The U.S. Administration’s Decision on the Muslim Brotherhood and Terrorism: Rationales – Contexts – Implications

The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued a statement announcing that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) had designated the Egyptian and Jordanian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entities pursuant to counterterrorism authority under Executive Order 13224. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of State designated al-Gama’a al-Islamiya as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity pursuant to the amended Executive Order 13224. The Department of State also designated the Secretary-General of the Lebanese Islamic Group, Mohammad Fawzi Taqoush, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.

This decision raises a set of core questions. The first concerns the underlying reasons and motivations driving it; the second pertains to its political and security repercussions in general, and its specific implications for the Muslim Brotherhood—particularly its affiliated branches; and the third relates to expectations and potential consequences in the Jordanian context.

I. Reasons for the Decision and Its Contexts

It is well known that U.S. President Donald Trump had, since his first presidential term, sought to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. However, this move was deferred until the current period, largely due to disagreements and divergences within U.S. policy and legal circles over such a designation, particularly on technical and legal grounds.

Turning to the underlying reasons and motivations behind the decision, it is evident that it is closely linked to the context of the war on Gaza, as well as to the significantly growing influence of the Christian Zionist movement in the United States. This movement offers unwavering support for Israel and views political Islam movements as a primary source of threat in the region. This context may help explain why the groups targeted by the U.S. decision are Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated organizations in the so-called “frontline states” (Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt), which maintain strong and longstanding ties with Hamas. This is particularly the case with the Islamic Group in Lebanon, which participated in a direct and official manner—through its military wing, the Fajr Forces—in military operations against Israel during the war. Consequently, its designation was elevated relative to the Brotherhood-affiliated groups in Jordan and Egypt.

The justifications previously articulated by President Trump did not conceal the fact that “Israel” constitutes the primary driver behind this decision. In this context, it is important to recall public statements made by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in which he explicitly asserted that the Muslim Brotherhood represents Israel’s principal adversary in the Sunni Islamic world, whereas Iran and its allies constitute Israel’s main adversary within the Shiʿi Islamic sphere.[1]

Pushing the analysis further, the decision appears to be linked to a broader process of new strategic and political “engineering” of the Middle East, particularly with regard to redefining allies, partners, and adversaries, and to a renewed delineation of the region’s geopolitical landscape. Within this framework, the Trump administration’s position converges with that of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, as well as with the policies of several Arab states that view the Muslim Brotherhood as an internal and regional threat. Some of these states played a significant role in shaping the decision by supporting think tanks and lobbying networks that actively advocated for the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

II. Political and Security Implications

With regard to the branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, the decision does not, in principle, entail significant new legal repercussions. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has been designated as a terrorist organization since 2013; a large number of its members are imprisoned or living in exile, and the group is banned from any form of political or party activity. In Jordan, the Brotherhood has been deemed illegal since 2020, with several judicial rulings issued against it. At the same time, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) Party continues to enjoy legal and parliamentary representation, and the U.S. decision did not target the party, which places it—at least formally—outside the scope of direct external risk or threat. As for the Islamic Group in Lebanon—the local Muslim Brotherhood affiliate—the decision is unlikely to have a substantial impact, particularly when compared to Hezbollah, which constitutes a powerful armed local and regional actor with significant political weight, parliamentary representation, and past participation in government, despite its long-standing designation as a terrorist organization. Accordingly, the status of the Islamic Group is unlikely to produce any major or qualitative shift in the Lebanese political equation.

At the Western level, the decision is likely to be followed by intensified monitoring by lobbying groups and institutions involved in confronting Islamist movements, particularly with respect to the activities and networks of Islamists in the United States and in several European countries, notably France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Opponents of political Islam are expected to seek the inclusion of additional individuals and institutions by portraying them as extensions or affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood.

