JPS Interview with Nabil Amr

Q1: In light of the current circumstances, do you believe that moving into the “second phase” has become an unavoidable trajectory-one that will proceed regardless of whether Israel or Netanyahu desire it or not?

Nabil Amr: the Security Council resolutions-together with the U.S. initiative led by President Donald Trump-make it evident that the political trajectory has become binding, and that the transition to the “second phase” is no longer contingent on Netanyahu’s preferences. The United States has played a decisive role in imposing a ceasefire, whether in the Lebanese arena or in the Gaza Strip; absent this direct intervention, Netanyahu would have continued managing the war solely on the basis of his own calculations.

A close reading of the rapidly unfolding political and diplomatic developments suggests that the recent Security Council resolution, along with the U.S. initiative spearheaded by President Trump, has effectively charted a course that Israel-and Netanyahu in particular-can no longer circumvent. Despite its broad and somewhat general language, the UN resolution implicitly outlines a multi-stage framework. Even though these stages are not mentioned explicitly, they are clearly discernible in the logic of the text and in the nature of the international pressures that have coalesced around it.

Netanyahu has tied his personal political fate, as well as the future of his governing coalition, to the trajectory and outcomes of the war. Having failed to achieve the “absolute victory” he promised his base, he has become willing to prolong the confrontation even at the cost of Gaza’s complete destruction. This is precisely what the international community has deemed no longer acceptable-prompting a gradual removal of decision-making authority from his hands and a shift toward more direct American management of the process.

The American role proved decisive in enforcing the ceasefire, whether in the Lebanese arena or in the Gaza Strip. Had Washington not intervened as directly as it did, Netanyahu would have continued to conduct the war in line with his own political interests. He has effectively tied his personal political survival-and that of his governing coalition-to the trajectory of the war, particularly to the promise of achieving “absolute victory,” a goal that has not been realized and is no longer attainable under the current military and humanitarian conditions. Consequently, leaving the initiative solely in Netanyahu’s hands would have meant the continuation of the war, even if it resulted in the complete destruction of Gaza.

Through this resolution-and through the political mandate granted to President Trump at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, which brought together most of the world’s states and major international blocs-the Security Council has put forward a clear roadmap: first, ending the war, and then opening a political track for the Palestinian question, to be pursued in successive stages. This mandate has effectively positioned Trump as “the de facto leader of the Middle East trajectory” at this particular moment, thereby making the transition to the second phase an explicitly declared international objective.

Although Netanyahu continues to cling to certain pretexts in an effort to delay this transition-such as the issue of the two remaining bodies in Gaza, which he seeks to instrumentalize in order to hold the entire situation hostage to his personal political interests-these pretexts have begun to lose traction as elements of the file’s management gradually shift from his government to the direct oversight of the U.S. administration. Washington now bears responsibility for the delivery of humanitarian aid and for establishing the practical arrangements that will shape the next phase.

Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the possibility that Netanyahu may still surprise the world by obstructing the process-whether by engineering certain events or by leveraging the support of sympathetic figures within the U.S. administration or Congress. Even so, the broader trend points toward a gradual diminishing of his role in directing the war. In my view, the removal of certain files from his hands and their transfer to direct American management is far preferable to allowing him to retain unilateral control over the course of events.

Yet despite these developments, Palestinians and Arabs still face a formidable task: articulating the contours of the next political phase and translating the current international momentum into concrete steps toward the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Q2: Some argue that the recent Security Council resolution is creating a political environment reminiscent of the period that preceded the first Oslo Agreement-suggesting that we may now be on the verge of an “Oslo II.” How do you view this comparison?

Nabil Amr: In my view, this comparison is inaccurate and reflects a considerable degree of historical oversimplification. The contexts in which the first Oslo Agreement emerged and the present moment are fundamentally different. Oslo materialized in the early 1990s, at a time when the world had shifted into a unipolar order following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and when the United States was at the height of its global influence. Europe, too, was more capable of playing supportive and substantive roles in the political process. As for the Arab region, despite its chronic complexities, it enjoyed a relatively higher level of stability-one that allowed for the emergence of a negotiation track of the kind that later came to be known as Oslo.

Moreover, the Oslo Agreement itself was not without fundamental flaws-among them the absence of a clearly defined framework for a final settlement and the inability to curb settlement expansion. Subsequent developments only further exposed the fragility of the structure upon which the agreement had been built.

Today, we inhabit a Middle East vastly different from that of the 1990s. The region has been engulfed in a cycle of continuous upheaval since the Arab Spring, while the global economy has suffered severe shocks in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and its accompanying structural crises. American influence is no longer what it once was, and Europe’s role has diminished significantly, even as other international powers seek to secure a foothold in the region. All of this unfolds against the backdrop of a deeply fragmented Palestinian landscape, a far more brutal occupation, and an ever-expanding settlement enterprise-conditions that render the present moment fundamentally distinct from any context that might be meaningfully compared to the original Oslo period.

