Hedging Its Bets: Egypt’s Calculated Position in the US-Israeli War on Iran
The US-Israeli Operation Epic Fury, launched on February 28, 2026, has thrown the Middle East into profound turmoil, as Iran’s three-pronged defense strategy triggered full-scale regional destabilization. First, by targeting Israel as well as US military bases and economic interests across the region, Iran placed GCC countries, along with Jordan, in a precarious position, effectively catching them in the middle of the conflict. Second, Iran’s regional network of non-state allies was mobilized against what they perceived as an existential threat to the regime. As a result, additional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, became involved. Finally, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz negatively impacted oil prices and disrupted supply chains, further worsening the economic conditions of many already struggling countries in the Middle East.
Amid this regional crisis, Egypt’s position cannot be understood as a form of passive neutrality. Rather, Cairo has developed a pattern of “flexible positioning” characterized by several key features: solidarity with the Gulf states, avoidance of a rupture with Washington, resistance to the expansion of Israel’s regional influence, and a sustained commitment to preserving open channels for mediation.
Accordingly, the significance of the Egyptian case lies not merely in defining Cairo’s position toward the war, but in what it reveals about the transformation of Egypt’s role within the Arab regional order. Does this policy reflect Egypt’s return as a regional mediator capable of managing strategic balances, or does it instead expose the limits of its capacity for leadership within an Arab system increasingly shaped by Gulf resources, Israeli military initiative, and American security guarantees? This paper argues that Egypt now operates within an intermediate position between leadership and mediation. It no longer possesses the capacity to lead the Arab order through the logic of a single regional center, yet it still retains sufficient geopolitical weight, diplomatic experience, and political legitimacy to manage spaces of de-escalation, negotiation, and the prevention of full-scale regional polarization.
Egypt’s Official Stance: Opposing Escalation, Solidarity with the Gulf
A review of the official statements issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) throughout the conflict reveals three consistently recurring themes: calls for restraint and the resumption of negotiations to contain the escalation, expressions of support for the Gulf countries alongside condemnation of Iranian hostile attacks, and criticism of Israeli aggression while carefully avoiding direct condemnation of the United States.1
The fine line that Egypt sought to navigate is best exemplified in the reported revision of its first official statement on February 28. According to some reports, Egypt’s initial MFA statement was withdrawn shortly after publication, amended, and then republished. Initially, the statement expressed Egypt’s deep concern over the military escalation and warned of a widening conflict. However, following the Iranian retaliatory response, the statement was revised to emphasize strong condemnation of attacks that violated the territorial sovereignty of the GCC states.2 A similar message was reiterated by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on March 1, while addressing the Egyptian military leaders. He stated that Iran had miscalculated and should not have targeted Arab states under any circumstances.3
Egypt’s solidarity with the Gulf countries came as no surprise. Historically and ideologically, Egypt has long positioned itself as a primary defender of the Arab world. This stance is best encapsulated by el-Sisi’s Masafat al-Sikka (meaning within reach) doctrine, which asserts that Egyptian military power is ready to defend the Gulf at any time.4 Furthermore, for decades, Egypt has viewed the GCC states as a vital economic lifeline for its own chronically strained economy. Since 2013, the need for Gulf countries’ economic support has further intensified. They supported the Egyptian regime by loans, direct deposits to the central bank, investments, and by acting as guarantors to its IMF programs.5 A recent example is the $35 billion Ras El-Hekma deal with the UAE in early 2024, which marked the largest foreign direct investment in the country’s history.6
In this context, Egyptian solidarity with the Gulf should not be interpreted merely as a rhetorical extension of the “Masafat al-Sikka” doctrine, but rather as a structural interest tied to the stability of the Gulf sphere itself. For Cairo, Gulf security has become intertwined with the conditions of Egypt’s own financial and monetary stability. Through investments, deposits, remittances, employment opportunities, and energy linkages, the Gulf has evolved into a vital economic depth for the Egyptian state. Consequently, any major disruption in the Gulf directly affects Egypt’s capacity to manage its domestic economic crises, rendering regional escalation a dual threat: a threat to the security of its allies and a threat to the equation of internal Egyptian stability itself.
