Iran’s Third Republic in the Making
In recent weeks, a series of brief remarks by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian have conveyed important signals about the nature of the unspoken disagreements within the structure of the Iranian political system. During a limited meeting with a group of intellectuals and elites, the president stressed the importance of preventing any single institution from monopolizing decision-making during this sensitive period. Shortly afterward, he openly criticized Iranian state television for its repeated attacks on the government, which is generally associated with the pragmatic or moderate camp.
This is not the first time that divisions have surfaced within Iran’s decision-making circles. Such differences became apparent when Pezeshkian pledged not to expand confrontation with neighboring countries while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was simultaneously conducting military and missile operations beyond Iran’s borders. Similar discrepancies have repeatedly emerged between the rhetoric of the president and his foreign minister on one side and that of senior IRGC commanders on the other. Even figures associated with the conservative and security establishment, such as Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, have at times appeared less capable of influencing major strategic decisions than the military-security apparatus.
These developments lead to a question frequently raised by political observers and scholars: do such differences reflect genuine disagreements within the Iranian system, or are they merely a distribution of roles among its various factions? The answer lies somewhere in between. The disagreements are real and substantive rather than cosmetic or orchestrated. They revolve around competing visions regarding foreign policy, negotiations with the United States, and the management of Iran’s mounting economic and social challenges. Yet these disagreements remain constrained by a clear red line: preserving the regime and ensuring its continuity. Consequently, what is unfolding is not an existential struggle, an internal schism, or an alignment of one faction with external actors against another. Rather, it is a competition among different visions and approaches within the Iranian political establishment itself, where political debates intersect with broader struggles among rival centers of power operating within the framework of the Islamic Republic.
In this context, the latest issue of *Foreign Affairs* devoted significant attention to Iran’s future and included several notable contributions. Among the most important was an article by Afshon Ostovar, “The Real War for Iran’s Future,” which argues that the post-Khamenei era may witness a structural transformation in the nature of the Iranian state, marked by a further shift of political power toward security and military institutions, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Several indicators support this scenario. The first is the gradual decline in the political influence of the traditional religious establishment compared to earlier periods. The second is the likelihood
that any future Supreme Leader, regardless of his personal background, will depend more heavily on military and security institutions to consolidate legitimacy and manage a potentially difficult transition. The third factor stems from the recent war itself, which enhanced the stature of the IRGC as the institution that assumed primary responsibility for managing direct confrontation with the United States and Israel.
From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that the Revolutionary Guards have sought to expand their role beyond military operations to include influence over negotiations, political decision-making, and the shaping of the official narrative surrounding the war and its outcomes. The struggle is no longer confined to managing the battlefield; it is increasingly about controlling the interpretation of the war and defining its political meaning. Yet the most important battle facing the Revolutionary Guards may not be taking place beyond Iran’s borders but within them. The military establishment understands that the day after the war could prove more complicated than the war itself.
At the same time, voices within Iranian society calling for greater political openness continue to grow louder. Many demand a relaxation of ideological controls over public life and argue that improving economic conditions and living standards should take precedence over costly regional engagements. These demands are no longer limited to traditional opposition groups; they extend to broader social sectors and even to some elites operating within the system itself.
Current trends suggest that the Revolutionary Guards are preparing early for this next phase, not merely as an ideological military institution but as the most organized actor capable of managing the coming transition. The challenge before them is not only to preserve the political order but also to shape its future direction amid mounting social and economic pressures.
The real struggle now taking shape in Iran is therefore not about the war that has already occurred. It is about who will possess the authority to define and shape the Iran that emerges after it. The central question is no longer how the war will end, but who will write the political script for the next chapter of the Islamic Republic. If the current trajectory continues, the answer may lie increasingly with the institutions that emerged strongest from the conflict itself, foremost among them the Revolutionary Guards. In that sense, what is unfolding today may well be the early formation of Iran’s third republic.