How do we Read the Results of the 2024 Parliamentary Elections?

• The 2024 parliamentary elections witnessed heavy surprises represented by the number of seats won by the Islamic Action Front (IAF) at the level of the national and local lists. The modest results of the political parties, especially those that were expected to take on a larger number and be a match for the Islamists. The third is the level of transparency and credibility in this election reminds us of what happened in 1989, contrary to the perceptions or propaganda promoted by many.
• What happened is a real and significant victory for the state with its political and security institutions, without exaggeration, because the most important outcome is the restoration of the credibility and legitimacy of the political process, which represents a turning point that we need to build upon.
• There is an opportunity today for both the decision-making kitchen, the government, and the opposition to reach an understanding of the next stage, the terms and framework of the democratic transition in Jordan.
• The transition or democratic transition is a process that takes a period and has its conditions, the most important of which is national unity, as a precondition, and then the existence of understandings and dialogues to enshrine new rules of the political game during the transitional period, which is also very important.
• Explain the Muslim Brotherhood’s victory through three main hypotheses; first is the “Gaza effect,” which was controversial among the political elite, and many expectations that it would not be reflected strongly in the election, but there would be a state of reluctance within the major cities, which did not succeed and did not fail completely.  Second, the votes in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood is a natural consequence of the build-up of the crisis of confidence between governments and Jordanians, the pit of collapse that has been formed over the past years and has been a state of indifference in official circles toward it.  Third, the Third World’s programmatic parties do not operate automatically, especially at an early stage of democratic transition, and at first, it makes sense that ideological parties or ideas prevail, but after people see the results and the differences between theory and reality, they begin to look for programmatic parties.
• It is unfair to judge the partisan experiment with failure, and I claim that the experiment succeeded in its first step on more than one level; Experience has confirmed that there is no “electoral engineering” and that parties must rely on themselves, so the results will be reflected effectively on the political parties movement in the next phase and filtering it significantly and correct the trend toward the right track.
• What the new parties have achieved, especially those that have passed the threshold, especially the following parties; Al Mithaq Party, Eradeh Party, Azm Party, Al Etihad Al Watani Party, the Jordanian Labor Party, the Labor Party, Namaa Party, which is not insignificant, as reaching popular bases almost reach (one hundred thousand) for Al Mithaq is important, within a few months, and within the conditions of the war on Gaza and questioning the political game, with the competition with other political parties on the same social base, and it is necessary to build on it effectively.
• The elections must be the beginning of a new and more dynamic phase in the democratic transition, and this requires a great deal of flexibility from the decision-making institutions on the one hand and the political opposition on the other.
• The IAF today; has the ball in its court, whether they will strengthen the opinion within the decision institutions that push for progress and further incursion into the democratic path, through rational and realistic proposals by the Front, and away from the logic of competition of a zero-sum game; Or the euphoria of victory that has caused Islamists in the Arab world nothing but major disasters, and then led to the deterioration of the democratic process significantly.

The 2024 parliamentary elections in Jordan witnessed heavy surprises represented by the number of seats won by the Islamic Action Front (IAF) the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood movement) at the national list level, first, nearly half a million votes in favor of the national party list, and second at the local level. The second, heavier surprise, the modest results of political parties, especially those that had been expected to take more and be a competitor for Islamists, compared to the amount of support they received from the governmental institutions. The third surprise is that we are talking about a level of transparency and credibility in the elections that reminds us of what happened in 1989, contrary to the perceptions or propaganda promoted by many.

The results are important, but more importantly, how will the decision-making kitchen read the results in the context of regional, domestic, and international circumstances?

Here lies an important set of questions that need to be asked today with a level of insight and depth higher than traditional or superficial reading, which sees things only at a limited and partial level, the direction of reading is the one that will largely frame the scenarios of the next stage!

Who are the winners and who are the losers?  What are the signs of Islamist victory?  What are the implications of the results of other political parties, especially the Al Mithaq Party, Eradeh Party, Islamic Nationalism Party, Taqqadum Party, and Azm Party? What are the political implications, and the next form of parliamentary and party scene based on the current results?

Let us go directly to the indications that will emerge from the parameters of the next stage, and the indexes are determined by the methodology of reading, and this methodology that I recommend.

First: On the level of political modernization and the prospects of democratic transformation

What happened is a real and significant victory and support for the state with its political and security institutions, without exaggeration, because the most important result is the restoration of credibility and the return of the political process and its legitimacy after there was a large gap in confidence and credibility during the previous years, which represent a turning point that is necessary to build upon on it. Where the size of the opposition’s participation covered the limitations of political participation, and this participation stressed that those who questioned the integrity of the elections the credibility of the state and the size of the bet that the king personally placed on the modernization project were wrong; This is evidenced by fair elections and strong results for the political opposition.

After the 1989 elections, the politicians in Jordan were greatly surprised by the results, and some senior statesmen said, “This Council will not live”, and some countries in the region pressured Jordan to retreat from that experience, and if that experience was completed and took the time and stage required for maturity, completion and stability, we would be today a country with a solid democracy, and to move from historical tides phase to the establishment of new rules and assets of the political game, that opportunity went away, especially after the National Charter 1990-1991, but today it returns strongly with the centenary of Jordan and with the celebration of the silver jubilee of King Abdullah II’s accession to the Throne, and there is an opportunity today for both the decision-making kitchen, the government and the opposition to reach understandings for the next stage, the conditions and the framework for democratic transition.

There will necessarily be people who are worried and skeptical about the completion of this experiment, and those who push to go back by spreading the fear of the danger of such results at this delicate stage in the history of the region, but – in contrast – the same delicate stage and the current historical moment and face the right-wing Zionist project and the American pressure on Jordan, in case if Donald Trump wins. All these factors lead to the completion of the experiment and the building of a coherent and strong internal front and understanding between Jordanians and political institutions. This is an opportunity that needs time and frame to try to complete the future path toward democracy.

