From Paris to Amman: The Syrian-Israeli Security Agreement between Tentative Understandings and Deadlock

Introduction

The Syrian-Israeli meeting held in Amman on August 23, 2026, under Jordanian auspices and with US mediation, brought the prospect of a security agreement between the two sides back to the forefront. The meeting followed Israel’s strike on Abu al-Duhur airbase and came against the backdrop of understandings announced in Paris earlier in the year that had produced neither a security agreement nor practical measures capable, at a minimum, of restraining Israeli conduct. The Amman meeting was therefore intended to de-escalate tensions among the parties, manage escalation, and revive a stalled negotiating track.

This paper proceeds from the premise that the meeting’s substantive value depends on its capacity to constrain Israeli actions on the ground and anchor any security arrangement in Syrian state sovereignty. It applies this criterion by examining Israel’s approach to Syria; the balance of power and vulnerability underlying any prospective security agreement; the limits of Syria’s reliance on the emerging network of regional interests in Syrian stability and the restoration of state functions; and the effects of Israeli-Turkish competition. It then turns to southern Syria and Suwayda as the most immediate practical tests of any prospective understanding.

The Amman Meeting: Can an Operations Room Achieve What the Paris Cell Could Not?

According to leaked details of the Amman meeting, a Syrian delegation headed by Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and including the directors of General Intelligence and Military Intelligence met with a senior Israeli delegation whose members were not disclosed by the Syrian side.[1] Media reports identified the delegation as being led by Mossad Director Roman Gofman.[2] The meeting followed Israel’s escalation through its bombing of Abu al-Duhur airbase[3] in northwestern Syria. Assessments of the strike’s purpose varied: some viewed it as a message to Türkiye,[4] given the presence of a Turkish military delegation at the site; others saw it as a message to the Syrian state, intended to delimit its strategic space and constrain the rebuilding of its defence capabilities, military alliances, and strategic partnerships. Domestically, the escalation may also serve as an electoral mobilisation tool in Israel by reinforcing a narrative of strategic denial, depicting Türkiye as an emerging threat, and showcasing Israel’s ability to impose deterrence. This is particularly relevant amid the difficult electoral contest facing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as current coalition alignments suggest that even an electoral victory may leave him unable to form a government. This domestic calculation, however, need not have been the operation’s sole motive.

According to the leaks, the parties discussed establishing a dedicated operations room in Amman under US supervision to prevent friction or confrontation inside Syria, including tensions between Israel and Türkiye.[5]

This proposal raises questions about its relationship to the liaison cell announced in Paris in early January[6] to exchange information, reduce escalation, and address disputes. Israel reportedly refused to activate the proposed coordination centre in Amman.[7] It is therefore difficult to determine whether the proposed operations room constitutes a new mechanism or a direct extension of the Paris cell. Either way, the proposal demonstrates that the earlier understandings never developed into an operational framework capable of regulating developments on the ground.

The Amman meeting thus appears to be a Syrian-US attempt to reactivate or salvage an arrangement that had been agreed in principle but obstructed in practice by Israeli rejection, rather than the launch of a new negotiating track. Even so, the meeting carries particular importance for Jordan. Jordanian access to the negotiations helps avert a compartmentalised approach that could produce temporary and fragile settlements detached from Jordan’s perspective. Active political and diplomatic engagement with developments in southern Syria is therefore essential to safeguarding Jordan’s national security—an approach on which Syria’s new government may also rely at this critical stage.

Israel’s Approach to Post-Liberation Syria

The most important key to understanding the course of any prospective security agreement, the likely outcome of the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, and Israel’s refusal to implement earlier understandings lies in Israel’s broader post-October 7 approach to the region and, more specifically, its approach to Syria after liberation.

Israel’s new military posture in Syria—including its advance beyond the 1974 disengagement zone; its targeting and destruction of defence infrastructure and capabilities; and the incursions, arrests, and daily violations that have continued since December 8, 2024[8]—performs two interrelated functions. First, it secures strategic gains that allow Israel to move from managing threats to reshaping Syria’s security space by expanding its freedom of action, reinforcing strategic deterrence, demilitarising the south, and retaining Suwayda as a source of leverage. Second, and more importantly for the negotiating process, it converts military superiority into the starting point for negotiations and thereby raises the ceiling of Israeli demands.