If a comparison must be drawn, it is one that highlights the differences rather than the similarities. We are not facing an “Oslo II,” but rather a new moment shaped by the convergence of international pressure and the exhaustion produced by the war-one that demands a reconfiguration of the rules of the game. Yet whatever political outcome emerges from this moment, it will not be a replication of Oslo, regardless of how many interpretations attempt to frame it as such.

Q3: Those who hold this view argue that, at the time of the first Oslo Agreement, the PLO was experiencing severe financial distress-a condition they believe is being replicated today. They also point out that Oslo emerged in the aftermath of Iraq’s defeat, while the present moment follows a series of major blows dealt to the so-called “resistance axis.” Do these parallels strengthen the claim that the current phase is producing an “Oslo II”?

Nabil Amr: I am not inclined toward this type of comparison, as it overlooks the structural differences that distinguish one historical moment from another. Every political development arises within a specific context and derives its logic from a complex web of conditions and variables. It is therefore neither accurate nor appropriate to subject such developments to superficial equations of resemblance.

It is true that, as Palestinians, we have suffered greatly in what I call the “Palestinian October War”-that is, the recent war on Gaza and the subsequent military escalation in the West Bank. The people have borne immense human losses, endured systematic destruction of infrastructure, and faced a severe contraction of everyday life. Yet these losses did not yield a single, uniform outcome. Alongside this tragic dimension emerged a political gain of profound strategic significance: the establishment of a Palestinian state has become a global commitment rather than a matter of moral sympathy or transient political support.

When nearly 190 states recognize the State of Palestine, they do not do so merely to ease their conscience or to placate the Palestinians. Rather, they have reached a deep conviction that the Palestinian question-if left unresolved-will remain the core source of instability in the Middle East and a perpetual drain on international interests in the region. This reality, though it has emerged from a tragic context, ultimately serves the Palestinians’ long-term strategic interest.

However, it must be underscored that international recognition does not, in itself, create a state. It constitutes a significant reservoir of political capital, yet this capital must be translated into institutional and practical realities. Such a transformation requires a coordinated Palestinian–Arab–international effort to move recognition from the realm of legal legitimacy to the realm of actual, tangible statehood on the ground.

Among the most significant variables shaping the current context is the direct entry of political Islam into the political arena-not as a distant expression of solidarity, but as an active participant within Arab and Islamic governance structures. This presence has altered the very terms of engagement with Israel. When representatives of Arab and Islamic states met with Netanyahu in Washington, they compelled him-for the first time and with unprecedented firmness-to explicitly retreat from the idea of annexation, which had constituted the core of his political project, and to abandon the displacement schemes he had repeatedly hinted at, including the so-called “Riviera Plan,” which envisioned uprooting the population of Gaza and dispersing them across the world without any right of return.

We are now at the heart of an open-ended confrontation-one in which certain gains are being secured while others continue to face obstacles. This is a natural feature of any political or negotiating process; no settlement with an adversary grants either side everything it desires. What is unfolding today is not a “second Oslo,” but rather a political moment defined by new dynamics. It requires sustained Arab, Islamic, and international effort to translate the recognition of the State of Palestine into tangible reality, rather than allowing it to remain merely ink on paper.

Q4: The Security Council resolution stipulates that any political progress or transition is contingent upon reforms being carried out “to a satisfactory extent” within the Palestinian Authority. How do you interpret this reference? Is it a widely used pretext, or an objective requirement?

Nabil ‘Amr: Unfortunately, this reference cannot be dismissed as a mere pretext; it is an undeniable reality. We, as Palestinians, live under the authority of the Palestinian Authority and are fully aware of its conditions. Are we satisfied with its performance? Is the Authority exerting the necessary effort to address the most critical issue in modern Palestinian history? The straightforward answer is: no.

For this reason, when I speak of reform, I do not view it as an American demand or an international condition so much as a purely national necessity-one that stems from the needs of the people themselves. It is a necessity for strengthening their resilience, consolidating their presence on their land, and enabling them to defend and reclaim their rights.

Any genuine reform must be grounded in an internal Palestinian vision and in the conviction that building a strong national institution is a condition for existence, not merely a condition for negotiation. The international community may link reform to its engagement with the Palestinian Authority, but this linkage-however pressing it may appear-does not alter the essence of the matter: we need reform because the condition of our institutions demands it, not because external actors call for it.

Reform, then, is not a struggle with external actors; it is a struggle with ourselves-with a political structure that requires reconstruction, and with an institution that must renew its legitimacy and enhance its capacity to confront the challenges of the current phase.

Q5: But is this truly what the Security Council resolution means-and what the Americans and others actually want? Or has the discourse on “reform” become a pretext that international actors employ to exert pressure on the Palestinians?

Nabil ‘Amr: There are indeed genuine points of convergence between what the international community is requesting and what the Palestinians themselves objectively need. In principle, the world has no objection to the Palestinians having a parliament elected freely and fairly, nor does it oppose the establishment of an authority grounded in clear democratic legitimacy; in fact, this is an essential prerequisite for serious engagement with any political entity. The Palestinian Authority, before facing any external pressure, should have taken the initiative to open a comprehensive electoral process, rather than searching for pretexts to obstruct it under the label of “postponement.”

