The Dissolution of the 40th Division: Implications Beyond Southern Syria

Syria is undergoing a succession of significant institutional and structural changes, particularly in its military and security sectors. The most prominent concern the restructuring of the army. The latest development, according to reports, is the dissolution of the 40th Division, one of the military formations operating in southern Syria. Its commander, Brigadier General Bunyan al-Hariri, was also affected by the changes, taking up a new position as deputy corps commander.

This development forms part of a broader effort to rebuild Syria’s military establishment. The restructuring plan envisages an army organized into five corps covering the entire country, with several brigades reporting directly to each corps according to geographical and operational considerations. This arrangement replaces the previous structure, in which corps commanded approximately twenty divisions distributed across five geographical sectors.[1] These divisions, in turn, comprised smaller units, including brigades, battalions, and companies.

This article examines the timing and significance of the decision to dissolve the 40th Division and considers what it reveals about the restructuring of Syria’s military establishment. It offers a preliminary assessment of the decision’s internal dimensions and its domestic and regional contexts. The division serves as a case study through which to examine developments extending beyond its particular local circumstances to the military establishment as a whole, against the backdrop of the complex situation in southern Syria.

According to the available information,[2] several officers from Daraa who had commanded brigades and battalions within the 40th Division were summoned by army commanders. Some had previously been displaced to northern Syria before the fall of the Assad regime. They were informed that their existing formation—the 40th Division—was being dissolved. The changes included removing some officers from their positions and requiring them to surrender their vehicles, while transferring others from battalion command to deputy battalion command. A new brigade was also established, incorporating battalions from Homs, Hama, and Idlib under officers from northern Syria. These measures caused resentment among some of the division’s personnel from Daraa, particularly after they were summoned to Khirbet al-Shayyab Camp in rural Damascus and informed of the decision. The situation escalated into a protest, a physical altercation, and gunfire into the air before it was brought under control. The personnel returned to Daraa the following morning.

The changes extend across Syria’s military establishment, with all military divisions having been dissolved.[3] In practical terms, this removes an intermediate command echelon between corps and brigades: corps commanders become directly responsible for their subordinate brigades, rather than exercising authority through division commands. The process also entails redistributing units, personnel, and commanders geographically and demographically. This may weaken the ties connecting military formations to their former commanders and local constituencies, while strengthening the Ministry of Defense’s capacity to direct and control forces centrally.

From a military perspective, these changes may improve command and control, standardize training and logistics, and replace geographically rooted divisions with mixed units operating under broader corps commands. They may also limit local commanders’ ability to retain cohesive groups of personnel bound to them personally and facilitate the transfer of units between governorates. This would allow greater flexibility in force deployment and reduce formations’ attachment to particular geographical areas. Similar organizational approaches are used by the armed forces of several countries, particularly in tribal settings where kinship-based loyalties are strong, including some Arab states. Rotating military personnel between regions is intended to curb localized loyalties and favoritism, which can otherwise impede appropriate military action.

The suitability of this approach for Syria nevertheless depends on the nature of the new structure, how it is implemented, and its capacity to produce meaningful results. This is particularly important given the Syrian army’s history before and after the revolution and the complexity of the security and military landscape as developments unfold following the integration and announced dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[4] Further complications concern the National Guard in Suwayda, including persistent disorder and instability, its intransigence, and its relationship with Israel.

The timing of the restructuring also reflects the sensitivity of loyalties within military formations established during the Syrian revolution along factional, local, regional, and tribal lines. Progress in moving beyond these ties and reshaping them within the military establishment is therefore connected to integration and the development of a unified military doctrine centered on allegiance to the state. At the beginning of the transitional period, some formations were only partially integrated and retained their previous composition. What appears to be a geographical redeployment and a reassignment of positions within the chain of command may thus amount to a broader reconfiguration of centers of influence within the new Syrian state.

The significance of these changes is particularly evident in southern Syria, where five military divisions are deployed:[5] the 44th and 70th Divisions in rural Damascus,[6] the 90th Division in Damascus,[7] the 40th Division in Daraa, and the 77th Division in western rural Damascus.[8] Their composition and organizational origins vary. Some draw on factions originating in different parts of Syria. The 40th Division, by contrast, comprises three brigades, seven battalions, and approximately forty companies. Most of its commanders and personnel are from Daraa, alongside members of Ahrar al-Sham, giving the formation a relatively pronounced local and tribal character.

