The Islamists’ Unfinished Questions
Amid the sweeping transformations reshaping the Arab East, a central question emerges: where does political Islam stand within these changes, how is it interacting with them, and how are they, in turn, reshaping it? This is the question that the recently published volume “Islamists After October 7: Questions of Identity and Destiny” (issued by the Politics and Society Institute and the Sharaq Forum, edited by Dr. Mohammad Affan and Mariam Al-Batoush) seeks to address through contributions from a group of scholars and specialists in the field.
The book brings together a number of important research papers examining Islamist movements across Palestine (Hamas and Islamic Jihad), Syria (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and other armed factions), Lebanon (Hezbollah), Yemen (the Houthis), and Iraq (the Popular Mobilization Forces). At the same time, it offers a broader reading of the regional landscape and the emerging transformations shaping political Islam and its role—particularly in the aftermath of the October 7 events and the major regional reverberations that followed, as well as the rise of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to power and the implications this carries. Notably, the book was published on the eve of the current U.S.–Iran confrontation, whether as a development in its own right or as part of the wider trajectory of regional instability.
The volume focuses on a set of major transformations shaping the landscape of Islamism in the Mashreq, foremost among them the evolving domestic and regional political environment, which can be understood across three levels: international, regional, and domestic Arab politics, alongside the relationship between Islamist movements and their social bases.
At the first level lies the transformation of the geopolitical order that has prevailed over the past two decades. This is evident in the contraction and fragmentation of what has been termed the “axis of resistance,” alongside the decline of Iran’s role, shifts in the Syrian position, and the weakening of the Lebanese front following the military blows suffered by Hezbollah since October 7. These changes are accompanied by a transformation in Lebanon’s internal balance, the large-scale destruction in Gaza and the new reality facing Hamas in the wake of the Israeli war, and a broader shift in Israel’s regional role, reflected in a new security-military doctrine premised on attempts at dominance. All of this unfolds alongside shifts in U.S. policy under President Donald Trump.
The second level intersects with the first and concerns the profound changes in domestic Arab politics in the post–Arab Spring era, particularly the sustained pressure on peaceful Islamist movements that have declared their acceptance of democratic processes. In their most prominent form—the Muslim Brotherhood—these movements have become banned or designated as terrorist organizations in several Arab states, after a period in which the international and regional environment had been more accommodating, allowing them varying degrees of political and social participation. Today, however, both domestic and international policies have increasingly narrowed the space available to them, raising a pressing question: what options remain for this broad current of political Islam, long considered the dominant trend, in the face of unprecedented political closure and the apparent failure of democratic pathways?
Adding to this is a striking paradox: the success of “armed Islamism” in reaching power in Syria through Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which has evolved into a regionally and internationally tolerated political actor after having been classified as a terrorist organization. This transformation has been accompanied by a significant ideological shift, as the group has distanced itself from much of its earlier jihadist discourse while consolidating its political authority. This raises an important question: can it still be classified as part of political Islam, or has it entered a new phase that some scholars describe as “post-jihadism”?
A related yet underexplored phenomenon can be observed among factions of what might be termed “Shi’a political Islam,” such as the Islamic Dawa Party in Iraq and its allies. These actors have also entered the sphere of governance without maintaining a firm commitment to traditional Islamist ideology. Similar patterns can be seen in different contexts, most notably in the Turkish model, where the Justice and Development Party marked a transition toward what has been described as “post-Islamism,” having moved beyond the classical ideological foundations associated with earlier Islamist currents.
In light of these developments, it becomes necessary to revisit and deconstruct the very concept of “political Islam.” This is particularly relevant in the context of the emerging phenomenon of “non-Islamist Islamists in power,” as well as the transformations affecting historically peaceful Islamist movements that have embraced democratic processes and moved away—partially or substantially—from their traditional ideological frameworks, including concepts such as the Islamic state, confrontation with secularism, and the slogan of “Islam as the solution.” Increasingly, these movements appear to be adapting to political realities and engaging with new political and economic agendas.
On the other hand, the transformation of political Islam is mirrored by a parallel shift in Arab state religious policies. States that once embraced nationalist or leftist ideologies are now granting greater prominence to religious discourse and competing with Islamist actors over the management of the religious sphere. As a result, the boundaries between Islamist ideological discourse and state-driven religious narratives have become increasingly blurred, raising further questions about the distinction between Islamist movements and other political actors or governments.
From these dynamics emerges the third level of analysis: the relationship between Islamist movements and their social bases. Historically, these movements represented broad constituencies that viewed their ideas and slogans as pathways to political solutions. Today, however, the nature of this social base is far less clear. In some contexts, it has taken on a sectarian character, as in Iraq and Lebanon; in others, it reflects social or geographic divisions; and elsewhere, Islamist movements derive their strength from their position as the primary opposition to state policies. This raises a critical question: how should we reinterpret the relationship between these movements and the social, political, and cultural structures within which they operate?
Ultimately, the significance of this volume lies not in providing definitive answers, but in raising a set of questions and observations that merit deeper reflection and study regarding one of the most important domestic and regional actors in the contemporary Middle East.