Watching the Region: A Strategic Assessment of Jordan’s Diplomatic Posture and Policy Trajectories Amid Ongoing Regional Transformations

The region is experiencing an exceptionally complex moment, as the repercussions of the Gaza war continue to reshape power configurations and patterns of interaction among regional and international actors. This remains the case even after the conflict has transitioned into a post-ceasefire phase marked by intensive deliberations over ‘the day after’ arrangements. Within this fluid landscape, Jordan’s recent diplomatic moves are increasingly understood as an extension of a long-standing doctrine aimed at calibrating regional power balances, avoiding entanglement in open-ended confrontations, and sustaining the push for a political pathway that ensures regional security and stability.

Amman’s approach-reflected in its successive positions at the UN Security Council and across various international forums-rests on several core principles:

1. The centrality of the Palestinian question as the foundational pillar of regional security;
2. The Hashemite custodianship over the Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem as an essential anchor for preserving the city’s religious and political identity;
3. Safeguarding Jordan’s national security amid rising uncertainty along the northern and eastern borders;
4. Maintaining a carefully calibrated network of relations with key Arab and international powers.

This posture reflects a consistent Jordanian conviction that lasting stability in the region cannot materialize without a just political resolution to the Palestinian issue, and that prolonged ambiguity surrounding ‘the day after’ arrangements will only heighten risks for Jordan and the region at large.

Moreover, the deepening entanglement of regional files-from developments in Syria, to the intensifying Iranian–Israeli rivalry, to the evolving trajectories of normalization and emerging security-economic alignments-has compelled Jordanian foreign policy to continuously recalibrate, adopting a more flexible and adaptive posture capable of responding to fast-moving shifts.

Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to offer a comprehensive assessment of the strategic underpinnings of Jordan’s policy choices during this critical period. It analyzes the mounting challenges confronting Jordanian decision-makers amid an ongoing reconfiguration of regional balances and strategic equations, and it unpacks how overlapping crises and competing actor interests are shaping Jordan’s diplomatic pathways and policy calculations.

Contents

1. Jordan’s Policy Outlook: An Assessment of Diplomatic and Security Approaches
2. Palestinian Security, International Presence, and Israeli Realities: Evaluating Post-Ceasefire Pathways.
3. Israel’s Strategic Behavior: Pressures, Internal Constraints, and Escalation Dynamics.
4. The Syrian File: Strategic Depth and the Management of Regional Balancing – An Assessment.
5. Regional Actors: An Analytical Reading of Alliance Trends and Crisis-Response Equilibria
6. Conclusion: Loss-Mitigation and the Pursuit of Political and Security Stability.

First: Jordan’s Policy Outlook: An Assessment of Diplomatic and Security Approaches

The Politics and Society Institute’s assessment of the current landscape suggests that the post-ceasefire phase is likely to open the door to broader discussions on reshaping the security and political environment in both Gaza and the West Bank. Despite ongoing deliberations within the UN Security Council, emerging international efforts-whose outcomes remain uncertain-appear aimed at steering the debate beyond a temporary truce toward structuring the contours of the next phase.

In light of available indicators, Jordan is expected to intensify its consultations with international partners to avoid scenarios in which unilateral solutions are imposed. This direction stems from a long-standing conviction in Amman that any approach circumventing international consensus risks generating imbalances that undermine prospects for sustainable stability.

Jordan’s Rejection of Annexation: A Fixed Position or a New Trajectory?

Jordan’s recent diplomatic messages signal a firm and consistent rejection of any Israeli annexation of the West Bank or measures that would erode the viability of a Palestinian state. This stance may be entering a more assertive phase should unilateral Israeli steps accelerate. A calibrated diplomatic escalation by Jordan is not unlikely should the political track deteriorate or collapse.

Within this context, current assessments indicate that the upcoming phase may involve attempts to establish new security arrangements in Gaza, though the contours of such arrangements remain undefined. Jordan’s likely priorities center on securing three core guarantees:

Preventing Gaza from being left without an agreed-upon, legitimate governing authority, so as to avoid the emergence of a vacuum or disorder.

Ensuring that security arrangements are not the sole component of the solution, and that they are accompanied by credible political steps that return Palestinian rights to a serious, structured negotiating framework.

