U.S. Domestic Debate on the Iran Nuclear Talks
Executive Summary
- Many have pressed for strikes on Iran because of its uniquely vulnerable position.
- A key distinction in approaches to Iran is exemplified by Mike Waltz’s insistence on dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, compared to Steve Witkoff’s preference to focus mainly on preventing the development of nuclear weapons.
- Witkoff is leading negotiations and his approach is dominant, although as negotiations drag out, impatience with Iran may lead to more threats from the US.
- US strikes on Iran would threaten Trump’s image as a dealmaker, increase US involvement in the region, could lead to attacks on the US military or its partners, and may not be completely successful.
Introduction
Since the October 7 attack by Hamas, Israel and Iran have been in direct confrontation, especially after Israel’s bombing of an Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1, 2024. Iran and Israel launched tit-for-tat strikes against each other, and tensions ran high for months in both capitals as they anticipated what a regional war might look like. Ultimately, the two countries ceased direct attacks on each other after Israel launched a strike that eliminated many of Iran’s defensive capabilities and air defense systems on October 26. The reported motive for the Israeli attack was to leave Iran defenseless and at great risk if a larger war or attack erupted. 15 days after being inaugurated, Trump reimposed his maximum pressure campaign on Iran to attempt to weaken its economy and coerce it towards a nuclear deal. Iran has reportedly reached levels of 60% enriched uranium, which would leave it mere days or weeks from achieving weapons grade enrichment levels of 90%. On March 5, 2025, Trump sent a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei warning military action against Iran if they did not reach a deal on its nuclear program within the next two months. This led to a disagreement between Iranian and American officials, as Iran refused to engage in direct negotiations under pressure, while Trump’s team insisted negotiations should be direct. The two eventually came to an agreement to establish talks for April 12, which were mostly indirect but satisfied both sides.[1]
Trump Administration Position
Trump has clearly stated that he prefers a deal with Iran as opposed to a military solution, but has also emphasized that Iran will suffer military and economic attacks if negotiations do not lead to progress. It remains unclear how the administration will measure such progress in the negotiations. A key contrast in the administration is represented by National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who is in favor of a full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff, who favors a diplomatic solution to limit Iran’s program. Witkoff has called for a verification program on Iran’s nuclear program and his reported redline is the development of a nuclear weapon. Waltz has stated that only a full dismantlement of the nuclear program is acceptable, either through a negotiation or military strikes.[2] Vice President Vance is more restraintist and has seemed to side with Witkoff, while Secretary of State Rubio is inclined towards destroying Iran’s nuclear capabilities however necessary.[3] Some influential officials are also pushing for strikes as a dual threat on Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the Islamic Republic itself. Rubio recently said that, “If the president makes the decision that we need to take action to prevent Iran from having a nuclear capability, we have the ability to do that, and to go further, perhaps even threaten the regime.”[4] This shows that regime collapse is a clear goal in mind for some American leaders.
As of now, the Witkoff opinion is dominating the US approach with Iran because his leadership on the talks only emphasized limits on Iran’s nuclear program. However, negotiations will surely be drawn out and only a temporary, less comprehensive agreement may be reached by Trump’s apparent two month deadline. As the deadline approaches and talks continue, the degree of patience towards Iran and any meaningful progress may indicate whether the US position will change.
The difference in opinion between Witkoff and Waltz does not seem to indicate a proper rift in the administration currently. Micheal Doran of the Hudson Institute argues that Trump deliberately pits opposing viewpoints against each other in his administration as Trump “Maintains control over the final decision while extracting maximum value from each perspective… The public nature of the oscillation allows Trump to appeal to domestic political constituencies with widely divergent perspectives.”[5] Trump will surely have the final say on the direction of any negotiations, which can prevent a difference in opinion from becoming a public division in the administration. Neither side will want to oppose Trump’s wishes and would likely fall in line. For example, the Waltz camp has not voiced any public discontent on the Iran negotiations despite Witkoff only mentioning limits on the nuclear program, which violates Waltz’s perspective that only a destruction of the program is acceptable.
