



Jordanians' Digital Voice: What Jordanians Are Saying in More Than 363,300 Posts About the Ongoing War on Iran

Executive Summary

The Politics and Society Institute analyzed Jordanians' reactions to the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran across social media platforms. The findings indicate a significant level of engagement, with Jordanians producing more than 363,300 independent posts across platforms including Facebook, X, Instagram, and Snapchat.

These posts were generated by more than 31.3 thousand different Jordanian accounts and collectively produced approximately 13 million interactions during the period between 21 February and 5 April 2026.

At a deeper analytical level, the data shows that 54.1% of Jordanians reject the war, while simultaneously avoiding alignment with Iran. Meanwhile, 39% follow developments neutrally without expressing an explicit political position. By contrast, only 6.9% of Jordanians express positive engagement with any party to the conflict-fewer than 7 out of every 100 Jordanians-a figure indicating that the Jordanian digital sphere has not become a space of political alignment in favor of any side.

The report further reveals that 66% of engaged Jordanians expressed their views in the language of anger, across more than 99.5 thousand posts. Yet this anger is directed primarily at the war itself. Jordanians simultaneously reject U.S.–Israeli strikes, the Iranian response, and the intervention of Hezbollah.

This broad expression of anger does not reflect an absence of differentiation. Instead, it suggests that Jordanians assess the conflict primarily through the lens of its direct humanitarian and economic consequences, rather than through ideological or geopolitical alignment. This pattern becomes particularly clear in discussions surrounding Iranian strikes against Gulf countries. In the Jordanian public consciousness, such strikes translate into concerns about fuel prices, employment opportunities, and remittances from hundreds of thousands of Jordanian families working in Gulf states.

At the level of more specific discussion themes, the analysis indicates that Jordanians do not support the American role in the conflict. Many express skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the U.S. military presence in the region-particularly in the Gulf-after Iranian strikes exposed what many perceive as its limited deterrent capacity. Jordanians also attribute responsibility for the strategic miscalculation that prolonged the war to U.S. President Donald Trump.



The report also notes that Jordanian online discussions did not remain confined to the primary parties involved in the conflict. Debate expanded to include other actors, particularly Russia. Attention to Russia increased notably following Trump's announcement that restrictions on Russian oil exports would be lifted. In response, 59.4% of Jordanians engaging with this issue argued that Russia's position is inconsistent with its publicly declared partnership with Iran and expressed rejection of that stance.

The report also shows that all Jordanian governorates participated in posting about the war, with the largest concentration of activity originating from Amman. The findings further indicate that the gender gap appears in the volume of participation rather than in the nature of attitudes, as Jordanian men and women express largely similar positions at very close rates.

Interpreting these findings, however, requires awareness not only of what the data reveals but also of what it may obscure. Jordanians engage digitally on social media within the context of the Jordan's 2023 Cybercrime Law, a regulatory environment that likely encourages a degree of self-censorship, prompting individuals to weigh their expressions carefully before posting. In addition, a significant portion of genuine public discussion takes place beyond the visible public sphere, particularly within private or closed groups on Facebook. Consequently, what this report captures is the declared digital voice rather than the entirety of the conversation.

This dynamic becomes even clearer when examining engagement patterns across platforms. Although Facebook posts were considerably fewer in number, the platform generated 11.6 million interactions, compared with only 1.5 million interactions on X. This disparity suggests that a substantial share of Jordanian discussions unfolds within the semi-private digital spaces of Facebook groups, reinforcing the conclusion that the report documents the visible layer of public discourse rather than its full depth.

Overall, the findings indicate that Jordanians on social media approach regional wars less through the logic of political alignment or mobilization and more through the circulation of information and efforts to contain tensions.

1. The War in the Jordanian Digital Sphere: Framework and Methodology of the Report

Regional wars can be understood as revealing moments that expose the nature of political and social awareness within societies. Such conflicts are rarely received merely as military events; they often function as developments that reshape how individuals perceive their position within a tense regional order. In this context, the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran, which began on **28 February 2026**, represents one of these pivotal moments, generating a broad Jordanian public debate that can be clearly observed across social media platforms. Contemporary wars increasingly extend




beyond the battlefield, unfolding within digital spaces in the form of debates and interactions that reflect societal perceptions and the broader contours of political awareness. The Jordanian public has therefore not treated this war as a distant external event; rather, online discussions indicate a high level of engagement with its regional developments.

Against this background, the importance of this report becomes evident. The analysis relies on data collected through a specialized digital listening and analytics tool designed to monitor and analyze social media content at the global level. Through this approach, the report seeks to capture patterns of interaction and sentiment within the Jordanian digital environment during the early phase of the conflict.