The connection between these two objectives explains why Israel, despite its gains, has been unable to convert them into stable and sustainable political and security arrangements. Any agreement would effectively freeze those gains within binding arrangements that might constrain Israeli conduct. Israel avoids such an outcome because it continues to view itself through the logic of hegemony and a post-October 7 “surplus of power,” while seeking to keep its gains open to further expansion. Yet its long-term strategic interest would be better served by an agreement with a central authority capable of securing and protecting its northern border than by continuing field-level attrition.

The dangers of this approach are clearest in southern Syria. Entrenching it would strip the south of its geopolitical function and turn it into a vulnerable security flank. This would weaken Damascus’s ability to control its southern border, open the way for overlapping local and security arrangements, and restrict Jordan’s capacity to build a stable security framework with the Syrian state. The consequences would extend beyond Syria, with potentially disastrous effects for Jordan and the region as a whole.

Paradoxically, Israel’s approach in Syria has begun, in varying forms, to occupy the space once held by Iran’s approach, despite the differences between the two projects’ objectives and instruments. In this sense, Israel too is becoming a burden on the region and increasingly colliding with the interests of regional states.

The Security Agreement: An Asymmetrical Balance of Power and Vulnerability

The prospective security agreement rests on an asymmetry in the parties’ respective sources of power and vulnerability. Israel possesses military and operational superiority that enables it to impose facts on the ground and raise the ceiling of its negotiating demands. Its principal vulnerability, however, lies in its limited ability to convert those gains into stable, sustainable, and regionally acceptable political and security arrangements. Any attempt to consolidate a unilateral Israeli security order in the south would generate instability and impose cumulative political, economic, social, demographic, and security costs on Israel. It would transform southern Syria from a short-term source of leverage into a volatile long-term burden.

Damascus, by contrast, lacks a comparable military margin, while the current government lacks sufficient legitimacy to make sovereign decisions of this magnitude during the transitional period. Any strategic concession could provoke domestic reactions that would damage the legitimacy of both the transition and its government. Yet this constraint also provides Syria with a measure of strength. Avoiding binding agreements or strategic-level decisions shields Damascus from potential domestic repercussions while preserving room for diplomatic manoeuvre. That room may prove particularly useful amid continuing changes in the formation of the Syrian army, the expansion of Syria’s alliance network, and the possibility—however remote in the foreseeable future—that Israel’s next elections could produce a shift in policy towards Syria. Taken together, these factors allow Damascus to maintain a flexible formula for coordination and communication with Israel, designed to avert direct confrontation rather than settle the issue definitively or offer concessions. Israel understands this equation: Damascus’s limited legitimacy restricts its ability to make strategic concessions and, by the same measure, Israel’s ability to extract them.

Damascus’s actual negotiating strength nevertheless depends on its ability to build a disciplined army with a clear military identity and an organised chain of command, and then to consolidate authority over its domestic political and civil sphere by balancing civil peace with transitional justice. Such steps would reinforce stability, strengthen domestic legitimacy, and enable Syria to structure partnerships from a sovereign position. The value of a security agreement therefore lies neither in codifying Israeli superiority nor merely in managing current tensions, but in whether it opens a path to restoring order to Syria’s security space and prevents the south from becoming a permanent burden on all parties.

This asymmetry is naturally reflected in how each party understands the agreement’s purpose. Washington views it as a mechanism for de-escalation and tension reduction. Israel seeks strategic gains extending beyond the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement, while Damascus regards it as a route back to that agreement, which was itself a security arrangement. These divergent definitions and objectives suggest that the most likely near-term outcome is a set of partial and fragile security understandings for managing tensions, rather than a comprehensive agreement capable of reordering Syria’s security space.

Syria and the Makkah Agreement: Between Negotiating Gains and Strategic Costs

Following the announcement of the Amman meeting, one of the Syrian foreign minister’s first visits was to Pakistan.[9] During the visit, he announced that Damascus was considering joining the Makkah Agreement.[10] Such a move could strengthen Syria’s position in confronting Israel’s approach and in any future negotiating process.

As announced, the Makkah Agreement is not an alliance directed against Israel, despite Israeli attempts to portray it as an emerging “Sunni axis” or “Sunni NATO.” Nor is it directed against Iran. Rather, it is a coordinating framework intended to reshape regional security rules and relationships.

The agreement’s importance does not depend solely on Syria’s formal accession. Syria is already an implicit part of its strategic logic because it is an ally and strategic partner of both Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, and because Syria now constitutes a central determinant of both countries’ national security. This is especially true for Saudi Arabia, which has redefined its national security in a way that places Syria at its core. Syrian stability has consequently become a central node in the stability of the Mashreq and in the protection of neighbouring states’ geopolitical, economic, and security interests.

