Between Annexation and A Declaration of Statehood: A Historic Palestinian-Jordanian Turning Point

Israel is pursuing a policy of creeping annexation, turning the West Bank from a deferred arena of conflict into a settled reality on the ground

This paper addresses multiple dimensions of the current developments in the West Bank amid the war on Gaza and the policies of the far-right Israeli government. From the Israeli perspective, it has become clear that the American political front and the “Christian” Israeli right are operating in near-complete harmony. Official positions in Washington (represented by ambassadors and ministers) have called for the adoption of a rigid religious narrative similar to that of the Israeli extremists. Israeli officials have signaled that they will not adhere to traditional peace institutions: starting with their declaration of unwillingness to accept a Palestinian state or unity between the West Bank and Gaza, and extending to severing relations with all Palestinian frameworks, while focusing on strengthening field control through settlement expansion and the practical imposition of sovereignty on the ground.

In the West Bank, there has been an acceleration in settlement construction: in just a few years, areas exceeding what has been built since 1967 have been established, with detailed data indicating the growing extent of Israeli control in the West Bank. Settlement construction has reached historic levels: in 2024, the construction of 28,872 new settlement units was approved (18,988 of them in East Jerusalem alone).¹ By the end of the same year, the number of settlers had reached approximately 737,000 (503,732 in the West Bank and 233,600 in East Jerusalem),² far surpassing any Palestinian population in the same areas.

As for the undeclared aspects, they lie in the ongoing groundwork for gradually imposing de facto sovereignty. The measures of “silent sovereignty,” while falling short of formal annexation, create a fait accompli in which the occupation shifts from managing the conflict in the West Bank (the Oslo era) to decisively resolving it in its favor. Actual annexation leaves the Palestinian Authority with two bitter choices: to continue security coordination and lose what remains of popular legitimacy, or to sever coordination and create a security vacuum that could trigger broader local violence.

Israel has also imposed “full sovereignty,” with every village and its surroundings encircled by settlements and military road networks, while implementing measures (confiscation of water and land, withholding workers’ salaries, and security crackdowns) aimed at starving the Palestinian population and weakening the Palestinian Authority. Israel pursues a strategy of “creeping annexation” through land and water confiscation, the demolition of farms, the destruction of Bedouin communities, and the closure of villages under security pretexts. Settlement-related violence has reached unprecedented levels, with 1,420 recorded attacks in 2024, resulting in the displacement or forced evacuation of approximately 47 Palestinian communities since October 2023.

On the internal Palestinian front, there has been a sharp decline in services and welfare indicators: the West Bank has witnessed an “accelerated economic collapse,” with unemployment rising to nearly 35%,³ and enrollment in higher education dropping to its lowest levels in decades as people focus on securing their livelihoods. Despite political expansions (committees for the constitution, preparations for national council elections, and new party law projects), Palestinian activism appears constrained by the limitations of the existing authority.

In the security and settlement sphere in the West Bank, alarming field realities have emerged. Israeli leaders openly speak of their rejection of a Palestinian state. Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that projects such as the E-1 settlement fulfill a promise “that there will be no Palestinian state.” Meanwhile, Minister Smotrich proposed a plan to annex 82% of the West Bank while leaving isolated Palestinian enclaves,⁴ based on the principle of “maximum land with minimum population.” These trends are wrapped in religious and nationalist ideology and are practically implemented by integrating settlements, roads, and military zones into a single system that excludes Palestinians from any decision-making.

Israel has also reinforced its security and military presence by deploying battalions and military roads throughout the West Bank, while expanding the reach of settlers and their hostile activities to become “routine,” sweeping through hundreds of villages with government backing. This coincided with a systematic economic and political pressure campaign targeting Bedouins and residents (pursuit of shepherds, confiscation of water and agricultural land, preventing Palestinians from working in Israel, and withholding the Palestinian Authority’s funds). These security-settlement measures have been integrated with Israeli policies aimed at suffocating Palestinian resilience and compelling them to accept decisive transformations on the ground.