Not everything demanded from the outside is correct or well-intentioned; this is an undeniable reality. Yet the essence of reform remains a national necessity that cannot be deferred. Genuine reform is the kind that closes off pretexts available to our adversaries and strengthens the Palestinians’ ability to advance their national project.

Take, for example, the issue of school curricula. This file is frequently invoked to level predetermined accusations against the Palestinians. Nevertheless, the Palestinian Authority-through an institutional approach-succeeded in opening this dossier to UNESCO, allowing the organization to examine both our curricula and theirs. During my tenure in the Authority, I was personally responsible for the editorial committee, and my Israeli counterpart was then–Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni (or whoever held the foreign ministry portfolio at the time).

In one of the discussions on so-called “incitement,” I said to her something that remains recorded in the meeting minutes: Who incites more? A poem by a Palestinian poet? A school lesson? A map that depicts Palestine? Or an Israeli official who publicly declares that he “wishes the sea would swallow Gaza”? And before that, Lieberman stated that he “wished the Palestinians would drown in the Dead Sea.” If this is not incitement, then what is?

This is why I say that the manner in which issues are managed is what either closes off pretexts or opens them wide. If you manage a file effectively, you become capable of defending and preserving your narrative. But if you mismanage it, it inevitably turns into an indictment against you.

Q6: Are the immense financial pressures imposed on the Palestinian Authority-and the attempts by certain regional actors to restrict its role-part of a broader equation? Is this the real context behind these pressures?

Nabil ‘Amr: No, the region is not involved in the core of this issue in the way some imagine. And I do not want the Palestinian people to believe that “the entire world is against them”-for such a perception leads only to resignation. Before speaking about external actors, we must begin with ourselves. The Palestinian, when acting with awareness and wisdom, is capable of achieving a great deal-whether in confronting the occupation or in addressing internal crises.

Take, for example, the issue of elections. Even if Israel were to prevent them from being held in Jerusalem, is that sufficient justification to suspend elections across all of Palestine? In Jerusalem, we-Palestinians, institutions, leadership, and people-were able to hold the funeral of Faisal al-Husseini, attended by hundreds of thousands in the heart of the occupied city. We also managed to hold the funeral of Shireen Abu Akleh despite Israeli police repression-and we succeeded.

Why, then, does our political rationality suddenly collapse when it comes to the elections file? Why should we wait for Ben-Gvir’s approval to hold elections in Jerusalem? This is neither politically logical nor nationally justifiable.

Elections, under occupation, are not a governmental luxury; they are an act of resistance-a form of democratic resistance that confronts the occupier through the ballot box. The Palestinian Authority’s justification for cancelling the elections was, at its core, merely a pretext, for there was no genuine preparedness for elections to begin with. It is essential to be unequivocal: the absence of elections is not a technical matter; it is a political one.

There is a reality that cannot be ignored: Palestinians-by virtue of their demographic, geographic, and numerical presence-have become far too substantial to be sidelined or bypassed. Today, nearly nine million Palestinians live across historic Palestine: in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and within the Green Line. This massive human presence constitutes a structural dilemma for Israel, which has no viable solution for dealing with it: it cannot eliminate them, nor can it expel them, nor can it absorb them into any purported “final-resolution” project that erases Palestinian national rights.

Even in the Negev-where Israel recently erected concrete barriers-we must ask: if the state is unable to manage a few thousand Palestinians within the Negev itself, then how will it contend with nine million Palestinians spread across the entirety of historic Palestine?

The Palestinians’ most significant strategic source of power today lies in their demographic density, which has multiplied several times since 1967, including in Jerusalem. In the Old City alone, Palestinians constitute a clear numerical majority. It is this demographic reality that has halted-and will continue to halt-large-scale schemes of eradication or mass displacement. It is also the reality that has compelled the international community to recognize the Palestinians’ right to establish an independent state along the 1967 borders, to place the refugee question squarely on the agenda of a final-status resolution, and to acknowledge East Jerusalem as the capital of that state.

From this standpoint, it becomes imperative for the Palestinian Authority-and for society at large-to translate this strategic asset into an institutionalized political practice capable of generating tangible impact. It is not enough to wait for the world to act, nor to place the burden of responsibility solely on the international community. The point of departure must be internal: by reorganizing the national arena, fostering an active and mobilized public sphere, and presenting a credible and coherent model of governance that enables the international community to support the Palestinians with clarity and confidence.

Someone once remarked to me on television: “One hundred thousand people marched in London. Did more than twenty or thirty people even turn out in Ramallah?” I felt genuinely embarrassed, for I had seen with my own eyes-after a general call for mass mobilization-that the number of participants was remarkably small, and that nearly half of them were security personnel. This exposes an internal deficiency before it reveals any external one.

In sum, Palestinians must first fulfill their own obligations before asking others for additional support.

The Security Council has provided a political horizon, but translating that horizon into reality is our responsibility-not the responsibility of others.

Q7: Based on your assessments today, what do you foresee as the future of the Palestinian political system in both its components-the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority-as well as the model that Hamas has established in the Gaza Strip, a model that now stands at a critical crossroads?