The monitoring conducted in this report is limited to posts originating from Jordan and focuses on four major social media platforms: Facebook, X, Instagram, and Snapchat. The period of observation extends from 21 February 2026-one week prior to the outbreak of the war-until 5 April 2026.

The monitoring process recorded a total of 363,300 independent posts, produced by approximately 31.3 thousand unique users, representing distinct Jordanian accounts whose posts and tweets contributed to the dataset. Across the monitored platforms, these posts generated approximately 13 million interactions, including likes, comments, shares, and reposts.

The report's analysis of sentiments and orientations does not rely solely on automated classification of the data. Researchers at the Politics and Society Institute also conducted direct qualitative reviews of samples of posts categorized as negative, neutral, or positive. This step allows the research team to interpret the broader public mood among Jordanians and to better understand what users support or oppose through the patterns and directions reflected in their posts. The research team also carefully excluded posts generated by artificial intelligence accounts and coordinated bot networks in order to preserve the accuracy of the dataset and ensure that the findings reflect genuine expressions of Jordanian public opinion.





1.1. Definition of Key Terms

In this report, the term “discussion” refers to every independent post, tweet, or publication originating from Jordan that addresses the topic of the war.

The term “unique user” refers to any Jordanian account that posted content about the war or interacted with such content at least once. Each account is counted only once regardless of the number of posts it produces. Accordingly, this figure reflects the number of distinct Jordanian individuals participating in the discussion, rather than the total volume of posts.

The term “interactions” includes all forms of engagement with the content, such as likes, comments, shares, and reposts.

1.2. Scope and Limitations of the Report

The data analyzed in this report reflects only publicly accessible content available on the monitored platforms. Accordingly, posts originating from private or closed accounts fall outside the scope of observation. This limitation helps explain why Facebook—despite being the most widely used platform in Jordan—appears less prominently in the dataset than might be expected. Facebook operates within a more privacy-oriented environment compared with X, which increases the likelihood that a substantial portion of interactions occur within closed or semi-private spaces that remain inaccessible to data monitoring tools.

It is also important to note that X adopts more open data-sharing policies than platforms belonging to Meta Platforms—including Facebook and Instagram—which makes its content more easily observable and analyzable. As a result, the material captured from Facebook and Instagram represents only a partial segment of the actual discussion, rather than its full extent.

These considerations should be taken into account when interpreting the report’s findings. The results presented here therefore serve as a meaningful indicator of trends in Jordanian public opinion, rather than a comprehensive record of all forms of digital expression within the country.

2. Peaks in Digital Debate: Dynamics and Implications

Data collected through the digital listening and analytics tool indicates that the Jordanian online discussion surrounding the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran passed through several notable peaks. These surges in online activity were closely linked to unfolding military, political, and security developments, which directly shaped the rhythm and intensity of public engagement across social media platforms in Jordan.



RESULTS OVER TIME



The Intensity of Jordanian Digital Discussion on the War and Its Temporal Distribution

The analysis shows that discussion of the war was largely absent from the Jordanian digital sphere prior to its outbreak. Data indicates very low posting activity until the end of February 2026. The debate began to rise gradually during the final days of February as regional tensions intensified, coinciding with circulating reports of Iranian military movements and exercises near the Strait of Hormuz. This period also witnessed escalating warnings and statements by U.S. officials, including threats issued by U.S. President Donald Trump and remarks from Secretary of State Marco Rubio regarding Iran’s expanding missile capabilities. Within this context, the gradual rise in Jordanian online posting can be interpreted as reflecting a “pre-explosion” phase, during which social media spaces in Jordan became arenas for circulating expectations, concerns, and interpretations of the likelihood of war.

The first and highest peak of Jordan’s digital voice occurred between 1 and 2 March 2026, when the number of daily posts surged from very low levels to more than 15,000 posts per day, representing the highest level recorded during the entire monitoring period. This sharp increase coincided with two major events: first, the outbreak of the war on 28 February, and second, the announcement of the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the day following the start of hostilities. This development significantly redirected Jordanian online discourse, shifting it from a phase of anticipation toward direct engagement with the reality of the war and its consequences.

A notable feature of this trend is that discussion levels did not collapse after this peak. The surge therefore did not represent a brief or momentary spike. Instead, activity stabilized at consistently high levels, ranging between 9,600 and 12,800 posts per day during the period from 3 to 19 March. This pattern suggests a transition in the nature of Jordanian engagement—from an immediate reaction driven by shock to a more sustained and continuous monitoring of developments.




