Israeli National Calculations in Post-Assad Syria

This material was published in the third issue of the Jordanian Politics and Society magazine (JPS).

Note
The views and opinions expressed in the magazine are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of neither PSI nor the Editors.

The collapse of the Assad regime represents a critical juncture in Middle Eastern geopolitics, with significant implications for Israel’s strategic orientation. This article analyzes Israeli official discourse and security rationales to assess its evolving response to a post-Assad Syria. It focuses on three interrelated dimensions: (1) national security considerations in the reconfigured Syrian landscape; (2) Israel’s colonial ambitions linked to territorial expansion and the exploitation of internal Syrian divisions; and (3) regional recalibrations affecting Israel’s relations with Jordan and Turkey. While definitive outcomes remain uncertain, the analysis highlights how Israel navigates this complex arena, where other actors—including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey—play pivotal yet asymmetrical roles in shaping Israeli expectations and capacities.

Israeli National Security Calculations

Israel’s national security doctrine is shaped by its enduring self-image as a “villa in the jungle”—a technologically advanced state surrounded by a hostile and unstable region. This worldview underpins its strategic posture toward Syria, where the control of highland terrain, deterrence of hostile forces, and protection of critical resources, such as water, are key priorities.[1]  Central to this posture is Israel’s long-standing perception of the Iran-led axis as its primary strategic threat. Within this framework, the Assad regime played a pivotal role as a logistical corridor for Iranian arms transfers and proxy networks.

Although Assad avoided direct involvement in the war before his regime collapsed on December 8, 2024, Syrian territory remained a major theater for Israeli military operations, which escalated after the October 7 attacks. Israel viewed Assad’s regime as a strategic linchpin in sustaining a hostile, semi-modern, yet depleted military force. Its collapse marked a turning point, prompting Israel to intensify its military and political engagement on three interrelated fronts—each seen as a potential strategic gain in an increasingly fluid and fragmented Syrian landscape:

First, Israel eliminated the last hostile regular army on its borders through the most extensive and concentrated aerial campaign in its military history (known as Operation Bashan Arrow).[2] Secondly, Israel secured de facto control over the buffer zone between the two countries, effectively nullifying the 1974 disengagement agreement. This was followed by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s declaration that Israel would not allow the new Syrian regime’s forces to deploy southwest of Damascus, and his demand for the complete demilitarization of southern Syria, including the governorates of Quneitra, Daraa, and Sweida. Thridly, Israel has significantly highly disrupted Hezbollah’s ability to strengthen its military capacities through land-based smuggling routes from Syria. This was further compounded by the decline of Russian influence in the region—Moscow having lost a key ally and witnessed a contraction of its military footprint in Syria.

Israel’s current stance toward the new Syrian administration is one of guarded skepticism. Although President Ahmed al-Sharaa has adopted a pragmatic tone—reaffirming Syria’s commitment to the 1974 disengagement agreement, expressing reluctance to engage in conflict with Israel, and pledging to prevent attacks from Syrian territory—Israeli officials remain unconvinced. This caution persists despite U.S. President Trump[3] and several senators[4] indicating that al-Sharaa is open to joining the Abraham Accords, contingent on Syria achieving internal stability and territorial unity. For Israel, these signals are not enough to offset the risks. The post-Assad landscape remains volatile, with fragmented militias, residual elements of the Iran-led axis, and regional power plays continuing to pose serious threats. Israel thus approaches the new Syrian leadership through a lens of containment, not rapprochement.

First, there are concerns within Israel about al-Sharaa’s jihadist background and his previous ties to al-Qaeda. Second, Israel fears the growing influence of Turkey in Syria, particularly the potential formation of a Turkish-Qatari-Muslim Brotherhood axis that could adopt a hostile posture toward Israel. Third, there is the risk of Syria descending once again into civil war or collapsing into a “failed state”, which could enable the rise of new hostile armed groups along Israel’s borders.[5]

Israel’s colonial ambitions

In February 2025, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that Israel would “not tolerate any threat to the Druze community in southern Syria”.[6] This “humanitarian-protection” statement, coming from the most aggressive state in the region—one widely accused of systematic apartheid[7] and ongoing repression of Palestinians—should be understood on two interconnected levels:

• Israel’s colonial drive for expansion is closely tied to its ability to exploit the region’s ethnic, tribal, and sectarian divisions—fragmentations Arab states have failed to unify under inclusive citizenship. These divisions create openings—often enabled from within—for Israel to extend its influence. This begins with security or protective roles and gradually evolves into political control and territorial entrenchment beyond its borders.
• Israel’s approach to post-Assad Syria is shaped by the Israeli Druze community (over 140,000), many of whom serve in the IDF and hold influential public roles. Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, spiritual leader of Israel’s Druze community, stated that the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria has opened new opportunities for the Golan Druze to engage with Israel.[8] In Syria, the Druze (around 700,000), have faced attacks from Sunni Islamist groups such as ISIS and the Al-Nusrah Front, including the 2018 Suwayda attacks that killed over 250 people, and a 2015 massacre in Idlib.

