The Complexities of the Solution in Northern Syria: The Course of Damascus-SDF Negotiations
Indicators in the Syrian landscape point towards a Détente that aligns with the broader trend in Syria towards increased stability. Following the tripartite meeting that included the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), on Monday, 18 February, several fundamental decisions were made. These decisions create an atmosphere of consensus and understanding, favouring dialogue over military solutions after weeks of intensive negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian Ministry of Defence in Damascus. This comes after weeks of intensive negotiations between both parties, primarily focusing on the framework of political transition in the country and the nature of military integration of the SDF into the new Ministry of Defence.
The new tripartite agreement resulted in the SDF recognising Ahmad Al-Sharaa as the transitional president of Syria 20 days after his inauguration. Mazloum Abdi, commander of the SDF forces, congratulated the new transitional president and invited him to visit north-eastern Syria. This development not only paves the way for deeper and more comprehensive understandings regarding the future relationship between the parties but also holds the potential for positive change in the Syrian landscape. The implications of these transformations are not limited to avoiding military confrontation but also present a new opportunity to drive positive change in the Syrian question. However, the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the tripartite agreement’s outcomes on key issues leave many questions open. These unresolved matters, along with various factors and surrounding variables, may hinder the finalisation of a comprehensive agreement between Damascus and the SDF.
An Overview of the Syrian Democratic Forces
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were established on 11 October 2015, shortly after Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian conflict. The group received significant support from the United States (US), which was instrumental in addressing emerging challenges, particularly in the fight against ISIS and the protection of oil fields in the region. However, the US’s involvement went beyond these objectives, as it also aimed to counterbalance Russian and Iranian interventions that supported the Al-Assad regime at the time and to limit Turkish influence in northern Syria to some extent.
The SDF primarily serves as the military wing of Kurdish factions but also includes the broader population of north-eastern Syria, a region with Arab tribes majority. The SDF controls significant portions of three northeastern Syrian provinces: Ar Raqqa, Al Hasakah, and Deir Ez-Zor, covering approximately 25% of Syria’s total land area. This significance reflects the influence and power of the SDF. This region borders Iraq and Turkey and is rich in natural resources, including major oil fields such as Al-Suwaidiyah, Al-Omar, and Ar Rmelan, which produce nearly 90% of Syria’s oil. Additionally, the area possesses key water resources, including major rivers and dams, and is among the largest wheat-producing regions in the Middle East[1].
In addition, the US maintains around 30 military bases[2] and positions within SDF-controlled territories, covered by approximately 2,000 American troops[3], which provides critical support to the SDF, in addition to its comprising more than seven main factions, both Kurdish and Arab, with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) at its core. As of 2019[4] Estimates, Arab fighters made up about 60% of the SDF’s forces, primarily composed of local tribal fighters who joined as an alternative to the previous Syrian regime’s military framework.
Thus, the SDF has long been considered as an essential party in the Syrian dispute due to its political, military, and security-related strengths and strong alliance with the United States. However, the SDF faces a critical historical moment, with limited options amid Syria’s shifting political and military dynamics. The SDF must either pursue an agreement with Damascus to secure its position within the new governmental structure or risk escalation and confrontation. This scenario appears increasingly unfavourable given the decline of its previous strategic advantages. The political and military flexibility demonstrated by factions in north-eastern Syria reflects an attempt to reposition themselves in a manner that could define their future within Syria’s evolving political landscape.
