The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: A Strategic Crossroads

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan stands today at a strategic crossroads in redefining its role and its relationship with both the state and society. While the current flashpoint revolves around a group of 16 youths—most of whom are affiliated with the Brotherhood—accused of manufacturing and possessing weapons, this case is only part of a broader and escalating crisis between the Brotherhood and Jordan’s decision-making institutions. This crisis has been intensifying since the Arab Spring and has now reached a peak with the current case.

There is a rolling crisis of trust between the two sides. However, the state has continued to deal with the Brotherhood—and with the Islamic Action Front Party—in accordance with the rules of political engagement, pursuing a policy of containment rather than direct confrontation. Despite several past crises, the current moment marks a significant departure. Even if the recently arrested groups were not acting with the knowledge or approval of the Brotherhood’s leadership, there remains an internal context and organizational base within the movement that allowed such groups to emerge and evolve from mere weapons smuggling to weapon manufacturing. For decision-makers, this marks a tipping point. The reaction from the policy circles was to override the usual sensitivities that typically shape the state’s approach toward the Brotherhood and to adopt a firm and decisive stance before this trajectory leads to even more dangerous outcomes.

Let us move past the polarized reactions from Brotherhood supporters—who form a large base—and from outraged citizens shocked by the recent case. Let us agree on the minimum common understanding: that the youths were planning operations, manufacturing weapons, and smuggling them into the West Bank. Regardless of the presence of short-range rockets (which might indicate a potential threat to domestic targets), let us accept the minimum consensus. This discussion is not about the legal case—which is now before the courts—but rather about the political dimension and the state’s relationship with the Brotherhood.

We are thus facing youth groups that planned to manufacture and smuggle weapons, possibly to carry out operations against the Israeli army in the West Bank. Let us assume there is acknowledgment that this was coordinated with external parties linked to the “Axis of Resistance” and Iran. Back in 2021, a plan was launched to activate the arenas surrounding Israel. Armed cells began forming in Lebanon. Syria, however, firmly rejected the idea and informed Iran of its refusal. In Jordan, the plan proceeded through infiltrating a group of Brotherhood-affiliated youth. The writer of this article was informed of these developments by a senior figure within the so-called Resistance Axis. Therefore, it is crucial to note that the planning and operations of these groups predate the recent events in Gaza and the Al-Aqsa Flood, although those events clearly deepened the emotional and psychological motivations for many of these youths.

Returning to the youth case: we are dealing with a group that moved from smuggling to manufacturing, some of whom are linked to external actors. This is the dividing line between two paths. Turning a blind eye to armed activity, weapon manufacturing, and storage in densely populated areas—coordinated with smugglers and funded from abroad—undermines the sovereignty of the state. Even if the weapons are not intended for use inside Jordan, what prevents their future use domestically under similar justifications?

This is the critical question that the Islamic movement’s leadership must answer: What is the ideological, organizational, and political boundary between a peaceful political Islamic movement that believes in democracy and a radical jihadi group that views armed struggle as the only strategic path to achieving political objectives? If the leadership does not clearly and decisively draw this line, it will remain weak and easily crossed.

The formation of a military structure—under any pretext—is a departure from the usual crisis between the Brotherhood and the state. It is a matter that, from the perspective of Jordanian officials, requires urgent action. Ignoring this development could lead to a dangerous trajectory reminiscent of past experiences when armed cross-border operations under the guise of resistance eventually turned inward, threatening national stability and the state’s authority.

There are lessons to be learned from other experiences where small armed groups grew into powerful militias—states within states—ultimately rendering the central state unable to protect its sovereignty or monopolize the legitimate use of force. No country in the world accepts becoming a theater or transit zone for weapons smuggling or manufacturing—even if it’s just a passage, let alone a base—especially in today’s geopolitically fragile environment. Jordan remains one of the few stable nations in the region.

Some may argue, quite reasonably, that these are simply emotional youths reacting to the horrors in Gaza and the West Bank. Perhaps the matter should not be blown out of proportion, nor used to redefine the state’s relationship with the Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front.

As the author, I reject both exaggeration and trivialization. The matter should be evaluated proportionally—but we must also understand the dangerous context that led us here. Since the Al-Aqsa Flood, although the crisis predates it, Jordan has allowed large demonstrations and rallies in solidarity with Gaza—perhaps more than any other country. At the same time, the Jordanian government took an assertive diplomatic and political stance against Israel. Yet, the Brotherhood’s leadership offered only lukewarm and delayed praise, often opting instead for a confrontational tone with state institutions.

The official request was simple: Demonstrate wherever you wish, but avoid sensitive locations, especially the border and the Israeli embassy (which had already been vacated). These rallies served no strategic purpose and risked provoking security forces. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood insisted on reaching these sensitive points, portraying Jordanian security forces as suppressors. Two Brotherhood youth crossed into Israeli territory and were killed. While similar incidents had occurred before, what stood out this time was the level of celebration, coordination, and video documentation, suggesting a broader movement within the organization.

Serious violations of national unity occurred during the protests, including verbal attacks on the Jordanian army and state. Though these were isolated incidents and not treated harshly, they contributed to a broader and escalating mood that now requires national reflection and recalibration.

To understand the current crisis fully, we must look back beyond the Arab Spring to 2015, when the internal crisis within the Brotherhood escalated, leading to the departure of many moderate, pragmatic figures. Former General Supervisor Abdul Majid Thunaibat preemptively registered a legally recognized Brotherhood under the law governing civil associations. He was labeled a traitor by many. Later, other leaders such as Salem Falahat also left and formed new parties. The original Brotherhood lost its legal standing in 2020 and its properties were confiscated, but it continued operating unofficially with a General Supervisor, informal branches, internal elections, and a Shura Council. The state tolerated this in keeping with its historic preference for containment over confrontation, even as neighboring countries designated the group as a terrorist organization.

The Brotherhood could have corrected course. Proposals were made to merge with the legal Brotherhood, or to operate solely through the Islamic Action Front as the official political platform. But the hardline faction refused and continued to operate both legally and illegally—defying court rulings and challenging successive governments.

This historical context shows that the recent events are part of a long, escalating pattern. The current moment calls for a resolution. The responsibility now lies with the Brotherhood’s leadership: Will they commit to being a peaceful, national political party under the Constitution and law, with no dual or secret structures, fully embracing democratic principles? Or will they continue blending politics with religious allegiance, legality with clandestine operations, and refuse to reconcile their contradictions?

Finally, a crucial point relates to Islamic jurisprudence. The majority of the Brotherhood’s base are religiously devout. Traditional Islamic jurisprudence emphasizes the weighing of harm and benefit, prioritizing lesser evils and greater goods, and avoiding risky actions under uncertainty. From al-Mawardi to al-Juwayni to Ibn Taymiyyah, Islamic political jurisprudence has emphasized pragmatism. Under this logic, sacrificing national security in pursuit of symbolic actions is reckless. Jordan must prioritize protecting its state and society. Even in the West Bank, despite the abundance of weapons, many refrain from military operations against Netanyahu’s government to avoid justifying forced displacement—just as is happening in Gaza. Realizing the balance of power and acting accordingly is not a betrayal of faith—it is its very essence.