Lebanese Parliamentary Elections Between the Priority of Arms Monopoly and the Reproduction of the Balance of Power

The issue of parliamentary elections in Lebanon at the present moment does not appear to be a crisis of the electoral law or a problem related to a special district for expatriates as much as it appears to be a crisis of political timing within a turbulent regional context. The debate surrounding the sixteenth district (related to the election of Lebanese abroad), the missing implementing decrees, the divergence of interpretations between the Ministry of Interior and the Legislation and Consultations Authority, and the flow of appeals before the Shura Council are all formally valid elements, but they do not constitute the core of the impasse. [1]

The core of the impasse is that the Lebanese political system has found itself facing a question that goes beyond texts: Is it permissible to reproduce legislative authority at a moment when the internal security balance of power within the state has not yet been settled?

This question has not been publicly posed in this form, but it governs the behavior of most active forces. The Constitution mandates holding elections on time, yet political reality indicates that domestic and external priorities have shifted toward another, more sensitive file: the issue of the exclusivity of arms in the hands of the state. Since this file has not yet been completed, but rather has entered a sensitive executive phase linked to the army’s deployment plan north of the Litani River and the gradual control of Hezbollah’s areas of influence, any elections held now could be understood as entrenching a balance of power that has not actually changed. [2]

From here, the deliberate maintenance of the crisis of District 16 in a suspended state can be understood. The law is known, and the loopholes are known, yet the government has not initiated the issuance of implementing decrees, nor has Parliament moved to amend the text, despite the previously available time. [3]

This abstention cannot be explained merely by negligence, but rather by the existence of political awareness that legal complexity may, when necessary, become a constitutional outlet for suspending the electoral process.

Managing Deliberate Ambiguity Within Authority

If we examine the behavior of the executive authority over recent months, we notice a striking phenomenon: everyone speaks of commitment to holding elections, yet no one behaves as if they are an overriding political priority. Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri declared his candidacy early and raised the rhetoric regarding respect for constitutional deadlines, but at the same time refused for Parliament to be the body proposing an extension, preferring that the request come from the government. The government, for its part, deals with the legal issue with considerable hesitation, neither settling on an interpretation nor issuing decrees nor initiating an amendment project. [4]

This distribution of roles is not arbitrary and appears to reflect an attempt to manage time while awaiting the maturation of a broader consensus. Extending the mandate of the current Parliament, within a system exhausted by eroding legitimacy, cannot be a purely domestic decision. It requires a clear regional umbrella and guarantees that its political cost will not turn into an internal explosion.

Internal Balance of Power – Complex Calculations Beyond Gain and Loss

The internal equation is more complex than the question of who benefits electorally from postponement. It is true that the Shiite duo (Hezbollah and the Amal Movement) appears in an electoral position that would allow it to preserve its bloc if elections are held soon, benefiting from mobilization within its environment and continued Israeli pressure. However, the matter does not stop there. The party realizes that its parliamentary legitimacy at this stage would be read externally within the context of the struggle over arms. Any elections held now could be used as evidence that the balance of power has not changed and that arms still govern the political equation. [5]

In contrast, opposition forces see that the passage of time may bring about a gradual shift within the party’s supportive environment if accompanied by actual progress in the arms monopoly plan or escalating financial-security pressures. For these forces, particularly the Lebanese Forces and other anti-Hezbollah actors, time may function as a factor of gradual erosion of hard power.

The Sunni arena faces a sensitive variable: the potential return of the Future Movement. The entry of Saad Hariri into the electoral battle redraws the map and limits the ability of other forces to fill the vacuum. This factor is monitored regionally, particularly by Saudi Arabia, which has not yet granted full cover for an active political return at this timing. [6]

The Government as a Transitional Instrument

The government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, despite its political weakness, is externally perceived as a “functional” rather than “political” government. Its primary role is not to manage internal balances as much as to implement a defined reform and security path. Attempts to topple it through street pressure over salaries and taxes nearly opened the door to broad governmental change, but external intervention prevented that. [7]

The Regional Dimension: Lebanon as Part of a Broader Architecture

The debate over parliamentary elections in Lebanon cannot be understood in isolation from the trajectory of U.S.–Iran negotiations, which constitute the overarching strategic framework within which most regional files move, including the Lebanese arena.

From this perspective, parliamentary elections do not appear to be an urgent priority in American calculations. Washington currently focuses on two central issues: first, consolidating the principle of arms exclusivity in the hands of the Lebanese state as a practical extension of the implementation of Resolution 1701; second, preventing any internal Lebanese development that could reproduce political legitimacy for an armed force outside the official framework before this security file is readjusted. [8]

France approaches the issue from a different but intersecting angle. The French approach prioritizes institutional stability and the continuity of the current government as a tool for implementing financial and administrative reforms and managing internal balances during a sensitive phase. Paris does not publicly push for postponing elections but does not pressure for holding them if doing so would destabilize stability or obstruct reforms. [9]

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, views the file through the lens of reshaping political balances, particularly within the Sunni arena, in the broader context of reorganizing its regional roles. The timing of elections is therefore linked to calculations extending beyond Beirut.

Scenarios and Their Deep Implications

If elections are held on time, the current balance of power will likely be reproduced with marginal modifications.

If a short technical postponement evolves into a longer extension, it will be presented as a procedural necessity linked to the law. However, the clearest scenario behind the scenes is a direct political extension for one or two years under the title of completing the arms monopoly plan and reforms.

Conclusion

Lebanon stands before a profound test of the nature of its political system. Elections at this moment are no longer a procedural event but an intersection between redefining the function of the state and preserving existing balances. Any postponement, if it occurs, will not be a technical decision but an indirect declaration that the balance of power has not yet been settled.

Sources

[1] Al-Modon – ‘The Response of the Legislation Authority Mixes the Cards: Is Someone Linking Elections to Arms?’

[2] Al Jazeera – ‘Implementation of the Second Phase of Arms Monopoly in Lebanon: Political and Field Calculations’

[3] Lebanon 24 – ‘District 16 Fuels Conflict and the Duo Holds Elections Beyond the Entitlement’

[4] MTV Lebanon – ‘Berri Embarrasses the Government… by Running for Elections!’

[5] Asas Media – ‘The Duo’s Insistence on Elections as a Preemption of Regional Equations’

[6] Arabi Post – ‘Return with Conditions: Hariri Prepares to Return to Lebanese Political Life’

[7] Al-Modon – ‘Postponing Elections for Two Years: Priority to Arms and Salam Survives an Ambush’

[8] Carnegie Middle East Center – ‘A Mechanism of Coercion’

[9] Al-Akhbar – ‘Saudi Arabia and France Officially: Postpone the Elections’