Syria and Russia: The Fall of an Ally and the Fracture of an Idea?
Since Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin introduced his vision of “Neo-Eurasianism” three decades ago, the idea has served as an ambitious framework for countering Western dominance and crafting a multipolar international order with Russia at its core—a vision embraced by the new Russian elites. Although fundamentally philosophical and theoretical, Moscow’s foreign policy actions since 2008 (beginning with Putin’s Munich Security Conference speech in 2007 and the intervention in Georgia in 2008) seemed to translate Dugin’s Eurasian concept into practical reality.
For Russia, Syria represented a historic opportunity to reposition itself on the international geopolitical map and revive its role in the Middle East. The violent military intervention in Syria since September 2015 enabled Moscow to ensure the “warm waters” of the eastern Mediterranean and establish two military bases along the Syrian coast[1], and secured expansive, long-term access agreements, granting it strategic influence in a highly contested region. If Syria served as a testing ground for Dugin’s ideas of building a Eurasia free from American unipolarity, the Syrian regime’s potential collapse today would be a severe—perhaps fatal—blow to this project.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow worked tirelessly to restore its role in international politics. The loss of the Soviet legacy, which extended across Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, led to a sharp decline in Russia’s influence, confining its power to its immediate neighborhood. Even Moscow’s significant role in the UN Security Council proved insufficient to offset this decline. With limited room for expanding its international presence in Europe, Russia’s leadership increasingly turned toward the Middle East. In this context, Syria became a cornerstone for Russia, providing access to the Mediterranean and opportunities to build alliances and secure tangible gains. Syria thus enabled Russia to demonstrate that it is not merely a veto power within the UN but an active player capable of shaping global dynamics.
Against this backdrop, recent remarks by Dugin—both in articles and through ongoing commentary on his page on the X platform—reflect deep concern among Russia’s elite and possibly within the Kremlin itself. For Dugin, often regarded as “Putin’s brain” or the intellectual architect of Russia’s contemporary geopolitical vision, the collapse of the Syrian regime cannot be understood merely as the fall of an ally or the loss of a military outpost. Instead, it strikes at the very essence of the Eurasian idea. According to this perspective, Russia seeks to establish an international order recognizing its role as a revisionist great power —a dissatisfied power reclaiming its stature after decades of decline.
Russia’s intervention in Syria was intended to prove its ability to protect its allies against Western pressures and signal the nearing end of unipolar dominance. However, the potential collapse of the Syrian regime threatens to undermine this Russian ambition, particularly given Moscow’s inability to sustain its Syrian ally. Furthermore, the brutal realities attributed to the Assad regime could tarnish the image of Russia as a defender of its partners. This could deepen doubts about the seriousness of the Eurasian vision and its ability to compete with Western—particularly American—dominance in international politics.
What is unfolding in Syria is not isolated from the broader international context. Its reverberations will likely be felt across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, reinforcing the impression that Russia still needs to transition from reactive posturing to proactive strategic action. Despite its military and diplomatic maneuvers, Russia may struggle to secure gains in its newfound spheres of influence. Traditional allies of Russia, such as Serbia, Georgia, and even Belarus, might fear scenarios similar to Assad’s, realizing that Russian military interventions might not guarantee their survival in the future, as the Syrian case has demonstrated.
Ultimately, the collapse of the Syrian regime will not be merely a local or regional event but a turning point of potentially global significance. It could rival major geopolitical shifts such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union or the breakup of Yugoslavia. More importantly, it challenges Russia’s self-perception and capabilities while casting a dark shadow over Dugin’s theories and the Eurasian project. These transformations might compel Moscow to reconsider its approach to international engagement, steering it away from aspirations for a multipolar world as envisioned in previous eras. Instead, Russia may face two equally unpalatable choices: retreating into a narrowly confined sphere of influence within its immediate neighborhood or reshaping its international strategy to align with a more realistic understanding of global power dynamics—one that recognizes the futility of relying on weak allies and fragile spheres of influence to change the structure of the international order.
[1] Tartus, a port city on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, has long been a hub for naval cooperation between Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) and Syria. Initially, the Soviet presence in Tartus was limited to logistical support and maintenance facilities, reflecting the Cold War-era bilateral agreements rather than the more assertive, geopolitical influence-driven posture associated with Russia’s contemporary Eurasian ambitions.