Several rapid regional developments fueled this phase of ongoing engagement. Among the most prominent were Iranian missile strikes targeting energy infrastructure in Gulf states, as well as the intervention of Hezbollah, which-acting as a non-state actor aligned with Iran-launched rocket barrages toward northern Israel beginning on 3 March. Additional developments further intensified the debate, including Iranian missiles reportedly crossing Turkish airspace and continuing tensions around the Strait of Hormuz.

A temporary decline in posting activity among Jordanians appeared around 20 March, when the number of daily posts dropped to approximately 6,400 posts per day. This decrease likely coincided with the celebrations of Eid al-Fitr, which may have shifted social media activity toward other forms of communication and content sharing.

However, discussion levels quickly rose again, reaching a new peak between 23 and 25 March, when the volume of debate increased to approximately 12,800 posts per day. This surge coincided with Iran’s categorical rejection of a U.S. proposal for a ceasefire, indicating that Jordanian public engagement responded to political and diplomatic developments with the same intensity observed during military events.

Taken together, these patterns suggest that the peaks in Jordanian online discussion were far from random, instead closely linked to critical political and military turning points. The persistence of elevated levels of debate for more than five consecutive weeks further indicates that Jordanian society did not treat the war as a passing event. Rather, it has been perceived as an ongoing regional transformation with direct implications for Jordan’s domestic reality.

3. Jordanian Public Mood: Rejection of the War and Intensified Anger



General Sentiments of Jordanians Toward the U.S.–Israeli War on Iran

Sentiment analysis data indicates that the Jordanian discussion on social media regarding the war on Iran was characterized by a clearly negative tone. Negative sentiment accounted for 54.1% of total interactions, compared with 39% neutral sentiment, while positive sentiment remained very



limited at 6.9%. In practical terms, this means that 54.1% of Jordanians reject the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran, while at the same time not aligning themselves with Iran.

This negative sentiment should not be interpreted as alignment with any particular party. The data indicates that Jordanian rejection extended to the conflict as a whole, including the Iranian response and the rocket barrages launched by Hezbollah. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that expressions of support did not exceed 6.9%, meaning that fewer than seven out of every one hundred Jordanians expressed a positive stance toward any side in the conflict. Some Jordanian posts and interactions did express support for Iran, often framed through the broader perception of Israel as an adversarial actor in the region. Even so, the proportion remains small, indicating that the Jordanian digital sphere did not function as a space for political mobilization in favor of any of the war’s parties, nor did it generate calls for alignment on religious, economic, or ideological grounds.

The 39% share of neutral sentiment reflects the role of a broad segment of Jordanians whose engagement consisted primarily of sharing news and following developments without adopting a declared political position. In other words, more than one third of participants assumed the role of news followers rather than political commentators. This pattern itself constitutes an important indicator. It may reflect a climate of attentiveness and cautious observation, and it may also be influenced by the regulatory environment created by the Jordan’s 2023 Cybercrime Law, which encourages greater caution in public expression. At the same time, the overall volume of engagement—approximately 13 million interactions—demonstrates genuine Jordanian interest in the unfolding developments.

When these findings are examined within their temporal context, it becomes clear that negative sentiment did not remain static. Instead, it intensified with each wave of military escalation, particularly when strikes expanded to affect Gulf countries with which Jordan maintains strong economic and social ties. The targeting of these states produced a tangible shock across the region. This pattern again suggests that Jordanian public opinion on social media responded to the war primarily through the lens of its direct implications for regional stability, rather than through alignment with one party against another.


Overall, the data reveals a rising collective anxiety toward a war in which Jordanians perceive no clear winner—except for the strategic advantage it may provide to Israel.

3.1. The Nature of Jordanian Sentiments Toward the War

Digital listening data reveals a clear predominance of anger in Jordanian discussions on social media regarding the war. Anger accounted for 66% of the total recorded sentiments, making it the dominant emotional response among users in Jordan. It was followed by sadness at 10.3%,



fear at 8.6%, while expressions associated with love and national belonging reached 8.4%. Joy accounted for 5.9%, and surprise represented only 0.8% of the observed emotional responses.



Classification of Jordanians' Sentiments Toward the War Across Social Media in Jordan

3.1.1. Jordanians Express Anger Toward the U.S.–Israeli War on Iran

Anger appears as the dominant emotional response within Jordanian social media spaces. It accounts for 66% of recorded sentiments, represented in more than 99.5 thousand Jordanian posts expressing anger. In practical terms, two-thirds of Jordanians engaging with the war articulated their position through the language of anger rather than neutrality. This anger is often accompanied by expressions of condemnation and anxiety, particularly regarding the continued escalation of tensions and conflicts in the region, especially between Iran and Israel.