The agreement could benefit Damascus in three specific ways: by strengthening its negotiating position vis-à-vis Israel; broadening its regional relationships, alliances, and diplomatic opening, particularly if the framework expands to include other states such as Egypt, which has yet to accept the new government in Damascus; and firmly linking Syria’s stability to the interests of multiple regional powers.

The principal mechanism of influence is clear: Damascus’s sources of leverage in this process are not primarily military. They lie in its ability to transform the emerging network of regional and international interests in Syrian stability and the restoration of state functions into tangible strategic constraints on Israel’s approach.[11] A comparable dynamic was evident in opposition to the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza to Egypt and Jordan. Such constraint would operate through raising the political and economic costs for any actor—including Israel—that seeks to obstruct Syrian stability or perpetuate the country’s security vacuum, rather than through direct military confrontation, an option unavailable to Damascus in any event.

The growing divergence between Washington and Tel Aviv over Syria enhances the importance of this strategy and the possibility of using it to Syria’s advantage. This divergence does not signal the end of their strategic alliance, but it does reveal that their interests and priorities in Syria are not identical. The gap has been evident in three areas: lifting sanctions on Syria, Russia’s presence in the new Syria, and the proliferation of actors and zones of influence that obstruct the centralisation of authority in Damascus.

This divergence creates room for Syria and regional states to shape Washington’s definition of its interests in Syria by highlighting the alignment between the interests of US regional allies and the overarching US interest in Syrian stability and the restoration of state functions. Washington will not necessarily pressure Israel as a result. Yet the broader this alignment becomes, the greater the cost to the United States of accommodating Israeli demands in isolation from the interests of its allies—and the more feasible it becomes to turn this coalition of interests into a strategic constraint on Israel’s approach.

Accession, should it occur, would naturally carry costs. Foremost among them is the risk that Israel would escalate to prevent or obstruct it, particularly given Israel’s post-October 7 pattern of violating the rules of engagement and diplomatic norms, alongside an opportunistic policy of expanding wars.

Within the bounds of political realism and what is currently possible, however, accession could strengthen Syria’s negotiating position with Israel and improve its relations with other states, especially if Syria’s entry is followed by the accession of additional countries. If the framework develops, its effects could extend beyond security and politics to encompass broader understandings, including the acceleration of regional connectivity projects in which both Syria and Jordan participate. Such a development would narrow Israel’s freedom of manoeuvre and deepen its isolation, especially because international and regional projects can rapidly reroute when the logistical, political, or security environment proves unsuitable.

The Makkah Agreement, its coordinating framework, and the roles of Syria’s allies nevertheless remain formative. They have yet to generate an effective deterrent force or produce practical deterrent effects. The challenge is to interlock these interests through the framework so that retreating from or undermining it becomes considerably costlier than maintaining it, especially given the possibility of a shift in US policy towards Syria after the Trump era. The objective is to convert a temporary alignment into a durable strategic transformation that will be difficult to reverse over the long term.

This strategy also imposes alliance-related obligations on Damascus. Syria is relying on its ability to integrate these interests and act as their coordinator, yet alliances may eventually impose choices at a moment when alignment is no longer optional. The broader wager is therefore on the future expansion of such arrangements, whether through the Makkah Agreement itself or through the accession of additional countries and the resulting effects on Syria. In its current form, the agreement has yet to acquire a fully developed deterrent capacity. It nonetheless represents an attempt to seize the initiative, fill the regional vacuum, and prevent Israel from occupying that space alone.

Suwayda: The Next Difficult Test

The first repercussions of the meeting may emerge in southern Syria. It was followed by Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz’s visit to the south, particularly Mount Hermon, and his provocative declaration that Israel would not withdraw from the territories it had occupied.[12] At the political level, Hikmat al-Hijri described the relationship between the Druze community and Israel as organic and historically rooted.[13] These maximalist statements regarding Israel can be read as an effort to strengthen or secure Suwayda’s negotiating position at a moment when Syrian-Israeli understandings over the south may be under discussion. They seek to pre-empt a deal in which Suwayda is treated merely as a security provision within a broader understanding between Damascus and Tel Aviv, rather than as a party whose position and interests must be taken into account.

