What did Trump Just Do to the Muslim Brotherhood?

On 24 November 2025, United States President Donald Trump issued an executive order that took a half-step that three decades of precedent suggested was based on inaccurate information and analysis.  The order claimed that it “sets in motion  a process by which certain chapters or other subdivisions of the Muslim Brotherhood shall be considered for designation as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”  

None of Trump’s predecessors had bowed to pressure to declare the Brotherhood a terrorist organization for a host of reasons, which Trump’s order sidesteps rather than contradicts.  But the new measure still makes significant departures with repercussions in the Arab world and the United States.

Rejecting Designating the Brotherhood in the Past 

While there certainly are organizations in many countries inspired by the “Society of Muslim Brothers” founded in Egypt in 1928, they are not chapters of a single organization nor formally linked in any but the loosest way; some organizations with roots in the Brotherhood have supported pro-American regimes in Iraq, Jordan, and Israel; almost none have targeted Americans; and only a few have engaged in actions that can be classified as “terrorism” by inflicting violence on civilians for political objectives (and some of those that have done so have repudiated the choice later). It is absolutely true that Hamas has roots in the Brotherhood and has targeted Israeli civilians since its inception; it is also true that a branch of the Israeli “Islamic Movement” also has roots in the Brotherhood—and lent its vote in support of a coalition of centrist and right-wing Israeli parties.

The process of designating a body as a “foreign terrorist organization” is certainly political and politicized but it is also very legal and bureaucratic in the United States.  And indeed, after laborious processes that involved multiple agencies across the government reviewing the matter, no previous United States president has ever found the Brotherhood to be a terrorist organization.  Trump’s predecessors have rejected pressure from regional governments in the Arab world (who seem to be motivated more by the political strength of an oppositional movement more than the threat of violence against civilians); they have ignored outlandish conspiracy theories about Brotherhood infiltration of the United States government and even of the presidency.

What Is New In Trump’s Order?

It must be noted that Trump’s executive order does not actually overturn much of that reasoning.  It “sets in motion” a process by which leading government officials are to report within thirty days about designating “Muslim Brotherhood chapters or other subdivisions, including those in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, as foreign terrorist organizations.”  How does that differ from past presidential actions?

First—and perhaps most important—it is clearly (though not explicitly) based on a bypassing the set of legal and bureaucratic measures with a quickly political one.  Having gutted or cowed into silence the bureaucracies and bodies of expertise that might question any classification, senior Trump officials will likely make their decisions based on their personal inclinations or ambitions to please their leader or their political bases.

And that is the second shift: the cumbersome bureaucratic process is being set aside (again implicitly but clearly) in an atmosphere in which leading politicians—such as both senators from Texas—show that they find political benefit in attacking many things or people associated with Islam.  Without a trace of irony, they often do so in the name of religious freedom.  Senator John Cornyn infamously declared in April 2025 that “religious discrimination and Sharia law have no home in Texas” as if preventing Muslims—and Muslims alone–from living in accordance with their understanding of their religion is not itself discriminatory.  For many years, fear-mongering politicians have sought to accomplish to overturn the expert bureaucratic process by drafting new laws that were aimed specifically against the Brotherhood. Now they no longer have to (though Texas’s other Senator, Ted Cruz, has said he will still try to “lock” designation into law). In fact, while Trump’s followers are now divided between those who support the Israeli right and those who wish to distance themselves from Israel, both camps can unite against the Muslim communal and political organizations.

But there is third difference that is also implicit but clear: the executive order is based not on a domestic legal process but on an international political order alongside the domestic one.  A decade ago there was strong pressure from regional governments that took harsh measures against their own Brotherhood-like organizations.  The Trump move cites Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Palestinian organizations as if they are “chapters” or “subdivisions” of the Brotherhood and aligns the United States with a variety of actors that portray the Brotherhood as part of a global threat.

Potential Repercussions

But if the Trump order simply targets organizations that have already been targeted, sometimes quite harshly, will the Executive Order have any real effect? Does it simply move against organizations that have already been banned or suppressed?

There are three ways in which Trump’s move could have quite significant impact. First, it may place the financial and intelligence resources of the United States at the disposal of governments seeking new tools against their Islamist opponents.

Second, it might encourage new moves by governments that have not yet suppressed their own domestic movements. Indeed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (likely concerned only the Israeli Islamic Movement’s vote share) has already made clear he sees the Trump move as an opportunity to tackle a possible threat to his majority in a future Knesset.

Finally, the many asylum seekers and emigres in the United States with some kind of Brotherhood background may find government officials and courts much more hostile; indeed, officials in other countries may also be swayed by the American move when they hear a refugee from a country express fear of repatriation. 

The wording of the executive order does not require any of these moves—but it will make them difficult to resist. And indeed, it is a clear message to the bureaucracy not to resist them at all.