After Al-Sinwar… Open-Ended Conflict
Many Arab Governments, as well as many Western officials, have shown political short-sightedness by rushing into welcoming the assassination of Hamas’s leader Yahya Al-Sinwar and by concluding that the movement will be weak after his death, and that will open the door to a prisoner return deal, these are expectations or wishful thinking that ignore fundamental realities of the ongoing dispute. Even the historical experiences in which Israeli’s previous targeted assassinations strategy with Hamas, or even the American with the leaders of Al-Qaida and the Islamic State (ISIS) has proved its utter failure to deal with the Islamic movements in its multiple and varied forms, whether they were national liberation movements or jihadi and radical movements.
Moreover, many other factors reflect the evolving dynamics of the current situation at different levels. However, there are several important variables about Hamas, its destiny, and the influence of Al-Sinwar’s martyrdom on the strength and influence of Hamas. First of these variables, is the movement’s organizational structure in terms of internal cohesion and resilience, or the speedy recovery and controlling of the leadership (As happened with Hezbollah after the first strikes that toppled most of its military and political leadership). Thus, there are no indications or signs that there is a potential for major slides and defections in the structure of the movement, instead, they have been able to maintain despite the exceptionally harsh circumstances over the past year.
Iran tied its reaction to direct targeting from Israel while leaving large areas for the proxy war.
The second variable is grassroots support, and Israeli policies have been working on the hypothesis of isolating Hamas from its popular base since the beginning of the war, we could have imagined its success if Israel had provided other options, alternatives, and prospects for people, on the contrary, the only alternative that Israel presented to “Hamas”, was the expulsion, death, torture, occupation, and genocide, creating a common destiny for both Hamas and Gazans.
The third variable lies in the objective conditions, as well as in the surrounding contexts or the local and regional dispute environments, including the power scales and their shifts. In terms of the Palestinian sphere (Gaza), Hamas has been able to withstand and endure, but there is a significant gap in power scales. Furthermore, It is plain to see that Israel is working today on the fragmentation of the Gaza Strip, blowing up any possibility of living in it and ending any possibility of armed resistance in the future. Although Hizbollah regained its balance in record time, the Lebanese and regional equation is greatly pressuring it. Also, there were leaks and signs that it might accept a ceasefire, without linking it to a ceasefire in Gaza too, as was required previously.
As for Iran, its operations and reactions have been directly tied to Israeli targeted attacks, while leaving significant room for proxy warfare through its allies and forces affiliated with what is known as the “Alliance of Resistance.” Indeed, there is a dilemma for all involved parties, but it seems bigger for Israel, this is because the doctrine driving Netanyahu and the Israeli right-wing is one of absolute and complete superiority, aiming to reshape the geostrategic reality in the Middle East. While this might be achievable in Gaza, either now or in the near future, due to the ongoing daily war of extermination and killing, still, the outcomes in the medium and long term remain uncertain. Regarding Hezbollah, the situation appears more challenging for Israel, and the same applies to other factions in Iraq and Yemen, not to mention Iran. If Netanyahu’s doctrine is based on the idea that the only end to this war is an absolute or almost complete defeat of Iran, as a form of surrender, considering it the only requirement for reshaping Israel’s new national security strategy, consequently, this suggests that we are facing an endless war or open-ended outcomes. This would mean eliminating Iran and changing its behavior or regime structure, while simultaneously eliminating Hezbollah, Hamas, and other regional forces, which is a scenario closer to fantasy unless we imagine Netanyahu throwing nuclear bombs on everyone!
By expulsion, death, torture, and genocide, Israel created a common destiny for both Hamas and Gazans.
Despite a small geographic area like the Gaza Strip, which the Israeli army has destroyed, turning it upside down, and almost wiping it off the map, there remains fierce resistance, and the people that being killed still insist on staying in their homes despite the horrors and catastrophes that exceed the capability of any human society. So, what will the situation be like when we are talking about regional wars, with a civilizational and semi-global nature, as these conflicts create significant ripple effects among millions of Arabs and Muslims?
Within these standards, the assassination of Al-Sinwar would not represent a game changer in the directions and tracks of the dispute, even though he was representing the hardline faction within Hamas and the most committed to the movement’s conditions. In addition, even if his successor (or the next in line of leadership) were to lean more towards finding a way to block Netanyahu’s agenda of completing the Nakba and Naksa by taking over more other lands and by creating a new reality with greater destruction in the West Bank and the further Judaization of Jerusalem, the problem does not lie with the Palestinian or regional parties today. The issue is specifically with the existence of a right-wing Israeli government that sees no future for Israel except through expanding the state’s territory, changing the political geography of Palestine, and shifting regional power balances. To conclude, this scenario greatly overestimates Israel’s capabilities for dominance and superiority, betting on espionage and cyber-intelligence that were initially successful against Hezbollah. However, the reality of the conflict is far more complex than that.