The War on Gaza and What Comes After: A Preliminary Reading of Crises and New Ideas

Major historical-political events or turning points are closely linked to the movement of ideas. They often lead to new intellectual waves that emerge after previous trends. The current war of extermination in Gaza, with its massive emotional and visual impact and the anger and resentment it stirs among broad segments of Arab societies, will undoubtedly have significant ideological and intellectual consequences on Arab social culture in the coming days. These will emerge as strategic regional transformations and the decline of specific ideas, replaced by others more in tune with the street’s collective psychological and emotional state in general and the active elite in particular.

Over the past decades, several intellectual waves swept the Arab world. In the wake of independence and the formation of post-colonial nation-states and after the Nakba of 1948, nationalist and leftist ideas rose to prominence. These ideologies often merged in parties like the Ba’ath Party, the Nasserist movement, and Arab nationalists. There was great hope for Arab unity as a way to confront the Zionist project. The Cold War created a fertile environment for these movements, which penetrated many Arab armies and resulted in a wave of military coups and the rise of regimes and parties espousing this rhetoric in countries like Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and Yemen.

The 1967 war marked a turning point that contributed to the rise of Islamic movements. These embraced Islamic slogans and civilizational perspectives as an alternative to the nationalist project, and these ideas quickly spread throughout the Arab world. Although they did not achieve the same level of political dominance as the nationalist and leftist movements, they became a significant force and remain active today. However, the Islamic trend itself splintered into various streams, including radical ideologies influenced by events like confrontations with military regimes, prison experiences, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the oil boom that facilitated the global spread of Salafism, the assassination of Sadat, and the 1982 invasion of Beirut. These events sparked new Islamic waves, such as the Islamic Jihad movement, inspired by the Iranian revolution (for example, Fathi Shaqaqi and his book; Khomeini and the Islamic Solution), the rise of armed Islamist and jihadist groups, and Hezbollah’s ascent with Qutbist ideas.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War in 1991 ushered in yet another ideological wave, culminating in the rise of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda became not only a serious threat across several Arab states but also a global phenomenon. The second Intifada in 2000 led to the 9/11 attacks, followed by the 2003 Iraq War and the emergence of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group. Later, the Arab Spring and the counter-revolutionary wave enabled Zarqawi’s legacy to morph into the significant threat known as the Islamic State (ISIS), which declared its “caliphate” under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014. This development shifted “jihadist ideology” from an elite, limited phenomenon (i.e., al-Qaeda) to a mass movement (i.e., ISIS), aided by the explosion of information technology and media, which redefined the Arab political space and brought the street into the political arena—a phenomenon we might call the “criminalization of politics.”

Over the past two decades, Islamic movements still dominated the popular scene, as demonstrated by their rise during the Arab Spring and temporary accession to power before the counter-revolution. However, these movements were internally fragmented and engaged in fierce ideological and political battles, not only with rival ideologies but among themselves. They ranged from radical, revolutionary groups advocating violent change to more moderate ones blending democratic and liberal ideas and adopting democratic models within political systems. Yet, jihadist ideology suffered a significant intellectual, political, and military defeat with the collapse of the ISIS model, which engaged in horrific practices. At the same time, the Islamic-democratic idea also faltered due to the failure or sabotage of many Islamist parties during the Arab Spring and the descent of post-revolutionary states into civil wars and even more brutal authoritarian regimes. This contributed to the weakening of these movements—not fundamentally, however—due to several reasons: the return to prisons and exile, the revival of a historical narrative of victimhood, the lack of viable alternative discourses, and the failure of authoritarian alternatives to solve the worsening political and economic crises plaguing many Arab countries.

The war on Gaza comes amid these transformations. In light of early indicators of its outcomes, some major ideologies will likely be the first casualties—chief among them Arab nationalism. Despite its historical influence, its ability to mobilize popular sentiment has declined significantly. This doesn’t necessarily mean that Arab nationalist sentiment has disappeared among the public, but rather that the ideologies adopted by traditional regimes and parties—linking development, liberation, and the Palestinian cause—have lost credibility. Gaza may represent the final nail in the coffin of these ideas.

Liberal and even moderate Islamic parties that previously embraced democracy, freedom, and human rights now find themselves completely out of timing. This is due to the collapse of these very values in the democratic countries themselves—where populist and right-wing movements are eroding them at the core—as well as the moral collapse revealed by the U.S. administration’s support for the Israeli aggression in Gaza. The scenes of children and civilians being killed have made it impossible for the Arab and Islamic streets to continue buying into these so-called universal human and civilizational values.

So, back to the beginning: What are the key features of the next intellectual wave? It’s too early to say, as the political landscape remains volatile. The war on Gaza is still ongoing, accompanied by unprecedented regional dynamics—the overt dominance of Israel, the openly complicit stance of U.S. policy under Donald Trump, unresolved confrontations with Iran, and an unstable regional game without new rules. Internal conditions in many Arab countries remain precarious, buffeted by developments leading into dangerous unknowns. The political and economic crises—unemployment, poverty, social marginalization, failed development projects, loss of political legitimacy, and governments’ inability to provide answers—define the state of the Arab world today.

According to the British historian Arnold Toynbee’s theory of “challenge and response,” the most likely scenarios for the Arab region are further rigidity, decline, and deterioration.

Thus, Are we headed into a dark tunnel with no exit, leading to a dangerous new wave? Or could certain transformations open new horizons for change—and in which direction? What’s happening in Gaza and Palestine is extremely serious, as it poses a profound challenge that demands an answer. Syria remains a volatile front, the U.S.-Iran game in Iraq is dangerous, and growing protests in Turkey could become a regional game changer. The roles of Egypt and Saudi Arabia—and their attempts to restore some semblance of Arab cohesion—will shape the environment in which new ideas will grow.

One more important observation from the past two decades: the machinery of idea production has changed. Intellectual waves no longer begin in official Arab institutions or elite cultural circles. There are no longer major thinkers offering grand theories to lead intellectual or popular movements. Instead, these waves are now born with great fluidity in an age of “liquidity” and social media. Events now move faster than thinkers, intellectuals, or regimes. Sometimes it is entirely unknown individuals who create movements and waves that everyone else then scrambles to follow.