El Fasher Between Escalating Rapid Support and Attempts at International Truce

Since the outbreak of armed clashes in April 2023, Sudan has entered a phase of open conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, a conflict that has gone beyond a dispute between two military commands to reveal a deeper crisis related to the structure of the Sudanese state itself. The confrontation that began in Khartoum quickly spread to multiple regions, particularly Darfur and Kordofan, turning it into a multi-front war in which military calculations overlap with political divisions.

With UN experts describing[1] the ongoing violations in Darfur as amounting to genocide, the city of El Fasher has returned to the center of international debate. This development gives the situation political dimensions that go beyond the local context. With the escalation of military operations and the rising cost of displacement and civilian casualties, and growing fears about the repercussions of instability in the region, the El Fasher issue is now on the Security Council’s agenda. The Security Council is discussing a humanitarian truce[2] as an attempt to contain the repercussions and prevent the conflict from spreading, placing the conflict under increased international scrutiny.

El Fasher is located in the north of the Darfur region in western Sudan. It is the capital of North Darfur state and home to the headquarters of the Sudanese army’s Sixth Infantry Division[3], giving it direct military weight within the region. The city is also a crossroads for land routes connecting Darfur with Libya and Chad on one side and central Sudan on the other[4], making it a vital logistical hub for supplies, trade, and humanitarian work. International reports indicate that the Darfur region is witnessing extensive activity in the gold mining sector, which has become a source of war economy in recent years. In the current conflict, gold has shifted from being an economic resource to a direct means of financing military efforts, with both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces relying on its revenues to fund their operations. Reports indicate that gold production in areas controlled by the army generates approximately $150 million per month, while the Rapid Support Forces are estimated to have produced around 240 tons of gold between 2015 and 2022. However, more than 70% of production is believed to be smuggled out of the country through unofficial channels. Sudan also lost about 20% of its gold reserves at the Central Bank after its headquarters were stormed during the war, exacerbating currency market turmoil[5].

In this context, El Fasher’s importance stems not only from its administrative or military location, but also from the fact that it is a testing ground for the power relationship between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces. Control over supplies and population movements, and the ability to influence humanitarian access, means having real leverage in negotiations. Therefore, control over the city is not a meaningless symbolic goal, but rather a political card that translates into legitimacy on the ground. Whoever controls the ground has the ability to impose their political conditions, and whoever imposes their conditions comes closer to reshaping the state. Therefore, the ongoing escalation is linked to calculations related to the future distribution of power in Sudan and the position of each armed actor in the post-war arrangements. In this context, the article raises questions about the motives behind the escalation in El Fasher and how international truce efforts intersect with a conflict structure in which power is distributed among multiple actors within the state.

From a tool of the regime to an independent actor

Understanding these developments may require a return to the path that has been shaped since Omar al-Bashir came to power in 1989 through a military coup that overthrew the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi. During his years in power, the regime relied on arming local groups in Darfur known as the Janjaweed[6], before granting them official status in 2013 under the name Rapid Support Forces. These forces were attached to the National Intelligence and Security Service and commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti.” This arrangement created a multi-level security structure, in which the instruments of power were distributed between the army, the security services, and a paramilitary force with relatively independent leadership. Over time, a reality emerged in which security decision-making centers were distributed among more than one entity.

In 2011, Sudan lost its southern region after secession, depriving the country of about 75% of its oil reserves[7], which constituted a severe economic shock. The decline in revenues and the deterioration of financial resources led to the collapse of the local currency and high inflation, sparking growing popular anger against the government’s economic policies. This coincided with the issuance of an arrest warrant[8] by the International Criminal Court against Omar al-Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, which further exacerbated popular discontent and contributed to creating an environment conducive to widespread protests. This public anger culminated in the December 2018 revolution, when Sudanese people took to the streets in mass protests demanding the overthrow of the regime and comprehensive change in the structure of government.

The table provides an overview of energy in South Sudan in 2021.

At a time when the country was facing a deep economic crisis, the Rapid Support Forces emerged as a key player in Sudan after participating in the Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen starting in 2015. It is worth noting that they receive funding from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates[9] for fighting and securing the borders, which has provided them with enormous resources, reflecting on their political and military influence. This expansion of influence has been accompanied by an increased presence on the domestic scene, adding a new element to the power equation.