Jordanian posts clearly reflect anger at the possibility of the war expanding. Many users express a desire for the conflict to end quickly and reject the involvement of additional actors. They also show concern over the potential expansion of Gulf responses to Iranian strikes. The initial wave of anger began with rejection of U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran, and later extended to include anger at Iran's military response, as well as frustration toward the involvement of other actors such as Hezbollah in the escalation.

The analysis further indicates that the Jordanian public mood does not revolve around political or religious alignment. Jordanian posts and interactions reveal a broadly critical stance toward all parties involved, including Iran itself. There is a visible rejection among Jordanians of the idea that Iran should be treated as an ally simply because it is an Islamic state. This pattern reflects a wider reluctance to use religion as a framework for justifying political or military positions. At the same time, religious language does appear in Jordanian posts in relation to expressions of humanitarian



sympathy toward Iranian civilian victims, yet this sympathy rarely evolves into political endorsement or calls for alignment with Iran.

A clear economic dimension also emerges within these angry posts. Jordanians repeatedly express concern about the war's direct impact on daily life, including rising fuel prices, threats to energy and water supplies, and potential effects on employment opportunities. Notably, this economic anger tends to intensify whenever new escalatory statements are issued by political leaders such as U.S. President Donald Trump or Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In many cases, Jordanian users translate these political statements almost immediately into concerns about their everyday economic realities, demonstrating how regional geopolitical developments are interpreted through their potential domestic consequences in Jordan.

3.1.2. Jordanian Fear and Sadness Beneath the Surface of Anger

Feelings of sadness (10.3%) and fear (8.6%) emerged as prominent emotional responses within Jordanian public opinion toward the war as expressed on social media. In this context, sadness can be interpreted as a reflection of cumulative emotional exhaustion shaped by Jordanians' long exposure to regional conflicts. Many Jordanians do not perceive the current war as an isolated event; instead, it is viewed as part of a prolonged trajectory of crises in the region. The experience of the Twelve-Day War and the reciprocal missile exchanges between Iran and Israel in June 2025 remain particularly salient in public memory. From this perspective, sadness reflects a broader sense of symbolic loss-whether of the idea of regional stability or of the possibility of escaping the persistent cycle of escalation.

Fear, by contrast, appears primarily as a pre-emptive response shaped by uncertainty rather than as a reaction to a single direct threat. It reflects a widespread perception that the boundaries of the conflict remain unclear and that the potential for escalation-or for the war's repercussions to spill over into Jordan-remains plausible. These concerns encompass both security risks and economic consequences.

Themes of fear and sadness also appear in relation to the anticipated economic impact of the war and its potential effects on daily life in Jordan. Public discussions frequently reference the possibility of rising oil prices, increasing costs of consumer goods, and potential threats to employment opportunities.

Meanwhile, expressions of sadness among Jordanians often carry a more subdued and humanitarian tone, centered on concern for civilians and the broader social consequences of war. Social media discussions reveal a clear sense of empathy toward victims-particularly civilians in Lebanon, the Gulf states, and Iran-without this sympathy translating into political alignment with any party to the conflict.



These sentiments therefore extend beyond a purely political reaction. They reflect a deeper sense of uncertainty and apprehension regarding an increasingly unstable regional future-one perceived as likely to impose significant humanitarian and economic costs. Concerns about economic deterioration are particularly evident in discussions about the potential burden Jordanians may bear from the war's economic repercussions, including the risks associated with disruptions in energy supplies and the possible closure of key maritime corridors that could affect Jordan's domestic economy.

3.1.3. War and the Reinforcement of National Sentiments Among Jordanians

The positive sentiments identified in Jordanians' interactions on social media regarding the war appear in relatively small proportions. These posts are primarily directed toward strengthening national sentiments, as well as expressing hope for peace, stability, and the cessation of the war's expansion in the region.

Feelings of love account for 8.4%, as Jordanians post messages dominated by emotional expressions of solidarity with national security, the leadership, and the army in Jordan. These posts also include expressions of wishes, hope, and prayers for stability, particularly for Lebanon and the Gulf countries. This clearly reflects a tendency among Jordanians-evident in their posts-toward de-escalation.

