This material was published in the second issue of the Jordanian Politics and Society magazine (JPS).

In recent years, Jordanian-Iraqi relations have witnessed a qualitative leap, following a long period marked by much doubt and caution between the two sides. While it cannot be said that the development of this relationship has completely eliminated the previous situation, it has made it less ambiguous. The relationship has undergone numerous transformations since the American occupation in 2003 and the arrival of the new regime in Baghdad, reaching today a more effective diplomatic communication and more developed economic movement, despite remaining political and security concerns between the two parties.

The nature, determinants, and course of the relationship between the two sides cannot be separated from the continuous changes in both international and regional contexts, and before that, the ongoing transformations within Iraq which led to the absence of a clear strategic vision for Iraq’s foreign relations, particularly with its neighbors. However, changes in recent years have developed a new state of awareness for both parties about the necessity of developing the relationship between the two countries. In contrast, Jordan saw Iraq as an important opportunity and outlet in light of economic challenges resulting from decreased treasury support from regional countries and affairs with some experiencing a period of coolness, which was accompanied by the intransigence of the Syrian regime, led by Bashar al-Assad, against economic openness towards Jordan, despite attempts by Jordanian diplomatic leaders internationally to reduce sanctions represented by the Caesar Act, and grant Syria some exceptions, along with Amman’s efforts to reintegrate Damascus into the Arab sphere within steps addressing the course of the Syrian crisis, but Assad chose then to bypass Jordanian efforts.

Although the relationship between Jordan and Iraq began to take another turn during the tenure of former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, whose brief period witnessed King Abdullah II’s visit to Baghdad and the holding of trilateral summits between Amman, Cairo, and Baghdad, a state of revival was experienced by Jordan with Mustafa Al-Kadhimi assuming the premiership of the transitional government, who developed the course of the relationship between the two countries politically and not just economically. It seemed clear that the Jordanian side had hoped for Al-Kadhimi to continue in his position after the October 2021 elections, but Amman came to face a new-old reality, titled “The Coordination Framework” which includes traditional Shiite political forces and forces that include armed factions in their structures, which presented Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani to be Iraq’s prime minister, who notably made his first foreign visit to Jordan, and the latter, in turn, spared no effort in engaging and seeking to develop relations on both political and economic levels specifically.

Perhaps Donald Trump’s return to the White House, which was preceded by a period of transformation that the region is experiencing in the balance of powers after the “October 7th” incident and subsequent events, primarily the dismantling of Lebanese Hezbollah’s capabilities, the assassination of its Secretary-General, and the fall of the Syrian regime, necessitates today a rethinking of the Jordanian-Iraqi relationship. What enhances the necessity of rethinking is that there are upcoming challenges for the region and at the same time more opportunities that may open for both countries, particularly Jordan, which has better foreign relations than Iraq at both regional and international levels.

The Jordanian-Iraqi Relationship: Persistent Attempts to Break Barriers

Before the Jordanian-Iraqi relationship began to develop into its current form, Amman had already prepared itself for this phase—long before the establishment of the “Coordination Framework”—by opening channels of communication with various political forces in Iraq, particularly the Shiite political forces. Despite visits by Jordanian officials to Iraq, including a notable visit by the King, one remarkable event was the visit of Abdul Salam Al-Odah in November 2021, who was the then Speaker of the Jordanian Parliament[1]. During that visit, accompanied by a Jordanian parliamentary delegation, he met with both traditional Shiite forces and factions originating from armed groups listed on U.S. terrorism lists.

This visit was followed by recurring Jordanian visits that renewed contacts with these figures. This marked a shift in Jordan’s perception of the Iraqi equation, signaling that disagreement does not necessarily preclude engagement or containment. Amman recognized the necessity of expanding its network of understanding with Shiite Islamist political forces rather than limiting its relations to so-called “moderate forces”—which are also part of the Coordination Framework, such as former Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi and Ammar Al-Hakim, leader of the Hikma Movement, who already has good relations with Jordan. It is worth noting that the Coordination Framework is not a monolithic bloc but includes internal differences in orientations. Jordan also maintains a relationship with Muqtada Al-Sadr, who chose to remain independent of the Shiite alliance.