The Jordanian Axis (Position, Threat Sources, Options)

Jordan views the stability of the West Bank and the rights of Palestinians as an inseparable part of its national security

These developments pose multiple and interconnected threats to Jordan. The kingdom observes the developments in the West Bank with grave concern, given the existential, both political and demographic, risks they pose. In the event of annexation of the Jordan Valley (or the entire West Bank), the Palestinian Authority would collapse along with the current political order, potentially undermining the Jordanian peace treaty amid a large influx of new populations into Jordan (which could trigger the treaty’s nullification in the case of “forced displacement” by any party). The 1994 Wadi Araba Treaty was founded on the stability of the West Bank and the presence of a Palestinian partner. Jordan’s security doctrine considers the stability of the West Bank and Palestinian rights as an “inseparable” part of national security; therefore, annexation is viewed as a strategic threat.

Additional security risks also arise: the collapse of the Palestinian Authority or the outbreak of a new intifada could lead to the spread of chaos across the border. Although Jordanian security forces have the capacity to maintain order domestically, scenarios include the possibility of refugee influxes, armed infiltration attempts, or escalating internal political pressures.

On the other hand, decision-makers in Amman believe that any potential annexation of the West Bank would revive old assumptions that “Jordan is Palestine,” a notion that Jordan firmly rejects. The demographic factor alone, as highlighted in the Quincy security report,⁵ signals a potential crisis if millions of Palestinians (whether Jordanian passport holders or refugees) were to flow into the kingdom.

In this context, experts and analysts consider the Palestinian issue to be intrinsically linked to Jordan’s national security. Jordan hosts approximately 2.5 million registered Palestinians⁶ and shares important resources with the West Bank (water, energy infrastructure) that could be targeted in any preparatory steps toward annexing the Jordan Valley.

The sources of threats to Jordan can be analyzed as follows:

• Potential demographic pressures: This is an emergent threat. Some reports indicate that Palestinians abroad are purchasing property in Jordan in anticipation of possible displacement scenarios.
• Economic pressures: Analysts have noted that Jordan’s financial situation and relative fragility limit its capacity to bear additional burdens. Any escalation in the West Bank would impose extra costs on Jordan (refugees, aid, unemployment, infrastructure strain), weakening the state’s ability to cope with existing economic crises (water, energy, debt).
• Political and diplomatic pressures: Jordan is working to expand its political agenda beyond the Palestinian issue, but international alliances remain unstable. While Jordan’s current position in international forums regarding Gaza and the Palestinian stance is strong, this does not imply military support. On the contrary, Jordan lacks “capable” allies able to effectively counter this Israeli threat.
• Collapse of the Palestinian Authority/security vacuum: Weakening or collapse of the PA under annexation pressure or loss of popular legitimacy could create a security vacuum in the West Bank, which could be filled by armed factions or uncontrolled militias, directly transferring the confrontation to Jordan’s borders. Jordan would then be forced to intervene or face the consequences of security breakdown.
• Rising influence of non-state actors (Hamas, Palestinian Jihad, Iran-backed regional factions): Any expansion of Hamas or involvement of regional actors in the West Bank would complicate the security situation, placing Jordan under dual pressure: popular pressure demanding support for the resistance, and international pressure requiring restraint. The result would be a dual threat to Jordan’s internal security, manifested in protests or security breaches.
• Exposure of the Wadi Araba Treaty and international pressure: Continued Israeli annexation weakens the treaty’s value in the eyes of the Jordanian public, forcing Jordan into difficult choices: either internal confrontation with its population or external confrontation with Western partners if it considers suspending the treaty. This is a political-diplomatic threat that could escalate into an internal threat if used as a tool of popular pressure.

In short, annexation would completely upend Jordan’s strategic calculations and threaten the peace treaty itself.

Israeli Strategic Behavior

Israeli policy is no longer negotiable; it has become a project to entrench the status quo through a rigid religious and nationalist ideology

Israeli policy reflects a mix of ideology and pragmatic calculations. Current leaders, even the secular ones, speak of the “historic Land of Israel” as an indivisible entity. In 2025, Netanyahu stated that he feels he is on a “historic and spiritual mission,” affirming his vision of a “Greater Israel.”

This approach is supported by right-wing coalitions within the Knesset and ties with American evangelical movements, especially with Trump’s return to the White House and the accompanying U.S. leniency toward settlement activity. In practice, Israel has shifted its focus toward consolidating the “fait accompli” on the ground rather than any negotiated path, entrenching a “one-state solution” mindset from the Israeli perspective.

