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Analytical Paper

The Turkish Perspective on the U.S.–Israeli–Iranian War:

A Comprehensive Critical

**Analysis of the Turkish National Intelligence Academy's Report from a Jordanian
Perspective.**



Introduction

In May 2026, the Turkish National Intelligence Academy (Millî İstihbarat Akademisi)-a Turkish research institution directly affiliated with Türkiye's National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and headed by Professor Talha Köse-published a report entitled "The U.S.–Israeli–Iranian War from Military and Geopolitical Perspectives and Türkiye." This report builds upon an earlier study issued by the Academy in August 2025 on the "Twelve-Day War," revealing a consistent analytical framework adopted by Turkish intelligence institutions in addressing the Iranian–Israeli file.

Rather than treating successive confrontations as isolated crises, the Academy interprets them as interconnected stages within a single, evolving trajectory of strategic escalation.

The significance of this report, irrespective of the accuracy of every operational detail it contains, lies in the fact that it represents a semi-official voice of Türkiye's intelligence establishment rather than that of an independent academic or media institution. Its interpretation, therefore, should not be confined to its descriptive content; it should also extend to what the report reveals about Ankara's priorities and concerns, as well as the image Türkiye seeks to project both domestically and to regional actors.

This expanded version of the paper pursues four complementary objectives: to summarize the broader Turkish perspective as reflected throughout the report; to provide a detailed review of the report's three chapters and their various subsections; to offer an in-depth analysis of its principal arguments and findings; and to develop an independent Jordanian reading that places Jordan's national interest at the center of the assessment.

Before turning to the details, it is important to note that the Turkish report is based on a narrative of a war that began on 28 February 2026 and lasted for approximately forty days. According to the report, the conflict involved direct U.S.–Israeli strikes against Iran, including an attack targeting



former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and was followed by a fragile ceasefire that had not yet produced a final settlement by the time of publication.¹

These claims will be treated as the analytical framework upon which the report constructs its assessment. At the same time, any figures or operational details cited in the report should be understood as originating from a single Turkish source and must therefore be approached with methodological caution when used to support policy conclusions.

A Summary of the Turkish Perspective on the Iranian–Israeli File

As reflected throughout the report, the Turkish perspective on the Iranian–Israeli file can be distilled into five interrelated pillars that, taken together, constitute an implicit yet coherent Turkish strategic doctrine underpinning the entire document.

1. A Dual Rejection: Neither Iranian Collapse nor Unrestrained Israeli Dominance

Türkiye seeks neither the collapse of the Iranian state nor the emergence of unchecked Israeli regional dominance. This position should not be understood as neutrality in the conventional diplomatic sense, but rather as a calculated strategic assessment. From Ankara's perspective, the disintegration of Iran would create a major security vacuum along Türkiye's eastern frontier, extending from Iraq to the Caucasus.

Conversely, the expansion of Israeli military influence in Syria and Lebanon-as portrayed in the report-would result in the emergence of a dominant military power along Türkiye's southern borders operating without meaningful regional constraints.

2. Promoting Regional Connectivity Corridors as a Strategic Alternative to the Strait of Hormuz

The report employs the Strait of Hormuz crisis to underscore the strategic importance of the **Development Road Project** and the **Middle Corridor**, both of which are championed by Türkiye. These initiatives are presented not merely as economic alternatives but as part of a broader strategic message directed at the Gulf states and Türkiye's Central Asian partners: confidence in regional connectivity should gradually shift from vulnerable maritime chokepoints toward overland routes crossing Turkish territory. The extensive analytical attention devoted to this issue-including

¹ ASKERÎ VE JEOPOLİTİK PERSPEKTİFTEN ABD/İSRAİL-İRAN SAVAŞI VE TÜRKİYE (The U.S.–Israeli–Iranian War from Military and Geopolitical Perspectives), Turkish National Intelligence Academy (Millî İstihbarat Akademisi), Ankara, May 2026. Unless otherwise indicated, all operational data, quantitative figures, weapon system designations, dates, and factual claims attributed throughout this paper to "the report" are drawn exclusively from this publication and have not been independently verified.



detailed illustrations of oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz-is disproportionate to its actual significance within the military course of the war itself, revealing a clear Turkish effort to promote its preferred connectivity agenda.

3. Justifying Investment in the "Three-Dimensional Depth" of the Defense Industry

The report uses the lessons of the war to advance an institutional case for expanding investment in Türkiye's domestic defense industry through the concept of "**three-dimensional depth**," which combines technological superiority, production capacity, and long-term strategic sustainability.

This narrative appears to be directed primarily toward domestic audiences and decision-makers within the Turkish Ministry of National Defense rather than external readers, positioning the conflict as evidence supporting continued investment in indigenous defense capabilities.

4. Presenting Türkiye as a Balancing Power Rather than an Aligned Actor

The report repeatedly emphasizes that Ankara maintained open channels of communication simultaneously with Iran, the Gulf states, Pakistan, Europe, and the United States. According to this narrative, Türkiye's multi-vector foreign policy constitutes its principal competitive advantage within the emerging regional order.

This discourse serves a dual purpose: projecting Türkiye as an indispensable regional mediator while simultaneously justifying its decision not to become directly involved in the conflict before a domestic audience that might otherwise question the absence of a more active Turkish role in a major war unfolding along its immediate strategic neighborhood.

5. Underlying Concern over Israeli Expansionism

Perhaps the most sensitive element of the Turkish perspective is its carefully articulated concern regarding Israeli expansionism in Syria and Lebanon, which the report frames as a direct challenge to Türkiye's own security rather than solely to neighboring Arab states.

The report goes so far as to refer to the possibility of strategic competition between Ankara and Tel Aviv and notes that Israeli strategic discourse has increasingly portrayed Türkiye as a "strategic challenge." This suggests that Ankara's primary long-term concern extends beyond the Iranian threat itself to the containment of Israeli strategic ambitions in the post-war regional environment.

Such an assessment reflects Türkiye's immediate geographic exposure to developments in the Syrian and Lebanese theaters, in contrast to its relatively more distant position vis-à-vis Iran, aside from its security interests in northern Iraq.



Overview of the Report

This chapter provides a systematic review of the report by following its original structure, examining each chapter and subsection in sequence. It begins with the report's discussion of emerging military technologies and the doctrinal lessons drawn from the conflict.

1. The Expanding Role of Artificial Intelligence

According to the report, artificial intelligence (AI) has evolved from a decision-support tool into an integral component of the command-and-control architecture, capable of generating direct operational outputs. The report states that the United States employed Anthropic's Claude AI alongside Palantir's AI-powered Maven system to identify and prioritize Iranian targets. Israel, meanwhile, is described as having relied on the Gospel and Lavender systems, both of which had previously been used in operations in Gaza.