At the level of the Arab world, although the decision was welcomed by a number of Arab governments that regard the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to national and regional security—and that have long-standing positions and historical conflicts with the movement, such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, and later Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and will most likely be welcomed by several of these governments—it is nevertheless essential for officials in many of these states to be attentive to the risks of aligning their positions toward the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist movements with the U.S. stance. This stance is clearly shaped by the Trump administration and the growing influence of the Christian–Zionist lobby in the United States, and is embedded within the broader regional arrangements of the post–Gaza war phase and the “new Middle East” articulated by Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli right. While there may indeed be disputes, problems, and challenges in Arab states’ relations with the Muslim Brotherhood within their domestic political equations, the current decision was not intended to support Arab governments, but rather constitutes part of a Zionist–Israeli agenda for the coming phase.

The risks posed by this decision to international and regional stability are considerable. Previously, the dominant categorization of terrorism in the Arab and Islamic worlds was largely confined to al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). Today, however, the inclusion of major social and political forces—such as Muslim Brotherhood organizations and Shiʿi actors aligned with Iran—on terrorism lists, combined with the closure of democratic transition pathways in most Arab states, deteriorating economic conditions, and the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, signals the potential for significant internal upheavals in several Arab countries. It also points to the emergence of a broad wave of political radicalization, with profound effects on wide segments of an angry and disillusioned Arab youth generation, frustrated by developments at both the domestic and external levels.

III. The Jordanian Implications of the U.S. Decision

In the Jordanian context, the decision represents the minimum level of anticipated repercussions. Prior to its issuance, debates centered on whether the IAF would also be classified as a terrorist party or movement, a prospect that would have raised profound questions regarding the future of the Jordanian House of Representatives, which includes 31 MPs affiliated with the IAF. As the country’s largest opposition party, the IAF constitutes a particularly complex case in the period ahead, especially following Jordan’s ban on the Muslim Brotherhood, the confiscation of its assets, and the referral of several of its leaders and members to the judiciary on multiple charges.

In effect, the decision has left the fate of the IAF largely within the Jordanian arena, framed by the familiar domestic crisis between the state and Islamist movements. Debate within the political system remains unresolved regarding the party’s future, oscillating between a hardline approach that calls for dissolving the IAF—possibly dissolving parliament, holding early elections, and reassessing the entire political modernization process—and a more flexible current within the system that advocates caution and restraint in dealing with the party. This latter approach emphasizes careful consideration of alternative scenarios, while using the current context to increase pressure on the party’s leadership and MPs to adopt more pragmatic and rational discourse and behavior in their engagement with the state, driven by political, social, and security considerations.

To date, no definitive decision has been taken, although closed-door discussions have reportedly taken place between the Chairman of the Independent Election Commission, Mousa Maaytah, and Islamist representatives. These discussions have focused on proposed amendments to the party’s internal bylaws, as well as suggestions to change the party’s name and to further develop its discourse and conduct in order to de-escalate tensions with the state.

Within the party itself, two main currents have emerged. The first is a hardline faction that has maintained control of the leadership for several years, particularly following the departure of most moderate figures from both the movement and the party. This faction seeks to avoid direct confrontation with the regime, attempts to steer clear of open clashes, and aims to retain its leadership position by treating the current crisis as temporary and unlikely to affect its broader orientation. The second current, supported by a group of younger leaders and several MPs, calls for a comprehensive review of the party’s trajectory, strategies, discourse, and behavior. It advocates leadership change and a renewed understanding with the state on national political grounds, with the aim of rebuilding and redesigning the foundations of the coming phase.

Overall, the situation within the party remains unstable. Each faction is likely to seek to instrumentalize the U.S. decision in support of its own agenda and narrative. Nonetheless, it is evident that the party is experiencing a pronounced state of weakness and a lack of strategic vision, largely associated with the departure of some of its most seasoned and politically experienced leaders over the past few years.

[1] Benjamin Netanyahu: Christian Zionism constituted a foundational pillar in the establishment of Israel.