Damascus-SDF Negotiations
The SDF’s position remained somewhat unclear during Operation ‘Deterrence of Aggression’, which led to the downfall of the Al-Assad regime on 8 December 2024. The SDF withdrew from several key locations west of the Euphrates, such as Manbij, after prolonged clashes with the Syrian opposition. These areas were secondary to its primary stronghold east of Eastern Euphrates. Following attacks on Al-Assad regime forces, the SDF also withdrew from significant Iranian-influenced regions, such as Al-Mayadin and Al-Bukamal, immediately after the arrival of the Syrian revolutionary troops in Deir Ez-Zor on 11 December 2024[5]. A day later, the SDF raised the flag of the Syrian revolution[6], acknowledging the regime change and the new political reality. However, several key issues emerged, placing the SDF at a crucial juncture, including:
1- Political relationship with Damascus: The Autonomous Administration of North and East of Syria (AANES) and the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) are considered the political shield of the SDF, which in previous years embodied a model of self-administration, and with the lack of experience of self-administration as an executive authority in northeastern Syria; However, it continues to play essential service roles in the region. Within these components, political trends and currents express incoherent orientations, including these currents, the hawkish tendency, which is considered to be hard-line toward negotiations with Damascus and preserve the gains of the previous phase in northeastern Syria, and this trend is close to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); it is pushing for the lifting of the ceilings of the negotiating demands to maintain the specificity and structure of the SDF, and for the military integration to take place without complete fusion in the Syrian Ministry of Defense[7]. Among those affiliated with this trend is the “Kurdistan Front of Syria”, which issued a statement denouncing the recent consensus in front of Damascus and accused the Kurdish parties of what it called “abandonment”[8].
In front of this, a moderate tendency appears to seek to reach through negotiations the best conditions and outputs to meet the ambition of the political components in the region. Their demands are reflected in the simulation of the experience of the Kurdistan region, where the Kurdish identity is preserved culturally and politically. The area’s resources are managed within the central role of Damascus, and this trend is expressed by figures such as Ilham Ahmed, who has leadership in AANES.
Between the two currents, intra-regional pressures are intensifying across the three structures (SDF, SDC and AANES) in northeastern Syria. Still, the indicators of reality indicate Damascus’s preference due to the main factors in the negotiation scene. This explains the recent tripartite meeting, which presented realistic initiatives for Damascus to visit transitional President Ahmed al-Shara’a to the region. This means more consensus, but it does not necessarily mean total agreement until now.
The essence of the negotiations is focused politically on the mechanism of guaranteeing the political and cultural rights of the Kurdish component in Syria, where views differ between the Syrian government’s proposal, which, according to its discourse, is based on the principle of equal citizenship, and the demands of the SDF to install these rights in writing in the constitution. In this context, certain legal guarantees may be provided, especially since this issue was one of the main negotiating obstacles between the Kurdish forces and the Syrian opposition during the various political stations in the years of the conflict, whether during the era of the “Syrian National Council” or later during the formation of the “National Coalition of Revolutionary and opposition forces”[9].
2- Military and Security File with the New Syrian Ministry of Defence: Sensitive negotiations continue between the new Syrian Ministry of Defence and the SDF regarding integrating forces into the ministry’s structure. The SDF demands integration as an independent military bloc within the Ministry of Defence while maintaining a degree of autonomy in its areas. On the other hand, the ministry insists on fully complete integration the SDF into the unified Syrian army without any independent entities. Syrian Defence Minister Marhaf Abu Qasrah has stated that the continued existence of the SDF as an independent bloc within the Ministry of Defence is “untenable'”[10].
Thus, the primary contentious issue in these negotiations is the integration method into the military and security establishment. The ministry demands a complete dissolution of separate military components, requiring the SDF to surrender its weapons, dismantle its existing structure and hierarchy, redistribute military ranks to fit within the ministry’s framework, and allow for the redeployment of military forces across Syrian territory. This process would mean abandoning the SDF’s previous organisational identity in favour of a new identity aligned with the ministry, reflecting Syria’s latest phase.
This divergence of positions makes the negotiations zero-sum in character, with each side pursuing its objectives without making significant and fundamental concessions and missing the middle point between the two parties. The SDF is betting on the cards of privilege in its sleeve, such as the history of fighting terrorist organisations such as ISIS, and the camps inside which the fighters of the organisation are held, estimated at 10,000 detained fighters, distributed over 28 camps under its control[11].