This background suggests that Amman, even before the formation of the Coordination Framework following the 2021 elections—whose government formation consultations lasted nearly a year—had worked to establish lines of communication with various Shiite forces. This effort facilitated engagement with the government of Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, who visited Jordan in November 2022 during his first foreign tour as Prime Minister. This visit was followed by a joint call involving Al-Sudani, former U.S. President Joe Biden, and King Abdullah II.[2]

The relationship between the two countries has been shaped by cumulative positions and policies following the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Jordan initially viewed the new political system post-2003 with great concern, perceiving it as an extension of the Iranian project in the region. This led Jordan to “securitize” the Iraqi file for many years. However, recent shifts in Jordanian policy reflect a realization that armed factions, through their political faces, now wield significant influence over political, economic, and security matters in Iraq. Jordan has recognized the strategic inevitability and opportunities it cannot afford to miss amidst its internal and external political, economic, and security challenges.

As a result, Jordan has repeatedly sought to reintegrate Iraq into its regional role, which could eventually lead to its integration into the Arab world. This was evident in initiatives like the “New Levant Project,” which brought Amman, Baghdad, and Cairo together. While the project’s primary focus was economic, it also carried significant political dimensions.

On the other hand, the Coordination Framework forces have sought to operate from a different perspective to consolidate governance and maintain gains after disappointing election results and internal struggles, particularly with their popular bases and the Sadrist Movement—a rival Shiite political force with broad social and regional ties. To achieve this, the Coordination Framework has attempted to present a different image from the stereotype of being Iran-aligned forces by adopting a more pragmatic approach and pursuing greater openness to the Arab world.

Furthermore, the Coordination Framework recognizes the depth and importance of Jordan’s relationship with the United States, potentially opening a channel of communication that could ease the complex situation it faces. This includes U.S. Treasury Department sanctions targeting leaders within the Framework and restrictions on banks affiliated with Framework factions. Expanding relations with Jordan might alleviate these pressures.

However, efforts to strengthen Jordan-Iraq relations often face significant obstacles, particularly the Iranian influence in Iraq. The relationship between Jordan and Iran remains characterized by suspicion, caution, and mistrust. Some Iranian-backed armed factions exhibit open hostility toward Jordan, as seen in their digital media outlets, their presence near Jordan’s borders, and their involvement in drug smuggling attempts into Jordan.

Additionally, some Framework forces leverage their parliamentary representation to apply constant pressure on Jordan, citing reasons such as harboring Iraqi opposition figures and the banned Baath Party[3], maintaining ties with Israel, or benefiting from preferential oil prices from Iraq. They argue that such privileges warrant reconsideration.

Jordan and the Economic Opportunity in Iraq: Obstacles to Major Projects

Jordan has long viewed Iraq as a strategic depth, an economic lifeline, and a key determinant of its economic situation. Historically, Jordan has often served as Iraq’s economic gateway during times of crises with regional or international actors. For example, in the 1960s, when Syria closed the Port of Latakia to Iraqi exports and imports, Jordan opened its Port of Aqaba as an alternative, competing with Latakia at the time. A more significant historical event was the international sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s, following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. During this period, Jordan became Iraq’s sole economic outlet and conduit for humanitarian aid.

In recent years, Jordan-Iraq economic relations have witnessed notable growth. After being severely affected by ISIS’s control of the Trebil border crossing with Jordan, trade volume has since rebounded, surpassing $1 billion annually following the reopening of the crossing in 2017. Additionally, Iraqi investments in Jordan have exceeded $30 billion.[4]

While both countries share extensive economic interests, Jordan’s ambitions for major projects in Iraq face numerous obstacles. One significant hurdle is the potential impact of these projects on Iranian interests in Iraq. For instance, the Basra-Aqaba oil pipeline project continues to encounter delays, partly due to Iranian influence. Armed factions have threatened to target the pipeline under the pretext of Jordan exporting oil to Israel[5], contributing to the slow progress from the Iraqi side.