Nabil Amro: The issue is not merely that the model is “at stake,” as you put it; rather, I believe the situation has gone far beyond that. What occurred in Gaza did not simply bring an end to the governing model there-it obliterated the very environment that sustained it. When between 80% and 85% of the Strip is destroyed, we are confronted with a level of devastation unprecedented in modern Palestinian history: not during the 1967 setback, nor the 1973 war, nor at any other juncture of an occupation that has now stretched across nearly a century.

Today, we are not speaking of an authority experiencing a momentary shock; we are speaking of a place compelled to begin its life from scratch. The reconstruction of Gaza starts from almost absolute zero-a reality that cannot be ignored, nor can its severity be understated.

Naturally, Hamas cannot absolve itself of part of the responsibility for what has occurred. It was the de facto governing authority, and it administered the Strip throughout the years preceding the war. Yes, it resisted Israel and inflicted losses upon it-no one denies that-but the overarching outcome is that we have lost most of Gaza, and that restoring it to its previous state may require no less than twenty years.

How many widows has the war left behind? How many children perished in their earliest months or years? How many generations have lost half-or even three-quarters-of their schooling? These are not passing statistics; they are lived realities that will shape the future of Palestinian society for decades to come.

Political action-and any political movement-is not judged solely by the righteousness of its motives; it is judged by its ability to minimize losses and maximize gains. This, in turn, requires clear mechanisms for protecting civilians, securing adequate shelters, and safeguarding the educational process. The collapse of education alone is enough to extinguish the future of an entire nation.

When I think of a fifteen-year-old adolescent who has lost three or four years of schooling due to the war, it means I am compelled to return him to the educational level of an eight-year-old child. Such a gap is not easily repaired with time. The decision to engage in resistance or military action cannot be assessed by zeal alone, but rather by careful calculations of its outcomes-for those who measure well, achieve well.

Q8: In light of this reality, how do you envision the future of the Palestinian political system?

Nabil Amro: In your question, you allude to what appears to be a dichotomy between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority, as though they were two separate entities. Such a dichotomy does not actually exist in political reality. There is no genuine separation between them: the PLO relies financially and administratively on the institutions of the Authority, while the Authority derives its primary legitimacy from the legitimacy of the PLO.

Is it conceivable to say that Mahmoud Abbas is president of the Authority but not president of the PLO-or the reverse? Can a person be divided in half? Politically, this is simply illogical.

The Palestinian political system is a single, integrated framework whose structure extends from the primary school all the way to the presidency. Unless this system-its institutions, structures, and mechanisms of governance-functions cohesively, no reform effort can succeed.

The absence of separation of powers, the near absence of an independent judiciary, and the paralysis of the Legislative Council are all manifestations of a system in disarray. At the core of this entire structure lies one fundamental pillar: the ballot box. When a political leadership abandons recourse to the ballot box and searches for pretexts to prevent elections, it is effectively paving the way for personalized rule and obstructing democratic life.

Therefore, it is meaningless to speak of “reforming the PLO first and then reforming the Authority.” Even tribal structures do not manage their internal affairs in such a fragmented manner. The entire system-the PLO, the Palestinian Authority, local councils, and trade unions-must undergo a comprehensive reordering within a unified framework grounded in one principle: direct elections, or direct popular mandate.

We conduct local elections with considerable success, and experience has shown that municipal elections have produced genuinely commendable models: enlightened young leaders, well-crafted plans, effective administration, and substantive programs. Why, then, should this experience not be extended to the parliament? Why should it not be extended to the presidency?

The answer is straightforward: those who fear elections fear the revelation of their true political weight. And because this fear exists, the refrain becomes: “The circumstances do not allow it.” But when have circumstances ever truly favored the Palestinian people? Circumstances are not granted; they are seized.

This is why I state clearly: we currently find ourselves in a situation with no functioning political system. And unless this system is restored through electoral legitimacy, Palestinians will remain managing a political reality devoid of the structural foundations of both statehood and representative governance.

Q9: Why did the Security Council resolution avoid any detailed reference to the situation in the West Bank, except for its mention of “market reform”?

Nabil Amro: Practically speaking, when drafting any international resolution related to an ongoing war, priority is given to the most urgent issue-and this is precisely what happened with Gaza. Attention became so fragmented around the Strip that separate tracks emerged: one for a ceasefire, another for civil administration, and a third for humanitarian relief. Naturally, then, the focus on Gaza was far more pronounced than the focus on the West Bank.

However, the resolution did not ignore the core of the political track; it included an explicit reference to the need to reopen the Middle East file through a process that leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state. This central trajectory is present, and it emerged in the aftermath of a global conference held in New York, during which the majority of the world’s states recognized the State of Palestine.

As for the Americans, there is a widespread misunderstanding: the United States is not opposed to the idea of a Palestinian state; it is opposed to the timing of its establishment.

It was the United States that coined the term “two-state solution.” And the American position today essentially says: yes to Palestinian rights-but not now. This does not signify rejection of statehood; rather, it reflects Washington’s belief-whether justified or not-that the conditions are not yet ripe.

