Syria and the War on Iran: The Dilemma of Hostility and Neutrality

The U.S.–Israeli war on Iran has reopened the prospect of a new phase of regional instability in the Middle East. Its repercussions are not confined to the direct parties to the conflict; rather, they extend to other arenas intertwined with the region’s broader strategic balances. In this context, Syria emerges as one of the states most sensitive to these developments, particularly in light of the geopolitical transformations it has experienced since the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad and the complex and multifaceted challenges confronting the Syrian government. Foremost among these challenges is the preservation of Syria’s territorial unity in the face of persistent concerns over fragmentation. While some progress has been achieved through political arrangements with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria, the issue remains unresolved in relation to the leadership in As-Suwayda and the entity known as the “National Guard.”

Although Syria no longer constitutes a direct arena for Iranian military influence and deployment as it did during the previous decade, its geographical position, the entanglement of its regional relationships, and its historical tensions with Iran may render it particularly vulnerable to the spillover effects of the ongoing war. This raises critical questions regarding the capacity of the emerging Syrian state to avoid becoming entangled in regional conflicts during this transitional phase, especially as it seeks to prioritize domestic stabilization and the reordering of Syria’s internal political landscape.

First, the relationship between the new Syrian government and Iran does not originate from a position of neutrality or normalcy; rather, it is shaped by a legacy of political hostility that took form during the years of the Syrian uprising and the accompanying direct and forceful Iranian military intervention, which has long been accused of altering the trajectory of events throughout the conflict. Nevertheless, this adversarial legacy does not necessarily imply that Damascus is prepared to engage in the ongoing war against Tehran. The central challenge facing the Syrian government today lies in preventing Syria from becoming a forward arena of confrontation with Iran or with its regional allies, particularly Hezbollah and the Iraqi factions aligned with Tehran.

In this context, it is conceivable that the United States-which appears strongly motivated to secure a swift outcome in the war-may exert pressure on Syria to assume a more active role in regional security arrangements connected to the conflict with Iran. Such a scenario would place Damascus before a delicate strategic equation: balancing its historically antagonistic political stance toward Tehran on the one hand, and the strategic necessity of insulating the Syrian arena from broader regional conflicts on the other.

Second, the sensitivity of southern Syria has intensified amid the broader regional escalation, given its immediate geographical proximity to Israel and the Golan Heights. At the same time, the continuing stalemate in As-Suwayda-along with the refusal of some of its factions and community leaders to engage in dialogue with the Syrian government-raises a fundamental question regarding the potential repercussions of the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran for the local landscape in Suwayda. This concern is particularly salient in light of the clear and explicit support reportedly provided by Israel to Hikmat al-Hijri and to the entity known as the “National Guard.”

In this context, it is conceivable that the tensions accompanying the war may prompt certain actors to view this front as part of the broader regional deterrence equation. Such a development would impose additional challenges on Damascus, most notably the need to prevent Syrian territory from becoming an arena for the settling of regional scores. At the same time, it would require the Syrian government to position itself with considerable caution in order to maintain stability and safeguard state sovereignty.

Third, the war on Iran raises security concerns related to the potential resurgence of extremist organizations across the Syrian geographical landscape, particularly in the Syrian desert (the Badiya). Contemporary history suggests that jihadist organizations-most notably Islamic State (ISIS)-often exploit periods of security vacuums or moments when regional and international actors are preoccupied with larger geopolitical confrontations. Should the ongoing regional escalation divert military and political attention away from counterterrorism efforts, such groups may find renewed opportunities to reactivate their dormant cells, especially in desert and border regions that previously witnessed significant militant activity within Syria.

In light of these challenges, the importance of adopting a comprehensive Syrian approach-at both the political and security levels-becomes increasingly evident. Such an approach should aim to politically and geographically insulate Syria from direct involvement in the war against Iran, while prioritizing internal stabilization and the reconstruction of state institutions. The success of Syria’s transitional phase cannot be understood solely in terms of its capacity to control borders or combat terrorism domestically; rather, it must also be measured by its ability to avoid entanglement in competing regional alignments that could reproduce the crises of the past and transform them into future conflicts.

From this perspective, a set of strategic orientations can be envisaged for the Syrian government. First, there is a growing need to adopt a balanced Syrian foreign policy grounded in non-alignment, whereby Damascus avoids direct involvement in regional conflicts while maintaining open channels of communication with all regional and international actors. Second, strengthening national capacities in border control and territorial protection becomes essential in order to prevent Syrian territory from being used as military or logistical platforms for cross-border conflicts. Third, counterterrorism efforts and the rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas should be placed at the forefront of national policy priorities, through cooperation with international and regional partners without being drawn into competing political alignments.

Ultimately, the war on Iran underscores that the future stability of Syria is closely tied to the country’s ability to manage its sensitive geopolitical position with strategic prudence. The capacity to balance regional pressures while safeguarding sovereignty and reinforcing internal stability makes the neutralization of Syria from broader Middle Eastern conflicts a necessary strategic choice. The success of such a strategy extends beyond merely protecting the Syrian state; it also contributes to reshaping the contours of regional stability and reducing the likelihood that Syria will once again become a platform for wider conflicts or proxy wars on its territory. In this sense, preserving Syria’s transitional trajectory ultimately depends on maintaining the correct strategic priority: placing domestic stabilization and internal reconstruction above external rivalries and regional antagonisms.