Similarly, the Jordan-Iraq electrical grid connection, which has been implemented on a limited scale, is seen by Iran as a threat. This is because the U.S. excludes Iran from supplying energy to Iraq, despite Iraq’s urgent need for large energy supplies. Iran leverages this need as an opportunity to earn hard currency amidst ongoing sanctions, limiting the effectiveness of the energy grid project. The same challenges apply to the proposed joint economic zone between Iraq and Jordan, which could reduce Iraq’s dependence on Iran for goods worth over $4 billion annually.[6]

Post-“October 7”: A Critical Change in the Landscape

Jordan has participated in security dialogue rounds hosted by Baghdad involving Iran. Despite the perception among many experts that Jordan’s relationship with Iran aligns with Saudi Arabia’s stance—highlighted by Jordan’s withdrawal of its ambassador from Tehran in 2016 following the storming of the Saudi embassy—it was surprising to these observers that Jordan did not restore full diplomatic representation after the 2023 Saudi-Iranian agreement brokered by China. This is despite repeated Iranian calls for normalization, voiced by former Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian. Jordan appears to have its own unique, security-related issues with Iran that directly affect its national security.

While Jordanian elites have long recognized that meaningful engagement with Baghdad often necessitates dialogue with Tehran, and that strategic discussions with Iran could be a diplomatic necessity, Jordan’s security concerns have only grown since October 7.

Following the surprising Hamas operation, there has been an uptick in smuggling attempts involving drugs and weapons, implicating Iraqi armed factions linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These factions are active along Jordan’s northern border with Syria and its eastern border with Iraq. Jordan’s concerns were further heightened by demonstrations near its border organized by factions tied to key forces within Iraq’s Shiite Coordination Framework. These protests were intended to pressure Jordan and the international community to halt the war in Gaza.[7]

Compounding these issues, Kata’ib Hezbollah targeted a U.S. base in northeastern Jordan, killing three U.S. soldiers[8]. In response, American forces launched strikes against leaders responsible for the attack. Months later, Abu Ali al-Askari, the spokesperson for Kata’ib Hezbollah, declared the faction’s readiness to arm 12,000 Jordanians. Meanwhile, Iranian missile strikes on Israel passed through Jordanian airspace twice, despite repeated Jordanian warnings to Tehran to avoid dragging Jordan into regional conflicts.

Jordan has also taken a firm political stance against Israel due to its national security concerns and its solidarity with Palestinians. This position has been consistently communicated to Iran, emphasizing Jordan’s refusal to become a battleground for regional confrontations.

Regional Transformations and Trump’s Return: Open Scenarios for Amman and Baghdad

Jordan realizes that it is currently facing a complex regional equation that requires rethinking many issues and preparing for the upcoming phase, especially with the uncertain Iraqi situation following Iran’s strategic losses in Lebanon and Syria, and the return of Trump, who may apply maximum pressure on Iran and its proxies in the region, which is their most important and final stronghold.

Security-wise, despite the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the control of armed forces hostile to Iran and its proxies, which should alleviate Jordanian concerns related to border security and drug smuggling operations, the route of smugglers may shift from the northern border to the eastern border with Iraq, which extends over 180 kilometers. This border had witnessed large-scale smuggling attempts, with millions of pills being smuggled[9], although in recent years the Syrian front was more active due to the length of the border between Jordan and Syria, which is twice as long as the border between Iraq and Jordan. However, we are talking about a drug economy that is a key economic resource for armed factions, which view Jordan as a stable base and a passage to the Gulf countries.

Politically, after Lebanon and Syria, Iraq may be next, and it seems that Iraqi politicians are awaiting an event whose scale and scope are unknown. However, this necessarily directs preparations for all scenarios, which is reinforced by the repeated Israeli threats to armed factions in Iraq and the strikes launched on the Ansar Allah group in Yemen. This appears to be an Israeli-Western investment in the retreat of Iran’s role in the region and its isolation, despite its loss of allies and strategic areas for which it has worked and sacrificed for years. Additionally, Israel feels a surplus of power, and its Prime Minister has repeatedly promised to change the shape of the Middle East. These ambitions now coincide with Trump’s return, which could bring many surprises.

Economically, the U.S. administration holds a set of options to pressure Iran and Iraq, should Trump fulfill his promises of exerting pressure, such as imposing more sanctions on Iraqi political leaders and additional sanctions on Iraqi banks accused of smuggling hard currency to Iran. Furthermore, there are many possibilities, such as the potential drop in oil prices, on which the Coordination Framework government relied heavily in recent years to stabilize its rule and achieve the greatest gains. Additionally, the potential cancellation of the U.S. exemption for Iranian energy exports to Iraq poses new challenges for Jordan. However, this may also present an opportunity at the same time.