4. Axes of the Jordanian Debate: How Did Jordanians React to the Major Developments of the War?

The rapid developments of the war did not alter the core of the Jordanian position. The Jordanian digital voice remained consistent in its main sentiments-namely the rejection of escalation and concern over the consequences-throughout the monitoring period. At the same time, several pivotal events prompted more intense and detailed reactions among Jordanians, including the assassination of Ali Khamenei, the strikes on the Gulf, and the role of the United States. The following section provides a reading of these key themes and how Jordanians engaged with them.


4.1. The Assassination of Ali Khamenei and the Jordanian Debate

An examination of Jordanian interactions and posts on social media following the announcement of the killing of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei shows that this event constituted a prominent moment in the trajectory of digital debate. Jordanians produced more than 21.7 thousand posts on the subject.

The data indicate that 62.5% of these posts expressed rejection of Khamenei's killing, while expressions of support did not exceed 3.1%, and these were often framed in a sarcastic or mocking tone. The remaining 34.3% of posts were neutral in nature, which can be explained by



the predominance of objective and news-oriented content within a significant portion of the circulating material.




Distribution of Jordanian Public Sentiments on Social Media Concerning the Assassination of Ali Khamenei

This distribution reflects a cautious pattern in the interaction of Jordanian public opinion, which tends to reject military escalation rather than adopt celebratory, supportive, or strongly oppositional positions. The analysis also indicates that Jordanians' rejection of the assassination of Ali Khamenei stems primarily from concerns about the regional consequences of the event rather than from political alignment with Iran. The findings do not suggest that Jordanians engaging in online discussions positioned themselves on Iran's side in the war. The limited visibility of pro-Iran expressions may partly relate to the regulatory environment shaped by the Jordanian Cybercrime Law, as well as to Iran's threats and targeting of sites in Jordan, which may make open expressions of support for Iran more complex. Consequently, the majority of interactions were associated with concerns about the expansion of the war and its implications for regional stability.

The analysis also shows that the rapid decline in the volume of interactions in the days following the assassination of Khamenei indicates that, despite its immediate intensity, the event did not evolve into a sustained public opinion issue. Instead, it remained largely within the framework of a news shock linked to a broader context of escalation. This suggests that Jordanian public opinion



reacts strongly to pivotal moments, yet quickly redirects its attention toward the broader dynamics of the war and its consequences rather than focusing on a single event in isolation..





Graph Showing the Distribution of Public Sentiments and the Volume of Social Media Posts in the First Three Days After the Announcement of the Assassination of Ali Khamenei

4.2. Hezbollah's Strikes and the Jordanian Public Debate

When Hezbollah launched volleys of rockets toward northern Israel on 3 March 2026, an action directly driven by the assassination of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the development did not constitute merely another military incident. Rather, it reshaped the broader map of the conflict, making it more complex with Hezbollah's entry as an active party. This escalation pushed southern Lebanon into the sphere of direct Israeli targeting, accompanied by large-scale civilian displacement and a significant increase in humanitarian losses.

This development also reverberated across Jordanian social media spaces. During the first days following Hezbollah's strikes against Israel, Jordanians generated notable online engagement, producing more than 43.6 thousand posts and tweets discussing the event.



Distribution of Jordanian Public Sentiments on Social Media Regarding the Rocket Strikes by Hezbollah and the Israeli Missile Response by Israel

Sentiment analysis indicators show a clear dominance of negative reactions at 60.3%, compared with 36.3% neutral sentiments and only 3.4% positive sentiments. In other words, six out of ten Jordanians who interacted with this event expressed rejection or condemnation. Approximately 60.3% voiced opposition to the intervention of Hezbollah in the war and rejected the Iranian strikes, while also rejecting the missile response by Israel. This pattern indicates that Jordanians are concerned about the potential expansion of the war, particularly the possibility that the Lebanese–Israeli confrontation could widen to include Syria and other parts of the region.

Several posts also reflected anger among Jordanians toward Hezbollah’s entry into the war, with some users arguing that the organization lacked the necessary ammunition and logistical resources to sustain such involvement. These discussions often linked Hezbollah’s intervention to the growing losses experienced in Lebanon and to the negative repercussions for the daily lives of Lebanese civilians. At the same time, the analysis of Jordanian posts reveals visible expressions of hope for stability in Lebanon, alongside manifestations of Arab solidarity and Jordanian sympathy with the Lebanese population.

By contrast, the proportion of Jordanian discussions supporting Hezbollah’s rocket strikes did not exceed 3.4%. These supportive posts frequently connected the strikes to the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution and situated them within a broader framework of solidarity with what is often referred to as the “axis of resistance,” particularly in relation to the Palestinian issue.