Our task as Palestinians-together with the Arabs and Europeans-is to persuade the Americans that delay only makes matters more complicated, and that recognition of a Palestinian state without concrete implementation measures remains meaningless. It has also become clear that the countries which have recognized Palestine are capable of taking far more serious steps, provided there is a unified Palestinian will.

Q10: The situation in the West Bank today is extremely explosive!

Nabil Amro: That is true-and this volatility lends renewed credibility to the Palestinian narrative on the international stage. When the occupation persists and settlement expansion continues unabated, an eruption becomes not only expected but inevitable. Any flare-up in the West Bank immediately exposes the futility of attempts to obscure the fundamental truth: that the absence of a comprehensive political solution is the root of the entire crisis.

When Israel expands its settlements, proposes annexation schemes, or unleashes the “youth”-the settler militias-against Palestinian villages, the entire political architecture that some international actors, including Trump, hope to construct in Gaza collapses under the weight of a single eruption in the West Bank. The conflict is interconnected; Gaza cannot be addressed in isolation from the West Bank.

Thus, when we tell the world: Look at what happens in the absence of a just and acceptable political solution for the Palestinian people, the explosion in the West Bank becomes further evidence that the roots of the crisis are not security-related but fundamentally political, and that occupation and settlement expansion are the true sources of instability.

The world, at its core, understands this reality: as long as the occupation endures, the West Bank will remain susceptible to ignition; and as long as settlement expansion continues, any political arrangement will remain fragile and incomplete.

Q11: Some argue that there is a global silence regarding settler crimes. Do you share this view؟

Nabil Amr: No, there is no silence in the sense that is often claimed. Europe-as a whole-has repeatedly warned against settler violence, called for its cessation, and categorically refused to recognize any settlement, from the very first to the most recent outpost. There may be limited exceptions here and there, but they do not alter the broader European consensus rejecting any form of legitimization of settlement activity.

The only parties that exhibit a degree of leniency toward the settlers are certain institutions within the United States and some currents inside the U.S. administration. As for the broader international position, it is unequivocal: there is no legitimacy for any form of settlement activity.

But the heart of the matter does not lie in the world’s statements; it lies in the position of the Palestinians themselves. Had the Palestinians accepted annexation or settlement expansion in exchange for certain “everyday conveniences,” the settlement enterprise would have prevailed. Yet they did not. On the contrary, they remained steadfast, held their ground, and refused to abandon their land despite the settlers’ terror.

This popular steadfastness is precisely what has thwarted the project of emptying the land, and it is what keeps the possibility of a Palestinian state alive-no matter how intense the assault becomes.

Q12: Returning briefly to the international context: Do you foresee a settlement in Ukraine? Have the conditions matured for such an outcome?

Nabil Amr: No, the conditions have not yet matured. The reason lies in Trump’s approach to crisis management. He is an impulsive figure who deals with some of the world’s most complex crises with the mindset of a contractor seeking to build a tower: he buys the cement, gathers the workers, and starts construction-without examining the roots of the problem or its structural complexity.

Trump is now speaking of handing parts of Ukraine over to Russia and is thinking in transactional terms, as though he possesses a “magic wand” with which he can redraw borders at will. Yet he overlooks the fact that Ukraine is a vast country-its territory nearly the size of France-with immense resources, and that the war there is not merely a border dispute but a structural struggle over identity, sovereignty, and vital strategic space.

Even his pledge that Ukraine should “pay back from its own flesh” all the American assistance it has received-by granting Washington access to fields and underground resources-reflects a dangerously reductionist worldview.

I certainly hope for a settlement that would end the Russian–Ukrainian tragedy and alleviate the immense human losses-hundreds of thousands have lost their lives-but Trump’s approach does not inspire confidence. It may push Ukraine toward a form of partial capitulation, yet the foundations for such an outcome remain unclear, and I do not see that the objective conditions for a real solution have yet been met.

Question 13: If a settlement in Ukraine could emerge on the basis of annexation, why can’t the same logic be applied here-in the West Bank-given the current balance of power?

Nabil Amr: The Ukrainian context cannot be mapped onto the Palestinian one. The differences are structural and profound. Historic Palestine-the West Bank, Gaza, and the areas within the Green Line-with its geography and demographic makeup, does not constitute even the equivalent of a single major Ukrainian city. The situation is fundamentally different in every respect.

Moreover, who is the decision-maker in this context? In the matter of annexation, Trump spoke as though he held the master key to all solutions, yet the moment he encountered international objections, he stepped back. This underscores that annexation is not an inevitable fate, but rather a subject of ongoing struggle between Palestinians and Israelis.

As Palestinians, we face a clear equation: either we recover all the territories occupied in 1967-including East Jerusalem-as recognized by the international community, or the conflict will persist. This is an equation that has endured for 60 or 70 years, and it cannot be reduced to the logic of “the strong impose their will.” History is full of states that collapsed and surrendered during the world wars, yet that did not become a rule obligating all peoples to capitulate to superior force.

Today, the world stands with us in demanding the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders and in placing the refugee question on the negotiating table. This is not a favor granted by anyone; it is the direct outcome of the Palestinian people’s steadfastness.

Q14: But the annexation project is advancing rapidly on the ground, imposing new facts almost every hour!