Furthermore, Israel’s intervention in post-Assad southern Syria goes well beyond the unconvincing narrative of protecting minorities. Its strategic ambitions are clearly reflected in the words of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, who openly advocated for the fragmentation of Syria into multiple political entities:

“We are all glad that Assad is gone, but we have to be realistic… everyone knows who the new leader is. They are taking revenge on the Alawites, they are hurting the Kurds… Syria can only be stable if there is a federation that includes various autonomies and respects diverse lifestyles.”[9]

Israel’s colonial ambitions in Syria go beyond exploiting internal chaos—they aim at redrawing borders through a new form of military occupation. By early 2025, Israel established at least nine military posts (in the 2024-occupied Golan Heights), declared plans for settlement expansion (in the 1967-occupied Golan Heights), and declared plans to maintain control over a 15 km “zone of control” and a 60 km “sphere of influence” encompassing Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda. These areas are being demilitarized, stripped of resistance, and gradually absorbed into Israel’s expanding security zone under the pretext of counterterrorism and “protection” of Druze minorities. In this regard, Israeli military leaders have recently advanced a new strategy aimed at consolidating regional dominance under the guise of a “three-layer defense doctrine”:[10]

First Layer (Inside Israeli Territory): A fortified barrier zone along the border featuring permanent military posts, fences, sensors, artillery units, and rapid deployment forces, aimed at physically separating Israeli communities from hostile areas nearby.

Second Layer (Inside Enemy Territory): Forward defense deployments within enemy territory (like Gaza and southern Syria), involving temporary or semi-permanent Israeli presence—military outposts, patrols, or aerial surveillance—designed to preempt attacks before they reach the border.

Third Layer (Demilitarized Zones): A new strategic layer demanding full demilitarization of threat zones (e.g., Gaza, southern Lebanon, and southern Syria), removing heavy weapons and Islamist factions to prevent long-range attacks or cross-border incursions.

Regional recalibrations: Jordan and Turkey

From an Israeli political-military perspective -If Jordan sneezes, Israel catches a cold-, an expression that underscores how any instability in Jordan could directly threaten Israeli security.[11] This concern is amplified by geography: the Israel–Jordan border stretches approximately 307 kilometers, while Jordan’s northern border with Syria runs about 362 kilometers. With Syria in a state of flux following the collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024, Israeli strategists have grown increasingly alarmed at the potential for regional spillover.

The downfall of Assad triggered a rapid reassessment of Israel’s northern security posture. The power vacuum, shifting alliances, and rise of armed non-state actors compelled Israeli officials to act swiftly. According to Israeli journalist David Barak, security discussions took place just days after Assad’s fall, involving senior Israeli and Jordanian intelligence officials.[12] While publicly unacknowledged, Israeli media suggested that the discussions focused on the risks posed by jihadist infiltration, arms and drug smuggling, and potential waves of displacement.

In internal deliberations, Israeli authorities reportedly conveyed to neighboring states—including Jordan—their intention to expand buffer zones inside southern Syria. These measures were framed as defensive and aimed at preempting cross-border threats, with reassurances that they would not infringe on Jordanian territory.

In Israeli strategic discourse, Jordan is consistently viewed as a vital anchor of regional stability and a buffer against encroaching chaos. From Israel’s perspective, Jordan’s diplomatic agility—maintaining lines of communication with Western powers, Russia, Damascus, and certain Syrian rebel groups—positions it as a uniquely capable intermediary in managing the post-Assad landscape.

Analysts frequently cite Jordan’s engagement with moderate Sunni factions in southern Syria as a stabilizing factor, especially as Iranian-backed networks continue to exploit Syrian territory to smuggle arms and narcotics, including Captagon, into both Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territories.[13] Israeli policymakers view Jordan’s stability as integral to preventing these threats from reaching Israel’s borders and the West Bank.

While Jordan is seen as an indispensable buffer to Israel’s east, Israel’s perspective on Turkey is marked by deepening strategic anxiety. Turkey’s expanding role in post-Assad Syria is rapidly reshaping the regional balance of power, posing a growing challenge to Israel’s strategic posture. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Ankara has positioned itself as the primary external actor backing Syria’s new leadership under Ahmad al-Sharaa.

Analysts argue that while Israel remains focused narrowly on security imperatives—such as deterring Iranian arms transfers and preventing jihadist entrenchment—Turkey’s broader geopolitical and economic agenda gives it a distinct advantage. As Gallia Lindenstrauss of the INSS notes, Turkey “cares more” about Syria and is willing to invest accordingly; a situation that presents both a strategic dilemma and a constraint. 