The remaining 36.3% of posts were neutral in tone and tended to focus on analytical or informational perspectives rather than strong normative positions. These posts addressed several themes, including concerns about the potential escalation of internal conflict in Lebanon, the Lebanese government’s decision to impose visa requirements on Iranian citizens, references to broader Arab solidarity and condemnations directed toward both Iran and Israel, as well as growing concerns about unconventional developments such as cyber warfare or the recurrence of security incidents similar to the pager device explosions reported during the June 2025 war.



Jordanian posts on Hezbollah strikes Israel

Jordanian Interaction Intensity Index on Hezbollah’s Strikes Against Israel (3–9 March 2026)




The word map aligns with the quantitative findings, as the terms “Lebanon,” “south,” and “Hezbollah” dominated the discussion as the most frequently used expressions. This clearly indicates that Jordanians approached Hezbollah’s intervention primarily from the perspective of its humanitarian consequences for Lebanon, before considering it through a political lens. At the same time, the appearance of the names of regional countries-such as Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Syria-alongside prayer expressions such as “*Allahumma*” (O God) reflects a clear humanitarian dimension within the Jordanian discussion. Jordanian concern extended to civilians in all countries affected by the strikes, whether Iranian or Israeli. This further confirms



that Jordanians did not perceive Hezbollah's strikes as a victory, but rather as an additional humanitarian burden on the region as a whole.

4.3. Jordanian Public Opinion Toward the U.S. Role in the War



Indicators of Jordanians' Sentiments Toward the U.S. Party in the War

The data recorded more than 60.4 thousand Jordanian posts and tweets addressing the American role in the war. Sentiment analysis indicators show a clear predominance of negative reactions at 64.4%, compared with 33.2% neutral sentiments and only 2.3% positive sentiments. In other words, more than six out of every ten Jordanians who engaged with the issue expressed rejection and condemnation of the American role.

The proportion of positive sentiments, which stands at **2.3%**, should not be interpreted as support for the American role in the war. Rather, it likely reflects positive engagement with specific American positions or responses to Iranian strikes that affected neighboring countries. It is also possible that the analytical algorithm classified some sarcastic or satirical content as positive due to the absence of explicitly negative wording. Jordanians frequently employ this type of content when discussing the war and certain positions associated with the U.S. president Donald Trump.

Accordingly, this marginal percentage appears less as a genuine supportive current and more as an exception that confirms the broader pattern. Overall, the findings indicate a clear rejection among Jordanians of the American role in the war.

4.3.1. Concerns About the U.S. Military Presence and Its Ability to End the War

The Jordanian debate revealed clear concerns regarding the scale of the American military presence in the Middle East and the existence of U.S. military bases in the region. Many Jordanians argued that the United States possesses the capacity to halt the war but is instead choosing to continue the escalation.



At the same time, a segment of Jordanians has begun to question the effectiveness and practical value of the American military presence, particularly after Iranian strikes reached countries in the Gulf-an event perceived as shocking within the regional context. In this regard, Jordanian discussions frequently reflected visible concern about what was described as a shortage of American interceptor missiles.

4.3.2. Trump - When an Unpredictable Personality Leads an Uncalculated War

A clear interest appears among Jordanians in exchanging tweets and posts about the personality of the U.S. president Donald Trump. His figure became a central axis in the Jordanian debate, not only from the perspective of political analysis, but also because his unexpected statements and fluctuating rhetoric made the trajectory of the war more difficult to interpret.

The data recorded extensive Jordanian engagement with several of his controversial remarks, including references to a “large and valuable gift” from Iran, his praise for the rescue of an American pilot, and his threat to “send Iran back to the Stone Age.” Jordanians described these statements as revealing a leadership approach that deals with war through a transactional mindset and reflects a degree of confusion stemming from unusual personal traits.


Many Jordanians also argued that Trump entered the war convinced that Iran lacked the military capabilities necessary to respond, and that the conflict would therefore be short and decisive. This assumption, they suggested, relied heavily on assessments advanced by Benjamin Netanyahu-assessments that subsequent developments proved inaccurate. In this sense, Jordanians attributed responsibility to Trump for the miscalculation that contributed to prolonging the war. It is also notable that Jordanians expressed these views in numerous sarcastic and satirical posts following several of Trump’s speeches.

4.3.3. Linking the U.S. Role to Domestic American Issues

A number of Jordanian posts also drew a noticeable connection between Trump’s entry into the war and the spread of the Jeffrey Epstein files scandal. Some Jordanians suggested that the timing of the war was not entirely unrelated to attempts to divert attention from domestic political crises within the United States.



