Netanyahu in Washington Next Week… What Worries Jordan?
By Mohammad Abu Rumman
According to announcements from Benjamin Netanyahu’s office and American political sources, Netanyahu has received an invitation from U.S. President Donald Trump to visit Washington next week (February 4). This makes him the first Middle Eastern leader to meet with Trump, especially following Trump’s controversial statements regarding the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza.
Jordan’s primary concern regarding this meeting is that Netanyahu may endorse Trump’s statements and further reinforce his belief in Palestinian displacement. He might even secure new promises from Trump on this issue, making it harder to shift or alter the U.S. president’s stance later. This is particularly worrisome for decision-making circles in Amman, which had been hoping to arrange a meeting between King Abdullah and President Trump as soon as possible. However, Netanyahu’s prior meeting with Trump is likely to complicate matters, particularly in dealing with an administration whose political agenda Jordan had already been wary of. These concerns were confirmed by Trump’s remarks on Palestinian displacement and the suspension of USAID funding, which directly harmed Jordan’s economy, development projects, and civil society institutions.
Trump’s statements appear bizarre and unexpected to policymakers in Amman. Jordan has never been geographically or politically involved in the relocation of Gaza’s Palestinians, as it does not share a border with Gaza like Egypt does. When former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken suggested this scenario, Jordan rejected it—not out of fear that Gazans would be relocated there, but because it feared this could set a precedent for the displacement of Palestinians from the West Bank in the future. Therefore, it is unclear why Trump is involving Jordan in the Gaza issue in the first place. Moreover, such a scenario is practically unfeasible unless Egypt fully opens its borders and agrees to a mass transfer of Palestinians—something that remains highly doubtful.
If relocating Gazans to Jordan is not a realistic scenario, then what exactly concerns Jordanian officials and politicians about Trump’s statements?
The first concern is the presence of “omitted phrases” in Trump’s rhetoric. He appears to be conflating different Palestinian issues. It is likely that, at a later stage, Jordan will not be asked to receive Gazans but rather to deal with Palestinians in the West Bank—whether through a security role in the territory or, if Israel annexes parts of it, by absorbing a number of Palestinians. Some Israeli officials have openly stated that hundreds of thousands of West Bank residents hold Jordanian passports and should be transferred to Jordan. Such discourse raises alarms in Amman, as it suggests a convergence between the Trump administration and the Israeli right-wing on resolving the Palestinian issue by shifting part of the Palestinian population burden onto Jordan.
The second concern is Trump’s approach to regional issues. His way of thinking and handling political matters in the region is troubling for Jordan, as it reflects a disregard for Jordan’s strategic importance as a longtime U.S. ally. Trump operates in a manner of issuing directives and expecting others to implement them, treating political positions as negotiable assets. This raises concerns in Jordan that the resumption of U.S. aid might be tied to political concessions and compliance with American pressure. As a result, Jordan may have to endure four years of dealing with a difficult and unpredictable administration—during a period of critical regional developments where Trump is determined to settle key issues.
Jordan will not openly confront the Trump administration and will avoid direct diplomatic clashes. However, Jordan has gained significant diplomatic experience and has the ability to expand its manoeuvring space, craft political tactics, and form regional alliances to mitigate external pressures. The Jordanian leadership distinguishes between firm red lines that cannot be compromised and other issues that require a degree of flexibility and adaptation. Jordan will likely adopt a smart approach to countering these ideas and plans. However, if Jordan is forced into a position where it must accept Palestinian refugees, its response will be to defend its strategic and national interests. If asked to play a security role in the West Bank, Jordan will refuse. Instead, Jordan’s leadership will seek to align with regional partners and will leave the primary responsibility in decision-making and for countering the liquidation of the Palestinian cause to the Palestinians themselves.
At the same time, Jordanian diplomacy is expected to build a regional consensus, particularly with Saudi Arabia, which has emerged as a leading power in the Arab world, as well as with Egypt and even Turkey, whose positions have recently aligned with those of Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Behind the scenes, Jordan will also work to strengthen the Palestinian position, enabling it to navigate the coming phase. However, these anticipated strategies and manoeuvres do not negate the reality that the next few years will be challenging for Jordan in dealing with the Trump administration.