The report further argues that although these systems formally retain mechanisms for human oversight, they may, in practice, operate with a high degree of autonomy due to **automation bias**—the tendency of individuals and institutions to favor machine-generated recommendations even when confronted with conflicting information. According to the report, this phenomenon significantly increases the risk of operational errors and potentially catastrophic decision-making.

The report identifies three core battlefield functions performed by artificial intelligence:

1. **Target identification**, through extracting operationally relevant targets from radar data, satellite imagery, and signals intelligence.
2. **Target prioritization**, by ranking targets according to their operational value, windows of opportunity, and associated risks.
3. **Dynamic target updating**, involving the continuous revision of target lists in response to developments on the battlefield.

It further argues that official U.S. and Israeli references to managing "thousands of targets" inside Iran demonstrate the practical impossibility of conducting such an operation through manual processes alone.

The report also devotes considerable attention to the concept of decision superiority, which is linked to compressing the OODA Loop—Observe, Orient, Decide, Act—originally developed by John Boyd. It warns that when this decision cycle is shortened beyond the limits of human cognition, military systems effectively become semi-autonomous in practice. The report suggests that this dynamic partly explains the rapid achievement of U.S.–Israeli air superiority during the conflict.



Finally, the report examines Iran's Mosaic Defense doctrine (*Mozaik Savunma*), which is based on delegating the authority to launch ballistic missiles to lower-echelon field commanders while enabling semi-independent operational cells to function autonomously. According to the report, this decentralized structure raises important questions regarding command responsibility during targeting and engagement decisions. At the same time, it demonstrated a notable degree of resilience and redundancy within Iran's command-and-control architecture, allowing it to continue functioning despite a series of high-level decapitation strikes directed against Iran's senior military leadership.

2. Air and Missile Defense

The report argues unequivocally that the notion of an impenetrable air defense shield has been fundamentally undermined. According to its assessment, the conflict demonstrated that even the most advanced air defense systems—including Israel's Iron Dome, David's Sling (Davut'un Sapanı), and Arrow missile defense system—can be overwhelmed through saturation attacks, innovative munitions, and unfavorable cost-exchange dynamics.

The report contends that the Khorramshahr ballistic missiles employed by Iran, equipped with multiple cluster warheads, forced air defense systems to engage dozens of incoming targets rather than a single warhead. This placed considerable strain on the terminal interception phase, significantly reducing the effectiveness of systems such as David's Sling and the Patriot missile defense system.² Although Israel claimed an interception rate of 92%, the report explains that the statistical probability of successful penetration increases as the number of incoming projectiles (n) grows, regardless of the overall interception rate. According to the report, these inevitable "leakages" were responsible for strikes that reached critical infrastructure, including the Haifa oil refinery.

The report also documents several examples intended to illustrate the widening cost asymmetry in modern air defense. It cites Iran's destruction of Qatar's AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar—estimated to be worth approximately US\$1 billion—using a ballistic missile, as well as the destruction of Bahrain's AN/GSC-52B satellite communications terminal by a Shahed-136 loitering munition.

In addition, the report revisits the Twelve-Day War of June 2025, arguing that the conflict inflicted severe damage on Iran's mobile early-warning and air defense systems, thereby granting U.S. and Israeli aircraft extensive operational freedom over Iranian airspace. Nevertheless, despite this

² Turkish National Intelligence Academy, Chapter One, sections "The Twelve-Day War" and "The Forty-Day War." The report cites Haaretz and The War Zone as secondary sources for estimates of missile interception rates.



advantage, both sides reportedly lost several unmanned aerial vehicles to Iranian ground fire. The report further states that a U.S. F-35A fighter was forced to make an emergency landing after sustaining damage, while an F-15E Strike Eagle was shot down near Isfahan, suggesting that Iran's air defense network, although significantly degraded, was not completely neutralized.

Drawing on these observations, the report advocates a new air defense doctrine built around four principal pillars:

1. A **distributed, network-centric architecture** rather than a centralized defense structure.
2. The integration of **offensive capabilities** into the broader defensive architecture.
3. Greater **cost-effectiveness** through the expanded use of directed-energy weapons and electronic warfare systems instead of relying primarily on expensive interceptor missiles.
4. An **AI-enabled decision-making process** capable of rapidly assessing and prioritizing incoming threats.

The report also introduces two emerging operational concepts. The first, "left of launch," emphasizes neutralizing aerial threats before they are launched by striking them at their point of origin. The second, "cheap defeat," advocates the use of lower-cost defensive solutions-such as C-RAM gun systems and laser weapons-in place of costly interceptor missiles whenever operationally feasible.

3. Defense of Strategic Infrastructure, Military Bases, and Critical Installations

The report documents that the targeting of the **South Pars Gas Field** demonstrated that economic assets have become an integral part of the battlefield. It further argues that Iran's public threats to strike Gulf energy facilities illustrate that modern warfare is increasingly conducted through reciprocal attacks on critical infrastructure. The report also observes that Iranian strikes primarily focused on support assets rather than frontline combat platforms.

According to its assessment, attacks on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia targeted aerial refueling aircraft and E-3 AWACS airborne early warning and control aircraft rather than combat fighters themselves. This, the report argues, underscores the disproportionate operational value of enabling assets-such as aerial refueling platforms, radar systems, and communications infrastructure-relative to the comparatively lower cost of attacking them, rendering these high-value capabilities particularly vulnerable despite their strategic importance.

The report further draws an instructive historical comparison by noting that Iran relocated a substantial portion of its missile production and storage capabilities into underground and mountainous facilities, likening this approach to Germany's underground industrial complexes during the Second World War.



According to the report, this hardened infrastructure enabled Iran to sustain a relatively stable rate of missile salvo production despite repeated bombardment of facility entrances. Consequently, the report concludes that the aerial campaign failed to inflict a decisive impact on Iran's latent missile production capacity.

4. Defense of Major Military Platforms

The report revisits the longstanding debate over the operational viability of large and costly military platforms-particularly aircraft carriers-arguing that while they continue to possess considerable operational value, they have also become high-value, high-risk targets rather than merely instruments of power projection. According to the report, the United States deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups and several amphibious assault ships to the region, including the USS Boxer and USS Tripoli, accompanied by U.S. Marine Corps units. This deployment, the report argues, reflects the continued reliance on such platforms as instruments of strategic deterrence and political signaling.