Embedding clear, publicly articulated political principles in any agreement, including a commitment to a Palestinian state, recognition of the Palestinian Authority’s role, and preventing the imposition of new realities on the ground through force.

Yet, the realization of these objectives remains uncertain. Key international actors have not yet reached a consensus on the nature of the next phase nor on who will assume primary responsibility for shaping the security and political order in Gaza.

Jordan’s National Security: A Realist Approach Moving Toward Potential Recalibration

Analytical readings indicate that the long-standing equation-“domestic resilience as a prerequisite for supporting Palestine”-continues to serve as the organizing framework of Jordan’s regional posture. Yet, the accelerating shifts in the West Bank may push this equation toward a phase of precise recalibration, enabling the Jordanian state to adapt to scenarios that could prove more complex than any the region has witnessed in recent years.

Amman appears fully aware that any major disruption in the structure of the Palestinian Authority or a breakdown in the security landscape of the West Bank would confront Jordan with direct challenges that touch its national security and internal balance. While Jordan’s foreign and security policy has traditionally relied on a gradualist and calibrated approach, the coming weeks may bring signals prompting Amman to expand its preventive and political tools-while still upholding its core principles of supporting the Palestinian people and safeguarding its long-term strategic interests.

Domestic Consolidation as the Foundation of Jordan’s External Posture

Jordan’s consistent approach underscores that fortifying the domestic front is the primary condition for maintaining an effective role regarding Palestine. A stable internal environment-security-wise, politically, and economically-ensures the state’s ability to move externally with confidence and flexibility, while preventing other actors from exploiting internal vulnerabilities to pressure Jordan or constrain its choices.

This stabilizing effort includes strengthening social cohesion, enhancing security preparedness, and preserving political balance-factors that collectively sustain Jordan’s autonomy in decision-making and its capacity to act in an increasingly turbulent regional environment. In this sense, a strong Jordan is a Jordan capable of supporting Palestine, not only through diplomatic stances but by cultivating an internal foundation resilient enough to uphold its historical and regional role without being exposed to external shocks or coercive pressures.

Preventing Security Vacuums: A Persistent Strategic Priority

Our assessment indicates that Jordan’s primary priority will remain the prevention of security vacuums-whether in Gaza or the West Bank. Yet this objective may grow more complicated if Israel moves toward imposing unilateral arrangements. Based on current readings, Amman may need to reinforce more coherent Arab–Islamic alignments, especially if the current level of regional consensus begins to erode.

The West Bank as the Core of Jordan’s National Security

The West Bank will continue to constitute a central axis of Jordan’s national security considerations. However, it remains too early to determine whether upcoming developments will require Jordan to assume additional roles-or conversely, to reduce its level of engagement depending on how events unfold.

Despite global attention being heavily focused on Gaza, Amman seems to be working on the West Bank file on a daily basis, recognizing that the area represents the strategic space most deeply intertwined with Jordan’s national security. The principal concerns include:

• expanding Israeli settlements,

• worsening economic pressures,

• administrative measures that may exacerbate the crisis,

• and declining Palestinian capacity to manage the civil sphere.

For these reasons, it is likely that the West Bank will remain a focal point of sustained political and legal pressure for Jordan in the coming stage.

Within this fluid environment, Jordan’s discourse-reflected clearly in Amman’s diplomatic activity-appears aimed at broadening the scope of international attention so that the war is not viewed as a crisis confined to Gaza alone, but rather as an interconnected system whose most dangerous repercussions extend into the West Bank. There is a growing Jordanian assessment that the West Bank may become the more enduring arena of threat, whether through the acceleration of settlement expansion, attempts to dismantle the Palestinian Authority, or the imposition of unilateral facts on the ground that could evolve into open confrontation.

It should be noted here that the annexation of the West Bank could lead to a full regional explosion. Accordingly, Jordan’s warnings must carry enough weight to influence this dilemma, particularly when they intersect with international security assessments that consider the West Bank a strategic linchpin in the regional stability equation.