This confrontation did not arise suddenly. In areas suffering from state weakness, financial independence is measured by the ability to make political and security decisions outside the state system, not just by the ability of the armed actor to pay salaries or purchase equipment. With the accumulation of resources and the expansion of its margin of maneuver, the Rapid Support Forces’ relationship with official institutions gradually shifted: from a security arm operating within a specific power structure, to a negotiating partner, and then to a party vying for leadership itself. The fall of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 removed the ceiling that had kept the balance of power in check, and the rivalry moved out of the shadows and into the open

Here, it is useful to recall the approach of non-state armed actors. The Rapid Support Forces do not fit the classic model of a militia outside the state, nor that of a fully disciplined official institution; they are a hybrid actor: it relies on legal legitimacy when granted to it by Bashir in the past, but it builds its influence through resources and alliances that transcend the institutional structure. This type of actor aims not only to influence political decision-making, but also to possess the very tools of governance: land, the local economy, movement, and legitimate violence.

In the war that has been raging since 2023, when military confrontation erupted in Khartoum between the Sudanese army led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, before quickly spreading to other regions , especially Darfur and Kordofan, This was not a limited clash within the capital; it was a moment that revealed a deep flaw in the structure of power. Due to its geographical location linking the African coast, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea, Sudan[10] cannot afford a long vacuum in its centers of sovereignty without repercussions extending beyond its borders. Indeed, regional and international parties quickly entered the crisis, either through political positions or indirect roles, each according to its strategic calculations: the United Arab Emirates financially supported the Rapid Support Forces[11] to strengthen its influence in Darfur and link resource networks to military activity, Egypt provided partial diplomatic and military support to the Sudanese army[12] to ensure the security of its borders and regional corridors, while the United States focused on limiting the conflict’s impact on regional stability and security. In addition, neighboring countries such as Ethiopia had a direct impact on the borders and displacement routes.

El Fasher as an arena for the redistribution of sovereignty

In this context, El Fasher becomes more than a military front; control of vital roads and access points means control over supplies, population movement, and humanitarian access. This control produces effective authority that transcends formal recognition. Sovereignty, in its practical sense, is exercised not through political statements, but through the ability to organize space. When an armed force can determine who enters and exits, who receives supplies and who is denied them, it exercises a form of governance.

The rivalry in El Fasher reflects a struggle for the monopoly of sovereignty as the actual capacity to organize geographical space and control instruments of coercion. Control was distributed during 2024-2025, with the Sudanese army retaining about 60% of the country’s total area, concentrated in the east and north, where ports, international outlets, and institutions of official recognition are located, while the Rapid Support Forces control approximately 40% of the territory, particularly in Darfur and parts of Kordofan, areas linked to vital economic resources and supply routes[13].

In this sense, Sudan is divided not only into areas of influence, but also into two modes of exercising power: centralized formal sovereignty versus decentralized field sovereignty. The conflict in El Fasher embodies this division, as the city represents a point of contact between these two forms of control, with each side seeking to convert geographical influence into sustainable political legitimacy. Here, the gravity of the situation becomes clear: the collapse of the state does not begin with the loss of the capital, but with the loss of its ability to monopolize the organization of space and control the instruments of coercion.

The violence in El Fasher cannot be reduced to a side effect of the fighting in the context of the ongoing conflict. Violence becomes a means of reshaping the political environment, and forced displacement redistributes the population. This is clearly evident in the forced displacement of more than 9.5 million people internally[14] in Sudan since the beginning of the war. Darfur alone has borne a large share of this movement, with estimates suggesting that more than 800,000 people have been displaced from their areas in the region[15]. This redistributes the local balance of power, as communities that are emptied of their inhabitants lose their ability to exert political or military pressure. In this sense, demographic control becomes part of a strategy of domination.

Similarly, the collapse of public services not only creates a humanitarian crisis, but also produces a sovereign vacuum that is filled by armed actors. In El Fasher and throughout Darfur, the question is no longer who provides the service, but who allows access to it. Reports from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs indicate that more than 70% of health facilities in Darfur were out of service during periods of escalation in 2023–2024, while multiple aid convoys were delayed, blocked, or redirected. This breakdown has transformed food and medicine from a universal right into a resource subject to negotiation on the ground. In this context, armed actors act as “compulsory brokers” through two practical mechanisms: First, control of humanitarian corridors: dozens of convoys faced access restrictions in Darfur, and aid[16] only reached all target areas after field arrangements with locally dominant forces. Second, control of population movement: with more than 9.5 million people displaced, crossing points and displacement camps become spaces subject to those who control security in the region. Allowing people to leave, return, or access aid gives armed actors an indirect ability to shape patterns of loyalty or impose silence.