At the same time, the report notes that the USS Gerald R. Ford was withdrawn from the theater for repairs following a fire in its laundry compartment, according to the official U.S. statement. It presents this incident as an illustration that the vulnerability of major military platforms is determined not only by the platforms themselves but also by the resilience of the broader logistical and support networks upon which they depend.

The report further warns that any scenario involving the blockade or seizure of Kharg Island (Hark Adası) off Iran's southern coast would expose amphibious vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz or operating inside the Gulf to multiple forms of attack because of their close proximity to the Iranian mainland. It argues that Iran's asymmetric naval capabilities-including fast attack craft, unmanned surface vessels, shore-based anti-ship missiles, and naval mines-continue to constitute a credible threat despite the destruction of significant portions of Iran's conventional surface fleet, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fast boats and midget submarines. According to the report, this threat extends beyond U.S. naval forces to encompass regional maritime traffic more broadly, particularly commercial shipping and large oil tankers operating in Gulf waters.

5. Electromagnetic Spectrum Warfare

The report argues that air superiority is no longer determined solely by the number and sophistication of airborne platforms, but increasingly by dominance of the electromagnetic



spectrum. Radar systems, data links, satellite communications (SATCOM) terminals, early warning systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and command-and-control networks together constitute the invisible yet decisive layer of modern air power. As the report explicitly states, "the side that seeks to control the skies must first control the electromagnetic spectrum."

According to the report, Iran launched attacks-based on open-source reporting-against at least seven U.S. military bases, targeting radar installations, satellite communications infrastructure, aerial refueling aircraft, and other high-value assets such as airborne early warning platforms. These strikes were intended to disrupt the essential functions of threat detection, airborne force sustainment, and the command and coordination of air operations.

The report categorizes these targets into three principal groups. The first comprises communications infrastructure, exemplified by the reported attack on satellite communications terminals in Bahrain.

The second includes early warning radar systems, notably the reported targeting of Qatar's AN/FPS-132 radar together with the AN/TPY-2 radar supporting the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) battery in Jordan. The report emphasizes that the AN/TPY-2 serves as the battery's primary sensor and that, without it, the THAAD system cannot independently search for or track incoming targets.

The third category encompasses airborne early warning, command, and control platforms, including the reported damage sustained by an E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base.³

6. Robotic Warfare and Unmanned Aerial Systems

The report notes that although loitering munitions have been employed since the 1980s, their operational significance became particularly evident during the Russo-Ukrainian War, a trend that continued in the present conflict. It estimates the cost of a single Iranian loitering munition used against U.S. military bases at between US\$20,000 and US\$60,000, compared with approximately US\$3.7 million for a Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missile and around US\$2 million for an Aster-30 interceptor employed by the SAMP/T air defense system.⁴

³ Turkish National Intelligence Academy, Chapter One, section "The Air War and the Battle for Control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum," p. 23. This passage constitutes the only explicit reference to Jordan (Ürdün) in the entire 68-page report. Jordan is not mentioned elsewhere in the document, including the sections addressing the Gulf states, regional diplomacy, or regional connectivity corridors.

⁴ Turkish National Intelligence Academy, Chapter One, section "Robotic Warfare and Unmanned Aerial Systems," drawing on a CNBC report concerning the Shahed-136 unmanned aerial vehicle and a report by the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance regarding interceptor missile costs.



According to the report, this dramatic cost disparity transforms loitering munitions from a merely tactical asset into an effective instrument of strategic attrition. Their ability to operate in coordinated drone swarms can saturate air defense systems while overloading surveillance, command, and control networks. The report argues that this challenge is likely to become even more complex with the incorporation of AI-enabled swarm algorithms, allowing large numbers of unmanned systems to coordinate autonomously and adapt dynamically during combat operations.

7. The Economics of Munitions and the Production Capacity Challenge

The report argues that the twin challenges of munition consumption and industrial production capacity, first highlighted during the Russo–Ukrainian War, re-emerged in the present conflict. It contends that the inability of the U.S.–Israeli coalition to achieve a decisive strategic effect within the first 72 hours, combined with Iran's capacity to sustain a flexible military response, prolonged the conflict and substantially increased demand for both offensive and defensive munitions.

According to the report, the opening phase of the campaign involved the employment of Tomahawk and Popeye cruise missiles, the air-launched Rampage ballistic missile, and the ATACMS and PRSM tactical surface-to-surface missile systems. These were followed by the extensive use of precision-guided munitions-including Paveway II/III, GBU-31/32 JDAM, and SPICE guided bombs-in successive re-strike operations against hardened facilities that required repeated attacks to achieve the desired operational effects.

The report further emphasizes that munition consumption is not linear but cumulative, arguing that available estimates point to a gradual depletion of U.S. and allied interceptor missile inventories, thereby raising concerns regarding the long-term sustainability of defensive operations.

In response to these challenges, the report highlights an emerging U.S. procurement strategy aimed at balancing expensive precision-guided weapons with lower-cost, operationally sufficient alternatives. Examples cited include the LUCAS loitering munition developed by SpektreWorks, the Barracuda-500 missile produced by Anduril, Lockheed Martin's Common Multi-Mission Truck (CMMT) platform, and Kratos' Ragnarök Low-Cost Cruise Missile (LCCM).

The report also notes a discernible shift toward sourcing innovative capabilities from small and medium-sized defense companies, rather than relying exclusively on the traditional major defense contractors.

8. Network-Centric Warfare and Data Integration

The report concludes that modern warfare is evolving away from centralized, hierarchical command structures toward distributed, network-centric architectures. It argues that Iran's Mosaic



Defense doctrine-based on delegating authority to local commanders and enabling small, semi-autonomous units to continue operating independently-demonstrated genuine strategic resilience in the face of repeated decapitation strikes targeting senior leadership.

At the same time, the report notes that such a decentralized command structure complicates the restoration of centralized control during ceasefire negotiations and post-conflict stabilization, as the fragmentation of command authority makes coordinated de-escalation more difficult.

Ultimately, the report concludes that the most effective force structure on the modern battlefield is neither fully centralized nor fully decentralized, but rather a hybrid networked architecture-one that remains digitally interconnected while retaining the flexibility to operate in a distributed manner when required.

Following its assessment of military developments, the report turns to the political and geopolitical dimensions of the conflict, which are organized into the following themes:

- **Iran: Political and Institutional Transformations**

The report presents a detailed chronological account of developments in Iran. It states that nationwide protests began on 28 December 2025 and continued throughout the first three weeks of 2026. This was followed by the outbreak of war on 28 February 2026, during which Iran's former Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei—who had served as Supreme Leader since 1989 after holding the presidency from 1981 to 1989—was reportedly killed.

According to the report, his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, was elected Supreme Leader on 8 March 2026, despite reported concerns regarding his health and the continuation of medical treatment, according to some accounts.