Nevertheless, it remains too early to determine whether the United States is willing at this moment to adopt the same approach, given a more complex environment marked by competition over influence and domestic pressures that shape decisions related to the Middle East. Preliminary readings suggest that the most pressing challenge facing Jordanian and Arab foreign policy today lies in maintaining the current U.S. administration’s attention-under President Donald Trump-on the Palestinian issue. The political mood in Washington during Trump’s presidency is characterized by a high capacity for swift, impactful decision-making, coupled with clear sensitivity to internal and external pressures. As a result, part of the Arab diplomatic effort is likely focused on persuading the White House that any political or humanitarian steps regarding the Palestinian file can be translated into an “achievement” credited to the administration internationally-provided that such steps are crafted in ways that do not generate uncalculated tensions on the ground.

The importance of the American role stems from the fact that several assessments indicate that President Trump remains the actor most capable of exerting direct influence on the trajectory of the ceasefire or on adjusting the political rules of engagement among the parties. This makes him a central figure in Jordanian and regional diplomatic communication. It appears that Amman is betting-at varying degrees-on the window of influence allowed by the governing style in Washington, particularly since Jordan’s priorities during this phase range from consolidating the ceasefire, securing humanitarian assistance, and preventing any attempts at forced displacement, to dealing with Israeli policies that may threaten regional stability.

It should be noted here that King Abdullah II continues to possess a strong ability to read political shifts within Washington-whether at the level of the presidency, Congress, or key political influence centers. This may explain the continued and explicit U.S. support for Jordan, even during periods when the regional environment is considerably more volatile. Jordanian–American relations appear to operate along two overlapping tracks:

1. A stable bilateral track that maintains an advanced level of security, military, and economic cooperation, and is likely less affected by political fluctuations in Washington.
2. A flexible regional track shaped by the nature of challenges in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, and requiring Jordan to constantly balance between security imperatives and U.S. strategic calculations.

Amman continues to retain a privileged position within American institutions, grounded in a long accumulation of bilateral ties and in King Abdullah II’s ability to sustain open channels of dialogue even during politically sensitive periods.

Several questions remain open regarding:

• whether the current Trump administration will push toward a new political vision for the Palestinian file,
• or whether it will prefer an interim security-oriented approach that keeps the situation within manageable limits,
• and how Jordan can balance proactive engagement while preventing Israel from unilaterally shaping the contours of “the day after.”

In this context, Jordan continues-within a consistent framework-to issue periodic reports containing precise figures and data on violations in occupied Jerusalem. The strategic purpose behind this effort appears to be:

• anchoring the Jordanian narrative within international discourse,
• reinforcing the principled connection to the Hashemite custodianship,
• and securing the support of actors not typically expected to engage with the issue, as seen in the Hungarian position.

It is likely that the continued emphasis on Jordan’s role in safeguarding the Christian and Islamic presence in Jerusalem will deepen international understanding of Amman’s position, and potentially widen the circle of states that approach this file with greater sensitivity.

Second: Palestinian Security, International Presence, and Israeli Deployment – An Assessment of Post-Ceasefire Trajectories

Current regional and international discussions about Gaza’s future following the ceasefire indicate that the key actors are engaging with three main axes that are likely to constitute the preliminary framework for any sustainable arrangements. Although the contours of these axes are still in formation, the initial indicators allow for a preliminary assessment of these trajectories.

First: Palestinian Security – Between the Need for Empowerment and the Possibility of Complexity

The idea of establishing a unified Palestinian security architecture appears to be one of the most frequently discussed points, yet it remains constrained by a set of open questions. There is a growing recognition of the importance of having Palestinian security bodies capable of managing internal security and preventing disorder, especially given the need to restore civil institutions and stabilize administrative governance in the Strip.

However, the success of this trajectory remains contingent upon several variable factors, including:

• the degree to which different Palestinian factions are willing to accept a restructured security decision-making process,
• the extent of international readiness to provide long-term institutional support,
• and the Palestinian Authority’s ability to fill the vacuum without triggering internal tensions.

It is possible that this issue will become one of the main obstacles in the “day after” phase, particularly if it is not accompanied by a clear political plan that ends the existing duality between Gaza and the West Bank.