The social disintegration resulting from ongoing violations deepens this equation. Divided communities are less capable of producing a unified political discourse or organized resistance. Ethnic, tribal, or geographical divisions become lines of separation that are used to perpetuate control[17]. In this sense, civilians cannot be considered mere victims; rather, their presence and distribution become an element of the architecture of power.

The influence of regional powers on the dynamics of the conflict and possible options

The war in El Fasher has gone beyond the boundaries of internal conflict, with regional and international agendas[18] influencing the dynamics of the conflict. The ongoing conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces is taking place with the support and competition of regional powers seeking to consolidate their influence in East Africa, which is evident in several ways: Direct financial and logistical support for some armed actors, diplomatic pressure from regional parties to advance the truce, and attempts to influence the outcome of the conflict in a way that serves the interests of those parties. The UAE has also been accused of financing and sending mercenaries to serve objectives in the conflict, while countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia are leading efforts to achieve a balanced political solution motivated by the desire to maintain regional stability.

The conflict’s impact also extends to the Red Sea, which connects northeast Africa to global maritime corridors and is a vital artery for international trade, especially for oil and commodities. Any military escalation could disrupt the operation of the Port Sudan port[19] and increase security risks to commercial vessels, raising transportation costs and making the stability of maritime corridors a focus of attention for Gulf and regional powers. In this sense, regional intervention becomes linked not only to internal power balances, but also to the protection of strategic interests in the Red Sea and ensuring freedom of navigation.

In light of the complexity of local and regional interventions, three possible scenarios can be envisaged:

1. Partial military resolution with stabilization of the de facto division: The army and Rapid Support Forces continue to control specific areas, with lines of influence stabilized without completely ending the conflict.

2. A temporary truce with repositioning: Short-term ceasefire agreements allow each side to rearrange its forces and positions, but do not address the root causes of the power struggle or rebuild state institutions.

3. Deeper internationalization of the conflict: Direct regional and international interventions, whether through political pressure or military support, could transform the conflict from an internal dispute into a regional crisis, with the risk of spillover into the Red Sea and vital maritime corridors.

The truce between text and reality

Given this complexity, attempts at an international truce stand out as another test of the nature of the conflict[20], as they presuppose the existence of parties capable of controlling their fighters, committing to a ceasefire, and submitting to monitoring mechanisms. However, El Fasher reveals that it is the balance of power on the ground that determines the seriousness of any commitment. As long as control on the ground remains the source of effective legitimacy, commitment to a truce will continue to be linked to military calculations.

The problem lies not only in the absence of trust, but also in the multiplicity of decision-making centers. Armed actors with financial and military independence are not bound by a single central authority. This makes any agreement inherently fragile. In this case, the truce is not understood as a step towards a comprehensive settlement, but rather as a tool for repositioning, with each party measuring its usefulness in terms of the opportunity it provides to rearrange its cards.

Hence, the international bet on a truce without addressing the root causes of the imbalance of power becomes a bet with limited results. The humanitarian track cannot be separated from the political track. As long as El Fasher remains an arena for the redistribution of sovereignty, any temporary ceasefire will not change the essence of the conflict.

In conclusion, what El Fasher ultimately reveals is a deeper crisis concerning the nature of the Sudanese state. Will the state remain a central framework that monopolizes the tools of violence and organization, or will it become an arena of competition between actors, each of whom possesses a part of sovereignty? This question does not concern Darfur alone, but rather the future of the political system as a whole.

The Rapid Support Forces represent a model of an actor that has managed to transform its position from a security tool to an independent center of power. This transformation did not happen suddenly, but rather through the accumulation of resources, the expansion of networks, and the exploitation of moments of political vacuum. In the absence of comprehensive institutional rebuilding, this model will remain reproducible, either in its current form or in other forms.

What is happening in El Fasher is not just a battle for a city; it is a test of Sudan’s ability to be a unifying state with centralized power and sovereignty, where the tools of governance are no longer limited to official institutions but are linked to control over land, resources, and population movement. Every armed actor who possesses a part of this control can impose their conditions on reality, making any agreement or truce impossible unless the roots of this multiplicity of centers of power are addressed, lest the separation turn into an east and west Sudan.