Trump himself has generally opposed large-scale military operations on Iran, despite Israeli pressure, and has emphasized his effort to bring about stability in the region. This approach boosts his credibility at home as a strongman that is capable of coercing stability. He has shown this preference against conflict through his first few months in office by trying to force parties in the Gaza war and Ukrainian war to negotiate an end to their respective conflicts, despite Israel restarting its destructive war in Gaza weeks later. Launching an assault on Iran would risk a larger conflict and would contradict his supposed image as a stabilizer. As chaos has ensued surrounding the Trump administration, especially in regards to the economy and his tariff regime, Trump would likely seek to avoid a further image of chaos. Diplomatic negotiations and a semblance of cooperation would encourage stability and promote his perception as a dealmaker.[6]
The Trump administration in the meantime has moved several key military assets into the region, including a second aircraft carrier and six B-2 Bombers to Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean. These moves could be to enforce its operation against the Houthis in Yemen and to provide credibility to its threat of strikes on Iran to coerce a deal.[7] Many consider the military option as a last resort for Trump although Israeli officials, certain American officials, and some influential members of Congress have called for an attack on Iran because of its strategic vulnerability. Many still recognize that even heavy strikes on Iran’s facilities would be extremely unlikely to destroy its entire capabilities and Iran would still hold the intellectual expertise to achieve a nuclear weapon.[8] Military strikes would also create an image of chaos and could lead to attacks on US assets or allies as retaliation. Much of the America First base of Trump is opposed to continued US involvement in the Middle East and foreign conflicts. Strikes on Iran would be extremely risky because they would further embroil the US in the region, and retaliatory attacks on the US military would threaten a key base for Trump’s domestic support which he is keenly aware of. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether the US threat of strikes is credible based on the instability it would cause, the unlikely outcome of a total destruction of the Iranian nuclear program, and the risks it could pose to Trump’s support and the US military.
American Think Tank Perspectives
Many US think tank experts, especially those from right-leaning organizations, see this as a strategic window of opportunity to strike Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities to eliminate the threat of Iran. They argue that maximum pressure and strikes on Iran’s nuclear program would end Iran’s threat to the region and blunt their ability to sow chaos and threaten Israel or the US. Mike Watson of the Hudson Institute has claimed that Iran will likely take a deal on the nuclear program because the threat of destabilization from US-Israeli strikes is too great, and because the threat is credible based on the US administration rhetoric and its willingness to attack Yemen. [9] However, Micheal Doran, also of the Hudson Institute, has proposed that Trump and many on the right are more in favor of restraint on the Middle East to avoid conflict in the region and focus on China. Thus, he says it would be unlikely to see a US-Israeli attack on Iran. The US defense establishment has been attempting for over a decade to shift to China, and this conflict threatens that aim while Iran is already weak and increasingly contained.[10]
A common perspective among neoconservatives close to the Trump administration, such as former Iran envoy Elliott Abrams, is that Iran will, “Tie Israel and the United States in knots by getting into negotiations in which they dupe Witkoff into thinking that negotiations will produce a lot.”[11] This faction believes it is worthless to engage in talks at all because Iran will never agree to dismantle its nuclear program, which is the only acceptable result for them. Hence, only a military strike would create this outcome, which they think could also upend the current political order in Iran to permanently erase the threat of Iran. Iran is undeniably very likely to extend diplomatic talks for as long as possible to ward off military action and to allow an October 18 UN deadline to pass for snapback sanctions on Iran to expire. In addition, nuclear program negotiations are extremely technical and will inherently require much time and deliberation to create a suitable agreement. What may dictate the probability of military action is whether perspectives of more overt aggression percolate into administration thinking because of impatience over such a lengthy process.
The Israeli government and lobby have historically pressured the US to abandon talks with Iran and have continued to do so throughout this new stage of talks. The Israeli military doctrine prioritizes preemptive military strikes on nascent nuclear programs in the region to stop proliferation and maintain Israel’s escalation dominance and supremacy.[12] Netanyahu reportedly offered a plan to the US to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites by May, although Trump rebuffed the plan and many in his administration warned against such an attack. Israel wants a complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program, an end to Iranian funding of proxies, and the dismantling of its ballistic missile program. None of these priorities are currently on the table in negotiations, which Israel could interpret as a threat to its security. Aaron David Miller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace wrote that Israel would hate a potential deal with Iran, because even with intrusive monitoring, “any deal won’t end Iran’s capacity to weaponize; it can only keep them away from weaponizing.”