The report further states that both parties accepted a temporary ceasefire brokered by Pakistan on 7 April 2026, followed by a meeting in Islamabad on 11 April 2026, which helped reduce the risk of further military escalation. However, a subsequent round of negotiations scheduled for 21 April 2026 was cancelled after Iran announced that it would not participate. By 12 May 2026, no clear political settlement had been reached. The report notes that U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly described Iran's latest proposal as "stupid" and "garbage," asserting that the ceasefire was at "its weakest point" and remained "on life support."

The report assesses the likelihood of an overt military takeover in Iran as low, arguing that the Iranian political system derives its legitimacy primarily from political-religious institutions rather than coercive power alone. Nevertheless, it anticipates a significant expansion of the influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), particularly under its Commander-in-Chief



Ahmad Vahidi, as well as the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, commanded by Ali Abdollah, which the report credits with playing a central role in maintaining the continuity of state institutions despite the assassination of senior officials.

The report also highlights several civilian political figures who assumed prominent roles during the conflict, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, who reportedly succeeded Ali Larijani following his death on 17 March 2026.

The report devotes particular attention to evaluating the credibility of the Iranian opposition in exile, especially Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former Shah, and his political circle.

According to the report, they failed to distinguish between the domestic protest movement of January 2026 and the subsequent foreign military intervention. As a result, their public support for military action allegedly eroded what little domestic credibility they had retained. The report further argues that even segments of Iran's internal opposition ultimately supported the state's wartime strategy in order to avoid the prospect of national collapse and political chaos.

The report also contends that Iran's long-standing strategy of remaining at the nuclear threshold-maintaining the capability to develop nuclear weapons without actually producing them-failed to deter war. It argues that this strategy, which the report describes as having ultimately cost Ali Khamenei his life, has strengthened factions advocating a more rapid pursuit of an operational nuclear deterrent during and after the conflict.

Regarding Iran's relations with the Gulf states, the report revisits the longstanding territorial dispute over the three Emirati islands following Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. It argues that the war is likely to produce a far deeper rupture between Iran and the Arab Gulf states than either the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution or the Iran–Iraq War. According to the report, Iran accuses several Gulf states of providing operational platforms for U.S. and Israeli military actions, while Gulf governments accuse Iran of unjustifiably targeting their military and civilian infrastructure.

Finally, the report refers to circulating reports suggesting that Iran may seek war reparations from certain Gulf states. It argues that Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates may become subject to increased Iranian pressure for differing structural and political reasons. Against this backdrop, the report concludes that the ongoing strategic consultations among Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt are assuming increasing regional significance.



- **Israel: The Transformation of Its Strategic Identity**

The report characterizes Israel's evolving strategic identity as undergoing a structural shift toward regional dominance through conventional military power. According to the report, this transformation has been driven by the simultaneous and coordinated responses of Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi Shiite militias to the strikes on Iran.

These developments have led Israel to regard multi-front warfare not as an exceptional contingency but as a permanent structural reality. Within this context, the report also notes that Israel has implicitly signaled its intention to maintain a permanent presence in southern Lebanon.

The report attributes this strategic transformation to two principal dynamics:

First, it argues that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sought to prolong the conflict in order to extend his political tenure.

Second, it contends that the Israeli government has attempted to "resolve the Iranian file" by taking advantage of the strategic latitude provided by the Trump administration, operating under the assumption that Israel's international standing could deteriorate little further following the war in Gaza, which the report describes as genocide.⁵

The report cites detailed public opinion data indicating that 81% of Israelis supported the war during its initial phase. However, the proportion of respondents who believed that the Iranian regime would suffer severe damage declined from 62.5% at the outset of the conflict to 48% by the end of March 2026, suggesting a gradual decline in public confidence regarding the war's strategic outcomes.

The report also documents the Knesset's passage of a death penalty law on 30 March 2026. According to the report, the legislation authorizes capital punishment for individuals convicted of killing an Israeli citizen on racist or hostile grounds with the intent to harm the State of Israel and its people. The measure was promoted by the far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir

⁵ The report explicitly employs the Turkish term *soykırım* ("genocide") in describing the war in Gaza when discussing the strategic calculations of the Israeli government. This terminology should be understood as reflecting the official position of the institution that authored the report rather than as a definitive determination under international law.



and, according to the report, also permits military courts in the occupied West Bank to impose death sentences without requiring unanimous judicial approval.⁶

From an economic perspective, the report records an increase of more than 25% in Israel's energy and logistics costs, attributing this rise to heightened security risks affecting the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It further states that 71% of Israeli high-technology companies experienced disruptions in capital-raising activities, while investment was completely suspended in 11% of these firms. The report also notes a growing trend among international technology companies to relocate local employees outside Israel.⁷

On the societal level, the report describes sustained internal population displacement from Israel's northern and southern border regions toward the country's interior. According to the report, this movement has contributed to mounting housing shortages and challenges related to social integration, leaving Israeli society "caught between the psychological exhaustion of living in a permanent state of war and the momentum of a military victory narrative."

- **The Gulf States: The Shock of Exposed Security Vulnerabilities**

The report portrays the Gulf states as the third party most adversely affected by the war, arguing that one of its most significant consequences was the exposure of the fragility of Gulf national security strategies despite decades of reliance on the costly American security umbrella. According to the report, a substantial number of Iranian missiles and unmanned aerial systems successfully reached their intended targets despite the Gulf's U.S.-based air defense architecture—an unprecedented development in both scale and speed for the region.

The report argues that the renewed perception of the Iranian threat is likely to encourage Gulf states to pursue a gradual and carefully calibrated diversification of their defense partnerships. At the same time, it notes that such a transition will be complicated by divergent national security approaches and the geopolitical rivalries that persist among the Gulf states themselves. Economically, the report anticipates a near-term increase in Gulf defense expenditures to replenish depleted weapons stocks and ammunition, accompanied by heightened tensions surrounding the future security of the Strait of Hormuz and declining hydrocarbon revenues.

- **Iraq: Escalating Structural Fragility**

The report documents the severe economic consequences of the conflict for Iraq, noting that approximately 86% of the country's state revenues are derived from oil exports shipped through

⁶ Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Operation Roaring Lion Survey, April 2026.

⁷ Israel Innovation Authority, High-Tech Sector Survey During the War, April 2026.



