tends to favor relative stability-even if fragile and temporary-over abrupt transformations with unpredictable consequences. Jordan’s experience with the collapse of neighboring states (Iraq after 2003 and Syria after 2011) has taught decision-makers in Amman that the fall of regimes is often followed by vacuums exploited by radical groups or by massive refugee flows, making the costs of chaos far higher than the costs of maintaining a weak but containable regime.
From a strictly pragmatic standpoint, Jordan also takes the evolving Syrian equation into account when assessing the possible outcomes of the Iranian scene. Should the regime in Tehran collapse, the strategic rationale-held by the United States and Israel-for maintaining the current arrangement in Damascus or for dealing pragmatically with the Sharaa authority as a temporary reality may disappear. Western and Israeli engagement with the current Syrian authority in the past phase was not rooted in political acceptance or recognition of lasting legitimacy, but rather in narrow security calculations aimed at ending Iran’s organized presence near Israeli borders and preventing chaos in southern Syria.
With the removal of the immediate Iranian threat, these actors may reassess their stance toward the authority in Damascus, especially given that the nature of the current system-based on armed political Islam-does not align with long-term American and Israeli visions of the regional order. In such a case, Syria could once again be opened as an arena for reordering, pressure, or gradual dismantlement-not for the sake of stability, but to reshape the security environment in line with external interests.
Such a scenario constitutes a strategic nightmare for Jordan, as it would shift the epicenter of instability directly to its northern flank. Any renewed destabilization in Syria-whether through internal conflict, regime fragmentation, or the reopening of combat arenas-would likely trigger additional refugee flows, intensify border security pressures, and increase the risk of extremist group expansion in southern Syria, all of which pose direct threats to Jordanian national security. Consequently, Jordanian decision-makers have a clear interest in preventing a chain of cascading collapses that begin in Iran and end in Syria, and thus prefer-wherever possible-gradual, controlled change over a regional transition into a new cycle of uncontainable chaos.
Accordingly, the danger of Iranian protests does not lie in their internal trajectory or immediate political outcomes, but in the manner in which they may redefine the region’s capacity for control. Jordan does not face a threat emanating from Iran as a state, but rather from the patterns of transformation that may follow its weakening or collapse-when systems previously subject to indirect management enter a phase of rapid fluidity that leaves no room for a safe transitional process.
In moments such as these, regional influence does not unravel gradually; it collapses in the form of gaps. Networks that once operated under a certain ceiling of control-whether motivated by political or economic interests-suddenly transform into autonomous actors seeking funding, legitimacy, and protection. This transformation does not create an immediate threat, but it generates a highly combustible environment in which unregulated actors proliferate, borders are tested, and risk-taking escalates without the presence of a center capable of imposing a general rhythm of control.
From this perspective, Jordan treats the Iranian scene as a test of the region’s ability to sustain fragile equilibrium. The persistence of a weak regime may prolong attrition but preserves basic lines of control, whereas an unmanaged collapse could unleash rebound waves that extend beyond Iran itself and reproduce threats no longer linked to a state or axis, but to the region’s loss of its core mechanisms of control. Jordan does not fear change per se; it fears unpredictable change-which is why caution is not merely a political option, but a security necessity in a regional moment that no longer tolerates margins of error.
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