The Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon after Trump’s Terrorist Designation: Strategic Deadlock and Shifting Alliances

The executive order issued by U.S. President Donald Trump[1] designating the Muslim Brotherhood-including its Lebanese branch-as a terrorist organization represents a pivotal moment in Washington’s approach to political Islam in the Middle East. The decision goes beyond immediate security considerations, reflecting a broader shift in the United States’ assessment of the role of Islamist movements in fragile environments, their connections to wider regional networks, and their impact on trajectories of conflict and alliance formation across the region.

This step carries particular significance in the Lebanese context. The Islamic Group in Lebanon, as the local extension of the Muslim Brotherhood, is not a central or dominant actor within the Sunni political landscape. Rather, it constitutes a religious–social movement with a historical legacy dating back to the 1960s, institutional networks, and a presence that has diminished in certain local environments. In addition, the group assumed a limited military role during the most recent war with Israel through what was known as the “Support Front,”[2] during which it lost several members in Israeli airstrikes targeting an armed organization known as the “Fajr Forces,” as explicitly referenced in the executive order.

The U.S. decision was issued at a moment when the group was seeking to reconfigure its position after years of organizational and political contraction, rendering its implications complex and extending beyond the legal dimension to encompass a broader reshaping of the boundaries of its political and social presence.

Internal Repercussions: Disruption of the Integration Path

In the months preceding the decision, the Islamic Group had been working to re-engage with Lebanese political life through the electoral process, particularly in light of the collapse of the Assad regime and the rise of an Islamist system with a jihadist background.[3] The group, which had been counting on the Syrian transformations, appeared to have entered into quiet and undeclared dialogues with ideologically distant political forces, including the Free Patriotic Movement and the Kataeb Party. These discussions were accompanied by parallel talks with traditional Sunni figures in major cities such as Beirut and Tripoli, aimed at forming joint electoral lists in mixed districts and capitalizing on the vacuum that has characterized the Sunni political arena since the absence of the Future Movement, a development that has resulted in a profound political void.

These discussions pointed to a shift toward building unconventional alliances within Lebanese politics, reflecting the group’s fragile position and its need for new frameworks of influence to overcome its historical isolation. This was particularly the case given that its participation in the “Support Front” alongside Hezbollah failed to receive endorsement from political and religious authorities within the Sunni community.

Consequently, the U.S. decision brought these trajectories to an almost immediate halt. Christian political parties that had previously engaged with the group through an electoral pragmatism-seeking to benefit from its dispersed voter base across multiple electoral districts, within the context of a hybrid electoral system-can no longer afford the political cost of associating with an entity that has now fallen under U.S. scrutiny. Similarly, Sunni political figures who had been exploring electoral arrangements capable of achieving limited breakthroughs are now likely to avoid alliances that carry direct external political risks.

As a result, the political window on which the group had been betting for its repositioning has effectively closed. This development pushes it back into a diminished position within the Sunni landscape and increases the likelihood of its gravitation toward a single axis-the Hezbollah-led axis-not out of political conviction, but as a consequence of the exhaustion of alternative options.

Alignment with Hezbollah

The U.S. designation functions as an indirect driver toward deepening the relationship between the Islamic Group and Hezbollah, not on the basis of ideological convergence, but rather as a result of the similarity of pressures confronting both actors. Once the group is placed within the category of terrorist organizations, its political options narrow significantly, and other Lebanese parties-particularly Christian parties and traditional Sunni actors-become less willing to associate with it or to integrate it into electoral or political alliances. By contrast, Hezbollah emerges as the only actor capable of absorbing the costs associated with maintaining such a relationship, given its long-standing experience with U.S. sanctions and its structural incorporation of Israeli and American pressure into its political and security calculus.

From this perspective, convergence between the Islamic Group and Hezbollah becomes a plausible trajectory under the current constraining environment.[4] Both actors are subject to direct targeting-the former through designation and sanctions, the latter through ongoing Israeli military and security pressure as well as sustained U.S. sanctions-rendering their relationship one of mutual necessity. The Islamic Group requires a political umbrella that provides a minimum level of protection and institutional continuity, while Hezbollah benefits from the group’s continued presence within its allied environment in the Sunni street, even if only with limited weight. Ultimately, this reality pushes toward greater alignment between the two sides, with significant implications for the redefinition of the group’s role and orientation within the Lebanese political system.

Financial Impact: Strangulation of Support Networks

The structure of the Islamic Group in Lebanon cannot be understood outside the network of educational, health, and social institutions it has built over decades. These networks do not merely function as a façade for civic activity; they constitute an internal financing structure, a base of social influence, a recruitment mechanism, and a channel of engagement with lower- and middle-income communities across multiple regions.

Targeting these networks lies at the core of the U.S. executive action, which focuses on drying up funding streams associated with designated terrorist organizations, particularly those accused of facilitating support for Hamas. With the Muslim Brotherhood now classified as a transnational terrorist organization, associations linked to the group become subject to heightened monitoring and face significant obstacles in transferring funds, securing grants, or maintaining financial ties with external actors.

