Muscat Round: The Thin Thread of Hope Between Washington and Tehran

Muscat, the capital of Oman, hosted last Friday a new round of “indirect” U.S.–Iran negotiations—an attempt to identify common ground that might pave the way for an agreement capable of defusing a potential war. Such a confrontation could erupt if the United States were to launch a military strike against Iran, a move that would likely compel Tehran to respond and could drive the region toward an uncertain trajectory. This comes amid mounting indicators of tension on the ground, most notably the approach of a U.S. naval strike group led by the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln toward the Arabian Sea.

While Tehran seeks, first and foremost, guarantees against military aggression and, subsequently, relief from sanctions, Washington is assessing the seriousness of the Iranian side in offering concessions that would yield strategic gains while sparing the United States the potential costs of a military attack. In this sense, the Muscat round—despite the metaphorical “gun on the table”—represents an exercise in testing intentions and gauging mutual readiness under conditions of deep mistrust, particularly in the wake of the June war last year, which continues to shape the outlook of Iranian negotiators.

Nevertheless, complex questions arise regarding the genuine willingness of each party to negotiate and the prospects of reaching outcomes capable of easing the momentum of escalation. It remains unclear whether these meetings constitute a substantive diplomatic effort or merely a political maneuver aimed at crisis management through buying time—either to reduce pressure amid intensifying threats or to construct justifications based on the exhaustion of alternatives, which could later be invoked should either side decide to transition to military confrontation.

Across all fronts, the option of a military strike remains plausible so long as the current impasse persists. Tehran continues to reject placing any issue on the negotiating table beyond its nuclear program, adhering to a negotiating tactic that addresses each file separately in order to prolong talks and absorb pressure. Washington, by contrast, insists on putting all dossiers on the table simultaneously—foremost the nuclear program, followed by the missile program, and then the question of regional proxies, of which the most strategically consequential remaining force may be the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement.

Militarily, despite the significant damage sustained by Iran’s air defense systems—damage that has impaired their operational capabilities following confrontations over the past two years—and despite Israel’s demonstrated ability to target military and political leadership, penetrate deep and complex locations, conduct operations from within Iranian territory, and the United States’ capacity to deliver decisive strikes, concerns over Iran’s missile program remain highly prominent. The program forcefully asserted itself during the confrontation of last June, producing effects that were felt even by the THAAD missile defense system supplied by the United States to Israel. This comes as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps recently unveiled the Khorramshahr-4 missile, with a range of approximately 2,000 kilometers and a warhead weighing around 1,500 kilograms.

Yet, against these concerns surrounding Iran’s missile capabilities and unmanned aerial systems, Tel Aviv is simultaneously weighing the potential consequences of Washington refraining from launching a military strike—an outcome that could allow Iran further military recovery, as underscored by reports emerging from the United States. This prospect has driven Israel to intensify its pressure to obstruct any negotiating track. It is further reinforced by the influence of a current within the U.S. administration represented by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, which appears to cast doubt on the utility of negotiations with Iran, particularly in contrast to the efforts led by Steve Witkoff, who may be taking seriously the cost–benefit calculus and available alternatives in the event of a turn toward military action.

Returning to the negotiating table, a wide gap continues to separate the American and Iranian positions. Iran refuses to relinquish what it regards as its right to uranium enrichment for civilian purposes, while the United States calls for the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program alongside the intensification of a “maximum pressure” strategy. Just hours before the latest round of talks, Washington imposed sanctions on 14 tankers and 15 entities linked to Iranian oil and petrochemical products. Within hours of the round’s conclusion, the U.S. president signed an executive order imposing 25 percent tariffs on countries engaged in trade with Iran. These developments underscore the profound complexity of the file and the uncertainty surrounding the trajectory of the coming phase.

In conclusion, despite the convening of a new round of negotiations, the option of a calibrated military strike remains a plausible scenario. Within the framework of the equation imposed by the United States, Iran appears to be the party most invested in preserving a fragile thread of hope by offering concessions that, to some extent, remain compatible with the values of its political system and its domestic image—particularly as it faces intermittent waves of protest driven by deteriorating economic conditions under international sanctions, alongside other significant structural pressures.

At the same time, Washington is acutely aware that targeting such a deeply rooted system—one shaped by the cultural and ideological imprint of the Islamic Revolution and embedded within a geopolitical sphere that extends beyond its formal borders—entails considerable risks and potentially heavy costs. This recognition may explain its renewed willingness to test the negotiating track once more, a path that could well prove to be the “last” if it fails to deliver the outcomes Washington seeks.