Basra. It states that Iraq's daily oil production, which stood at approximately 4.188 million barrels per day in February 2026, declined to roughly 1.3 million barrels per day by early April 2026, with production in southern Iraq falling to around 900,000 barrels per day. During the same period, oil exports, previously averaging approximately 3.4 million barrels per day, reportedly fell to nearly zero.⁸

In the electricity sector, the report states that national power generation declined by approximately 3,500 megawatts, falling from pre-war levels of 30,000–31,000 MW to 27,000–28,000 MW. It warns that summer electricity demand, projected to reach 50,000–55,000 MW, could significantly deepen Iraq's energy crisis.

From a security perspective, the report documents a series of Iranian strikes against multiple locations in Erbil, including a reported armed drone attack targeting the residence of Nechirvan Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region. According to the report, these attacks constitute a troubling indicator of the region's deteriorating stability.

It further notes escalating Iranian accusations that Kurdish groups were being used as operational proxies against Iran, while Kurdish officials, in turn, accused external actors of attempting to exploit the region. The report also references repeated statements by U.S. President Donald Trump concerning alleged weapons shipments.

Overall, the report concludes that the war simultaneously weakened Iraq's security, economy, and political institutions, strengthening the influence of armed militias as decisive political and military actors while further eroding the authority and capacity of the central government.

- **Syria: Freezing a Fragile Recovery**

The report argues that although Syria did not become a direct theater of war, the conflict nevertheless disrupted its already fragile recovery trajectory. According to the report, the use of Syrian airspace by both Israel and Iran, the fall of missile and drone debris on Syrian territory, drone attacks on military installations in eastern Syria, the return of approximately 120,000 Syrian refugees from Lebanon following the outbreak of the war, and Israel's expansionist ambitions collectively exerted significant indirect pressure on Syria's stabilization process.⁹

On the western front, the report notes that Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa expressed support on 9 March 2026 for the Lebanese government's efforts to disarm Hezbollah. The following day,

⁸ CEIC Data, Iraq Crude Oil Production Index, April 2026.

⁹ The New Arab, report on the return of approximately 119,000 Syrian refugees from Lebanon during the Israel–Hezbollah war, May 2026.



Syrian military positions reportedly came under fire, prompting the Syrian Armed Forces to reinforce their deployments along the Iraqi and Lebanese borders and tighten security at border crossings.

The report warns that Israel could exploit the Druze issue as a means of expanding the conflict into Suwayda and establishing a new military occupation. It identifies three principal dynamics underpinning this assessment.

First, the existence of influential locally armed Druze formations in Suwayda, together with public statements by groups led by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri expressing support for Israel and the United States while advocating forms of self-administration.

Second, the Syrian government's efforts to reassert its authority in the country's south, thereby increasing the likelihood of direct friction with Israel.

Third, the broader regional strategic distraction created by the war, which the report argues simultaneously presents both opportunities and risks for the parties involved.

As supporting evidence, the report cites Israeli strikes against Syrian military targets following clashes in the Suwayda countryside in March 2026, interpreting these operations as evidence of a lowered Israeli threshold for military intervention. It concludes that preserving Syria's current level of relative stability has become a critical prerequisite for reconstruction and the attraction of foreign investment, while warning that the regional uncertainty generated by the war threatens to reverse the country's fragile recovery process.¹⁰

- **International Implications: From the Strait of Hormuz to the Global Order**

The report devotes extensive attention to the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, noting that approximately 25% of global oil trade, 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade, and nearly 30% of the world's fertilizer trade pass through the waterway. Before the outbreak of the war, the Strait handled an estimated 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per day, with the majority destined for China, India, Japan, and South Korea.

¹⁰ The Turkish report states that incidents of violence in Syria declined by 73% during the final third of 2025 and that fatalities resulting from direct violence fell to 23 cases in March 2026-the lowest monthly figure recorded in fifteen years-citing the SyriaWeekly March 2026 Syria Update.



The report further notes that maritime war-risk insurance premiums increased by approximately tenfold during the first days of the conflict, illustrating the speed with which geopolitical uncertainty is translated into global economic costs.¹¹

From a political and legal perspective, the report concludes that the United States and Israel launched a militarily and legally controversial operation without awaiting authorization from the United Nations Security Council. It further notes that more than one hundred international legal scholars argued that the attacks constituted a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations, thereby contributing to the growing normalization of the use of force in international affairs.

The report also argues that China and Russia emerged as the lowest-cost strategic beneficiaries of the conflict. According to its assessment, Beijing, by avoiding an overt political alignment throughout the war, has benefited from the United States' renewed strategic preoccupation with the Middle East, thereby expanding its room for maneuver in the Indo-Pacific and across the Taiwan Strait. Moscow, meanwhile, is portrayed as benefiting from the diversion of Western political and military attention, enabling it to intensify pressure on Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

More broadly, the report contends that the conflict has created greater strategic space for middle powers to exploit the fractures of an increasingly fragmented international order, thereby reinforcing Türkiye's own aspirations to occupy such a position.

The final section of this chapter examines the report's assessments and recommendations for Türkiye. In addition to the previously discussed concepts of "three-dimensional depth" and the Steel Dome (Çelik Kubbe) project, the report introduces the concept of the innovation cycle, derived from lessons observed during the Russo–Ukrainian War. It argues that the time required to identify an operational battlefield requirement and develop a corresponding technological solution has contracted from months to weeks-and in some cases to mere days. Consequently, the report advocates the continuous adaptation of policy packages, operational planning, and the maintenance of strategic stockpiles of munitions and critical components in preparation for future crises.

The report also cites a striking example from the Twelve-Day War, describing an Israeli Mossad-operated drone production facility established inside Tehran that, according to the report, remained undiscovered until drones manufactured at the site were employed to strike Iranian early warning and air defense command-and-control centers. It presents this episode as evidence of the growing threat posed by widely accessible technologies that can be exploited even by actors operating inside an adversary's territory.

¹¹ U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2025 data, cited by the Turkish report regarding China's exports, which totaled US\$3.77 trillion in 2025.



The report further argues that states should move beyond the traditional concept of defensive cybersecurity toward a more proactive approach incorporating offensive cyber capabilities. It also advocates the adoption of mission command, a doctrine that delegates initiative to lower levels of command while preserving centralized strategic coherence.

According to the report, such an approach has become increasingly necessary as the compression of the OODA (Observe–Orient–Decide–Act) loop reduces the effectiveness of conventional hierarchical command structures.

In its discussion of decapitation operations, the report argues that the limited strategic impact of targeting Iran's senior leadership—including the reported killing of Ali Khamenei—is broadly consistent with an earlier case involving an attempted operation against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, which was followed by a relatively orderly political transition. The report characterizes that precedent as misleading for U.S.

Planners when assessing Iran, arguing that, unlike Venezuela, the Iranian state demonstrated a far deeper level of institutional resilience, enabling it to absorb leadership losses while preserving the continuity of its core governmental functions through an extensive and highly institutionalized bureaucratic apparatus.

