The Future of the Islamic Action Front Party in Jordan in Light of the U.S. Executive Order on the Muslim Brotherhood

Abstract

This paper posits that the Islamic Action Front Party (IAF) in Jordan may be included among the entities subjected to U.S. security assessment, on the basis that it represents one of the organizational arms linked-according to the American perspective-to the Muslim Brotherhood. The assessment may also encompass certain charitable associations operating in Jordan, as well as senior figures who are expected to fall within the scope of the forthcoming U.S. review. This expectation is grounded in prevailing assumptions within the U.S. administration that these entities may have contributed long-term financial support to the military wing of Hamas, a development viewed by Washington as a direct threat to its security interests in the region.

This evolution follows U.S. President Donald Trump’s issuance-on 24 November 2025-of an executive order directing the Departments of State and Treasury to launch a formal evaluation of several branches of the Muslim Brotherhood worldwide, with a particular focus on Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon. The goal is to determine whether these branches meet the criteria for designation as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) or Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT), in accordance with relevant U.S. legal frameworks.

The paper argues that the IAF still possesses limited yet strategic opportunities for political and organizational repositioning in anticipation of any potential designation, especially as the seventy-five-day review period stipulated in the executive order approaches its end. This scenario gains further salience in light of the distinctive nature of Jordan–U.S. relations. Jordan is widely viewed in Washington as a key regional partner in issues of security and stability, making it unlikely that the Jordanian state would ignore or refrain from responding to the decision should it be implemented in an official and binding form.

Historical Background of the Decision

According to the official website of the United States government concerning the designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), the classification of such groups plays a decisive role in America’s counterterrorism strategy. It serves as an effective tool to curb support for terrorist activities by coordinating with partner states and exerting pressure on organizations to renounce violent behavior.

The legal framework for designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations was first established in 1997, granting the U.S. Department of State the authority to classify foreign entities as “terrorist” if they engage in terrorist activities or pose a threat to the national security of the United States or its citizens. Since its inception, the United States has designated dozens of groups worldwide, including Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf Group, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and, notably, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force in 2019-the first instance in which an official state entity was designated as a terrorist organization.

Each year, several organizations are added to or removed from the list. For instance, the designation of Jabhat al-Nusra (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) was lifted a few months ago. The FTO list is reviewed biennially, and any designated organization may seek judicial review before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit within 30 days of the designation’s publication in the Federal Register. To succeed, the organization must present evidence demonstrating that the circumstances underlying the original designation have materially changed to a degree that warrants its removal by the United States.

International Responses to Similar Designations

International experience indicates multiple precedents-among both U.S. allies and non-allies-of states responding to American decisions to designate certain organizations as terrorist entities, particularly those issued under the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) framework. One of the most notable examples is the 1997 U.S. designation of Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on the basis of alleged attacks against American and Israeli interests and its close ties to Iran. The designation was operationalized through asset freezes, prohibitions on financial and logistical support, and the inclusion of senior Hezbollah leaders on terrorism watchlists. Subsequently, several European states aligned with the U.S. position, most prominently the United Kingdom in 2019 and Germany in 2020, both of which imposed comprehensive bans that included the group’s political wing.

Similarly, in 2019 the United States designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, resulting in extensive sanctions against affiliated companies and individuals. Financial institutions in allied states-such as the United Arab Emirates and Türkiye-also came under direct U.S. pressure to limit transactions with entities linked to Iran in order to avoid secondary sanctions.

At the regional level, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia formally designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization on their national terrorism lists, and adopted the U.S. position in designating Hezbollah-including its political wing-as a terrorist entity. These measures were driven by a mix of domestic political considerations and regional or international pressure. Consequently, religious and charitable institutions deemed organizational fronts for U.S.-designated terrorist groups were shut down in the UAE. For example, 83 entities were listed on the national terrorism roster, including several local religious and charitable associations.

In contrast, states such as Türkiye and Qatar adopted divergent positions. Both rejected the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and continued to provide political and media support to several of its leaders, despite facing criticism and pressure from the United States and Gulf states. It is worth noting that since 2012, Qatar has played a pivotal role in hosting the political leadership of Hamas following the movement’s relocation from Damascus to Doha-an arrangement that received implicit and pragmatic U.S. acceptance. This accommodation was shaped by Qatar’s role as a key regional mediator in managing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, where political and humanitarian coordination between Doha and Washington regarding the situation in Gaza remained largely intact until recent years.

Jordan’s Response to Similar U.S. Counterterrorism Designations

Jordan’s response to U.S. terrorism-related designations-whether issued under the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) framework or the Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) regime-has historically been gradual, multi-layered, and grounded in the principle of preserving its strategic security partnership with the United States, while simultaneously maintaining internal political, security, and societal stability. Jordanian security agencies continue to engage in systematic and direct coordination with the U.S. Department of the Treasury in implementing measures related to freezing the financial assets of individuals and entities listed as SDGTs, particularly those suspected of financing extremist groups in the region.

Jordan has also maintained an active presence in international coalitions targeting U.S.-designated organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, while adopting regulatory and precautionary mechanisms to comply with financial systems connected to U.S. secondary sanctions-especially regarding Iranian entities included on American sanctions lists.

It is within this broader context that the decision to dissolve the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan in 2020, followed by its formal ban in 2025, should be understood. These measures reflected a phase of significant strain in the relationship between the state and the Brotherhood, particularly during a highly sensitive regional moment in the aftermath of the events of 7 October, one of whose domestic reverberations was the drift of some youth toward forms of militarization or individual radicalization-phenomena the Brotherhood has consistently denied responsibility for. This period intensified the need to reorganize the legal and political framework governing the group’s operations within Jordan.