Nabil Amr: I do not see the matter in that way; I view the scene from a different angle. There is a fundamental difference between occupation and annexation. Occupation is a coercive form of control grounded in force-one that can, at any moment, translate into soldiers storming your home and taking you to prison. It is an ongoing, oppressive reality. Annexation, however, is something else entirely: it means that the occupied land becomes part of Israel with your consent. And that will not happen.

Israel may impose facts of occupation on the ground-yes. But annexation requires Palestinian, legal, and political recognition that the land is part of Israel. This is impossible. As long as the Palestinian remains on his land, as long as the people stand firm upon their soil, occupation will never be transformed into annexation. Occupation may persist and even intensify, but it only becomes annexation if the rightful owners of the land acknowledge it-and we have not, and will not, do so.

Q15: Are Jordan’s current concerns regarding possible displacement and the developments in the West Bank justified?

Nabil Amr: Yes, these concerns are justified-strategically before anything else-because the Jordanian state is not a neutral party in the Palestinian question; it is an integral actor within it. Jordan bears a longstanding pan-Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause and to the establishment of a Palestinian state. And we should not forget that the first Palestinian embassy established outside the occupied territories was opened by the Jordanian state in Amman-an action of profound political significance.

From a security standpoint, it is entirely natural for any state that respects itself to account for the presence of a powerful occupying military force directly on its borders. The distance between the Israeli army and the East Bank, as the common expression goes, is no more than “a few steps.” And despite Jordan’s limited capabilities compared to Israel’s vast military power, Amman plays a pivotal role in warning against annexation and in mobilizing diplomatic, political, and public efforts to counter it.

Annexing the Jordan Valley, for example, would directly infringe upon a set of pan-Arab responsibilities shared by major regional states-including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

It is important to note here that attempts at “political manipulation” have never ceased. Among these efforts is the push toward so-called “voluntary displacement,” repackaged as economic deals. Unofficial proposals were, at various moments, floated to Jordan, suggesting economic incentives in exchange for absorbing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. Yet the Jordanian response was unequivocal: absolute rejection.

Had Jordan or Egypt shown even minimal leniency on the issue of displacement, it might well have become a reality. Netanyahu himself stated openly that Palestinians could be “relocated” to other countries, going so far as to propose sending them to the Empty Quarter. However, the Jordanian position-much like the Egyptian one-stood as a firm barrier against such proposals.

For this reason, I said from the very first day that displacement would not occur. Egypt would never collude in the removal of Gaza’s population, and Jordan would not accept it under any circumstances, regardless of the cost. The Jordanian and Egyptian positions together formed a “formidable barrier” that blocked displacement in practice on the ground-before blocking it politically or in the media.

Q16: There is a political view in Jordan-one that is not marginal-that argues the Kingdom has paid a heavy price for the Palestinians, and that the time has come to focus inward. To what extent does this view reflect a political reality?

Nabil Amr: This view is marginal and does not reflect the mainstream current in Jordan. Had it been a core political position, the normalization process between Israel and Jordanian society would have advanced significantly-but it has not. It is true that proponents of this narrative exist, even among some Palestinians themselves, yet their influence remains limited, and they are not in any position to reach decision-making circles.

In Jordan, there exists a genuine state that indeed faces challenges and crises. Yet the essence of the relationship between Jordanians and Palestinians has, over decades, remained one of complementarity rather than discord. As I have often said: at one point in history, “we divided the one into two halves,” but those two halves were harmonious-and neither sought separation or retreat.

In truth, Jordan constitutes the primary lifeline for the Palestinians. From Amman, Palestinians are able to connect with the rest of the world, whereas the closure of this lifeline would amount to an existential suffocation. It would be misguided to assume that, when all other avenues are blocked, the Palestinian’s sole aspiration would be reduced to seeking employment in Israel.

Those who assume that Jordan’s disengagement from the Palestinian question would transform it into a “Switzerland of the East” overlook reality entirely. A serious state places its national security above all other considerations. Jordan’s national security-much like Egypt’s-is organically linked to Palestine. Egypt once declared that Gaza and Palestine constitute a central pillar of its national security doctrine. And despite the setbacks and defeats Cairo has endured over the years, this foundational principle has remained intact.

The same applies to Jordan: the bonds that unite Jordanians and Palestinians far outweigh anything that might divide them. Those who imagine that Jordan would become a wealthy and secure state simply by distancing itself from the Palestinian question fail to grasp their country’s geopolitical position or the very meaning of its national security.

Q17: Could the current political deadlocks and accumulating crises revive the idea of a “confederation” with Jordan, particularly in light of scenarios involving Gaza’s separation?

Nabil Amr: No, there is neither a “separation” of Gaza nor any engagement with confederation-related proposals in the current context. I have said before-on this very platform-that forced displacement will not occur, and everything written about it at the height of the war has proven today to be unfeasible. Yes, an individual Palestinian may travel abroad in search of employment, as happens everywhere in the world, but this in no way severs his connection to his homeland.