Second: International Forces – A Limited Function or a Gradually Expanding Role?
The discussion surrounding an international force or international monitors appears to be taking a “containment-oriented” shape rather than serving as an alternative to Palestinian sovereignty. The roles being proposed-according to initial readings-revolve around policing and coordination tasks aimed at preventing direct friction between Palestinians and Israelis, and creating a stable environment that would allow the launch of a new political process. However, the possibility of expanding this role remains present, especially if local actors face difficulties in managing the transitional phase.

It is notable that many Arab states, including Jordan, are avoiding any on-the-ground involvement in Gaza without a clear and binding political framework, reflecting concerns about arrangements that might lead to crisis management rather than conflict resolution. The scope of the international role-if it materializes-will likely depend on the nature of understandings between Washington and the key regional capitals.

Third: Israeli Presence – The Withdrawal Track and the Question of an International Framework
Available information indicates that Israel continues to maintain control over approximately 53% of the Gaza Strip’s territory, which makes the future of reconstruction and the sustainability of the ceasefire closely tied to a clear withdrawal timetable. Although such a timetable has not yet been finalized, the most commonly discussed scenario involves a gradual withdrawal under international supervision, in a manner that accounts for Israeli security considerations while granting Palestinians greater room to manage their affairs.

However, this scenario faces several potential obstacles, most notably:

• shifts in the internal calculations of the Israeli government,
• divergent international positions on the nature of the framework overseeing the withdrawal,
• concerns about a security vacuum that could be exploited by non-state actors.

The withdrawal file may become one of the most sensitive issues in the coming phase, given its direct connection to reconstruction efforts and the consolidation of the ceasefire, as well as its immediate impact on regional stability.

Recognition of the Palestinian State: Growing Momentum or a Temporary Wave?
The file of recognizing the State of Palestine has witnessed increasing attention in recent weeks, with Saudi Arabia and France emerging as key actors in reintroducing the issue to the international arena. This renewed push reflects the desire of several states to revive the political process after years of stagnation, capitalizing on the current regional pressures that have returned the Palestinian question to the forefront of global debate. However, the current momentum is still in its early stages, and it remains unclear whether it will translate into concrete measures or remain within the realm of political statements.

Despite the significance of this movement, it may encounter political and legal obstacles that could slow its progress or limit its outcomes. The absence of consensus among major powers-especially the United States and leading European states-stands as a clear ceiling on any broad international initiative. Moreover, the legal framework for recognition, in the absence of effective control on the ground and amid internal Palestinian divisions, adds another layer of complexity, making any international decision require precise arrangements before it can be translated into a political reality.

Despite these challenges, the recognition file is expected to develop into one of the effective political pressure tools in the coming months. Supportive states may resort to introducing draft resolutions at the United Nations or to building joint Arab–European diplomatic coalitions that reshape the debate around the two-state solution. This file may also serve as a means of pressuring Israel to halt unilateral measures in the West Bank, and the United States to re-engage more effectively in the political process.

This trajectory is likely to gain increased importance amid growing global divisions over how to address the Gaza and West Bank files after the war, as various actors may seek to use recognition of the Palestinian state as a tool to redirect the course of negotiations. While the path remains uncertain, the rising discourse surrounding it suggests that it may evolve into a central pillar of upcoming political dynamics-and potentially one of the key factors shaping regional arrangements in the post-conflict phase.

The current regional and international activity indicates that the issue of administering the Gaza Strip after the ceasefire is still in a formative stage. An initial idea-one that has not yet developed into a comprehensive plan-is being circulated: the establishment of a Palestinian committee chaired by the President of the State of Palestine to manage the Strip during the transitional phase. According to current indicators, this idea appears closer to a preliminary proposal than to an implementable formula, given the absence of details regarding operational mechanisms, legal references, and the extent of international commitment to it.

From an assessment perspective, Jordan seems to be approaching this proposal with calculated caution, possibly to avoid any formulation that could be interpreted-intentionally or unintentionally-as an attempt to create a political or administrative separation between Gaza and the West Bank. At the same time, it remains unclear whether these concerns will be resolved through Arab–international understandings or whether they will remain part of an open debate that may take longer than expected.

Initial readings suggest that the United States does not fully endorse the Palestinian committee idea in its current form. Instead, it prefers a broader administrative framework that includes multiple actors, while granting Palestinians a limited leadership role. Meanwhile, Arab states-especially those directly concerned with the file-appear to be moving toward reinforcing the principle of an exclusively Palestinian committee, although the shape of this insistence and the degree of consensus around it remain unresolved.