4.4. The Shock of Iranian Strikes on the Gulf and the Jordanian Debate



The data recorded more than 23.1 thousand Jordanian posts addressing the Iranian strikes on the Gulf states. Sentiment analysis indicators show an exceptional dominance of negative reactions at 60.8%, compared with 36.8% neutral sentiments, while positive sentiments remained almost absent. Notably, these proportions do not reflect a division in Jordanian opinion regarding the strikes. Rather, they indicate differences in the ways Jordanians expressed shock and rejection—some responding with strong condemnation, while others limited their engagement to observation and documentation. Jordanians expressed clear rejection of Iran targeting Gulf countries, and many of the interactions categorized as positive reflected expressions of solidarity with the affected Gulf states. Numerous Jordanians also shared posts offering prayers for the Gulf countries.

The timeline chart of sentiment distribution reveals two main peaks in the Jordanian discussion regarding the strikes on the Gulf. The first occurred between 28 February and 2 March, coinciding with the outbreak of the war and the beginning of the first Iranian strikes on Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha. This development constituted an immediate shock for Jordanian public opinion, which had not anticipated that strikes would reach countries associated with such levels of stability. The second peak appeared around 7 March, coinciding with the escalation of Iranian strikes on energy infrastructure in the Gulf, the burning of oil storage tanks in Fujairah, and Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz. A third, more moderate wave of interaction appeared around 21 March, linked to the continuation of Iranian threats to maritime navigation in the region and coinciding with the period of Eid al-Fitr.

What distinguishes this theme from other topics in the Jordanian discussion is that it was not primarily a political debate in the strict sense. Rather, it represented an expression of shock at the disruption of a long-standing equation of stability. In the Jordanian social imagination, the Gulf states had not traditionally been perceived as direct participants in military confrontations;



instead, they were associated with stability and economic opportunity. The targeting of these states with missiles and drones altered this entrenched image and generated deep concern among Jordanians.

The Jordanian debate did not separate itself from the direct economic dimension, as Jordan is structurally linked to the Gulf states through the remittances of hundreds of thousands of Jordanian workers employed there. This connection is reinforced by Jordan's reliance on energy imports through the same maritime routes that have now become threatened. Jordanians therefore immediately translated the strikes on the Gulf into direct livelihood concerns related to fuel prices, energy security, and employment opportunities. In this sense, the discussion was not merely commentary on a distant event, but rather an interpretation of its potential consequences for everyday life in Jordan.

The data also revealed a noticeable presence of expressions of solidarity and prayers for the Gulf countries in parallel Jordanian posts, reflecting the empathetic orientation of Jordanian public opinion toward the affected states.

4.5. Jordanian Public Opinion Toward Russia and the War

RESULTS OVER TIME



Peak of the Jordanian Debate on Russia and the Ongoing War

The analysis shows that Jordanians shared more than 3,200 posts and tweets related to Russia during the ongoing war. These posts were generated by 1,100 unique users and produced a total of 106,300 interactions. The significance of these figures becomes clearer when considering that Russia was not present at this level in the Jordanian debate at the beginning of the war. The surge in interaction—exceeding 1.3 million percent compared with the pre-war period—indicates that the war on Iran in particular prompted Jordanians to pay greater attention to Russia.

Jordanian expressions of opinion regarding Russia and the war rose sharply between 13 and 14 March, coinciding with a series of interconnected developments. These included Washington's announcement of the temporary lifting of restrictions on the sale of Russian oil to address the economic costs of the war, and Russia's submission of an independent draft resolution at the



United Nations Security Council in response to a draft resolution introduced by Bahrain on behalf of the Gulf states and Jordan.


In terms of sentiment, 59.4% of Jordanians interacting with the Russian dimension of the war expressed negative sentiments, indicating a lack of support for the Russian position. By contrast, 39.5% were neutral, while less than 1% expressed positive views. This predominance of negative sentiment warrants careful interpretation. It likely reflects frustration with what many Jordanians perceived as a contradictory Russian position. Although Moscow and Tehran maintain a strategic partnership agreement, Russia limited its role largely to statements and did not take tangible action on the ground or attempt meaningful mediation to end the war.

There also appears to be dissatisfaction with Russia’s stance at the United Nations Security Council, which some Jordanians interpreted as biased and implicitly encouraging toward Iran, particularly at a time when the Gulf states and Jordan were calling for a clearer international position amid the escalation of Iranian strikes on the Gulf.

