The New Map of the Middle East and Jordan’s Dilemma

In parallel with the ongoing war and the current phase of negotiations between the United States and Iran—and the debates and “day after” scenarios that follow—there are negotiations of no lesser importance and powerful dynamics taking shape in the region, but on a different front: the economic one. In particular, large-scale economic projects and the logistics networks they entail have become a focal point of global attention. Railways, transport sectors, and infrastructure projects—while appearing developmental and service-oriented—are inseparable from broader strategic and political visions for the region, especially when placed against the backdrop of a larger, underlying contest: the transition in the global order and the intensifying U.S.–China rivalry.

A few days ago, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates signed the Aqaba railway project. The plan involves building a 360-kilometer rail network linking phosphate and potash mines to the industrial port, through two main routes serving production sites in Al-Shidiya and Ghor Al-Safi. As envisioned by the Jordanian government, this project represents a cornerstone of an integrated national railway strategy aimed at connecting the Port of Aqaba to Syrian and Mediterranean ports.

At the same time, discussions and negotiations have begun between Turkey and Syria to build a railway network between the two countries, which could later extend to include Jordan and Saudi Arabia, enhancing regional logistics corridors. Parallel plans and negotiations involving other regional actors are also underway, alongside competing strategic visions. Perhaps the most prominent of these is the IMEC project, which seeks to connect the Middle East to Europe through large-scale infrastructure and is viewed as a competitor to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While IMEC is more focused on the Arab region, multiple sub-projects and alternative visions are also emerging—such as a Turkish–Syrian–Saudi–Jordanian framework—some following east–west axes, others north–south across the Middle East.

What is emerging, then, is a new regional configuration, with the economy—and particularly logistics and supply chains—at its core. This cannot be separated, as noted, from the transformation in the global system and the shift toward economic competition between the United States and China, along with the resulting realignments and restructuring of global alliances. From this perspective, one can also understand how China views these developments. As a well-informed Chinese political figure recently suggested to me, Beijing sees the wars pursued by U.S. President Donald Trump in places such as Venezuela and Iran, as well as his interest in Greenland, as part of a broader geoeconomic struggle with China. This outlook is reflected in U.S. policies toward NATO and Europe, which now finds itself at a crossroads—reassessing its relationship with Washington and redefining its own economic interests. Such shifts may ultimately reshape the very criteria of alliance, partnership, competition, and enmity among major powers.

Against this backdrop, the key question arises: where does Jordan stand, and how should it position itself? What framework should guide its strategic outlook for the coming regional phase? This leads us back to a more fundamental question: what will be Jordan’s regional role and standing amid these profound transformations?

Returning to the intersection of economic projects and political-strategic contexts, the debate extends to the relationship between some of these initiatives and the Abraham Accords, which are fundamentally grounded in the notion of “peace for prosperity.” This approach moves beyond a traditional political settlement of the Palestinian issue, instead reframing it as a matter of economic management and daily life within broader development schemes. Such a vision stands in clear tension with Jordan’s perspective on the Palestinian question and its own strategic interests. At the same time, however, there are infrastructure and economic projects that effectively integrate Israel into regional networks, raising critical questions about Jordan’s strategic choices, priorities, and trade-offs between political and economic considerations. In this context, alternative frameworks—such as a Turkish–Saudi–Jordanian–Syrian–Egyptian axis, sometimes referred to as the “Four Seas” project—may emerge as strategic and vital options encompassing political, economic, and security dimensions.