Conclusion

Although the Jordanian-Iraqi relationship has witnessed unprecedented qualitative and quantitative developments at both the economic and security levels since the foundation of Iraq’s new regime in 2003, this relationship still faces numerous challenges. Among these are the question of Iraq’s external decision-making independence and Jordan’s repeated neglect of the need to open a strategic dialogue with Iran, rather than relying solely on the United States as an important factor in managing the relationship between Amman and Baghdad. Additionally, Jordan still cannot disregard its security concerns due to the ongoing threats it has received from the Syrian border and the presence of armed factions in western Iraq near the Jordanian border. These factions have attempted to destabilize domestic security through smuggling, incitement, and the bombing of the American base in northeastern Jordan, which is feared to recur amid the escalating pressure on Iran in the upcoming phase.

However, in all cases, Jordan seems to believe that the boundaries of rapprochement and the necessity of developing relations with Iraq should remain present, and that any political force ruling the country must be engaged. This is also seen by some Iraqi political forces, which may feel its importance even more in the coming phase. Although the two parties may share some common visions on certain issues, there are strengths in the Jordanian-Iraqi relationship that Jordan may further activate in the upcoming phase or reconsider how to engage with them. These include good relations with Shiite forces within the Coordination Framework, Jordan’s Sunni depth in Iraq represented by social structures and political forces, attracting more Iraqi investments abroad, and Jordan’s regional and international relations as an asset, which Baghdad may also try to benefit from more in the coming phase.

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[1] Husna. “Jordanian Parliamentary Movement in Baghdad Confirms Support for Jordanian-Iraqi Agreements.” Published September 15, 2021. Accessed January 4, 2025. https://husna.fm.

[2]  “The Readout of President Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani of Iraq.” The White House, February 2, 2023. Accessed January 4, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/02/readout-of-president-bidens-call-with-prime-minister-mohammed-shia-al-sudani-of-iraq/?_gl=1spfdjd_gaNzA5MzA3NDQuMTczNjAwNDg5NQ.._ga_N6Y255Y5X2MTczNjAwNDg5NC4xLjEuMTczNjAwNDk4OC42MC4wLjA._gcl_au*NzYxODI1NDM1LjE3MzYwMDQ4OTY.

[3] Although Jordan has historically embraced figures opposing Saddam Hussein and hosted in the 1990s meetings and opposition figures who shaped the new political regime after 2003.

[4] Jordan News Agency (Petra). “The Jordanian-Iraqi Business and Finance Forum Highlights Iraqi Investments of $32 Billion in Jordan.” Published July 24, 2023. Accessed January 4, 2025. https://www.petra.gov.jo.

[5] ARGUS Media. “Basrah-Aqaba Oil Pipeline Will Never Be, Iraq Militia.” Published January 22, 2023. Accessed January 4, 2025. https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2414153-basrah-aqaba-oil-pipeline-will-never-be-iraq-militia.

[6] Shafaq News. “Iran Exports $4.5 Billion to Iraq Over Five Months.” Last modified 2023. Accessed January 4, 2025. https://shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%80%D8%A7%D8%AF/%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%87-4-5-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AE%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1. 

[7] Al-Araby Al-Jadeed. “Protest at Turaibil Border Crossing in Solidarity with Gaza Enters Its Third Week: Any Worth?” Published October 12, 2023. Accessed January 4, 2025. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB-%D8%A3%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%89.

[8] U.S. Department of Defense. “3 U.S. Service Members Killed, Others Injured in Jordan Following Drone Attack.” Published January 28, 2024. Accessed January 4, 2025. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3659809/3-us-service-members-killed-others-injured-in-jordan-following-drone-attack/.

[9] France 24. “Jordanian Authorities Foil Major Drug Smuggling Operation Coming from Iraq Hidden in Two Trucks of Date Paste.” France 24, December 25, 2022.   https://www.france24.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7/20221225-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D8%A3%D8%B6%D8%AE%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1