Suwayda’s distinctiveness has become more pronounced despite progress on integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the announced dissolution of both the SDF and the Autonomous Administration, because the SDF model cannot simply be replicated there. Suwayda is no longer solely a Syrian domestic issue; it is now tied to regional and international understandings and to the Syrian government’s capacity to reach an understanding with Israel that prevents the Druze issue from becoming an entry point for an Israeli security arrangement in the south. The roadmap proposed in Amman the previous year could provide an initial reference point for a settlement, with possible amendments to its provisions. Its success, however, remains contingent on Damascus’s ability to produce a domestic settlement and on the extent of regional backing available in response to any renewed Israeli violation on the ground.

A peaceful track based on a gradual domestic settlement and the restoration of the state’s role in Suwayda therefore remains the scenario most capable of preventing the entrenchment of Israel’s approach in the south and returning the governorate to Syrian sovereignty. Failure would leave open the prospect of intra-Druze conflict amid growing domestic anger and the proliferation of local forces. Suwayda is thus the most important field test of any security agreement: it will either open the way for the Syrian state to regain control of its southern sphere or leave the south as an arena for partial and fragile understandings shaped by overlapping local, Israeli, and regional calculations.

From Hama to Abu al-Duhur: Syrian-Turkish Relations in Israel’s Crosshairs

Israel’s targeting of Hama airport[14] and subsequently Abu al-Duhur airbase, using the same stated justifications, reveals a recurring pattern: Israel targets Damascus and Ankara simultaneously through the Syrian theatre. It pressures Syria to prevent the rebuilding of its military capabilities and constrain its defence partnerships and alliances, while signalling to Türkiye that it intends to limit the Turkish military presence and freedom of action inside Syria. The repetition of this pattern indicates that Israel has yet to encounter a material cost or constraint capable of preventing it from resorting to the same course whenever it judges Syrian-Turkish cooperation to have exceeded its preferred limits.

This development forms part of a wider shift in Israel’s approach following the Israeli-US war against Iran. Escalatory rhetoric towards Türkiye intensified, causing Syrian geography to recede as a sovereign space and become the new arena of confrontation between the two sides. That confrontation could expand into a broader regional conflict in which Damascus would not necessarily be a direct party.

The significance of the Amman meeting therefore lies not only in whether it can reduce the current escalation, but also in whether it can prevent this pattern from recurring. Unless the understandings develop into arrangements that restrict Israel’s freedom to target Syrian capabilities and partnerships, the Syrian-Turkish relationship will remain subject to reorganisation under Israeli pressure—affecting the locations of military cooperation, the nature of capabilities, and the degree of public disclosure. The issue thus extends beyond bilateral relations between Damascus and Ankara; it tests the Syrian state’s ability to build its armed forces and determine its partnerships on sovereign terms.

Conclusions and Recommendations

First, the Amman meeting represents an attempt to revive earlier understandings—the Paris cell and the proposed coordination centre in Amman—rather than a new negotiating breakthrough. Those understandings stalled at the implementation stage because of Israeli intransigence and rejection. The central obstacle is Israel’s lack of willingness to engage seriously with the mechanism. The meeting’s distinctive value lies in its response to the escalation and in the inclusion of Türkiye. This confirms that Israeli-Turkish tensions have become part of Syria’s security track and that preventing their spillover into the Syrian arena is now one of that track’s principal tasks.

Second, success should be measured by a more exacting standard than convening another meeting or announcing an operations room: the actual cessation of strikes, incursions, and arrests on the ground, and the prevention of any future coordination mechanism from becoming diplomatic cover for managing Israeli superiority instead of constraining it. As long as Israel views itself through the logic of victory and a post-October 7 “surplus of power,” every coordination mechanism risks shifting from an instrument for regulating the field into one that legitimises the existing reality.

Third, the parties’ divergent understandings of the agreement expose its structural limits. The United States views it as a mechanism for de-escalation. Israel seeks to secure gains extending beyond the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement, while Damascus regards it as a route back to that agreement’s framework. The most likely near-term outcome is therefore a set of partial and fragile security understandings for managing tensions, rather than a comprehensive agreement—unless Israeli conduct on the ground changes.

Fourth, the regional wager has yet to develop into an effective deterrent. The Makkah Agreement and the emerging regional partnerships surrounding it could strengthen Damascus’s negotiating position and provide meaningful room for manoeuvre. In their present form, however, they remain under formation and have yet to become operational. Theoretical intersections of interest must be translated into tangible arrangements—from security connectivity to substantive economic and energy integration—before they can become a strategic constraint on Israel’s approach.

