The West Bank and Jordan’s National Security

What is happening today in the West Bank and Jerusalem may appear to be simply an escalation of the familiar policies pursued by Benjamin Netanyahu’s government: expanding settlements, undermining the Palestinian presence, altering realities in Jerusalem, and using legislative, administrative, security and political tools to impose new facts on the ground. Yet such a reading risks overlooking a more consequential shift. What we have witnessed in recent days is approaching a tipping point, taking Israeli policies to a different and far more dangerous level.

The alarming rise in settler violence and attacks against Palestinian villages, the growing activity of extremist groups such as the “Hilltop Youth,” mounting pressure on institutions and private schools in Jerusalem, and the E1 settlement project are not merely making Palestinian life more difficult. Together, they are creating an environment in which human insecurity becomes a permanent feature of everyday life. E1, in particular, threatens to further fragment the West Bank geographically and undermine what remains of the possibility of a viable Palestinian state.

In this sense, we are witnessing a qualitative shift, even if it appears to be a quantitative continuation of previous policies. Extremist settler groups are increasingly assuming a role reminiscent of Zionist paramilitary organisations such as the Haganah and Stern Gang before the establishment of Israel: using violence, intimidation and coercion to create new demographic and geographic realities.

For Jordan, this is not merely a moral or political question. It directly concerns national security and strategic interests. The threats are multiple and interconnected: extremist Zionist rhetoric, which can no longer be dismissed as marginal within Israeli politics; the spectre of forced or so-called “voluntary” displacement; the hundreds of thousands of West Bank residents who hold Jordanian passports; attempts to alter the status quo in Jerusalem; and the profound social, political, cultural, geographic and historical interconnectedness between Jordan and the West Bank.

Nor is it realistic to assume that Israel’s next elections, even if Netanyahu leaves office, will simply restore the old peace process. The transformations within Israeli society and politics run considerably deeper than Netanyahu and his government.

This is precisely where Jordan’s strategic dilemma emerges. For decades, Jordanian policy has regarded a political settlement and the establishment of a Palestinian state as a vital national and strategic interest. Today, that prospect is rapidly evaporating, while the Palestinian Authority itself faces further erosion and perhaps, at a later stage, collapse. What should Jordan do if the assumptions upon which its previous strategy was built no longer exist?

Two broad approaches can be identified in the Jordanian debate. The first advocates, explicitly or implicitly, “looking east rather than west” and reducing Jordan’s involvement in the Palestinian question. Its premise is that developments in the West Bank are taking place beyond Jordan’s borders, and that Jordan’s primary responsibility is to protect those borders and firmly reject displacement.

The problem with this argument is that it overlooks geography, history, demography and security. For Jordan, the West Bank has never been an ordinary foreign-policy issue.

The second approach recognises the seriousness of current developments and their potential impact on Jordanian national security, but focuses primarily on diplomatic and political escalation against Israeli policies. Such efforts are necessary, but they are no longer sufficient.

What Jordan needs today is a third approach: a national strategy that recognises the West Bank and Jerusalem as vital components of Jordan’s national-security environment and moves beyond managing reactions towards developing an integrated strategic plan.

The Politics and Society Institute has previously proposed policy ideas along these lines. If Israel has moved from seeking to “resolve the conflict” to managing it, and now towards attempting to settle fundamental aspects of it unilaterally on the ground, Jordan must develop the tools required to deal with this new reality.

Consider, for example, the frequently repeated objective of “strengthening Palestinian steadfastness”. What exactly do we mean by steadfastness? What policies, instruments and resources can transform it from a political slogan into an implementable strategy?

The King Hussein Bridge should not be viewed merely as a border crossing. It is a vital lifeline for Palestinians in the West Bank at a time when Israeli policies increasingly risk turning the territory into a vast prison. Facilitating movement across the bridge and developing its infrastructure and procedures should therefore be treated as a strategic priority.

The same applies to Jerusalem and its holy sites, where there is an urgent need for a more coordinated and effective Jordanian-Arab strategy.

For Jordan, the West Bank is not a secondary foreign-policy file. It is simultaneously a question of national security, strategic interests, regional influence, domestic stability and a deeply intertwined historical relationship. If current developments are pushing the conflict into a new phase, the question is no longer simply how Jordan should respond to Israeli policies, but what its strategy should be for the day after the prospect of a Palestinian state has been eroded.

That is now one of the most urgent questions facing Jordan and its political and intellectual elites.