The Dilemma of Change in Iraq: Reflections on the Eve of Election Day
Tomorrow, Tuesday, Iraqis will head to the polls to participate in the country’s sixth parliamentary elections since 2003, amid mounting expectations and assessments pointing to the likelihood of the lowest voter turnout since the first elections held in 2005. This comes at a highly sensitive and complex moment for both the country and the wider region, reflecting the magnitude of the challenges facing the Iraqi state and society.
These pessimistic projections are not sudden, but rather the product of an accumulated crisis of trust between citizens and the political process, particularly regarding the capacity of elections to produce meaningful change. Successive electoral cycles have failed to yield any substantive transformation in the structure of power-one capable of altering the mechanisms of decision-making. This was most evident in the 2021 Iraqi elections, in which even a political figure as prominent as Muqtada al-Sadr was unable to break the entrenched political equation, paving the way for the consolidation of the Coordination Framework-an alliance of traditional parties and groups that emerged from armed factions and continue to maintain such weapons as instruments for influencing governance and policy direction.
An examination of the behavior of the Iraqi government-especially during the most recent parliamentary term-as well as the conduct of many political forces throughout their electoral campaigns, reveals a clear pattern: key actors within the political system have relied on clientelism and the reactivation of sectarian rhetoric as primary tools for mobilizing supporters and expanding their electoral bases. In recent years, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani oversaw the creation of hundreds of thousands of public-sector jobs with little strategic planning, despite repeated warnings from the International Monetary Fund regarding the long-term consequences of indulging in a sense of economic euphoria driven by high oil prices. Yet the use of public resources for partisan or personal gain has become a recurring practice among most political forces wielding influence within state institutions.
In parallel with clientelism, sectarian rhetoric has resurfaced in electoral messaging. Although political competition in Iraq today largely unfolds within each communal bloc rather than across the national spectrum, some political forces nevertheless appear to regard the combination of clientelist networks and sectarian mobilization-or the use of either one independently-as an effective means of preserving influence or increasing their share of parliamentary seats after their significant setbacks in the last elections.
Within the Shi’a political sphere, the Coordination Framework enters the electoral arena fragmented, following years of internal divisions. The most prominent of these is the rift between former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition, and current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who is seeking a second term on the basis of the political momentum and expansive clientelist networks he has built. This comes in addition to the recent foreign policy engagements he has pursued in an attempt to present himself as the leader of a coherent Iraqi state aligned with regional policies, distancing the country from rival axes and avoiding entanglement in external conflicts. However, such positioning did not translate into meaningful diplomatic returns, as demonstrated by the limited participation of Arab leaders in the recent Arab Summit-mirroring the similarly modest turnout at the 2012 summit held under al-Maliki’s government.
Although entering the elections through separate lists, most Shi’a political forces-despite their internal divisions-have opted to form unified coalitions in mixed and Sunni-majority cities, such as the al-Hadbaa National Alliance, the Unified Salah al-Din Coalition, and the Ninawa First Alliance. It is worth noting that these forces tend to employ a form of clientelism in these areas that is closely tied to their security and economic influence.
On the Sunni front, one of the most notable developments in recent years has been the decline of traditional political actors and the emergence of a new elite, largely composed of businessmen. This shift has transformed electoral competition into a struggle over securing the community’s relatively fixed share of power as set by prevailing political norms. Meanwhile, the leader of the Taqaddum Party has recently articulated ambitions to claim the presidency from the Kurds-arguing that such a move would restore the Sunnis to what he describes as their rightful place within the political system.
Within the Kurdish political landscape, the two main parties have maintained the established rules of the game over the past years. Other parties have not emerged as significant competitors in comparison, despite continuous attempts-most notably by the New Generation Movement led by Shaswar Abdulwahid and the Popular Front Party, whose leader Lahur Sheikh Jangi ultimately ended up under arrest-to break the dominance of the prevailing equation.
As for civil and reform-oriented parties, the al-Badeel (Alternative) Party currently enjoys the support of a segment of intellectuals and activists associated with the “Tishreen” protest movement, who have chosen to participate in the elections this time after boycotting the previous cycle. This includes the National Home (al-Bayt al-Watani) group, which decided to participate and put forward its secretary-general, Hussein al-Gharabi, whose party originated in the city of Nasiriyah and initially emerged as a promising political project before facing internal crises. Moreover, the parliamentary performance and outspoken political positions of MP Sajjad Salim-particularly his criticism of armed factions and Iranian interference-appear to have strengthened his and his coalition’s appeal among this segment.
Regarding voter turnout, the central and southern provinces-predominantly Shi‘a-are expected to witness relatively low participation compared with mixed areas, Sunni-majority regions, and the Kurdistan Region. This trend may be attributed to the experience of the Coordination Framework’s governance, which was preceded by waves of protest concentrated in these same provinces, as well as to the decisive boycott declared by the Sadrist Movement. In the previous elections, the Sadrists had secured 73 seats with more than 800,000 votes, making their absence a significant factor shaping turnout.
Perhaps what is most concerning today is that these elections are taking place at a moment when the entire region stands at a crossroads following the transformative events set in motion on October 7. Political forces in Iraq show no signs of a unified outlook toward these shifts, nor the capacity to articulate coherent assessments of their potential costs and benefits. This lack of strategic clarity leaves Iraq perpetually exposed as a potential arena for regional confrontation-an exposure compounded by the state’s persistent inability to control unchecked weapons, monopolize the use of force, and confront the deepening phenomenon of “non-statism,” which has been institutionally consolidating for years.
This persistent anxiety is accompanied by a sense of uncertainty and ambiguity about the future. Amid widespread frustration with the political order, the structure of governance, and the consociational model that continues to reproduce the same parties and electoral outcomes-and given the exhaustion that has permeated public sentiment since the Tishreen protests-complex questions remain unanswered: What is the way out? And how can an alternative to the current political reality be envisioned or constructed?