These internal dynamics coincided with a broader regional and international environment marked by escalating sensitivities toward political Islamist movements. This produced a climate-aligned with global trends, even if not directly driven by foreign decisions-that encouraged a reassessment of the role and legitimacy of such movements. Accordingly, the ban on the Brotherhood in Jordan was grounded primarily in legal considerations related to licensing and organizational legitimacy.

The decision nevertheless reflected, indirectly, a wider international atmosphere-including the posture of the United States under its new administration, which adopted a more adversarial stance toward Islamist movements. Although the Jordanian ban rested on domestic legal grounds, the broader geopolitical climate cannot be entirely disentangled from the timing and trajectory of the state’s actions.

(A separate paper by the author addressing these dynamics-“After the Ban: Options for the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Proposed State Response Pathways”-was published by the Politics and Society Institute on 18/9/2025).[1]

Political Implications of the Decision and the Prospects of Designating the IAF as a Terrorist Organization

The executive order issued by U.S. President Donald Trump in November 2025 signals a qualitative shift in Washington’s approach toward Sunni Islamist political movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. This development reflects a growing trend within U.S. policymaking circles toward adopting a more hardline posture in dealing with groups affiliated with the Brotherhood, especially those operating in states regarded as close American allies.

Although the executive order does not amount to a definitive terrorist designation of the Muslim Brotherhood, it mandates the Departments of State and Treasury to conduct a security assessment of several of its branches within a period not exceeding 75 days. The order asserts that “certain branches of the organization fuel terrorism and harm U.S. interests,” and while it refrains from naming specific branches, the general context and subsequent analytical commentary suggest that active branches in countries such as Jordan may fall within the scope of the review.

In this context, the paper contends that the IAF is likely to be included among the branches subject to U.S. assessment. This expectation is based on the party’s long-standing and deeply rooted structural and historical connection to the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan since its establishment. Research published by prominent U.S. think tanks specializing in Jordanian politics consistently describes the IAF as the Brotherhood’s formal political arm-a characterization directly linked to the political environment, internal organizational crises, and contextual factors that led to the party’s formation.

Moreover, the public political discourse of party members-especially in the years following the Arab Spring-did not seek to deny this connection; rather, it reaffirmed it in numerous official statements and ideological publications. Additional field-based indicators reinforce this overlap, including joint demonstrations and activities organized under the unified label of the “Islamic Movement in Jordan,” a clear reflection of the organizational interlinkage and ideological proximity between the party and the Brotherhood. This overlap is also evident in Western analytical literature-particularly American scholarship-along with numerous media interviews with the movement’s leadership at various levels, all of which have contributed to a widely shared perception among researchers and Western media that the IAF constitutes the direct political and organizational extension of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.

Taken together, these indicators represent potential evidence that could be used to justify including the party in the U.S. assessment process, on the grounds that such organizational and ideological interconnectivity reinforces the American assumption that some Brotherhood-linked entities serve as direct extensions of the parent organization-even in the Jordanian context.

While some media narratives have attempted to emphasize a distinction between the Brotherhood and the party, this separation has largely remained rhetorical rather than grounded in substantive structural change. As a result, the prospect of the IAF being included in U.S. terrorism-related classifications remains plausible. Should this scenario materialize, it would pose a sensitive strategic challenge for the Jordanian state, potentially requiring a recalibration of its approach toward the party-particularly in light of Jordan’s bilateral commitments to the United States and its role as a key regional partner in counterterrorism and security cooperation.

Options Available to the IAF Party in Light of the Expected U.S. Decision

Given this complex reality-and the growing expectations of an unprecedented political and security escalation against the party-the IAF may find itself at a decisive crossroads requiring strategic clarity. Remaining passive, adopting a wait-and-see approach, or adhering to the current status quo will neither serve the party’s interests nor mitigate the potential repercussions of an external designation, particularly if such a designation is accompanied by corresponding domestic action.

Accordingly, this paper argues that if the party seeks to preserve its institutional continuity and its role within the national political landscape, it will need to explore alternative pathways that provide greater room for political maneuvering and reduce the likelihood of direct confrontation-whether with the Jordanian state or with relevant international actors. The most feasible, albeit politically and organizationally challenging, options include the following:

First Option: Merger with One or More Parties

Under Political Parties Law No. (7) of 2022, the party may enter a merger process with another party or multiple parties. Legally, such a merger results in the dissolution of the legal personality of the merging entities and the transfer of their rights and obligations to the newly formed party. Article (24) of the law stipulates that the procedure must be approved by the respective general assemblies, after which the merger documents and amended bylaws must be submitted to the Independent Election Commission for approval, followed by publication of the new party in the Official Gazette.

This option could provide a flexible political exit strategy, enabling the party to reposition itself institutionally within a new political entity that may not fall within the scope of U.S. evaluation-particularly if the merger takes place before the conclusion of the 75-day review period specified in the executive order.

Second Option: Changing the Party’s Name and Organizational Identity

The law also allows political parties to change their name, emblem, and certain definitional attributes through a general assembly decision, with mandatory notification to the Independent Election Commission within 15 days of the amendment. Although such a change does not alter the party’s legal personality, it does represent a shift in the party’s formal and political identity that could help moderate the political impact of a potential U.S. designation.

However, this option remains less effective than a full merger, as the party’s original legal identity-and its historical associations-would remain intact.

Analytical Conclusion

The options outlined above constitute legally and constitutionally viable pathways available to the IAF, enabling it to respond flexibly to the anticipated U.S. decision while sparing the Jordanian state potential political and diplomatic embarrassment and preserving stability within the domestic party landscape. Moreover, the continued presence of the party within Jordan’s political life remains an important element of pluralism, democratic modernization, and healthy political competition-an objective that the state is, without doubt, keen to reinforce in the current phase.

[1] See: https://politicsociety.org/?p=14103