Finally, the report reiterates the importance of Türkiye's "Terror-Free Türkiye Process" (Terörsüz Türkiye Süreci). It argues that sustained diplomatic engagement and regional peace initiatives played a significant role in preventing Kurdish groups in Iran, Syria, and Iraq from mobilizing against Iran during the conflict. According to the report, the war has reinforced the strategic value of sustained dialogue among the region's ethnic, sectarian, and religious communities, making the continuation of these domestic reconciliation efforts a strategic priority alongside Türkiye's defense and economic objectives.

Analysis of the Report

1. A Critical Assessment of the Military-Technological Dimension

The military lessons highlighted in the report are not uniquely Turkish innovations. Rather, they largely reflect a broader international debate that has been underway since the Russo–Ukrainian War concerning the economics of munitions and the limitations of layered air defense systems when confronted with saturation attacks. The report's principal added value therefore lies not in its diagnosis—which broadly aligns with assessments found in defense analytical circles in Washington, London, and Moscow—but in how those lessons are employed. Specifically, Ankara uses these observations to justify a strategic investment trajectory that had already been taking shape within its domestic defense industry.



This is evident from the report's disproportionate emphasis on Türkiye's Steel Dome (Çelik Kubbe) project, to which it devotes considerably greater attention than it does to any Israeli or American air defense system analyzed in comparable depth.

The most significant weakness of this section lies in its references to the use of specific artificial intelligence systems in target selection without citing independently verifiable sources. Consequently, although such claims would carry important implications if substantiated, they should be treated as analytical hypotheses rather than established facts. A similar methodological limitation appears in the report's reference to the alleged Mossad-operated drone production facility in Tehran, which is likewise presented without independently verifiable evidence, reflecting the same pattern of reliance on a single source for highly sensitive operational claims.

The report's discussion of Iran's Mosaic Defense doctrine as an illustration of the resilience of distributed command structures does not, in itself, constitute a contradiction. Drawing doctrinal lessons from the battlefield performance of any actor—including an adversary—is a standard practice in military analysis and is consistent with the report's generally neutral treatment of Israeli and American defense systems. This approach is also compatible with the report's broader strategic outlook, which does not portray Iran as an absolute adversary but rather as a state whose collapse is considered contrary to Türkiye's strategic interests.

The more substantive limitation lies elsewhere. While the report recommends that Türkiye adopt a similarly distributed command architecture, it does not examine whether the country currently possesses the enabling capabilities required to implement such a model. These include distributed sensor networks, secure data-link infrastructure, and independent satellite capabilities. Without addressing these prerequisites, the recommendation risks remaining a doctrinal aspiration rather than an operationally feasible strategy grounded in existing technological capacities.

2. A Critical Assessment of the Political and Geopolitical Dimension

The report's central argument—that the Iranian regime is unlikely to collapse in the foreseeable future despite the severity of the military campaign—is broadly consistent with a well-established historical understanding of the resilience of Iran's institutional structure. However, the report appears overly confident in largely dismissing the possibility of deeper internal destabilization. This confidence sits uneasily alongside the report's own acknowledgement that the war's destructive impact on Iran's heavy industrial base "has not yet been fully understood." This internal inconsistency warrants attention: if the report itself recognizes that the full economic consequences of the conflict remain uncertain, it is difficult to assert with comparable certainty that the regime's long-term political stability is assured.



Similarly, the report's implicit comparison between the limited effectiveness of decapitation operations in Iran and the Venezuelan case assumes a degree of comparability between two fundamentally different political systems. While the analogy offers a useful illustrative reference, it falls short of constituting a rigorous analytical model. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has developed a deeply institutionalized bureaucratic, ideological, and security apparatus that has no true equivalent in Venezuela. This structural difference significantly limits the predictive value of the comparison when assessing similar scenarios in other states.

The report's assessment of Israel is marked by an unusual degree of candor for an official Turkish publication. It explicitly characterizes Israel as pursuing an expansionist regional agenda, describes the war in Gaza as genocide, and acknowledges the possibility of future strategic competition between Türkiye and Israel. This reflects a genuine shift in Turkish strategic thinking following several years of attempts to rebuild bilateral relations after the 2022 normalization agreements. Nevertheless, the report's conclusions remain carefully calibrated. Rather than advocating confrontation or a rupture in relations, it calls for a policy of managed strategic competition, thereby preserving Ankara's flexibility in its future dealings with Tel Aviv.

The most significant omission in this section concerns the near absence of Jordan from the report's analytical framework. Contrary to what a cursory reading might suggest, the report makes only a single explicit reference to Jordan throughout its entirety—namely, its discussion of Iran's reported targeting of the AN/TPY-2 radar supporting the U.S. THAAD battery deployed on Jordanian territory, within the broader context of electromagnetic spectrum warfare.

Beyond this isolated reference, Jordan is entirely absent from the report's discussion of regional diplomatic consultations, Gulf security dynamics, and regional connectivity initiatives such as the Development Road Project and the Middle Corridor, despite its strategically critical geographic position linking Israel, Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf. This omission is unlikely to be politically neutral. Rather, it reflects a Turkish strategic perspective that places Türkiye at the center of emerging regional arrangements while assigning Jordan considerably less analytical weight than its actual geopolitical significance would suggest. Consequently, Jordan appears in the report not as an independent political or diplomatic actor with its own strategic calculations, but merely as the location of an American military asset targeted during the conflict.

3. A Critical Assessment of Türkiye's Role as Presented in the Report

The report portrays Türkiye as a balanced, prudent, and stabilizing regional power. However, this image is inherently self-referential. As a publication produced by an institution affiliated with the Turkish intelligence establishment, it should be read not only as an analytical assessment but also



as a form of strategic state discourse intended to project a particular image of Türkiye's regional role.

The report praises Ankara's "balanced positioning" in response to Iranian missiles that reportedly landed on Turkish territory. Yet it does not examine the domestic political costs associated with this policy, nor does it consider how such restraint might be interpreted by some Gulf states as hesitation rather than strategic prudence. By emphasizing the advantages of neutrality while overlooking its political trade-offs, the report presents a largely one-sided evaluation of Türkiye's diplomatic posture.

Similarly, the report's presentation of the Development Road Project and the Middle Corridor as strategic alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz implicitly assumes that Iraq-the principal transit state for the Development Road-will remain sufficiently stable to support a major overland trade corridor. This assumption, however, appears inconsistent with the report's own empirical findings. Elsewhere, the report documents that Iraq's daily oil production declined from approximately 4.188 million barrels to 1.3 million barrels in less than two months, electricity generation fell by 3,500 megawatts, and the influence of armed militias continued to expand.