When Trump introduced the so-called “Riviera Project,” it implied the permanent departure of Palestinians with no prospect of return-an idea that is no longer on the table. The Gaza issue may eventually reach some form of resolution, and some Palestinians may indeed leave in search of employment opportunities. Yet all of this remains governed by a single condition: that they retain ownership of their land, preserve their national identity, and maintain the ability to return whenever they choose.

I prefer this response

The historical experience is clear: there are more Lebanese living outside Lebanon today than within its borders, yet a Lebanese remains Lebanese wherever he goes. The same applies to Palestinians: one may work in Amman, run a restaurant, open a salon, or even emigrate to the United States and obtain its citizenship, but his connection to his homeland does not cease.

As for me personally, I would say this: even if Smotrich lived in the apartment above my son’s, or Ben-Gvir resided in the one below, I would not leave. This is not merely a matter of symbolic steadfastness; it is because our lives have been built on this land, and millions of Palestinians have established their homes and livelihoods here. How can any human being abandon his house and property simply because “Ben-Gvir does not want him there”? The very notion is absurd.

And reality itself attests to this: the bridges between Palestine and Jordan remain wide open, with convoys continuously moving back and forth. I once asked a foreign journalist to spend a single day at the bridge, only to observe that those entering Palestine outnumber those leaving it-despite the occupation and despite the violence of the so-called “Hilltop Youth” and the settlers.

Palestinians live on their land and remain steadfastly attached to it. This is not rhetorical flourish; it is a tangible reality visible to anyone who observes, with their own eyes, the movement of people between the two banks of the Jordan. Palestine is vibrant with its people-rooted, present, and enduring. Neither schemes of displacement will succeed, nor will the imagined scenarios of “detachment” ever materialize.

Q18: Does the idea of a “confederation” constitute a realistic option for the Palestinians at this particular moment?

Nabil Amr: To begin with, it is important to recall the historical and political dimensions of our national options. The notion of a confederation is not a novel idea; it is explicitly referenced in the resolutions of the Palestine National Council, which means it is a recognized option within the set of strategic alternatives examined by the highest Palestinian institutions. However, any serious discussion of such a framework cannot overlook a fundamental prerequisite: that it be embraced by both the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples. This point is essential. No form of union can be constructed through a top-down bureaucratic decision; it must be grounded in the will of the people, expressed through a clear popular referendum that ensures mutual consent.

When we examine the nature of this relationship, we find that the social fabric shared by the two peoples constitutes a powerful supporting factor for any future integrative framework. The familial intertwinement between Jordanians and Palestinians is both extensive and deeply rooted. One need only consider how many Jordanian youths have Palestinian aunts and uncles, and how many Palestinian youths are bound by genuine kinship ties to Jordanian families. Such social integration is not commonly found among neighboring societies, and it stands as one of the most critical pillars for any prospective unifying project.

Q19: Some propose the idea of a confederation as part of a “solution with Israel,” rather than as a framework to be considered after a political settlement. How do you respond to this view?

Nabil Amr: At this point, Israel must be removed from the center of the equation. A confederation is not a negotiating project with Israel, nor should it be transformed into an “appendix” to any political settlement. Historically, this idea was discussed between the late President Yasser Arafat and King Hussein, and the discussion was unequivocal: a confederation would come after the establishment of the Palestinian state – not before it.

The current Jordanian position also reflects a measure of political wisdom: “When conditions mature, any form of cooperation can be discussed.” This is a pragmatic stance. In terms of political heritage, our relationship with Jordan was not merely a potential confederation; historically, it was closer to a genuine integrative union. This legacy of unity between the two peoples provides both a psychological and political foundation for any future framework.

Even if a Palestinian state were to emerge tomorrow, it would still be possible to conclude far-reaching agreements with Jordan-covering economic cooperation, security coordination, education, travel, and trade. The European Union itself is not a single state, yet it practices remarkably high levels of integration.

In the end, this remains a joint Palestinian–Jordanian choice. The Palestinians cannot impose it on Jordan, nor can Jordan impose it on the Palestinians. Without a shared decision, no framework can succeed. Therefore, I state clearly:

A confederation is, fundamentally, a Palestinian demand-one that is contingent upon the establishment of two states and upon the mutual consent of both sides. It may, in fact, provide a framework that enables Palestinians to consolidate their statehood within a stable, well-structured, and healthy relationship with Jordan.

Q20: How do the Lebanese impasse and the developments in Syria impact the West Bank and the broader Palestinian landscape?

Nabil Amr: To answer this question with precision, one must analyze the regional architecture. Prior to the crisis, Syria was not an “ordinary” state; it functioned as the decisive balancing point between two competing Arab orientations: the axis of resistance and the axis of political settlement. And although Syria was not engaged in direct confrontation with Israel, it nonetheless played a pivotal role in sponsoring resistance movements and providing them with strategic corridors. Hezbollah, for instance, relies on Syria as its principal logistical and political backbone.

When the Syrian regime reached a point of near-collapse at one stage, it represented the most significant strategic loss for the “resistance camp,” for Syria is one of the most influential states in the Middle East-owing to its pivotal geographic location, its multiple international borders, and its historic role in shaping the region’s balance of power.

