The Impact of Local Conditions on Jordanian Youth: An Analytical Reading Generational Awareness and the Issue of Political Participation

On the 22nd of October 2025, a discussion session was held within the “Generation of Modernization” project, implemented by the Politics and Society Institute (PSI) In cooperation with the Dutch Embassy, entitled, “The Impact of Regional Conditions on Jordanian Youth.” The session was not a fleeting discussion among youth; rather, it was a revealing window into a phase where regional transformations intersect with the individual and collective consciousness of a generation that is undergoing a situation of existential and political confusion simultaneously.
The session began by acknowledging the pervasive sense of frustration among youth due to the shrinking public space and the growing feeling of disconnection from national life. Although the project’s expressed objective is to enable university students to participate in political and community life, the session went beyond a workshop approach to challenge the very basic relationship between the youth and the state, and the region, identity, and the future.
The session opened with words that carried more of a questioning spirit than definitive answers. The topic, after all, is not new to young people—it has been circulating in their minds for at least two years, as they repeatedly ask themselves about the depth of their belief and their capacity to bring about change.
At the same time, questions arose about Jordan’s relationship with the surrounding regional conditions, and how this relationship is reflected in the youth’s awareness, their daily behavior, and the nature of the discourses circulating on social media. The speaker paused at the phenomenon of racist and sectarian rhetoric spreading across digital spaces. From this point, the discussion began by revisiting the old question: Who are we, and what do we want?
Youth Amidst the Region and Political Trauma
A participant initiated the discussion with a correct description of the youth political apathy as a long-term reaction to chronic regional traumas (or shocks). She clarified that the youth feel like ” like chess pieces moved at will by unseen hands,” a phrase that encapsulates a widespread sentiment of powerlessness that followed the Arab Spring and the subsequent disillusionments.
The speaker believed that the post-Arab Spring generation went through a period of overly high expectations that regional dangers would bring all people together in a single movement. The contrary took place: the intellectual, political, and productive rot that had built up for decades was revealed, producing a consciousness focused on existential, not political, issues.
She described the second stage as a period of limited reaction, whereby people made symbolic protests in the streets before enthusiasm gradually ran out. She attributed this to the sudden realization that the region itself has become self-absorbed with its own condition, and therefore cannot be relied upon as a source of change his realization fostered a conviction a conviction that change can come about only from within and by the young who are powerful enough to bear the cost of change. So, the call was for responsible political engagement because the price of abstaining from public life is the increasing problems for the next generation.
The speaker also identified a personal experience in parliamentary engagement as an attempt to restore the dignity of the principle of “individual responsibility.” She stated that what she witnesses among Arab youth gives her certainty that concerns are one, and destiny is one, and that change will never occur except by them. The frustration that dominates is due to the lack of action, and if this generation does not take a step to protect its future, no one else will.
And in answer to a question about the impact Jordan can have in the region, the answer was that it would not be a military one, but rather diplomatic, based on stances and initiatives. Jordan has little resources, but it does have a moral capital and an ability to create genuine collective Arab action, if only its youth restore faith in their effectiveness and agency in creating such action.
The ‘Futility’ Dialogue and the Genesis of Negative Consciousness
In the second intervention, one of the young women spoke about a feeling that has come to define the current youth condition. She explains that every effort to engage the community, university, or a party in politics is met with “excessive calculation” (or multiplicity of considerations), which refers to an intricate network of realistic, political, and social constraints that make action pointless (or useless). She recalled an exercise from a meet at the (PSI) two years earlier, when a young man who had lived through the Arab Spring presented about his persistent hesitation to take a clear-cut political position for fear. This hesitation, according to her, was transmitted to the next generation as a group behavior and a psychological: a generation caught between rejection and submission.
Consequently, there was a pervasive perception within a large portion of the youth that domestic influence feels negligible and Jordan’s capacity to affect the international order is practically zero. Yet, the speaker upheld that Jordan’s diplomatic capability holds an alternative model of action and influence.
She gave an example from the recent past: the “Fleet of Steadfastness” (Ustul Al-Sumud) where young people from various nations came together to assist Gaza. She noted what was amazing was not organizational might nor numbers, but the ability to unite under one humanitarian idea despite varied backgrounds. At that moment, it seemed the world could still reassert the moral power of public action, whereas Jordanian youth are in intellectual and media isolation; local media did not report the event to the same degree as other media, so much so that Tunisians heard more about the fleet than the Jordanians themselves.
The speaker then went on to discuss the general mood, and stated: ” We live in an era marked by 90% frustration and 10% hope,” she remarked, but that tiny fraction of hope can be converted into real fuel if it is consciously invested in. There remain some youth trends who cling to sub-issues (not so much big issues or broad consensus), but they create spaces for common action within the space of the possible and offer little examples of re-making meaning.
In another intervention, there was another tone, one that had a greater leaning toward reflective reason than outrage. A university student discussed how the past two years have created not only frustration but also heightened perception and awareness. He reported that he had been politically active with a number of parties and participated in many demonstrations, simply in an attempt to understand the “point of view of each group.” But he emerged from the experience with political parties having no trust, having learned that They lack coherent projects or shared visions, but instead simply recycle the same discourse with a new cast.
Yet the speaker was absolutely convinced that hope in Arab and Jordanian reality is almost non-existent “as long as the same people are making the decisions, and the same problems are recurring,” i.e., recycling elites prevents any real renewal.