The consequences of dissolving the division therefore extend beyond its deployment areas in Daraa Governorate. They also concern the Syrian Ministry of Defense’s plans for force deployment throughout the south, the redistribution of units and commanders within the new hierarchy, and the resulting shifts in influence within the military establishment. Several dimensions warrant consideration:

• The 40th Division occupies a distinctive position in southern Syria because of its composition and affiliations. It was formed primarily from residents of Daraa, who constitute its core, and is therefore rooted to a considerable extent in tribal networks and local ties. Some of its personnel previously belonged to Faylaq al-Sham, while approximately 1,475 new recruits joined after completing a preparatory training course.[9] This composition must be considered alongside the complex history of loyalties and relations between Daraa’s inhabitants and the former Syrian regime, particularly the security conditions that followed the Russian-brokered settlement agreements of 2018. That period brought instability, the proliferation of weapons, and organized crime, including kidnapping gangs, armed robbery at makeshift checkpoints, and drug-smuggling networks. It also witnessed the formation of factions, the incorporation of some into the former regime’s apparatus, and the withdrawal of some individuals into civilian life. Reorganizing these formations consequently raises the question of how to establish a unified military command while accounting for the circumstances in which units emerged and their local and inter-group relationships. This requires attention to the particular circumstances of each formation and region, through a gradual and systematic process proceeding “from the part to the whole.”[10]
• This was not the first such incident. Less than two months earlier, the 62nd Division, operating in Hama under Muhammad al-Jasim, known as “Abu Amsha,” was also dissolved. Al-Jasim had previously commanded the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division within the Syrian National Army, which was Turkish-backed at the time. Other decisions included removing Brigadier General Thaer Maaruf, the former commander of the Samarkand Brigade, from his command position in the 80th Division; relieving Brigadier General Mu’tasim Abbas, the former commander of the Mu’tasim Division, of command of one of its brigades; and removing Brigadier General Abd al-Nasser Abu Jalal, the former commander of the Ninth Division, from his command position in the 80th Division. Brigadier General Sayf al-Din Bulad, known as “Abu Bakr” and formerly commander of the Hamza Division, was also relieved of command of the 76th Division.[11] The interval between the two episodes suggests a gradual process designed to absorb and contain confrontational responses to the changes, thereby avoiding a direct confrontation with the formations’ personnel and potentially their commanders.
• In the case of the 40th Division, the changes also affected its commander, Brigadier General Bunyan al-Hariri, who was reassigned as deputy corps commander. This appointment can be understood in two ways. First, it represents an administrative promotion. Second, once the division had been dissolved, assigning its former commander to lead a smaller formation, such as a brigade, would have been inconsistent with his previous position. Appointing him deputy corps commander offered a way to retain him within the new military leadership without placing him in command of a smaller unit. A similar approach was taken with Abu Amsha and several other commanders. Although the circumstances differ, these cases support the hypothesis that restructuring may be intended to redefine former commanders’ positions and their relationships with their formations, rather than remove them entirely. Such an approach combines retaining commanders within the military establishment, withdrawing their direct authority over the bodies of personnel with whom they share established relationships, and assigning them more senior institutional positions that are less closely tied to local constituencies and their own military formations.[12]
• Integrating armed factions and addressing their legacy have remained among the principal challenges of Syria’s transitional period. The government has made some progress on this issue since the Victory Conference, at which the dissolution of the political, military, and civilian entities active during the revolution was announced. The current restructuring seeks to strengthen central state authority and curb factional and regional loyalties. It is intended to support the rebuilding of the army and security institutions and address shortcomings in the integration and consolidation process, particularly because some of the initial integration occurred rapidly through units that remained homogeneous in factional and regional terms.
• These measures constitute a strategic achievement for Syria’s military establishment and the state as a whole. They nevertheless carry substantial risks, particularly in the short and medium term. In Daraa, rapidly removing local commanders could weaken local cohesion, trust, and information networks. It could also affect the legitimacy of the authorities within the governorate and its relationship with the central authorities in Damascus, particularly the Ministry of Defense. This helps explain why protests were more pronounced in Daraa than in Hama. It also suggests that the dispute concerns who directs the unification process and how positions are allocated, rather than the principle of a unified army itself. Resentment among local residents over what they describe as “exclusion and marginalization” reinforces this concern, especially where individuals have been sidelined without a formal change in their positions. Such grievances could accumulate over time.
• Changes to commanders, personnel, and geographical deployments do not in themselves end factionalism or necessarily produce an entirely impartial and professional military institution. Factionalism may be reproduced within the institution even when units become geographically mixed. Meaningful progress therefore requires complementary efforts, particularly political education within the armed forces and the development of a new military doctrine oriented toward the conventional responsibilities of an army: safeguarding the state and protecting the population. This is necessarily a lengthy and complex undertaking, yet it supports the rebuilding and restructuring of military and security institutions following the fall of the former Syrian regime, particularly during the transitional period.
• Most of the changes have affected former faction commanders from outside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), including those who previously fought alongside it, particularly during Operation Deterrence of Aggression. Several leaks suggest that candidates for corps command—the upper tier of the new command structure—are drawn from HTS’s military elite. This raises questions about the restructuring’s capacity to create an inclusive military institution, particularly if the dismantling of factional structures in some formations is accompanied by a renewed concentration of influence within a particular core.
• Although the decision was internal and no direct connection has been established, it must also be considered in the context of the security agreement with Israel. Major Israeli demands concern the size and armament of the Syrian army and the extent of its deployment in the south, with the aim of establishing a security belt that would “address Israeli concerns” and “guarantee Israel freedom of movement.” Repeated daily Israeli incursions into Quneitra and western rural Daraa reflect this approach. These developments unfold amid the security challenges arising since October 7 and subsequent structural shifts in the regional security order, against the backdrop of the ongoing U.S.–Israeli–Iranian war and the possibility of its expansion.
• Jordan also figures in this context, particularly through shared concerns over border security and efforts to combat smuggling. The significance of military restructuring consequently extends to the future of security arrangements in southern Syria and their regional implications.