Israel’s escalation policy in the West Bank is based on four main strategic motivations:

1. Security considerations after the October 7 attack: In the aftermath of Hamas’s 2023 attack, Israel seeks to prevent the opening of a second front in the West Bank. Although these measures are officially framed in Israeli discourse as part of a “preventive counterterrorism” strategy, the scale of force employed weakens the Palestinian Authority and fosters environments of extremism, an equation that raises serious concerns in Jordan.
2. Ideological agenda of the far-right: The current Israeli government includes far-right figures who adopt an ideological vision of imposing full Jewish sovereignty over the West Bank, such as Ben Gvir. These policies are implemented without regard for Jordanian interests and revive dangerous narratives, such as “Jordan is Palestine,” which Jordan strongly rejects.
3. Domestic political survival: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu relies on the support of his far-right coalition partners to remain in power. For this reason, he allows the implementation of extreme policies, particularly following security incidents, to secure internal political cover.
4. Sense of impunity regionally and internationally: Israel acts on the belief that it enjoys broad maneuvering room without significant consequences, due to the decline of traditional Arab involvement in the Palestinian issue and continued U.S. support, regardless of some rhetorical criticisms.

From a security perspective, Israeli motivations can be interpreted as follows:

• Strategic security/geographical depth: Security experts estimate that control over the Jordan Valley provides Israel with strategic observation and control points (highlands and corridors) that reduce its exposure to future land-based threats. This is a traditional justification adopted by military and security circles. (Realist perspective: the state seeks to maximize its security through spatial control.)
• Domestic pressure/local politics: Internal Israeli alliances tend toward nationalist-religious parties that push for territorial annexation as a political achievement and to build an electoral base. Multiple analyses have noted an intensification of annexation rhetoric after 2023, linked to internal political shifts.
• Control over resources and borders: The Jordan Valley possesses significant water and agricultural resources; annexation allows Israel to manage these resources in ways that serve its demographic policies, reducing Palestinians’ ability to remain in sensitive areas. European Union reports have observed an acceleration in administrative power transfers and settlement expansion during 2024.

The ruling Zionist circles (and their American evangelical supporters) now openly assert that the Promised Land extends beyond the West Bank. Israeli political leaders justify this political direction with a “salvational” view of doctrine; the present-day religious Zionist right conflates nationalism and religion, seeing its opponents as “victims” rather than partners, producing a rigid ideology that does not tolerate the other. This ideological environment appears to have allowed the export of extremist thought to American circles as well. Analysts have cited statements by U.S. officials, ambassadors, and journalists reflecting a determination to erase any mention of the Palestinian issue. One remarked that Washington insists on “restructuring Palestinian curricula and eliminating everything related to Palestinian rights, including the Nakba, memory, and history,” echoing the same narrative promoted by Israel’s far-right.

Within this ideological framework, the status of cabinet leaders (Naftali Bennett, Ayelet Shaked, Ben Gvir) and their allies has been strengthened, so that a majority of Israelis are prepared to accept harsh measures. Opinion polls indicate broad public support for policies targeting Gaza; for example, Dabbagh cited a survey at the Hebrew University showing that 64% of Israelis believe “there are no innocents in ⁷Gaza,” and 52% support the “population transfer” of the Strip.

Future Scenarios and Expected Responses

• Scenario 1: Continued Gradual Annexation
  Israel is likely to continue pursuing a phased de facto annexation policy, imposing its administrative control over specific areas in the Jordan Valley and parts of Area C through government decisions and gradual field measures. This path would be accompanied by settlement expansion, enhanced military protection, and the gradual transfer of civil authorities to Israeli control. In this scenario, the international community usually limits itself to statements of condemnation or symbolic positions, without imposing deterrent sanctions.

Impacts: For Jordan, this scenario could produce a gradual but continuous refugee pressure, alongside rising internal tensions and popular demands to sever relations with Israel. For Palestine, the Palestinian Authority’s capacity to manage Area C would decline, with escalating popular resistance and sporadic operations.

Practical Responses: Jordan would activate emergency reception plans and launch diplomatic campaigns with the European Union, potentially using limited economic tools for pressure. Palestine might gradually reduce security coordination while linking it to international moves, while enhancing civil resistance initiatives and pursuing international legal claims.

• Scenario 2: International Containment and Freezing the Annexation Process
  European and international pressures may succeed in raising the cost of annexation for Israel through economic and legal measures, such as banning settlement products or imposing restrictions on academic and technological cooperation. These steps could freeze the annexation process and turn it into a low-intensity political conflict rather than imposing new realities on the ground.

