Ankara at a Critical Juncture: How Is It Viewed from Jordan?
The security architecture of the Middle East has, for several years, been undergoing profound and overlapping transformations that have reshaped the contours of the regional environment. The expansion of fragile states, the continuation of Israeli military operations and their repercussions for regional stability, coupled with the decline of U.S. engagement and the erosion of the effectiveness of the “security umbrella” previously provided by Washington, have all contributed to destabilizing the traditional security order. As a result, states across the region have redefined their threat perceptions and have begun searching for new, more flexible arrangements to navigate a rapidly changing reality.
Within this context, interpreting King Abdullah II’s visit to Türkiye as a routine diplomatic step overlooks the deeper dynamics unfolding in the region. Jordan does not operate on the basis of political impulsiveness or symbolic posturing; rather, it acts according to carefully calibrated assessments tied to shifting balances of power in its surroundings. Its engagement with Ankara at this particular moment therefore extends beyond the framework of bilateral relations, reflecting instead a proactive reading of broader transformations affecting the Kingdom’s security, its borders, and its position within a region that is being quietly reconfigured.
Türkiye today is not the same country Jordan knew a decade ago. It is no longer merely a state seeking to expand its regional influence through economic and diplomatic means. It has become a direct security actor in sensitive files that affect Jordan at the closest possible range: Syria, border dynamics, refugee flows, and even the emerging arrangements in southern Syria.
What concerns Amman is not rapprochement with Ankara per se, but the nature of Türkiye’s transformation itself. Ankara no longer behaves as a “distant” power with which coordination can be managed primarily through political channels; rather, it has become an on-the-ground actor wielding tangible influence in complex files that may directly affect Jordanian security. This shift fundamentally alters the rules of the game. Jordan has long managed its relations with regional powers through a strategy of balance, but when those powers evolve into field actors operating close to its borders, balance alone is no longer sufficient.
From this perspective, the visit appears less an expression of rapprochement than a Jordanian effort to understand unfolding dynamics before a new reality takes shape without its participation.
Jordan recognizes that the region is entering a phase of redistributing influence, not merely realigning political positions. Major actors are moving operationally on the ground, security maps are being drawn gradually, and sensitive dossiers-particularly Syria-are no longer managed solely through political channels, but increasingly through security and military ones as well. In such a context, Amman cannot afford to remain in the position of a passive recipient.
In this sense, the visit is not a message of friendship as much as it is a message of anticipation. It signals that Jordan seeks to be present in any forthcoming arrangements rather than be confronted with them after the fact. For the Kingdom, the real risk does not lie in Türkiye itself, but in the transformation of the region into an arena of overlapping spheres of influence, where multiple powers operate on the ground while small and medium-sized states strive primarily to prevent the repercussions of this dynamism from reaching their borders. This is what renders today’s political movements more closely tied to security imperatives than to diplomacy alone.
It is precisely here that the visit acquires heightened sensitivity, as it reveals Jordan’s awareness that the coming phase will not be managed solely through the traditional channels it has long relied upon. Instead, Amman recognizes the need to engage directly in understanding emerging transformations rather than merely observing them. Türkiye today is no longer just a potential partner; it is an actor that cannot be ignored in files that directly affect Jordan, whether Amman prefers it or not.
The question driving Jordan is not, “How do we cooperate with Türkiye?” but rather, “How far will Türkiye go in its new roles?”
Speaking of a “changing region” is a broad narrative that can be invoked on many occasions. What gives this visit its real significance, however, is the recognition of Türkiye as a power actively reshaping its role in Jordan’s immediate neighborhood. The challenge, therefore, lies not in bilateral relations per se, but in the transformations that underpin them.
At the same time, the visit cannot be understood solely through the lens of concern or risk management. There has been a growing convergence in the foreign policy orientations of Amman and Ankara in recent years. The two sides are moving toward a shared reading of several regional files, particularly regarding the imperative of stability, the avoidance of state collapse, and the adoption of pragmatic approaches to crises rather than ideologically driven engagement.
Jordan does not view Türkiye as a regional adversary, but rather as an actor with whom it shares multiple intersecting interests. More importantly, Amman has not entered into the broader regional discourse surrounding “Turkish military expansion,” nor has it framed it as a direct threat, as other regional actors have done. This reflects a distinct Jordanian reading of Türkiye’s role-one that is shaped less by the lens of military power and more by the broader patterns of political behavior.
More precisely, Jordan approaches Türkiye as a state with a dynamic and evolving foreign policy, rather than as an expansionist military power. This distinction is significant.
While Turkish policy may be operationally present across multiple arenas, Jordan has not positioned itself in confrontation with it, nor has it joined alignments against it. Instead, it has maintained open channels even during the most complex regional moments, which renders the visit closer to a continuation of a quiet trajectory of political rapprochement.
This, however, does not mean the relationship has evolved into a strategic alliance. Jordan rarely enters into deep partnerships with any regional power, preferring to preserve a flexible distance that allows it to maneuver with all actors. In this regard, it converges with Türkiye, which likewise does not operate within rigid alliances but rather within a fluid network of relationships.
The visit therefore reflects something more nuanced than any of the above: it is neither an expression of concern about Türkiye nor an alignment with it, but rather a mutual recognition of a growing intersection in the political trajectories of both sides, even if their respective instruments differ.
Türkiye operates through a combination of military, diplomatic, and economic tools, whereas Jordan moves through calibrated political and security instruments. Yet the overall direction of their engagement across regional files has begun to converge more than diverge. This constitutes the real novelty in the relationship-not merely the generalized notion that “the region is changing.”
The issue of Israeli expansion in the West Bank and the prospects of annexation provides a tangible space for complementarity between Jordan and Türkiye, not merely a convergence of positions. Jordan holds a direct geographic and political stake in this equation, as annexation poses an immediate threat to its border security, demographic balance, and internal stability-particularly given the potential for increased pressures linked to refugees and instability in the West Bank. Türkiye, by contrast, possesses greater capacity for diplomatic engagement and political pressure in international and Islamic forums, offering Jordan an external political depth it cannot generate alone. This distribution of roles creates a formula of mutual utility: Jordan provides geographic legitimacy and security leverage, while Türkiye contributes broader international and regional influence.
Settlement expansion and the trajectory toward annexation do not represent a Palestinian issue alone; they constitute a risk to regional stability as a whole and undermine any future political pathway. Here, the interests of both countries converge in practical terms. Jordan seeks to prevent the repercussions of annexation from spilling into its domestic sphere, while Türkiye views a potential escalation in the West Bank as a factor that could reignite regional instability and constrain its own political role. Accordingly, each side can benefit from the other through coordinated political and diplomatic pressure, the exchange of security assessments, and the formation of a broader regional stance aimed at preventing the West Bank from becoming a fait accompli arena. This does not amount to a conventional alliance, but rather to a functional partnership grounded in intersecting interests within a highly sensitive file for both parties.
Ultimately, the King’s visit to Ankara does not reflect a search for a new alliance as much as it signals recognition of a growing political convergence between the two sides on key regional issues, despite differences in their respective tools of engagement. It is a step toward reinforcing this convergence and understanding its trajectories early, in preparation for a regional reality that is quietly taking shape.