Rebuilding and re-establishing military and security institutions in the new Syria requires a transition from factional, regional, and tribal loyalties toward allegiance to the state. This involves more than changing personnel and reorganizing structures. It requires preventing the reproduction of power within a particular elite, dismantling the decentralized structures that emerged during the revolution, and developing a disciplined, professional national army capable of sustaining an effective internal balance and overcoming factionalism. The restructuring is understandable in light of the demands of the transitional period and the experiences of several Arab countries during comparable transitions. Its implementation nevertheless requires safeguards against exclusion, marginalization, and the concentration of authority within particular elites, alongside early attention to the social consequences and potential repercussions of these decisions.

Notes

[1] The five sectors are the coastal region, southern Syria, central Syria, western Syria, and northern and northeastern Syria.

[2] “Two Officers Reveal to Daraa 24 the Details of What Happened at Khirbet al-Shayyab Camp,” Daraa 24: Reality as It Is, September 30, 2026. https://bitly.cx/oFE8t

[3] According to a confidential source, all divisions were dissolved except the 90th Division, which functions as a de facto Republican Guard, and the Foreign Fighters Division.

[4] “In the Presence of the Foreign Minister, Mazloum Abdi Announces the Dissolution of the SDF and Its Full Integration into State Institutions,” SANA, August 25, 2026. https://sana.sy/photos/2562402/

[5] Nawwar Shaaban, “Syria in the New Era: The Process of Building the Military Establishment,” Arab Center for Contemporary Syrian Studies, last updated January 23, 2026. https://bitly.cx/BNiXA

[6] Jaysh al-Nasr, affiliated with the Free Syrian Army, is among the principal formations on which the 44th Division is based. It emerged from the merger of approximately fifteen military formations in 2015. The formation was based in rural Hama before relocating to the south and subsequently to Homs, where the division is now active. The division is distinguished by its experience in conventional warfare. The 70th Division was formed through the merger of four previously rival factions: the Syrian Free Army, which had operated from the U.S. base at al-Tanf, Jaysh al-Islam, Faylaq al-Rahman, and Faylaq al-Majd. Shaaban, “Syria in the New Era.”

[7] The 90th Division is regarded as a replacement for the Republican Guard. It includes personnel politically loyal to the new authorities and reports directly to the Ministry of Defense. Shaaban, “Syria in the New Era.”

[8] The 77th Division is one of the largest formations in the southern sector, after the 70th Division. It represents an extension of factions from Idlib following their redistribution and redeployment, particularly the National Liberation Front, and operates along the Lebanese–Syrian border. Shaaban, “Syria in the New Era.”

[9] Daraa 24, “Graduation of a New Cohort of Recruits from Daraa Governorate within the 40th Division,” post on Daraa 24’s Facebook page. https://bitly.cx/0kQIw

[10] Maen Talaa, “Security and Military Formation and Institution-Building Processes in Syria after the Fall of the Assad Regime: Context, Challenges, and the Future Agenda,” Politics and Society Journal, no. 3, “Syria in a New Era,” July 12, 2025. https://wp.me/pdSIuF-3mf

[11] Editorial Team, “Military Source to Ultra Syria: Sayf Bulad Relieved of Command and a New Position for Abu Amsha,” Ultra Syria, August 6, 2026. https://bitly.cx/NvPCd

[12] Interview with Mohsen al-Mustafa, researcher specializing in military and security affairs at the Omran