The challenge lies in formulating an Arab position capable of balancing U.S. sensitivities while avoiding any vacuum that the Israeli government could exploit to impose unilateral arrangements in the Gaza Strip. For now, it is difficult to determine whether this balance can withstand the pressure of upcoming events and the direction of international alliances.

So far, and based on available indicators, the file of civil administration and reconstruction has not yet entered its operational phase. International priorities remain focused on consolidating the ceasefire and preventing the collapse of the fragile understandings in place. It is likely that this situation will persist for a considerable period, delaying administrative and political files and potentially reintroducing them in different forms later.

Within this context, the supporting international committee may play a technical role to assist the Palestinians. However, it remains unclear whether this role will remain limited to technical support or expand into a form of actual oversight-a scenario that may not enjoy full Arab or Palestinian consensus.

A growing regional reading warns against being drawn into the discourse of “criticizing the Palestinian Authority,” which Israel actively promotes. Indicators suggest that the objective may be the gradual dismantling of Palestinian legitimacy, rather than merely exerting reform-oriented pressure. Weakening the Palestinian Authority creates:

• a political vacuum,
• security instability,
• an administrative collapse that is difficult to reverse,
• and turns the West Bank into a wide arena of potential explosion.

In light of this, Amman appears to view the Palestinian Authority as an indispensable pillar of stability, and that supporting it-politically and institutionally-is part of the strategy to preserve the trajectory of the Palestinian state.

Disarming Hamas: A Complex Issue Beyond Technical Treatment
The disarmament of Hamas stands as one of the most complex files-not only because of its military dimension, but because the concept of “arms” itself extends beyond:

• rockets,
• and manufacturing infrastructure,
• to include organizational, social, and political legitimacy structures.

Israel appears most focused on the tunnel network, viewing it as the most threatening component of Hamas’s military apparatus. Yet the open question remains: is it possible to initiate a reconstruction project for Gaza under an Israeli government that still approaches the Strip through the lens of punishment rather than settlement?

It is likely that genuine reconstruction will not begin without:

• a different political environment,
• regional understandings,
• and international guarantees capable of transforming the ceasefire from a tactical pause into a pathway for long-term stability.

Third: An Assessment of Israel’s Behavior – Pressures, Internal Predicaments, and Escalation Dynamics

It is likely that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu entered the ceasefire phase under significant political and security pressures-both domestic and external-and possibly in response to assessments within the security establishment that questioned the utility of continuing military operations in their previous form. Nevertheless, wartime rhetoric may still be used domestically as a tool to absorb tension or delay the escalation of political and personal crises surrounding Netanyahu.

As for the continued tensions on other fronts-particularly Lebanon-this may suggest that Israel does not object to prolonging low-level friction so long as it allows the government to maintain control over the domestic political tempo or exert pressure on regional adversaries. However, it is difficult to determine whether such a strategy will remain viable or sustainable in the coming months.

In this context, recent international trends point to a clear erosion of Israel’s political standing-one of the most notable strategic shifts produced by the Gaza war, according to initial assessments. The growing isolation of Tel Aviv within international institutions and the rising number of states supporting recognition of Palestine indicate that the political space Israel historically operated within is no longer as wide, particularly in Europe.

Even so, these gains appear inherently fragile; they may quickly recede if Western capitals realign their positions or shift their security priorities. For this reason, sustained Arab and Jordanian diplomatic engagement will likely be required to ensure that this unexpected momentum is not lost.

Meanwhile, Israel’s behavior in the post–October 7 period reflects an increasing tendency toward a “fortress mentality”-a posture that may be defensible from a security standpoint but, as some readings suggest, deepens Israel’s international isolation and hinders the development of an exit strategy from the crisis. In contrast, Jordan is directing a more outward-looking message toward Israeli society, recognizing that influencing public opinion may be an entry point for gradually shifting governmental policy. Notably:

• around 54% of Israelis do not want Netanyahu to remain in office,
• and the Israeli left is experiencing a historic decline that has nearly incapacitated its ability to present an effective political alternative.