The repercussions of this development are multifaceted: the contraction of the civil institutions that have historically served as the group’s social backbone; the shrinking of its capacity to cover operational costs; increasing difficulties in recruiting new personnel to work within these institutions; and the potential decline in the services they provide-thus weakening the group’s presence in the areas that depend on them. Most critically, these pressures come at a moment when the group is less capable of undertaking internal ideological and organizational reviews, making the challenge of adaptation far more severe than its traditional structure can absorb.

Regional Repercussions: The Loss of the Umbrella and Shifting Calculations

Over the past decade, the standing of the Muslim Brotherhood has steadily declined within the regional calculations of key Middle Eastern actors, most notably Turkey and Qatar-the two states that had provided the most prominent political umbrella for the movement following 2011 and the rise of Islamist forces during the Arab uprisings. This retreat has been driven by understandings reached between these actors and other Arab states, particularly as Turkey has recalibrated its priorities toward economic recovery and regional stabilization amid domestic economic contraction and shifting internal agendas.[5] Additionally, the most recent war on Gaza revealed growing unease between Turkish and Qatari leaderships and Hamas as a practical consequence of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation.

With the issuance of the U.S. decision, the continued sponsorship of the Lebanese branch of the Brotherhood becomes a high-cost option for both states. Turkey, which is seeking to rebuild a negotiation track with Washington and the European Union on the Syrian file and to secure defense procurement deals, is unlikely to risk adding another contentious dossier to its record. Qatar, meanwhile, which is working to consolidate its position as a neutral regional mediator, has little incentive to be perceived as an indirect supporter of an organization now listed on a U.S. terrorist designation list.

In parallel, the new Syrian regime led by Ahmad al-Sharaa has adopted a strategy of distancing itself from all components of political Islam,[6] including the Muslim Brotherhood, as part of an effort to regain international legitimacy. This shift deprives the Lebanese group of an environment that had historically served as a critical rear base. This orientation was reflected in an article by Ahmad Muwaffaq Zaidan,[7] adviser to the Syrian president, in which he called for the dissolution of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood-raising serious questions about how the Lebanese counterpart would be treated.

Taken together, this evolving landscape represents a strategic transformation that leaves the Lebanese Islamic Group without an effective regional cover and forces it to rely almost exclusively on its internal environment at a moment when its financial and organizational capacities are already in decline.

Social Impact and the Difficulty of Structural Renewal

Most sociological studies in the region indicate that younger generations are increasingly inclined toward civic and post-ideological forms of political engagement. Within this context, the U.S. designation constitutes an additional burden on the Islamic Group, as it significantly raises the cost of affiliation and renders commitment to the organization a legally and socially risky choice-particularly at a time when the movement has lost much of its appeal.

This dynamic widens the gap between the group and these generations, making recruitment increasingly difficult, at a moment when the organization’s ideological and structural foundations appear less capable of undertaking the intellectual revisions necessary to adapt to contemporary transformations. Historically, the group has shown limited flexibility in modifying its discourse, which renders the possibility of its ideological reconstitution a near-impossible trajectory.

The central question therefore remains: does this U.S. designation push the Islamic Group in Lebanon toward a phase of “organizational erosion,” in which it gradually loses its capacity to exert influence, or will it instead force the group to reconfigure its identity within a new framework that transcends its traditional ideological and organizational structures?

Future Trajectories and Prospects of Reconfiguration

The U.S. decision appears to constitute a critical juncture that will leave a long-term imprint on the Islamic Group in Lebanon. The cumulative internal, political, financial, and regional repercussions place the movement before a set of difficult choices under conditions that severely constrain its room for maneuver.

The first trajectory involves gradual contraction, whereby the group transforms into an organization of limited influence. Under sustained financial and political pressure, it would lose its capacity for recruitment and social presence, gradually becoming more of a symbolic historical entity than an active social force.

The second trajectory entails full integration into a single political axis-specifically, the Hezbollah-led axis-as the only actor capable of bearing the costs of maintaining a relationship with the group. While this path may provide temporary protection, it fundamentally redefines the organization within a framework that is entirely detached from its original identity.

The third trajectory consists of an attempt at self-reconstruction through a new discourse that shifts the group from a rigid partisan identity toward a low-cost socio-religious identity. However, this option requires a leadership structure capable of undertaking a profound review of its historical ideas and organizational practices-an outcome for which no clear indicators currently exist.

Across these trajectories, one conclusion remains clear: the Islamic Group in Lebanon is entering an unprecedented phase of transformation. The U.S. designation does not merely impose constraints; it actively redraws the boundaries of the group’s presence, role, and modes of influence, confronting it with a new equation-adaptation, contraction, or incorporation into a larger political system in which it risks losing both its autonomy and its traditional identity.

[1] US. Department of the state – Terrorist Designations of Muslim Brotherhood Chapters

[2] Carnegie middle east – Quwwat al-Fajr and Hezbollah: Unlikely Allies Against Israel

[3] Ayoub News – An Anticipated Meeting Between the Islamic Group and the Free Patriotic Movement

[4] Sawt Beirut – A Meeting Between Nasrallah and Takkoush

[5] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon) – and a Saudi and Gulf Ban on the Group

[6] Nidaa Al-Watan (Lebanon) – The Syrian Leadership Refused to Receive the “Islamic Group”

[7] Al Jazeera Net – When Will the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria Dissolve Itself?