The Events in Suwayda from a Jordanian Strategic Perspective

The recent press conference held in Amman, which brought together Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, the U.S. Envoy to Syria Thomas Barak, and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani, conveyed a significant message concerning the shifting dynamics in the region. It underscored Jordan’s deep concern over the painful developments in As Suwayda specifically, and in Syria more broadly—events that Amman views as directly linked to both its national security and the regional role it seeks to maintain.

The ongoing situation in As Suwayda—despite the ceasefire agreement—remains open to multiple trajectories and carries profound implications from a Jordanian strategic perspective. Chief among these is the discernible shift in Israel’s security doctrine: a transition from a defensive posture to an assertive drive for regional hegemony, with aspirations of positioning itself as the region’s foremost power and de facto enforcer in the emerging order.

In the Syrian context, Israel’s agenda oscillates between fragmenting the country into weak, warring mini-states and establishing a demilitarised, vulnerable zone in southern Syria as a theatre for Israeli military operations. This intent was made explicit by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who called for the creation of a demilitarised southern region. More alarmingly, Israel has begun to assert its influence by launching military strikes against Syrian forces under the pretext of protecting the Druze community, while simultaneously cultivating ties with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, As Suwayda’s Druze spiritual leader. Through such actions, Israel is positioning itself as a stakeholder in Syria’s internal affairs. This development constitutes a profound shift in the region’s strategic landscape and a redefinition of its prevailing rules of engagement.

From a Jordanian standpoint, a recent closed-door seminar held at the Politics and Society Institute, attended by senior military, security, and political experts, concluded that the developments in As Suwayda pose a direct threat to Jordan’s national security. Participants stressed that these events cannot be decoupled from the situations in Gaza or the West Bank, and that they reflect a broader, more alarming transformation in Israeli policy. The experts warned of likely spillover effects, particularly about the West Bank.

But what is the connection between As Suwayda and the West Bank? Before addressing this question directly, it is essential to identify the sources of threat posed by Israeli conduct in Syria. Jordan’s core strategic interest in Syria lies in preserving the country’s territorial unity—an objective increasingly contingent upon the viability of Syria’s new political order, its capacity to integrate diverse societal and communal groups, and its ability to secure borders and prevent renewed civil or sectarian conflict. Any deterioration in these areas would not only jeopardise Syrian stability, but also undermine regional security as a whole—posing grave risks to Jordan’s interests, including new waves of refugees, the potential resurgence of ISIS, the transformation of the Jordan–Syria border into a volatile frontline, and threats to shared water resources, refugee repatriation, narcotics trafficking, and counterterrorism efforts.

Accordingly, Jordan regards Israel’s strategic posture in Syria as a first-order threat. This concern is compounded by growing fears within Jordanian policy circles regarding the possibility that the current right-wing Israeli government may seek to establish a pro-Israel Druze enclave in southern Syria, reminiscent of the former South Lebanon Army. Such a development would have two serious consequences: first, a new wave of displacement from Daraa due to mounting insecurity and deteriorating political and economic conditions; and second, the encirclement of Jordan from the north and west, with Israel emerging as a regional leviathan capable of exerting active pressure on its neighbours.

This analysis brings us back to the question of the West Bank. It is increasingly clear that, from Israel’s vantage point, the two-state solution is no longer on the table. Equally apparent is the absence of any coherent strategy from the current U.S. administration concerning a peaceful resolution. Israel appears to be advancing pre-existing plans for annexation, territorial expansion, and the dismantling of the Palestinian Authority, seeking to fragment the West Bank into isolated, non-viable cantons.

The developments in Syria—catalysed by the post-7 October phase and Israel’s genocidal campaign in Gaza—alongside unfolding events in the West Bank, point to a dangerous recalibration in Israel’s strategic thinking. This moment reflects a stark absence of any regional counterweight capable of restraining Israel’s policies of displacement, demographic engineering, and creation of new political realities that reinforce Prime Minister Netanyahu’s vision. Suppose Israel can reconfigure the Syrian landscape. In that case, it is all the more capable of enacting more consequential policies in the West Bank and Jerusalem—policies that directly undermine Jordan’s strategic interests.

Jordan’s conflict with Israel, therefore, can no longer be understood solely through the prism of occupation in the West Bank. It now encompasses a wider concern over Israel’s regional conduct—its interventions in Syria, and its policies in Gaza, Jerusalem, and the West Bank. The trajectory of tension, diplomatic confrontation, and strategic anxiety between Amman and Tel Aviv is steeply escalating, despite the existence of a peace treaty. Perhaps most concerning is that Israel no longer portrays itself as a vulnerable actor seeking security. Instead, it now operates as a dominant regional force, actively imposing its agenda and exploiting the stark asymmetry of regional power.