As for Lebanon, it is the Arab country that has provided Palestinians with the greatest political, material, and moral support over the decades. We lived in Lebanon and built a substantial portion of our political achievements there. Our experience in Lebanon demonstrates that our circumstances have always been shaped by the nature of our relations with the various Lebanese actors:

• When we find ourselves in confrontation with a Lebanese party, the resulting crises immediately reverberate onto us;

• And when the relationship is positive, the political environment improves accordingly.

Nor should we forget that Palestinians in Lebanon remain within the circle of vulnerability; they continue to be wounded and killed in clashes and in airstrikes. The recent strike on Ain al-Halazon stands as a vivid contemporary example.

Accordingly, when viewing the Middle East as an interconnected system, we-as Palestinians-emerge as part of a single regional destiny. We are affected by everything that transpires in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, and we inevitably interact with the political and security repercussions of these developments.

Q21: Is it conceivable that a “Palestinian Ahmad al-Shar’a” could emerge and upend the landscape

Academic Translation:

Nabil Amr: We must be cautious about projecting the experiences of other countries onto our own reality. Ahmad al-Shar’a is a Syrian figure, and it is neither analytically sound nor politically appropriate to dress him in a “Palestinian garment.” The essential question, however, is this: Are Palestinians awaiting a single individual who will alter the course of history?

The answer is no. As Palestinians, we must rid ourselves of the culture that anticipates a lone savior. The Palestinian people are far too sophisticated to be held hostage to the genius of one person. This is a society with some of the highest levels of education in the region relative to its population size, and with a remarkable cultural and creative presence. Consider what Talal Salman wrote about how Palestinians contributed to the development of a wide swath of Lebanese cultural and civic life. Across the Gulf as well, Palestinian professionals built schools, taught generations, produced knowledge, and channeled their earnings back to the West Bank to support its resilience.

We are a people capable of generating power from within-not a people awaiting “another Saladin.”

The Palestinian future can only be shaped through a foundation of collective reasoning, cooperative engagement with neighboring states, and mutually beneficial relations with the Arab world-relations grounded not in dependency, but in the construction of shared interests.

Q22: How do you interpret-politically-the statement made by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to former President Trump regarding a trajectory that leads to a Palestinian state?

Nabil Amr: It is essential to acknowledge Saudi Arabia’s longstanding historical role with regard to the Palestinian cause. Since its establishment, the Kingdom has maintained a consistent and principled stance in support of the Palestinian people, even though it has not been able to break the entrenched Zionist–Western alliance.

King Faisal-may he rest in peace-offered an exceptional model of principled leadership when he halted oil supplies despite immense international pressure, ultimately paying with his life for that stance of conviction.

Today, two Arab states hold substantial influence over key strategic files:

• Saudi Arabia, in the realm of energy;

• Egypt, in matters of regional security.

Both states have confronted projects of chaos, political Islam, and internal destabilization. Alongside them stands Algeria, a country that has long instilled in its citizens a deep and enduring attachment to Palestine.

Within this broader regional equation, Mohammed bin Salman’s statement reaffirms a clear strategic line: no normalization without a credible and guaranteed pathway to a Palestinian state. The word “credible” here is not a mere rhetorical flourish; it signifies the presence of binding international and regional assurances that are politically protected. This is a position for which Saudi Arabia deserves recognition, especially in a moment when both the regional and global orders are undergoing profound reconfiguration.

Q23: The ordinary Palestinian wonders: why do wealthy states not provide greater financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority?

Nabil Amr: The belief that injecting funds will transform the reality is a flawed simplification of a far more complex landscape. Significant financial resources flowed to the Palestinian Authority in its early years, yet the fundamental structure of the conflict did not undergo any substantive change.

States act according to their national interests, not their emotions. No country goes to war on behalf of another, nor does any state jeopardize its own security for the sake of others. Egypt, for instance, will not enter a war with Israel simply because Palestinians are under attack.

Arab support remains in place, yet it is no longer sufficient. The issue has evolved into a question of destiny, not of funding. Consider the following:

• The scale of extermination that once appeared imminent in Gaza is no longer feasible in the manner envisioned by the occupation;

• Large-scale displacement has receded;

• Annexation has become globally unacceptable.

These shifts have emerged as a result of Arab and Islamic positions that curbed the excesses of both the American and Israeli stances. The issue, therefore, is not one of “more money,” but rather of a new regional equation.

Q24: Will the younger generation in the West Bank and Gaza-more than one and a half million first-time voters-head to the polls anytime soon?

Nabil Amr: I am among those who believe that going to the ballot box-even if the voter makes the wrong choice-is far better than abstaining altogether. Yet elections are not merely a technical procedure; they are a culture.

Young people constitute more than 50 percent of the Palestinian population, and yet we have failed to build for them a comprehensive project in sports, culture, and civic empowerment. To this day, we have not created an environment that makes this generation feel that it is genuinely part of the decision-making process.

What is required is embedding the idea of elections into the very structure of popular consciousness, not engaging with it only when dates are announced. Although this evolution is slow, progress is the natural course of life. A day must come when elections become a daily necessity, not an exceptional event.

Read this article in the interactive edition