Impacts: For Jordan, this scenario provides greater diplomatic space and strengthens its role as a regional mediator. For Palestine, it offers an opportunity to regain part of its political legitimacy and revive limited negotiation channels.

Practical Responses: Jordan would lead Arab–European coordination to expand the scope of targeted sanctions and work to ensure international oversight of Israeli measures. Palestine would use the freeze to advance international recognition demands and push forward its legal claims.

• Scenario 3: Security Deadlock and Internal Explosion
  This scenario envisions rapid or successive unilateral Israeli actions leading to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority’s ability to manage large areas, resulting in a security vacuum in which popular resistance transforms into organized armed operations, partially supported by regional actors.

Impacts: For Jordan, this could trigger large waves of refugees that threaten internal stability and strain infrastructure and security capacities. For Palestine, it would enter a cycle of violence and political fragmentation, losing opportunities to build an organized state.

Practical Responses: Jordan would activate nationwide emergency plans, seek urgent international support, and strengthen border security with strict entry controls. Palestine would declare a national state of emergency and convene its leadership bodies to respond to the collapse and organize resistance to prevent escalation into an open regional conflict.

• Scenario 4: Gradual Regional Political Solution
  This scenario is based on the possibility of reaching a regional–international understanding that freezes annexation in exchange for security guarantees for Israel and economic incentives for the West Bank. This could take the form of joint development projects with Jordan and international funding, leading to a relative improvement in the civilian conditions of Palestinians within a temporary framework.

Impacts: For Jordan, this scenario allows the maintenance of internal stability, opens new economic opportunities, and strengthens its regional role. For Palestine, it provides an opportunity to keep the prospect of statehood alive, even temporarily, with a need for international guarantees regarding its civil authorities.

Practical Responses: Jordan would leverage its position to launch a diplomatic and economic initiative ensuring that no forced demographic changes occur, while advocating for international oversight mechanisms. Palestine would engage cautiously with the arrangements to strengthen the legitimacy of its institutions and create broader political space.

Early Warning Indicators

• New Israeli legislation concerning land, serving as an indicator of changing sovereignty.
• Increased frequency of forced evictions or demolition orders in the Jordan Valley, signaling early waves of displacement.
• European parliamentary decisions or legal initiatives targeting settlements, indicating the potential shift toward international containment.
• Sudden escalation in armed attacks within the West Bank, signaling the possibility of a security explosion.
• High-level consultations between Jordan and Israel regarding guarantees or economic packages, indicating the potential launch of a regional settlement track.

Strategic Recommendations

I. Recommendations for the Palestinian Front

• Rebuilding national unity: A top priority is ending the political division that weakens the Palestinian position vis-à-vis Israel and the international community. This requires a comprehensive national dialogue leading to general elections (legislative, presidential, and national) to restore institutional legitimacy. This process should be accompanied by a new political charter clearly defining the objectives of the national movement and linking them to the right of self-determination within a balanced negotiation–resistance strategy.
• Strengthening official institutions and civil society: The Palestinian Authority needs fundamental reforms, including anti-corruption measures, bureaucratic capacity development, and transparency in resource management. Additionally, civil society institutions, unions, and the private sector should be revitalized as pillars of social stability and resilience, while providing space for independent media and universities to enhance internal cohesion.
• Restructuring security coordination: Rather than maintaining security coordination as a tool to sustain the status quo, it can be restructured to be conditional and time-limited, automatically pausing in the event of a significant Israeli violation or a step toward annexation. In parallel, alternatives should be developed in collaboration with the United Nations and donor agencies to secure essential services and prevent institutional collapse.

II. Recommendations for the Jordanian Front

• Upholding custodianship and regional role: Jordan should link the continuation of the peace treaty and cooperation with Israel to respect for the Hashemite custodianship of the holy sites and the rejection of any formal annexation. This role adds a legal and moral dimension to Jordan’s position and makes it an indispensable actor in any future equation.
• Strengthening regional alliances: Jordan should build a network of understandings with Egypt, Iraq, and the Gulf states, tying the path of Arab normalization with Israel to the extent that Israel respects its legal obligations and halts annexation. Jordan could propose a joint Arab–European initiative to monitor developments on the ground and apply graduated political and economic pressures.
• Securing the domestic front: Internally, a national narrative should be formulated to unite Jordanians around the view that stability in the West Bank is part of Jordan’s national security. A comprehensive communication campaign (political, media, educational) is needed to explain that confronting annexation is not just a matter of external solidarity but a prerequisite for protecting Jordan’s own stability and demographics.
• Risk and scenario management: Security agencies and relevant ministries should develop simulation plans for various scenarios, ranging from limited displacement to a full collapse of the Palestinian Authority. This includes strengthening civil defense, preparing emergency camps, drafting alternative economic plans, and coordinating with international partners to fund humanitarian responses.