Conversely, the Ministry of Defence asserts its authority based on several key elements, including its control over the majority of Syrian territory, its revolutionary legitimacy following the toppling of the former regime, and the broad military consensus among the more than 100 armed factions that attended the victory conference. Additionally, the ministry has secured international recognition in an unprecedentedly short timeframe—approximately two months.
The Ministry of Defence consistently stances that all military components must be fully and complete integration into the ministry’s structure under a model of total fusion rather than partial integration. Establishing a Syrian army with a unified and institutional identity is crucial in preventing a scenario where military factions retain separate identities, which could further complicate Syria’s military and security landscape.
Negotiations from the Perspective of Damascus
The new Syrian leadership, headed by Ahmed al-Shara, announced its firm rejection of any armed formations operating outside the framework of the regular army. This position necessitates dismantling the SDF as an independent military entity and individually integrating its members into the new national army. Additionally, all foreign elements affiliated with the PKK must leave Syria.
The Syrian government also demands complete control over Deir Ez-Zor, Ar Raqqa, Al Hasakah, and the remaining parts of Aleppo’s countryside, including sensitive matters such as the management of ISIS detainees, the administration of oil and gas resources, and oversight of border crossings and trade routes.
While the government is expected to show some flexibility in enhancing the authority of local administrations, it remains committed to avoiding any steps toward federalism, ensuring that Kurdish-majority areas receive adequate representation within the state framework.
Furthermore, the future of the AANES will be a key point of discussion. The Syrian leadership insists that no political, military, or administrative bodies exist outside the state’s institutional structure, reinforcing its commitment to central governance[12].
The New Geopolitical Reality in the Region
To preserve its national security and address regional concerns, the new understanding necessitates tackling the influence and presence of PKK fighters, who are designated as a terrorist organization on international lists. Ankara views the PKK as a major threat to Turkish national security and has consequently exerted pressure on Damascus to dismantle the SDF and prevent it from maintaining its current organizational structure or any affiliation—direct or indirect—with the PKK.
A key challenge in this context is the continued presence of these fighters, which poses a security dilemma for both Syria and neighboring countries, particularly Turkey and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The geographical factor further complicates the situation, given the strategic importance of Mount Qandil—where many fighters are based—and the ethnic and ideological connections among Kurdish groups. This complexity could lead to armed confrontations should these fighters refuse to withdraw from the region.
Regarding the issue of ISIS prisons and camps in northeastern Syria, Turkey remains wary of the ongoing U.S. monopoly over counterterrorism efforts in the region. After years of Washington’s support for the SDF—an arrangement fundamentally opposed by Ankara—recent reports suggest that diplomatic talks have taken place between Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria to explore the formation of a four-nation counterterrorism coalition[13]. While the coalition’s primary aim is to combat ISIS, it also reflects Ankara’s broader strategy to challenge Washington’s justification for supporting the SDF, which Turkey considers the Syrian branch of the PKK.
In this context, the emerging regional coordination could strengthen Damascus’s negotiating position against the SDF, either by increasing political and military pressure or by leveraging this alliance to reshape the balance of power in northeastern Syria. Reducing the U.S. military presence or restructuring the region’s security framework could significantly limit the SDF’s manoeuvrability, compelling it to make broader concessions in negotiations with Damascus.
Meanwhile, the SDF has reportedly received a message from Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, which is believed to call for disarmament and a peaceful settlement with Turkey[14]. If confirmed, this development could weaken the SDF’s bargaining position while simultaneously strengthening Damascus’s and, indirectly, Ankara’s positions.
Conclusion
Given the political and security complexities in northeastern Syria—marked by the intransigence of the SDF leadership, the uncertainty of the American position, escalating Turkish pressure, and deep divisions among local actors—adopting a decisive, final scenario appears unrealistic for both Damascus and the SDF. The situation necessitates a flexible, multi-faceted approach, particularly as the new Syrian government explores broader strategic options.
While Damascus is keen to avoid a military solution, it does not rule out its use as a means to strengthen its negotiating position, reshape local priorities, or expedite talks by lowering the SDF’s demands. This dynamic may compel the SDF’s political leadership—especially those aligned with the pragmatic Syrian nationalist current rather than the PKK-affiliated faction—to prioritize self-preservation. So far, the prevailing indicators do not favor the SDF.