In January 2025, Israel’s “Defense Budget and Force-Building Review Committee” (commonly known as the Nagel Committee)[14] issued a stark warning: Turkey’s expanding presence in Syria now constitutes a strategic threat comparable to that posed by Iran. The committee recommended preparing for a possible direct confrontation. Following Netanyahu’s second White House visit in April 2025, it is increasingly likely that Israel and Turkey will be compelled to reach some form of arrangement to ease bilateral tensions amid the chaos in Syria.

Final remarks

Israel’s evolving posture toward post-Assad Syria reflects a decisive shift from defensive survival to regional assertion. No longer content with the image of a “villa in the jungle,” Israel now acts as a self-appointed “policeman”—intervening, patrolling, and reshaping its surroundings according to colonial logics and strategic imperatives. Southern Syria, in particular, has become a laboratory for this “imperial turn,” where Israel combines military force, infrastructural entrenchment, and rhetoric of minority protection to reengineer the borderlands.

This shift unfolds against the backdrop of Donald Trump’s Middle East diplomacy. In a bid to expand the Abraham Accords, Trump urged Syria’s new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa to normalize ties with Israel, expel Palestinian militants, and assume control over Kurdish-run ISIS camps. He lifted US sanctions on Syria, defying Israeli objections, citing Saudi and Turkish support.

Sharaa, while welcoming the sanctions relief as “historic,” avoided public mention of normalization, signaling cautious pragmatism. He emphasizes national unity and internal stability before advancing regional alignments.

Israel, meanwhile, remains skeptical. It opposes US-Syria rapprochement, fears cross-border threats, and prefers Syria to be fragmented and isolated. In this triangle, Trump pushes for bold deals, Sharaa treads carefully, and Israel doubles down on securitized dominance—exposing the asymmetries shaping Syria’s contested future.

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[1] Kim Bar, “Aspects of the Formation of Israel’s National Security Doctrine,” Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, Israel Defense Forces, October 2024. See: https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/dado-center/research/aspects-of-the-formation-of-israel-s-national-security-doctrine-major-kim-bar/.

[2] Emanuel Fabian, “350 Strikes, Targeting Most Arms Stockpiles in Syria: IDF Airs Clip of Its Bombing Spree,” The Times of Israel, December 10, 2024. See: https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/350-strikes-targeting-most-arms-stockpiles-in-syria-idf-airs-clip-of-its-bombing-spree/.

[3] Lior Ben Ari. “Trump Lands in Qatar and Declares: ‘Syrian President Will Recognize Israel When Situation in His Country Stabilizes’.” Ynet News, May 14, 2025. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/BkEuligNp.

[4] Amichai Stein. “Syria Wants Peace with Israel under One Condition, US Congressman Tells Post – Exclusive.” The Jerusalem Post, May 2025. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/abraham-accords/article-851393.

[5] Assaf Orion, Israel and the Fall of Assad: Rejoice, Repel, Reach Out, Reload, PolicyWatch 3970 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 18, 2024)

[6] Herb Keinon, “Israel’s Shield for Syria’s Druze and the Regional Shakeup No One Expected – Analysis,” The Jerusalem Post, February 24, 2025. See: https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-843590.

[7] Amnesty International, Israel’s Apartheid Against Palestinians: A Look Into Decades of Oppression and Domination, February 1, 2022. See: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2022/02/israels-system-of-apartheid/.

[8] Jewish News Syndicate, “Golan Druze View of Jewish State Changing After Assad’s Fall, Israeli Druze Leader Says,” Jewish News Syndicate, January 9, 2025. See: https://www.jewishpress.com/news/israel/druze/golan-druze-view-of-jewish-state-changing-after-assads-fall-israeli-druze-leader-says/2025/01/09/.

[9] Government of Israel, Israel-EU Association Council Meeting, accessed April 14, 2025. See: https://www.gov.il/en/pages/association-meeting.

[10] Ron Ben-Yishai, “The Lessons of 7/10: Israel Has a New Three-Layer Border Defense Strategy,” Ynet, last updated February 25, 2025. See:  https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/b1btcz5q1g [In Hebrew].

[11] Cohen, Galit, Ofir Winter, and Gal Shani. “Thirty Years of the Peace Agreement with Jordan: Time to Upgrade Water Cooperation.” Institute for National Security Studies, 2024. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep64414.

[12] Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel and Jordan Held Secret Talks on Syria,” Axios, updated December 14, 2024. See: https://www.axios.com/2024/12/14/syria-israel-jordan-secret-talks.

[13] Dale Gavlak, “Jordan Engages with Syria’s HTS Leaders to Tackle Terrorism,” Voice of America, January 28, 2025. See: https://www.voanews.com/a/jordan-engages-with-syria-s-hts-leaders-to-tackle-terrorism/7953149.html.

[14] Udi Etzion, “Israel Must Prepare for Potential War with Turkey, Nagel Committee Warns,” The Jerusalem Post, January 6, 2025, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-836362