Fifth, Suwayda and the Syrian-Turkish partnership are the two most immediate and revealing tests. Continued targeting of the south, together with repeated dual-purpose strikes against Syrian capabilities and the Turkish presence—as in Hama and Abu al-Duhur—would demonstrate that Israel remains focused on expanding its conditions and consolidating facts on the ground, rather than moving towards an agreement that restricts its freedom of action.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the Amman meeting reveals that Israel approaches Syria not as a state with which a settlement or understanding can be reached, but as an open security space whose risks are continuously managed while its files are deliberately kept unresolved. As long as this logic persists, every future coordination mechanism—whatever its name or location, from Paris to Amman—will remain vulnerable to the same fate: an understanding is announced and then allowed to erode during implementation. For Jordan, the strategic wager cannot rest on waiting for Israel to reconsider this logic of its own accord, especially under a far-right government and amid Israel’s broader shift towards the far right. Expectations that upcoming elections will produce such a change therefore amount, at best, to a temporary wager.

The more credible course is for Syria’s neighbouring states—foremost among them Jordan, followed by the Gulf states that have redefined their regional security to make Syria an integral component and determinant—to undertake constructive mediation aimed at defusing the crisis through the emerging network of regional and international interests in Syria’s stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The success of this strategy would extend beyond protecting the Syrian state. It would help reshape the foundations of regional stability and limit Israel’s ability to deal with Syria in isolation. Left unchecked, such unilateral Israeli dominance would weaken regional states’ ability to establish direct connections with the new Syria and benefit from the accompanying economic, political, and security opportunities. It would also expand Israel’s presence along Jordan’s northern frontier and intensify the direct geopolitical pressure on the kingdom. Successful regional engagement, by contrast, would enable the new Syrian state to complete its recovery and reconstruction, strengthen the transition, and contribute to the stability of Syria and the wider region.

[1] Al Jazeera Net, “With US Mediation: Syria Reveals Details of Its Delegation’s Meeting with Israeli Officials in Jordan,” August 23, 2026. https://bitly.cx/COAff

[2] Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Syria and Israel Move to Defuse Tensions after Airbase Bombing,” Axios, August 23, 2026. https://bitly.cx/RTSy1

[3] Al Jazeera Net, “Abu al-Duhur Airport Targeted: Syria Accuses Israel as US Envoy Expresses Concern,” August 18, 2026. https://bitly.cx/otqN7

[4] Al Jazeera Net, “Messages to Ankara by Fire: Where Is Israel’s Venture in Syria Heading?” August 20, 2026. https://bitly.cx/UY8En

[5] Agence France-Presse, “Syria FM Met Mossad Chief in Jordan on Sunday: Sources to AFP,” Ahram Online, August 23, 2026. https://bitly.cx/FcmUZ

[6] US Department of State, “Joint Statement on the Trilateral Meeting between the Governments of the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Syrian Arab Republic,” January 6, 2026. https://bitly.cx/wYlE8

[7] Informed Jordanian source, previous interview, February 2026.

[8] Sijill Center, “Escalation of Israeli Violations in August,” September 1, 2026. https://bitly.cx/c2L3f

[9] Al Jazeera Net, “The First in 19 Years: Syrian Foreign Minister Arrives in Pakistan,” August 20, 2026. https://bitly.cx/fhkUE

[10] Syria TV, “Syrian Foreign Minister: We Are Considering Joining the Makkah Mutual Defence Agreement,” August 21, 2026. https://bitly.cx/Xd2ES

[11] Sasha al-Alou, “The Limits of Israel’s Approach in Syria: The Network of Regional and International Interests as a Strategic Constraint,” Omran Center for Strategic Studies, August 14, 2026. https://bitly.cx/oG4r

[12] Clara Nabaa, “From Syria, Katz Confirms His Forces Will Remain on Mount Hermon and in the Security Zone, Sending a Message to al-Sharaa,” Euronews, August 25, 2026. https://bitly.cx/Xd2ES

[13] Rakan al-Khoder, “Al-Hijri Holds Fast to Israel: Political Messages Complicate the Suwayda File,” Enab Baladi, August 30, 2026. https://bitly.cx/x1Vn

[14] Al Jazeera Net, “Israeli Airstrikes Target Damascus, Hama, and the Homs Countryside,” April 2, 2025. https://bitly.cx/pWHwI