III. International-Level Recommendations

• Maximizing legal and diplomatic pressure: Settlement activity and annexation should be redefined as international crimes, with cases pursued before the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. Jordan and Palestine should push for new UN resolutions and escalate diplomatic campaigns exposing the illegal nature of settlement expansion.
• Building pressure alliances with Europe: The European Union possesses economic and legal tools that can raise the cost of annexation for Israel (e.g., banning settlement products, restricting academic and technological cooperation, imposing targeted sanctions on companies supporting settlements). These measures should be transformed from symbolic initiatives into a coherent policy that freezes annexation and prevents its consolidation.
• Mobilizing international public opinion: Through media campaigns, academic conferences, and legal forums, Jordan and the Palestinians can craft a counter-narrative framing Israel as violating international law, while restoring recognition of the two-state solution as the only internationally legitimate option.

IV. Joint Jordanian–Palestinian Coordination Mechanisms

• Joint Intelligence Operations Center: Under international supervision, a Jordanian–Palestinian information center could be established to exchange SIGINT and OSINT intelligence on settlement activities and military movements, aiming to anticipate and respond early to potential waves of displacement.⁸
• Regional Emergency Authority: Comprising Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority, with international observers, to coordinate humanitarian and security responses in the event of any on-the-ground collapse.
• Early Warning Platform: To monitor new Israeli legislation, forced evictions, military movements, and European decisions, enabling proactive decision-making at both the Jordanian and Palestinian fronts.

V. Long-Term Strategic Dimensions

• Redefining resilience: Instead of viewing resilience as a temporary humanitarian condition, it should be transformed into a long-term political–economic project through investment in Palestinian education, technology, and infrastructure, supported by regional and international funding.
• Balancing realism and legitimacy: Jordan must balance its international commitments and Western alliances on one hand, with domestic legitimacy and its Palestinian depth on the other. The optimal approach is to act as a “political–legal–economic supporter of Palestinian resilience” while maintaining discreet security channels to prevent escalation into direct confrontation.

Potential annexation is not an event that can be ignored or managed unilaterally. The most realistic and effective strategy for Jordanian and Palestinian decision-makers lies in a balanced mix of maintaining internal security, pursuing international diplomatic and legal action to raise the cost for Israel, and building credible regional alliances. The current situation requires immediate and coordinated action; opportunities to limit annexation or mitigate its effects depend on increasing the political and diplomatic costs of Israeli actions, alongside a carefully planned security readiness to minimize potential humanitarian disasters.

1. European External Action Service. Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied West Bank, Including East Jerusalem: Reporting Period – January–December 2024. August 14, 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/report-israeli-settlements-occupied-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem-reporting-period-january_en ↩︎
2. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). State of Palestine: Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan. March 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session58/a-hrc-58-73-infographic-march2025.pdf ↩︎
3. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). Press Release: Economic Forecast 2024. 2024. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_EconomicForecast2024E.pdf ↩︎
4. For more: Settlement & Annexation Report: September 12, 2025 https://fmep.org/resource/settlement-annexation-report-september-12-2025/ ↩︎
5. For more: Jordan on the Edge: Pressures from the War in Gaza and the Incoming Trump Administration https://quincyinst.org/research/jordan-on-the-edge-pressures-from-the-war-in-gaza-and-the-incoming-trump-administration/ ↩︎
6. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Jordan. Accessed September 14, 2025. https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan ↩︎
7. Abdel Raouf Arnaout and Mohammad Sio. “64% of Israelis Believe There Are ‘No Innocents’ in Gaza: Poll. Survey by Hebrew University Center Shows Growing Extremism in Israeli Society.” Anadolu Agency, June 11, 2025. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/64-of-israelis-believe-there-are-no-innocents-in-gaza-poll/3594355 ↩︎
8. SIGINT = Signals Intelligence, OSINT = Open-Source Intelligence ↩︎