All sides involved in the April 12 talks stated that they were constructive and a positive first step, while a second round has been scheduled for April 19. This shows that the US representatives did not use threatening rhetoric or insist on a full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, because Iran had clearly stated that it would not negotiate under any pressure to dismantle its program. Trita Parsi of the restraintist Quincy Institute has praised the progress of the talks and has written that Trump now has the opportunity to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon and war with Iran through a comprehensive deal that limits Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. He says that Trump’s willingness to relieve sanctions and allow US companies to do business in Iran could be a decisive factor in the establishment of a deal that satisfies both sides and strongly limits Iran’s nuclear weaponization ability.[13] However, Elliott Abrams wrote for the Council on Foreign Relations, that Iran “won” the first round of talks and has criticized the Trump team’s approach. He argues that Witkoff made preemptive concessions when he said that the US position would start with calling for a full dismantlement of the program, yet also saying that the only red line was weaponization. Abrams continues by saying that the Trump administration has leverage now because of its military threat and the weak state of the regime, although the negotiation team is not pressing for much-needed goals regarding an end to Iran’s support of proxies and its ballistic missile program.[14] Abrams, along with many other experts from across the ideological spectrum, see the new talks as another attempt at a slightly remodeled JCPOA agreement, especially because Witkoff’s demands are almost exactly in line with what the JCPOA had established. Thus, a potential deal may be interpreted negatively by some conservatives, who for years have railed against the JCPOA or the pursuit of a similar goal
Conclusion
Many hope Trump will hold firm to his two month deadline and his threat of strikes to coerce Iran into adjusting its position and agreeing to a deal. However, a temporary deal is more likely to extend negotiations which may appease both sides to avoid unnecessary confrontation. Iran is at its weakest point in years, although it still holds significant power in the region and the ability to harm US military assets through conventional attacks or its remaining proxy forces. Risking conflict and war in the Middle East would directly contradict Trump’s claim of being able to create peace in the world through strength, although internal and external forces will be ever-nudging Trump towards destroying Iran’s nuclear ambitions once and for all.
[1] Maggie Haberman, Lara Jakes, and Fassihi Farnaz. “U.S. Holds Talks With Iran Over Its Nuclear Program.” The New York Times. April 12, 2025.
[2] Dana Stroul. “A Return to Maximum Pressure: Comprehensively Countering the Iranian
Regime’s Malign.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy. April 1, 2025.
[3] Eldar Mamedov. “J.D. Vance Says a War With Iran Is Not in the U.S. Interest.” The American
Conservative. November 2, 2024.
[4] Toi Staff. “Rubio says Trump will take action against Iran if nuclear diplomacy falls short.” Times of Israel. March 20, 2025.
[5] Michael Doran. “The King’s Foils.” The Hudson Institute. April 7, 2025.
[6] Micheal O’Hanlon. “Achieving “peace through strength” in the 2020s.” Brookings Institution. February 21, 2025.
[7] Dana Stroul. “A Return to Maximum Pressure: Comprehensively Countering the Iranian
Regime’s Malign.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy. April 1, 2025.
[8] Lawrence Freedman. “Showdown in the Middle East.” Substack. April 10, 2025.
[9] Micheal Watson. “Trump and Bibi Issue an Ultimatum. Iran and Hamas Should Heed It.” Hudson Institute. March 22, 2025.
[10] Elizabeth Dent. “Two Carriers in the Middle East: Implications for the Houthis, Iran, and U.S. Force Readiness.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy. March 27, 2025.
[11] Maggie Haberman, Lara Jakes, and Fassihi Farnaz. “U.S. Holds Talks With Iran Over Its Nuclear Program.” The New York Times. April 12, 2025.
[12] Doreen Horschig and Bailey Schiff. “What Factors Drive U.S.-Israeli Differences on Iran’s Nuclear Challenge?” Center for Strategic and International Studies. April 4, 2025.
[13] Trita Parsi. “With Iran talks, Trump could achieve a triple win.” Responsible Statecraft. April 13, 2025.
[14] Elliott Abrams. “The Talks in Oman: Round One Goes to Iran.” The Council on Foreign Relations. April 13, 2025.