Where El Fasher shows that the survival of the state depends not only on who wins militarily, but also on who can transform their influence on the ground into sustainable political legitimacy. Therefore, any settlement without rebuilding state institutions and redistributing power in a balanced manner will be temporary, and any truce will remain merely a pause in an unresolved conflict, posing a major challenge to the future of Sudan as a whole.

1. Sudan Tribune, “UN Official: Darfur Fashir Events a ‘Horrific Disaster’ and Our Duty is to Hold Responsible Parties Accountable,” Sudan Tribune, February 9, 2026, See: https://sudantribune.net/article/310474.
2. United Nations – UN Office at Geneva, “Sudan – Security Council Members Concerned About Ongoing Violence and Call for Ceasefire,” United Nations – UN Office at Geneva, February 27, 2026, See: https://www.ungeneva.org/ar/news-media/news/2026/02/116187/alswdan-ada-mjls-alamn-qlqwn-aza-astmrar-alnf-wydwn-aly-wqf-alqtal.
3. Mehr News Agency, “Why is Darfur, Fashir Strategically Important in W Sudan?” Mehr News Agency, November 3, 2025, See: https://en.mehrnews.com/news/238376/Why-does-Darfur-Fashir-have-strategic-importance-in-W-Sudan?
4. Al Jazeera Net, “Janjaweed,” Al Jazeera Net Encyclopedia, February 16, 2014, See: https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/2014/2/16/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF.
5. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Sudan – International Energy Analysis,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Last Updated, See: https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/SDN.
6. International Criminal Court (ICC), “Darfur, Sudan,” International Criminal Court, See: https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur.
7. Al Jazeera Net, “Rapid Support Forces in Sudan,” Al Jazeera Net Encyclopedia, May 15, 2023, See: https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/2023/5/15/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86.
8. International Crisis Group, “Sudan,” International Crisis Group (Africa / Horn of Africa), See: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan?utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.
9. EFE News Agency, “Sudan Cuts Diplomatic Ties with UAE, Declares it an Aggressor State,” EFE, May 6, 2025, See: https://efe.com/en/latest-news/2025-05-06/sudan-cuts-diplomatic-ties-uaw-aggressor-state/
10. Middle East Military Forum, “Breaking: Egypt Officially Recognizes Support to Sudanese Army Against RSF Militias,” MEMilitary.com, January 11, 2025,
11. European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), “Map: Areas of Control and Influence in Sudan,” Country Guidance – Sudan, Updated June 2025, See: https://www.euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-sudan/21-map-areas-control-and-influence.
12. Al Jazeera Net, “By the Numbers… Millions of Sudanese Between Hunger, Displacement, and Violence Amid War,” Al Jazeera Net, December 17, 2025, See: https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2025/12/17/%D8%A3%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%B6%D8%A9.
13. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Sudan – OCHA Sudan,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, See: https://www.unocha.org/sudan.
14. allAfrica, “UN Security Council Holds Closed Consultations on Sudan,” allAfrica.com, February 9, 2026, See: https://www.allafrica.com/stories/202602100011.html.
15. Reuters, “Sudanese Nomads Trapped as War Fuels Banditry and Ethnic Splits,” Reuters, February 9, 2026, See: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-nomads-trapped-war-fuels-banditry-ethnic-splits-2026-02-09/.
16. Al Jazeera Net, “Sudan… Foreign Intervention Warns of Prolonging the War,” Al Jazeera Net, March 29, 2024, See: https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2024/3/29/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B0%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%A5%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
17. EFE News Agency, “Sudan Cuts Diplomatic Ties with UAE, Declares it an Aggressor State,” EFE, May 6, 2025, See: https://efe.com/en/latest-news/2025-05-06/sudan-cuts-diplomatic-ties-uaw-aggressor-state/.
18. EFE News Agency, “Sudan Cuts Diplomatic Ties with UAE, Declares it an Aggressor State,” EFE, May 6, 2025, See: https://efe.com/en/latest-news/2025-05-06/sudan-cuts-diplomatic-ties-uaw-aggressor-state/.

19. Anews, “UN Security Council Condemns Violence in Sudan, Calls for Immediate Ceasefire,” Anews, February 25, 2026, See: https://www.anews.com.tr/world/2026/02/25/un-security-council-condemns-violence-in-sudan-calls-for-immediate-ceasefire