The transition or democratic transformation is a process that takes a period of time and has its conditions, the most important of which is national unity (as Dankwart Rustow said) as a precondition, and then the existence of understandings and dialogues to establish new rules of the political game during the transitional period, which is also very important. This is a challenge in Jordan’s case, many of the determinants are a continuous motivation during the previous historical experience to return back, the most prominent of these determinants are the geopolitics and the difficult position of Jordan with its constraints on the domestic political game, especially concerning the external equation.

Therefore, there is no need for any fear or intimidation, and the size of the presence of the Islamic opposition is still limited in the face of a majority supporting the existing policies, and all is that the political game and the modernization project have taken a large dose of confidence, credibility and strength. It would be impossible if there had been any interference or doubt in the election results.

Second: The results of the Islamic Action Front

I have argued that many IAF leaders were not expecting such results, even though their campaign was very successful (as we will present later in a study by the Politics and Society Institute);  The campaign focused on the main issues that maintain its social base on the one hand, and on attracting those who are a potential and empowered audience, as the Palestinian question and the war on Gaza were an essential part of their media campaign, the issue of Islamic identity in Jordan’s society and the role family and preserve it, the issue of normalization with Israel and related to (land bridge). Maher Al Jazi’s operation (at Al Karama crossing two days before the elections) may have strengthened their campaign, especially since they used it in political advertisements also.

Explain the Muslim Brotherhood’s victory through three main hypotheses; First, the “Gaza effect”, which was controversial among the political elite, whether Hamas’s overwhelming popularity in the Jordanian public opinion would be reflected in the ballot box or not? Many expectations were that it would not be strongly reflected, but there would be a state of reluctance within the major cities, which did not succeed and did not fail completely, as a state of reluctance remained, but the Jordanian-Palestinian voice at the level of the general list generally chose one of two things;  As for Islamists or boycotts, and the new political parties have not succeeded in making a significant breakthrough on the national list level, the message is very clear in this context.

The second assumption is that the Muslim Brotherhood vote is a natural consequence of the build-up of the crisis of trust between governments and Jordanians, that pit of collapse that has been formed over the past years, and a state of indifference in official circles toward it as if it were normal or unimportant, but it is really important in a case like Jordan. a country that facing persistent and strong challenges in both levels internally and externally, it is essential to have stable, consensual rules of the political game, and the only way to do so is through competitive electoral democracy.

The third hypothesis is that the programmatic parties in the Third World do not function automatically, especially at an early stage of the transition to democracy, for it is logical that parties or ideological ideas prevail, but after people see the results and differences between theories and reality, they begin to look for programmatic parties, in a country like Jordan, with this dangerous, turbulent regional environment, the dynamics of identity, questions of religion, geography, and the Palestinian issue, it is not possible to exclude or diminish the importance of ideological discourse, especially religious discourse.

Third: at the level of other political parties

It is unfair to judge the partisan experiment with failure, and I claim that the experiment succeeded in its first step on more than one level; Experience has confirmed that there is no “electoral engineering” and the parties have to rely on themselves, not on the “help of a friend”, and that “Nothing can scratch your skin quite like your own nails”, so the results will be reflected effectively on the party movement in the next stage and sifting it significantly and correct its direction toward the right track.

On the other hand, the achievements of the new parties, especially the following parties; Al Mithaq Party, Eradeh Party, Taqqadum Party, Islamic Nationalism Party, Azm Party, Al Etihad Al Watani Party, the Jordanian Labor Party, Namaa Party, and the Labor Party, is significant, as reaching popular bases almost reach (one hundred thousand) for Al Mithaq Party is important, within a few months, and under the conditions of the war on Gaza and skepticism of the political game, and competing with other political parties on the same social base is an important achievement, and gives these parties a popular base on which it is possible and necessary to build upon effectively.

The campaign of many political parties characterized by efficiencies, such as Al Mithaq Party, Eradeh Party, and the Social Democratic (who did not win), and the electoral scene differed significantly from previous experiences, and this is something that can be used and built upon in the next stage. From the democratic transition point of view, its theories, and the political parties’ science, these political parties have not failed, but have achieved a strong acceptable success, which can be built upon in the future, through realistic plans, self-reliance, and learning from previous mistakes.

As for the left parties in general, the Alliance for the Advancement (Al Nhoudh), our Road (Tarequna) List, and the Democratic Movement, the result was – from a realistic lens – expected., the result was – from a realistic lens – expected. The parties may have seriously tried to change their campaign and worked hard and hard, but the reality is stronger than it; The socio-cultural transformation was the most important change. Therefore, these parties, especially the Democratic Current Alliance, must rebuild their calculations in their intellectual discourse and their vision of reform and how to re-engage with the street through ideological or intellectual reviews at the minimum.

Then what next?

The elections must be the beginning of a new and more dynamic phase in Jordan’s democratic transition, and this requires a great level of flexibility from the decision-making institutions on the one hand and the political opposition on the other, the ball is in the court of the IAF today. Whether it will strengthen opinion within the decision-making institutions that push for progress and further penetration in the democratic process, through rational and realistic proposals by the IAF, and move away from the zero-sum game competition, or the euphoria of victory that has caused Islamists in the Arab world only major disasters, then the democratic process has deteriorated significantly.

Therefore, the decision-making institutions should give full opportunity to this experiment and leave the door open to understandings not necessarily with the Islamists, but with the political forces and parties in the next parliament in general, and to abandon our fears and exaggeration of the scale of the victory. Rather, it is an attempt to use this experience to strengthen the symbolic and organizational capabilities of the political system in the face of internal and external entitlements.