This reveals a clear methodological inconsistency between the report's optimistic strategic narrative regarding the Development Road and its detailed assessment of Iraq's structural fragility. It therefore raises a fundamental analytical question that the report leaves unanswered: How can a strategic corridor intended to serve as a reliable alternative to the Strait of Hormuz depend upon a transit state whose own analysis documents the collapse of nearly half of its oil production capacity within a period of only six weeks?

A Jordanian Perspective

Having examined the Turkish perspective and critically assessed its military and political foundations, it is equally important to reinterpret the report through a Jordanian lens grounded in Jordan's own national interests rather than Ankara's strategic priorities. Reports issued by institutions closely associated with state decision-making do more than document events; they also reveal the hierarchy of national priorities by highlighting certain actors while overlooking others. From this perspective, the significance of this section lies in examining how the report addresses Jordan, assessing the implications of its limited treatment, and evaluating the security, geopolitical, and economic consequences of the conflict for Jordan's strategic environment, whether explicitly acknowledged by the report or left unaddressed. Accordingly, this section seeks to develop an independent Jordanian assessment rooted in the Kingdom's unique geopolitical position and its interconnected regional security interests, evaluating both the insights offered by the report and the analytical gaps that require further interpretation.



1. The Central Incident: The Targeting of the THAAD Radar Deployed in Jordan

The report states that Iran targeted the AN/TPY-2 radar supporting the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery deployed in Jordan as part of a broader campaign against the regional early-warning and satellite communication network intended to blind the U.S.-allied integrated air and missile defense architecture. Although this episode receives only a brief mention in the report—a single sentence embedded within a broader discussion of radar installations in Qatar—its strategic significance extends far beyond the limited space devoted to it.

The incident demonstrates that Jordan was not merely a neighboring state indirectly affected by a regional conflict unfolding around it. Rather, it became the location of a direct military event within a major regional war through the targeting of a U.S.

strategic defensive asset deployed on its territory. This reality carries important implications for Jordan's security posture, underscoring that the Kingdom has become increasingly integrated into the region's evolving strategic architecture regardless of its continued efforts to avoid direct involvement in regional military confrontations.¹²

2. The Corridor Equation: Between the Development Road and Jordan's Geostrategic Position

Jordan is notably absent—whether intentionally or inadvertently—from the Development Road Project as presented in the Turkish report. The proposed corridor links Basra to Türkiye exclusively through Iraq, effectively bypassing Jordan despite the Kingdom's possession of the Port of Aqaba and an established overland transportation network connecting the Gulf with the Eastern Mediterranean through routes that are geographically shorter than portions of the northern Iraqi alignment. This omission should not be regarded as a purely technical matter but rather as a strategic indicator. It suggests that Ankara's preference for the Iraqi route is driven primarily by geopolitical considerations, including its longstanding relationships with both Baghdad and Erbil and its military presence in northern Iraq, rather than by a purely economic or security-based assessment of the corridor's optimal alignment.

More importantly, the report's own empirical evidence raises questions about the sustainability of this strategic assumption. It documents Iraq's decline in oil production from approximately 4.188

¹² The Turkish report provides no additional details regarding the reported targeting of the THAAD radar in Jordan, including the precise date of the incident, the extent of any damage, or the means of attack. Given the strategic significance of the incident from a Jordanian perspective, this lack of detail is itself noteworthy and underscores the need for independent Jordanian verification and additional corroborating sources before the episode is relied upon in any official policy assessment.



million to 1.3 million barrels per day, a reduction of 3,500 megawatts in electricity generation, and the expanding influence of armed militias, including attacks targeting the headquarters of the President of the Kurdistan Region using armed drones. Collectively, these indicators portray a state experiencing significant structural fragility, thereby casting doubt on the long-term reliability of a strategic corridor that depends almost entirely on Iraqi stability.

From a Jordanian perspective, these findings argue for a proactive rather than reactive strategy. Instead of positioning itself as a competitor to the Development Road, Jordan could present its territory as a complementary strategic corridor, leveraging the report's own assessment of Iraq's vulnerabilities to promote Aqaba and Jordan's transportation infrastructure as a more stable and resilient alternative within a diversified regional connectivity network. Such an approach would reduce dependence on a single transit route while aligning Jordan's geographic advantages with the broader regional objective of enhancing supply-chain resilience.

3. Security Implications for Jordan: Borders and Strategic Corridors

The Turkish report provides a detailed assessment of the growing fragility of the Iraqi–Syrian–Lebanese border region in the aftermath of the war, highlighting the expanding influence of armed militias and increased Iranian activity in northern Iraq, including the reported attack on the headquarters of the President of the Kurdistan Region. Although this assessment is presented primarily from a Turkish perspective focused on northern Iraq, its implications extend directly to Jordan. The Kingdom shares a long border with Iraq, particularly in the Rutba–Trebil sector, an area that has historically witnessed weapons and narcotics smuggling networks associated with Iranian-backed groups. If, as the report suggests, the authority of the Iraqi central government continues to weaken—supported by its own data documenting collapsing oil revenues and a deepening electricity crisis—Jordan is likely to face increasing security pressures along its eastern frontier regardless of developments in the conflict's principal theater.

The report's analysis of Iraq's electricity crisis also carries implications for Jordan that extend beyond conventional security concerns. It documents a decline in Iraqi electricity generation from approximately 30,000–31,000 MW to 27,000–28,000 MW, while projecting that summer demand could reach 50,000–55,000 MW. These figures are particularly relevant in light of ongoing regional electricity interconnection projects linking Jordan with Iraq and neighboring states. Any further deterioration in Iraq's energy sector during periods of peak demand could affect the stability of these interconnections and influence Jordan's long-term plans to export surplus electricity to the Iraqi market.

Along Jordan's western and northwestern frontiers, the report reveals another notable analytical imbalance. Despite devoting considerable attention to developments in Lebanon and Syria—and



providing an extensive discussion of the potential Druze scenario in Suwayda, which lies geographically much closer to Jordan's northern border than to Türkiye-it makes no reference whatsoever to the King Hussein Bridge or to the potential consequences of further Israeli expansion in the West Bank. Yet these issues carry far greater strategic significance for Jordan than for any other regional actor discussed in the report. Likewise, the report's own scenario for Suwayda-centered on armed local Druze formations, Damascus's efforts to reassert authority in southern Syria, and Israel's possible exploitation of these dynamics-has considerably greater implications for Jordan's border security than for Türkiye. Nevertheless, these developments are analyzed without any meaningful consideration of Jordan's security interests.