This situation appears to require a multi-layered approach to the Israeli file-one that combines:

• diplomatic engagement,
• symbolic pressure,
• and keeping the door open to potential future political pathways.

Furthermore, public opinion trends in Europe and the United States show a widening gap between governments that continue to support Israel and publics that increasingly oppose the war. However, it remains uncertain whether this gap will translate into actual political pressure on decision-makers or remain within the realm of popular expression that does not quickly reshape policy directions.

Still, it can be said-at least tentatively-that this shift provides an important window for Arab diplomacy, and for Jordan in particular, to advance a humanitarian and rights-based narrative capable of generating broader sympathy, even though the extent of its impact will depend on the evolution of events and the responsiveness of political institutions.

Fourth: The Syrian File – Strategic Depth and the Management of Regional Balancing

Recent indicators show that Syria continues to occupy a central position in Jordan’s approach to regional security, as it represents a natural extension of the Kingdom’s strategic depth and lies within a regional context open to multiple possibilities. It is clear that Amman views the Syrian file through a lens that assumes any significant destabilization inside Syria would directly affect Jordan’s security environment-whether through new refugee waves, security breakdowns in the south, or the expansion of smuggling networks.

The Syrian Regime’s Management of the South: An Open-Ended Assessment
Analytical readings suggest that Damascus has, over the past period, been able to contain several sensitive issues-particularly in the south, and especially in Sweida-with varying degrees of success. Yet it remains uncertain whether this containment reflects long-term stability or merely a temporary calm that could shift at any moment. The experience of recent years demonstrates that southern Syria may experience cycles of escalation and de-escalation, which makes Jordan treat it as a zone prone to ignition at any sign of imbalance.

Jordan views southern Syria as the most sensitive area of its vital sphere-not only in security terms but also politically. It is not unlikely that any Israeli expansion into the south-particularly in Sweida-would be interpreted in Amman as a direct challenge to Jordan’s strategic security. However, current Jordanian assessments do not lean toward military escalation; rather, they adhere to a clear principle: no deployment of Jordanian forces into Syria unless explicitly requested by Damascus and under a clear international mandate.

This principle appears to be part of a carefully calibrated Jordanian formulation aimed at avoiding involvement in dynamics that could be interpreted as infringing on Syrian sovereignty or as assuming a role larger than what the political environment in Damascus can accommodate.

Jordan’s Concern About Israeli Activity: An Expanding Grey Zone

There is growing concern in Jordan-as suggested by diplomatic activity and public statements-regarding Israeli operations deep inside Syria, whether airstrikes or tactical moves linked to the conflict with Iran and its allies. This concern coincides with continued narcotics and weapons smuggling across the border using increasingly sophisticated methods, including drones and thermal balloons, making the northern border an open file with the potential for security escalation at any time.

It is likely that Amman is attempting to balance preparedness for all scenarios on the one hand, and maintaining communication channels with Damascus and regional and international actors on the other, to avoid any escalation that could evolve into a broader confrontation-one in which Jordan could find itself involved by geography rather than intent.

Political Reform in Syria: The Dilemma of Speed and Caution

The Institute’s assessment suggests that the trajectory of political movement inside Syria faces a difficult equation:

• moving too quickly could open the door to internal unrest or clashes,
• while excessive slowness could allow armed factions to remain and deepen their influence.

For this reason, Jordan’s management of the Syrian file appears to lean toward supporting gradual and carefully measured steps that could enable Syrian state institutions to regain their presence cumulatively, without triggering a security vacuum or political explosion.

In this context, shifts in Jordanian–Syrian relations indicate that Amman may increasingly invest in building institutional capacity within Syria as a parallel track to security engagement. This includes diplomatic training and strengthening police and gendarmerie structures, including women’s police units. From an assessment perspective, such measures may represent an attempt to reinforce stability from behind the scenes or to invest in institutions capable of containing future tensions. However, the effectiveness of these efforts will depend on Syria’s internal conditions and the regime’s ability to translate support into institutional reform.