Given its deep economic dependence on the Gulf, preventing further escalation is a vital interest for Egypt, whose economy has already been adversely affected by the war. Beyond its actual and projected negative impact on the key sources of Egypt’s national income, namely the Suez Canal fees, tourism revenues, and remittances from workers abroad (predominantly in the GCC countries), the conflict triggered a sharp decline in Egypt’s reported exports (by 77% in the first two to three days) and a significant outflow of short-term foreign investments, or hot money, estimated at $5–8 billion. Consequently, the Egyptian pound depreciated rapidly, surpassing 52 EGP per US dollar within a matter of days.7
Egypt’s other major concern is its energy security. As a result of the war, its two primary gas suppliers have significantly been compromised. Imports from Israel, previously secured under a $35 billion contract, have declined by 95%, while supplies from Qatar were disrupted following Iranian missile strikes that disabled 17% of its production capacity. As a result, Egypt’s gas import bill has more than doubled, according to Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly. In response, the government has enacted emergency measures, including a 17% increase in fuel prices and mandatory early closure of businesses to ration electricity consumption, triggering widespread dissatisfaction within the domestic business community.8
Countering Israel: Balancing Economic Imperatives and Geopolitical Constraints
Egypt’s economic imperatives and its strategic commitment to Gulf security are not the sole determinants of its behavior in the current crisis. Equally significant is its concern over the rise of Israeli aggressive posture in the region. Despite the peace treaty signed nearly five decades ago, relations between the two countries can best be described as a “cold peace.” Moreover, under the right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Egyptian regime has perceived several warning signs. Contrary to the provisions of their mutual agreements, during its war on Gaza, Israel assumed control over the Philadelphi Corridor along its border with Egypt. In addition, a number of Israeli officials have repeatedly called for the displacement of Gazans into Sinai. More alarmingly, expansionist ambitions framed as “Greater Israel”, which include references to parts of Egyptian territory, have been promoted in public discourse by senior officials, including Netanyahu himself. In response to these provocations, Egypt enhanced its military capabilities through major arms deals and expanded the deployment of its forces in Sinai.9
Perceived as a direct threat to Egypt’s national interests, the war on Iran, coupled with ongoing Israeli aggression in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, has echoed Netanyahu’s statements about reshaping the Middle East.10 In this context, Iran and its regional allies, classically seen as a threat by the GCC countries, serve a paradoxically significant function from Egypt’s perspective by keeping Israel under sustained pressure. Hence, if Israel succeeds in toppling the Iranian regime and dismantling its network of regional allies, it might be emboldened and become in a better strategic position to implement its plans for Gaza that could undermine Egypt’s interests.
From this perspective, Cairo does not view the war on Iran merely as a conflict between Washington and Tel Aviv on one side and Tehran on the other, but rather as a moment that could reshape the regional balance of power in ways that place Egypt within a more constricted security environment. A fundamental weakening of Iran, coupled with continued Israeli escalation in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, could shift Israel from the position of a militarily superior power to that of a regional power capable of redefining the security order surrounding Egypt itself.
Accordingly, Egyptian concerns regarding Israel are connected not only to the trajectory of the war, but also to the postwar regional order: who will define the rules of the region, and who will prevent Gaza, Sinai, and the Eastern Mediterranean from being transformed into arenas of direct pressure on Egyptian national security?
Balance or incapacity?
Egypt’s conduct during this war raises a fundamental question: does Cairo’s policy represent a calculated balancing strategy, or does it reflect an inability to adopt a decisive position? The more persuasive answer is that Egypt is practicing a form of constrained balancing under heavy structural limitations. Cairo does not possess the luxury of fully aligning with any single side, because each alignment carries direct costs for its national interests. Broad military alignment with the Gulf could place Egypt in open confrontation with Iran and its allies, while excessive proximity to Washington and Tel Aviv could erode its Arab legitimacy. At the same time, tolerance of an unconstrained Israeli rise threatens Egypt’s own security environment in Gaza, Sinai, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Conversely, Egypt’s geographic position, negotiating experience, and diversified regional connections provide it with a greater capacity to manage de-escalation than to lead confrontation. In this sense, Egypt no longer appears as a leading power in the traditional Arab sense, nor as a marginal state devoid of influence. Rather, it functions as a balancing state operating within the limits of its capabilities, transforming structural constraints into a space for diplomatic maneuverability.
Consequently, in contrast to the Masafat al-Sikka approach, Egypt’s military support to the GCC states during this conflict has remained limited and largely defensive.11 Even the deployment of Egyptian Rafale fighters to UAE, which was revealed during President el-Sisi’s official visit in May 2026, was seen as “primarily symbolic”.12 Instead, it seems that Egypt opted to prioritize diplomatic engagement in coordination with both Pakistan and Türkiye.13 Beyond formal contacts and official visits, Egypt, primarily through its General Intelligence Service, facilitated indirect communication between Washington and Tehran during the ceasefire negotiations.14
Though it may seem wisely calculated, Egypt’s balanced response has placed it in an uneasy position. While navigating this trilemma, its tensions with Israel have grown, fueled by sharp diplomatic rhetoric and accusations regarding its military deployments in Sinai.15 Simultaneously, it seems that its Gulf allies were somewhat frustrated, expecting from the Egyptian regime more tangible backing in the face of the Iranian threat.16 Furthermore, Egypt’s pursuit of de-escalation runs counter to the objectives of some GCC states, which have lobbied the US administration not to end the war before the Iranian regime is strategically weakened, arguing that “a simple ceasefire is not enough”.17
The war reveals that Egypt’s regional role is no longer based on leading the Arab order from a single center of power, but rather on managing balances among multiple power centers. Cairo is operating within a highly delicate equation: deep economic dependence on the Gulf, a strategic relationship with the United States, growing concern over the persistence of regional instability driven by Iran’s wartime strategies, and acute security sensitivities toward any Israeli expansion in Gaza, Sinai, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Accordingly, Egypt’s policy throughout the war presents a model of what may be described as “flexible positioning” – the ability to support allies without sliding into open confrontation, preserve relations with Washington without granting Israel an unrestricted strategic mandate, and engage in mediation without compromising national security calculations.
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