From a Jordanian perspective, this suggests that Amman cannot rely on Ankara as its principal strategic partner in managing either the King Hussein Bridge or the evolving security environment in Suwayda. These issues remain fundamentally Jordanian responsibilities, albeit ones that require close coordination with Egypt and the Gulf states.

4. The Turkish Approach toward Israel: A Jordanian Perspective

Unlike Türkiye, Jordan does not possess the strategic flexibility to pursue a policy of managed strategic competition with Israel. Since the signing of the 1994 Peace Treaty, Jordan's relationship with Israel has been shaped by an inescapable web of geographic, economic, water, and security interdependence. Consequently, the Turkish perspective presented in the report-particularly its characterization of intensifying Turkish-Israeli strategic rivalry over Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the future regional security architecture, together with its description of the war in Gaza as genocide-carries a dual significance from a Jordanian standpoint.

On the one hand, any effective Turkish effort to constrain Israeli expansionist policies in Syria indirectly serves Jordanian interests by reducing the likelihood of a security vacuum along Jordan's northern frontier. On the other hand, if Turkish-Israeli competition escalates into a sustained strategic confrontation, Jordan could find itself in an increasingly delicate position, compelled to balance its relations with both parties simultaneously.

Amman remains bound to Israel through an existing peace treaty and longstanding arrangements governing borders, water resources, and security cooperation, while at the same time viewing Türkiye as an increasingly important economic partner and a significant regional counterweight within the evolving balance of power in the Middle East.

The death penalty law approved by the Israeli Knesset on 30 March 2026, allowing military courts in the West Bank to impose capital punishment without requiring unanimous judicial approval, also carries direct implications for Jordan. As the Hashemite Custodian of the Muslim and



Christian holy sites in Jerusalem and a state with profound demographic, political, and humanitarian interests in the West Bank, Jordan is uniquely affected by such legal and political developments. Yet the Turkish report discusses this legislation exclusively as evidence of the transformation of Israel's internal strategic identity, without considering its implications for Jordan or for the Hashemite custodianship. This omission once again illustrates the report's broader tendency to interpret regional developments primarily through a Turkish strategic lens, leaving the concerns of neighboring states-even those most directly affected-largely outside its analytical framework.

5. Iran and the Gulf: A Jordanian Perspective

Unlike the Turkish approach, which generally treats the Iranian file with a degree of strategic neutrality, Jordan's geopolitical position-while not directly bordering the Gulf, yet remaining closely linked to it through its economic ties and security coordination with the moderate Arab states-requires a more cautious assessment of Iran's post-war strategic trajectory. This is particularly relevant in light of the report's assessment that the conflict has strengthened the influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and empowered domestic currents advocating either the attainment of a nuclear threshold capability or a further expansion of Iran's nuclear posture. The report also raises the possibility that Tehran could seek war reparations from specific Gulf states, namely Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates.

For Jordan, these developments carry direct strategic implications. As a participant in the broader framework of Arab security coordination with the Gulf states, the Kingdom has a vested interest in preventing any escalation between Iran and its Gulf neighbors. This concern extends beyond considerations of Arab solidarity. Any disruption to Gulf stability or to regional energy flows-and the corresponding increase in Gulf defense expenditures anticipated by the report-would inevitably affect Jordan's economy, which remains closely linked to the Gulf through labor remittances, financial assistance, investment flows, and broader patterns of regional economic integration.

Viewed from this perspective, the report's recommendation that Türkiye pursue a flexible security strategy based on avoiding rigid bloc politics offers a useful model from which Jordan can also draw lessons. Rather than aligning exclusively with any single regional axis, Amman's strategic interests are better served by strengthening its channels of coordination simultaneously with Riyadh, Ankara, and Washington. Like Türkiye, Jordan is well positioned to leverage its reputation as a moderate and credible regional actor capable of maintaining constructive relations with multiple partners without becoming strategically dependent on any one of them.

Finally, although the report's comparison between the limited effectiveness of decapitation operations in Iran and the Venezuelan experience remains methodologically unconvincing as a



predictive framework, it nevertheless offers an important lesson for Jordanian strategic planning. The resilience of a political system in the face of leadership losses depends fundamentally on the depth and institutionalization of its bureaucratic and governing structures rather than solely on the level of popular support enjoyed by its leadership.

As such, institutional resilience should constitute a central analytical variable in Jordanian assessments of future regional stability and the potential consequences of leadership crises across neighboring states.

Conclusion

The report published by the Turkish National Intelligence Academy reveals as much through its omissions as through its explicit analysis. It demonstrates that Ankara views the U.S.–Israeli–Iranian war as a strategic opportunity to reposition Türkiye as a central regional power through three interrelated pillars: the expansion of its domestic defense industry, the development of overland connectivity corridors, and the consolidation of its role as a regional diplomatic mediator.

At the same time, although the report offers a valuable military and technological assessment supported by extensive quantitative data and technical detail, it ultimately remains a political document shaped by Türkiye's own strategic priorities. Its analysis consistently reinforces Ankara's policy agenda-particularly its promotion of the Development Road Project and the justification for sustained investment in the national defense industry-rather than providing an equally balanced assessment of all regional actors. This imbalance is most evident in its treatment of Jordan, which is mentioned only once throughout the report, and solely within the technical context of the reported targeting of the U.S. THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar deployed on Jordanian territory, despite the Kingdom's central position within any future regional security architecture.

From a Jordanian perspective, the report's greatest significance lies not in what it says about Türkiye, but in what it leaves unsaid about other regional actors. Jordan's near-complete absence from the report's discussion of regional connectivity initiatives, diplomatic consultation mechanisms, and the emerging regional order-as well as the omission of issues such as the King Hussein Bridge, the West Bank, and the Hashemite Custodianship even when addressing developments with direct implications for Jordan, including the Suwayda scenario and Israel's death penalty legislation-underscores the need for Amman to formulate its strategic priorities independently rather than expecting to be incorporated into the strategic calculations of Ankara or any other regional power.

Finally, the report's sole reference to Jordan-the reported targeting of the THAAD radar-deserves careful and independent examination. Given the report's brevity on this issue and its reliance on a



single Turkish source, Jordanian institutions should subject the incident to their own assessment and verification rather than relying exclusively on the account presented in the Turkish report. More broadly, the study demonstrates that analyses produced by national strategic institutions should not be treated merely as descriptive accounts of regional events, but also as reflections of the priorities, assumptions, and strategic narratives of the states that produce them. Reading such documents critically is therefore essential for developing independent national assessments capable of distinguishing between objective strategic realities and the political perspectives through which they are interpreted.