Fifth: Regional Actors – An Assessment of Alliance Trends and Crisis-Response Dynamics

Recent developments indicate the potential emergence of a more coherent Arab posture amid the successive crises unfolding across the region, and Jordan–Saudi coordination appears to be one of the most stable tracks. Available indicators suggest that Riyadh maintains a firm position against advancing any normalization arrangements before the establishment of an independent Palestinian state takes clearer shape-a stance that has contributed, and may still be contributing, to creating a political barrier against initiatives that bypass Palestinian rights. For Jordan, this direction may serve as a supportive pillar for its diplomatic efforts in the coming phase, although the scope of this coordination will remain tied to shifts in the regional and international landscape.

As for the United Arab Emirates, it seems to be operating within the broader Arab consensus on consolidating the ceasefire and supporting the Palestinian Authority, though it is too early to determine its capacity to influence the shaping of “the day after” arrangements, especially given the divergent calculations of major powers. Conversely, Qatar appears to be continuing its prominent role in regional mediation; however, Doha’s ability to sustain this role will depend on whether the political and media pressures directed at it diminish or intensify in the future. Nevertheless, the convergence between the Qatari and Jordanian positions on the necessity of preserving the unity of the West Bank and Gaza may lead to greater Arab understandings in the coming period.

Regional Partnerships: The Amman–Cairo–Baghdad Triangle

Indicators point to the possibility of expanding the cooperation track among Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq, although this partnership continues to face fluctuations linked to the political situation in Iraq. The recent increase in trade exchange between Amman and Baghdad may represent the beginning of a broader economic trajectory, yet it will remain vulnerable to disruptions stemming from internal power rivalries within Iraq. Projects such as the Basra–Aqaba oil pipeline may stay in a state of “suspended possibility”-capable of advancing or being frozen depending on how regional balances shape up inside Iraq over the coming months.

Turkey’s role in the Gaza file may expand or contract depending on the nature of its relations with the United States, Israel, and Hamas. It is possible that Ankara could revive its previous networks during certain phases of mediation, but this remains contingent upon the degree of regional actors’ willingness to accept such a role.

Conclusion: Managing Losses and Achieving Political and Security Stabilization

Jordanian and Arab assessments appear increasingly focused on safeguarding the two-state solution, even if the prospects for its near-term implementation remain limited. There is a growing recognition that this option may evolve into a political protection mechanism rather than an immediately actionable plan.

In this context, the aim may be to:

• curb settlement expansion,
• reduce pressure on the Palestinian Authority,
• and preserve its status as a legitimate political reference point.

However, it remains unclear whether these efforts will succeed in preventing the erosion of the Authority or halting Israeli tendencies toward imposing new facts on the ground.

Current readings indicate that Jordan is operating within an extremely sensitive environment, positioning it closer to managing balances and minimizing losses rather than pursuing major breakthroughs. Jordan’s focus in the coming weeks is likely to remain directed toward preventing the deterioration of security conditions-particularly in the West Bank, which directly touches the vital sphere of Jordan’s national security.

Jordan may view Gaza’s reconstruction as a political track as much as a humanitarian one; without a clear political agreement, reconstruction could reproduce the very conditions that led to the conflict. Hence, Amman appears set to maintain its rejection of the forced displacement of Palestinians, as such displacement directly affects its national security. This issue may prove to be among the most sensitive in the period ahead.

Regarding Jordan’s role, it is likely to continue providing humanitarian and political support without engaging in roles that exceed its capacity, especially given its understanding that restoring the Palestinian political system to an institutional pathway requires Palestinian internal efforts first-efforts no external actor can impose.

At the reconstruction level, no single actor is expected to be able to lead the process, making Arab and international coordination a necessary condition to avoid the emergence of a new vacuum or conflicting pathways. In this context, joint initiatives among Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan may gain importance in shaping a unified Arab vision for the day after.

The current phase may have imposed a tactical shift in Jordan’s tools rather than in its position, with the continuation of both public engagement and quiet back-channel communication. Although Jordan’s regional environment appears more complex than in previous years, its diplomatic tools still grant it enough room to remain an active player in shaping arrangements for Gaza and beyond-particularly in consideration of Egypt’s significant interests in this file.

Available indicators point to a high level of Arab coordination at present, which could pave the way for a more cohesive regional framework if current conditions persist. Still, it remains too early to determine whether this coordination will develop into joint political initiatives or remain within the bounds of consultations.