An Expert on Iranian Affairs: Any Change in Iran Will Come “From Within,” with the Blessing of the Revolutionary Guard and the Religious Establishment
The extended dialogue session in which Dr. Fatima Al-Samadi, a researcher at the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, participated via Zoom-titled “Iran’s Protests and the Question of Political Stability: Drivers and Trajectories” (19 January 2026)-alongside a group of prominent researchers and experts, reflects an exceptional political and strategic moment that Iran and the wider region are experiencing in the aftermath of Israel’s war on Gaza and the escalation of regional confrontation between Iran, Israel, and the United States. Dr. Al-Samadi is widely regarded as one of the leading Arab scholars specializing in Iranian affairs. She has worked in this research field for many years and has produced a substantial body of scholarly contributions, including Political Currents in Iran, Arabs and Iran: A Reassessment of History and Politics, and Self-Critique: Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri in a Dialogue of Critical Reflection on the Iranian Experience. During the session, Al-Samadi highlighted significant transformations in Iran’s political sociology, most notably the shift of protests from major urban centers to peripheral areas and rural regions. While she acknowledged the existence of a deep internal crisis within Iran, her central conclusion was that any change-should it occur-will originate from within the system rather than from external forces. She emphasized that externally imposed change would be rejected by Iranian political currents and even by the broader public. Historically, whenever Iranians sense that protests may descend into chaos, violence, or state collapse, they tend to retreat, as has happened on several occasions in the past. The following report presents the key ideas and conclusions articulated by Al-Samadi during the dialogue session.
The Nature of Protests and Internal Transformations in Iran
Despite their recurrence since 2009, protests in Iran cannot be read as a movement aimed at overthrowing the regime, but rather as a broad reformist pressure mechanism seeking to redistribute power and wealth and to achieve greater developmental justice. Although calls for “regime change” have appeared at specific historical moments, they have never crystallized into a unifying social demand. Previous experiences-most notably in 2009-demonstrate that Iranian society tends to withdraw when protests slide into chaos or attacks on public property, reflecting a deeply rooted cultural sensitivity toward public order and the state.
Accordingly, Western readings that have repeatedly bet on the collapse of the Iranian system through assassinations or military strikes have consistently misunderstood the Iranian political psyche. External attacks tend to revive national and civilizational legacies, transforming the conflict into an existential struggle that unifies society around the state rather than fragmenting it.
Cities, Peripheries, and the Changing Social Geography of Protest
One of the most significant recent transformations has been the partial shift of the protest epicenter from major urban centers to peripheral and border regions, particularly since the Mahsa Amini protests. Areas inhabited by ethnic minorities-such as Kurdistan, Baluchistan, and Khuzestan-have witnessed broader participation in protest movements. This reflects the intersection of social grievances with ethnic and developmental dimensions, as inequitable development and disparities in service provision between the center and the periphery constitute a structural challenge for the Iranian state, one that cannot be reduced to mere economic mismanagement.
Regime Structure and Possible Pathways of Change
From another perspective, Iran is not experiencing an internal division that threatens the survival of the state; rather, it is undergoing an internal debate over the form and future of the system. Even historically reformist figures, such as Mohammad Khatami, have retreated when they perceived that the foundations of the Islamic Republic were at risk. This illustrates the existence of an implicit consensus among diverse elites on the primacy of state survival, despite disagreements over its institutional configuration.
Accordingly, any change in Iran-if it occurs-will emerge “from within,” with the approval of both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the religious establishment, which constitute the two pillars of the system. Within this context, several scenarios for modifying the structure of governance have been discussed, including expanding presidential powers, adopting collective leadership, or reinstating the position of prime minister. However, all of these remain contingent upon internal power balances.
The Religious Establishment and the Revolutionary Guard
The discussion also emphasized that the religious seminary in Qom is not a monolithic bloc; rather, it encompasses multiple currents, including both supporters and critics of Velayat-e Faqih. Nevertheless, these currents converge in rejecting any external targeting of state symbols, foremost among them the Supreme Leader. As for the Revolutionary Guard, it has undergone a significant generational transformation, with the rise of a fifth generation that is more nationalist, more assertive, and more willing to confront adversaries-raising the likelihood of forceful responses in the event of escalation.
The Regional Context and the Post-Gaza War Shift
Regionally, attitudes toward Iran have undergone a qualitative shift following the war on Gaza. Several Arab states and Turkey have come to recognize that targeting Iran would create a strategic vacuum from which Israel would benefit, reinforcing its regional dominance. Consequently, an often-unspoken regional inclination has emerged in favor of containing Iran rather than seeking its collapse-driven by cost–benefit calculations rather than ideological convergence. Geography ultimately imposes itself: historically rooted states cannot be replaced by transient entities without incurring severe regional costs. This reality has revived the notion of Arab–Iranian dialogue as a long-term strategic option.
Managing Confrontation and Deterrence in the Grey Zone
Iran continues to manage its confrontation with Israel and the United States within the logic of the “grey zone,” drawing on its long experience with indirect deterrence. However, any large-scale strike against Iran would likely trigger a comprehensive regional response, potentially affecting U.S. and Israeli allies alike. In this context, Iran is currently reshaping its defensive doctrine, with an increasing emphasis on technology, cyber warfare, and the disruption of infrastructure rather than conventional military confrontation.
Debates over Foreign Policy Change and Ideological Identity
Among the most sensitive debates are proposals calling for a redefinition of Iranian foreign policy on the basis of “pure national interest,” including reducing support for the Axis of Resistance and linking relations with allies to economic returns. Such proposals threaten the foundational identity of the Islamic Republic, particularly regarding the Palestinian cause, which remains one of the central pillars of Iran’s anti-colonial discourse.
External Opposition and the Limits of Western Expectations
In this context, Western reliance on external opposition figures-including the son of the former Shah-appears misplaced, as such actors lack legitimacy and a social base inside Iran. The West itself recognizes that any viable alternative must emerge from within the system rather than from outside it. Moreover, external interventions in recent protests have sought to push the country toward chaos rather than toward organized political change.
Iran at the Center of Regional Reconfiguration
Despite multiple pressures, Iran continues to exhibit high levels of political and societal resilience and is moving toward gradual, negotiated change from within the system rather than toward sudden collapse. In the broader context, Iran’s future cannot be separated from that of the region as a whole, where the trajectories of Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan intersect at a moment of major regional reconfiguration-driven by competing agendas, foremost among them the Israeli agenda, amid the erosion of the existing international order. The question, therefore, is no longer about Iran’s fate alone, but about the fate of the entire region.