Daraa Beyond the Eighth Brigade: Strategic Shifts and Potential Implications

The Syrian landscape is witnessing a major shift following the announcement on 13 April 2025 of the dissolution of the Eighth Brigade and its complete absorption, both in personnel and equipment, into the Syrian Ministry of Defence. The brigade had been the most prominent armed formation in Daraa Governorate and, since the fall of Assad’s regime, had posed a persistent challenge to the new administration in Damascus, particularly due to its refusal to integrate and disarm over recent months.

This development underscores the transitional Syrian government’s drive to consolidate central authority, integrate the myriad armed factions under official institutional frameworks, and eliminate the influence of military factions from the political process. Moreover, the move contributes to the broader project of rebuilding and restructuring Syria’s military and security institutions following the collapse of the previous regime.

Simultaneously, amid an ongoing ground incursion into western Daraa and persistent Israeli airstrikes targeting key military sites in Syria, the likelihood of military friction between Damascus and the Israeli occupying forces is increasing, especially given the recent deployment of Syrian troops in Daraa’s western countryside. This local development is closely intertwined with the broader regional dynamics of Israeli-Turkish rivalry over influence in the new Syria.

The consequences of the brigade’s dissolution are not limited to its former areas of control in eastern Daraa. Instead, they extend to a wider projection of Ministry of Defence forces across southern Syria. Key implications include:

• Strengthening the Authority of the Transitional Government:

Integrating the Eighth Brigade into the Ministry of Defence marks a significant step toward consolidating the authority of the transitional government in Damascus. It reduces the influence of opposition groups that have resisted integration, most notably the military council in Suwayda Governorate and certain factions opposed to the Damascus–SDF agreement. The brigade’s complete absorption into the state military structure reinforces the centralisation of security and defence in the new Syrian order. It limits the emergence of polarising or anti-government power centres in southern Syria.

• A Shift from ‘Integration’ to ‘Absorption’:

Since the fall of Assad’s regime, the Eighth Brigade had resisted efforts to merge armed groups under the Ministry’s command. It notably abstained from the December 2024 meeting, where other armed formations agreed to dissolve and join the Ministry. The brigade retained its weapons and heavy equipment, making its current integration a strategic achievement for the transitional government. Importantly, this shift affirms a policy of complete absorption rather than mere integration as semi-autonomous units, rejecting models akin to Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces and their ambiguous relationship with the national army.

• Assuming Security Responsibilities in Daraa:

The roots of insecurity in Daraa date back to the post-2018 period when Russian-brokered settlement agreements enabled the proliferation of organised crime networks—including kidnapping gangs, smuggling routes, and drug trafficking hubs—amid a general spread of arms. One of the Ministry of Defence’s primary responsibilities is to launch robust security campaigns to curtail these destabilising activities, which also have spillover effects on Jordan. In this context, Jordan has played a cooperative security role by providing intelligence and technical expertise to Syrian authorities, reflecting continued political-security coordination between Amman and Damascus.

• Enhancing Security Coordination with As-Suwayda’s Social Forces:

Effective governance in southern Syria requires integrating the Ministry’s efforts with local actors in As-Suwayda, particularly the Men of Dignity Movement and the Mountain Brigade. Cooperative security frameworks become essential with criminal activities shifting between Daraa and As-Suwayda, including hotspots like the Badia and southern villages. The changes will likely increase pressure on those in As-Suwayda who reject Damascus’ central authority.

• Strengthening Sovereignty over Border Crossings With Jordan:

The expansion of Ministry of Defence deployments will inevitably extend to the Syrian-Jordanian border, which spans approximately 375 km and includes the Jaber-Nassib and Ar-Ramtha crossings. Jordan had closed the Ar-Ramtha crossing for security reasons. However, the relative improvement in Daraa’s security situation and a 500% increase in Jordanian exports to Syria since the fall of Assad may prompt reconsideration of reopening the Ar-Ramtha crossing. A secure border would also reinforce increasing economic and diplomatic engagement with Damascus.

• Legitimising Syria’s Military Presence vis-à-vis Israel:

The official deployment of Syrian Ministry of Defence forces across Daraa increases the strategic cost of Israel’s continued occupation of the western countryside. Israeli justifications for maintaining a buffer zone—based on perceived security threats—are weakened by the presence of internationally recognised, locally legitimate Syrian forces.

Ultimately, the positive repercussions associated with the new responsibilities assumed by the Syrian Ministry of Defence are beginning to foster a sense of cautious reassurance among the local population in Daraa. However, this emerging sentiment remains contingent upon the Ministry’s sustained capacity to enforce disciplined and effective security operations across the governorate’s eastern and western countryside.

Conclusion
The responsibilities assumed by the Syrian Ministry of Defence following the Eighth Brigade’s dissolution are likely to generate cautious optimism among local communities, provided that security operations are conducted in a disciplined and stabilising manner across eastern and western Daraa. Nonetheless, challenges remain, especially in areas facing Israeli encroachment. The key dilemma for Damascus lies in balancing military consolidation across Syrian territory while avoiding direct escalation with Israel, which could derail domestic stabilisation efforts. Ultimately, while the dissolution of the Eighth Brigade may yield substantial local benefits, Israel’s military footprint remains the most significant obstacle to lasting stability in southern Syria.