At the same time, the SDF’s growing political and military isolation could serve as additional leverage, pushing it to reassess its stance in negotiations. Should dialogue falter, the Syrian government may find sufficient justification for the use of force—whether limited or extensive—to regain full control over northeastern Syria. However, regional and international mediation efforts could emerge as a stabilizing factor, facilitating an agreement between Damascus and the SDF in a manner that aligns with Syria’s interests and promotes regional stability. Yet, the divergence between European and American positions on Syria may slow the resolution of outstanding issues, including the SDF’s status.
Ultimately, the new Syrian government seeks to utilise all available factors to establish a political and security reality that aligns with its interests while ensuring that it does not slide into open conflict, which could further complicate the broader Syrian landscape—impacting regions beyond northeastern Syria, such as the coastal areas and As Suweida. As the SDF’s strategic leverage continues to wane, it will likely face a critical choice: either accept integration under Damascus’ terms or confront scenarios that may prove detrimental to its long-term viability—outcomes that will unfold in the near future.
[1] Mohammed Sanjla, “the 10 largest producers and importers of wheat in the world”, Al Jazeera, March 18, 2024. Link to the link: https://bitly.cx/rlx8r
[2] He is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is “Map of the military positions of the external forces in Syria in mid-2024”. Bridge Center for Studies. Available from https://bitly.cx/un4g
[3] Al Jazeera , “US Says It Has 2,000 Troops in Syria, Not 900 as Previously Declared,” Al Jazeera, 19 December 2024, https://bitly.cx/m033
[4] BBC News. “IS Conflict: US Arming Syrian Kurds Unacceptable – Turkey.” BBC News, May 10, 2017. https://bitly.cx/7oCNu
[5] Free. “Syria. ” armed factions take control of Deir Ezzor after the SDF withdrawal. Free, December 11, 2024. Available from https://bitly.cx/lbdbt
[6]Al-Jazeera Net, “Syrian Defense Minister: Building the Armed forces does not conform to the mentality of the Revolution and factions,” Al-Jazeera, January 22, 2025. Available from https://bitly.cx/lhzge
[7] Interview with Samer Al-Ahmad, researcher at Omran Center for Strategic Studies, 18-2-2025.
[8] “The Kurdistan Front of Syria warns against the agreement of the ‘dam’ and ‘SDF’ and considers it a violation of Kurdish rights”, Kurdistan 24, February 18, 2025. Available from https://bitly.cx/0bs75
[9] Osama Sheikh Ali and Sasha al-Alu, “Northeast Syria and the question of fate .. A reading of the negotiating position and possible ‘scenarios’,” Omran Center for Strategic Studies, February 14, 2025. Available from https://bitly.cx/09zi
[10] “The Syrian Defense Minister: Building the Armed forces does not align with the mentality of the revolution and factions,” Al Jazeera Net, January 22, 2025. Available from https://bitly.cx/hfu6
[11] Richard Engel, Marc Smith, and Ammar Cheikh Omar, “ISIS Has an Army in Waiting — and Trump’s Next Move Could Decide Whether It Rises Again,” NBC News, February 12, 2025, https://bitly.cx/nSiDA .
[12] Osama Sheikh Ali and Sasha al-Alu, “Northeast Syria and the question of fate .. A reading of the negotiating position and possible ‘scenarios’,” Omran Center for Strategic Studies, February 14, 2025. Available from https://bitly.cx/09zi
[13] Said Abdul Razek, “Turkey has agreed with Jordan, Iraq and Syria on a ‘four-way coalition’ against ISIS,” Middle East, February 16, 2025. Available from https://bitly.cx/6kem
[14] “Ocalan sends 3 letters from his prison in Turkey. One of them to the ‘SDF’,” Arabi21, February 19, 2025. Available from https://bitly.cx/jbjg