Generation ‘Z’ Between Hope and the Loss of the Model of Sacrifice
Now the discussion was going into a wider interpretation of the post-millennial generation—Generation ‘Z’—as a reflection of the transformation of the entire society. One of the participants observed that the generation possesses qualitative skills in understanding, technology, and analysis, but it lacks the inspiring model of sacrifice. The previous generations believed in a cause for which they were ready to sacrifice; now, the young do not find any specific objective that justifies the risk or hardship.
This reflection opened the door for a historical comparison: the “Arab Dream” of the nineties was invoked, wherein the “Arab Nation” (Al-Watan Al-Arabi) existed in collective consciousness as a unifying notion. However, this dream vanished over the decades, and all that was left was a moral vacuum that has been filled by local and sub-identities. It was also pointed out that the crisis is not only intellectual but a crisis of the political systems themselves, which have failed to regenerate or build a credible unified or developmental project.
Despite this representation, the speaker called for the utilization of shared characteristics among Arab individuals (language, religion, history, geography) as pillars for rebuilding a collective vision, like the European Union, which started with a foundation of similarity rather than difference. He felt that a clear vision enables us to view the present more realistically.
He then proceeded to condemn the transformation of the nature of the political debate within the new generation, explaining how social media had a two-pronged impact: first, it succeeded in bringing the Palestinian issue to global public opinion under the banner of humanity, but secondly, it deepened fear within local societies of physical engagement. While the West demonstrates in support of Gaza, the Arab youth fears to go onto the streets lest it faces security or societal backlash. This paradox, it was argued, sums up the difference between freedom of expression as a value and freedom of expression as a danger.
The discussion extended to the idea of “historical leaderships,” noting that leaders who enjoyed flexibility and space for political maneuver have disappeared, and subsequent generations have not developed an alternative. What has occurred is that the vacuum of leadership has turned into a vacuum of meaning because there is no one who possesses the unifying narrative or the ability to mobilize individuals behind one concept.
One of the participants remarked that the political experience of the past half-century has “failed to form an integral political action,” and that the decision-maker himself is living in a situation of void, which has pushed the state at certain moments to respond to issues with the logic of “settling accounts” instead of strategic solution. This assertion was objected to by some participants but reflected an advanced critical awareness among the youth that the crisis is structural, not personal.
National Identity Between Internal Fear and External Threat
As the session reached this stage, the questions peaked in sensitivity: Does Jordanian youth today feel that their National Identity is threatened? And have their priorities shifted against the backdrop of accelerating events encircling the region?
They were responses from various quarters but converged on a single common denominator: the state’s fear of the new generation, and the generation’s fear of the state, society, and themselves. In one intervention, it was emphasized that any citizen who engages in the political process has come to be viewed as a potential threat, instead of a national actor. This perception, it was argued, does not only come from the authorities but from peers and colleagues as well. The most dreaded danger has now become not arrest or prosecution but suspicion by one’s own friends, a phenomenon that points to the extent of the breakdown of trust in the social fabric. Exterior fear has turned into complex interior fear, manifesting deep political illiteracy and mutual alienation between those who “speak politics” and those who do not.
One intervention illustrated this fact, saying: “We started addressing politics as if it is a daily profession restricted to a specific group, while its nature is daily awareness and behavior.” This is indicative of what could be termed as the crisis of perception: youths discuss politics in closed circles and do not actually address society, thus hindering the accumulation of public awareness.
However, the same speaker believed that this crisis, as bad as it may appear, can hold within it the prospects of transformation, for confrontation with reality triggers the will to reform. The same moment that a young person realizes how wide the gap is between the official discourse and the empirical reality is the same moment that true consciousness kicks in. She stated that the problem lies not in having an authority that organizes or defines, but one that oversteps the protection role to that of control, denying the citizen the feeling of ownership and self-esteem. While “the scene director watches from afar,” in her explanation, society remains immersed in suspicion of each other.
The session also addressed the sizes of the regional and domestic threats to Jordan from a youth perspective. The West Bank file was considered the most dangerous current challenge, as it represents a direct threat to the geographical and social structure of the Jordanian state, unlike the other regional files. Others felt that the Israeli attack on Qatar was another sign of the threat closing in on the Jordanian arena, which called for a reordering of national priorities. Conversely, contrary views were raised from political and student circles that argued the genuine threat is actually from within, as manifested in the breakdown of the social fabric and the emergence of sub-identities that erode national belonging, since the refusal of some elements to politicize destabilizes the democratic process. The discussion also touched on the use of “Twitter” or “X” as a platform that fuels divisions and replicates racist discourse, amidst a growing feeling among youth of an absence of political and social security, making them retreat behind tribal identities. There were sharp critiques of the state’s crisis management performance and allegations that it did not conquer the public, along with a poignant remark that the apprehension of talking about tribes nowadays has become more profound than before, particularly towards Generation ‘Z’, as a result of the successive disappointments of the Arab Spring, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the recent Gaza war.
Briefly, there came a clear vision of the features of a new youth consciousness that oscillates between fear and hope, and redefines the terms of belonging, identity, and patriotism. The post-Arab Spring, COVID-19, and Gaza War generation does not reject politics as much as it rejects its traditional forms, and seeks to redefine patriotism on a civil and moral basis beyond slogans and narrow loyalties. The crisis, the discussion wrapped up, is not in the absence of hope but in the vagueness of direction and the severing of bridges between official rhetoric and the street. The session turned into an actual debate revealing the extent of the change in contemporary Jordanian consciousness, where the question of identity and belonging has become a door for rebuilding trust between society and state, and reviving the public sphere as a site for producing a new sense of citizenship at a time when regional disappointments intersect with youth claims for freedom, dignity, and participation.