Jordanian users also repeatedly circulated posts referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulating the Iranian leadership on the occasion of Nowruz during the continued escalation of the war.

5. The Digital Geography of the Jordanian Debate: A Reading of Governorate-Level Distribution

SHARE OF COUNTRIES/REGIONS



Proportions of Participation Intensity by Jordanian Governorates in the Debate



The data show that the Jordanian digital discussion surrounding the ongoing war was distributed across all governorates. However, the capital, Amman, emerges as the central space for the production and circulation of debate about the war. This can be explained by several factors, most notably the high population density, the higher levels of digital connectivity resulting from infrastructure that facilitates continuous internet access for Jordanians, and the concentration of media institutions as well as political and cultural elites in Amman.

By contrast, the lower levels of interaction observed in other governorates do not indicate a lack of interest. Rather, they may reflect differences in access to digital platforms or variations in modes of expression. In some areas, engagement may be less visible or may occur through channels that are not monitored with the same level of intensity.

Aqaba: The Most Negative and the Fastest Growing

Aqaba records the highest level of negative sentiment among all Jordanian governorates, reaching 85.31%. It has also witnessed the fastest growth in posts, increasing by 217.5% since the beginning of the war. This pattern can be interpreted in light of Aqaba's economic position as Jordan's only maritime outlet. Its proximity to the conflict theater around the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz has made it particularly sensitive to the war's repercussions on maritime navigation and trade, placing the governorate among the most exposed areas to the potential economic consequences of the conflict.

Irbid: High Engagement with Fewer Posts

Data from Irbid reveals a notable phenomenon: the governorate generated 107.9 thousand interactions, despite producing only 11.9 thousand posts. This indicates that content originating from Irbid achieved a relatively higher level of engagement and circulation compared to its volume. Such a pattern may reflect the nature of the governorate's dense and closely interconnected social networks, which facilitate the rapid diffusion and amplification of digital content.

Ma'an: Relatively Lower Negativity

Ma'an displays a lower level of negative sentiment toward the war compared with other governorates, at 65.10%. In practical terms, this suggests that some posts from the governorate expressed limited support for the Iranian strikes against Israel. This finding merits attention in the broader analysis of Jordanian public opinion, as it may be linked to the governorate's distinct social composition and political discourse. Ma'an has historically produced political narratives that differ from those prevalent in other parts of the country during periods of crisis. Such positions may stem from limited trust in official narratives and a tendency to articulate perspectives that diverge from dominant national discourse. Nevertheless, the data does not




indicate the presence of a clearly defined ideological or partisan alignment among pro-Iran voices in Ma'an. Instead, expressions of sympathy toward civilians targeted in Arab and Muslim countries appear more prominently within the governorate's online discourse.

Al-Mafraq: The Shock of Proximity

Al-Mafraq exhibits a negative sentiment rate of 69.59%. This pattern can be interpreted through its geographical proximity to the Syrian border and its accumulated historical experience with regional instability. These factors appear to heighten local sensitivity toward any escalation in the region. Residents of Al-Mafraq often perceive themselves as among the most vulnerable to the consequences of an expanding conflict, particularly given the governorate's location near both Syria and Iraq, which reinforces perceptions of exposure to potential security and economic repercussions.

Overall, the data indicates that negative sentiment toward the war constitutes a shared pattern across all Jordanian governorates without exception. In other words, opposition to the war does not represent a phenomenon confined to the urban environment of Amman; rather, it reflects a broad national position. At the same time, the intensity of these sentiments and the underlying concerns vary from one governorate to another, shaped by differences in economic structure, geographical location, and historical experiences with regional crises.

Consequently, any analysis of Jordanian public opinion that relies solely on aggregate figures-without examining their geographical distribution-will remain limited in its ability to capture the depth and diversity of these attitudes. It is also important to note that several governorates rely more heavily on Facebook rather than X (formerly Twitter) for online engagement, while access to Facebook data remains more restricted. As a result, part of the Jordanian digital discussion surrounding the war may remain underrepresented in datasets derived primarily from the X platform.



6. The Gender Gap in Jordan's Digital Debate


The data shows that men led the online engagement with the war on Iran, accounting for 79.3% of total interactions, compared to 20.7% for women. This disparity reflects a clear gender gap in the level of participation in political discussions within Jordan's digital sphere.

More revealing than these absolute figures, however, is the pattern that emerges from the comparative sentiment analysis between genders. The data indicates a striking similarity in the nature of attitudes expressed. Male users recorded 58.3% negative sentiment and 34.9% neutral sentiment, while female users registered 56.7% negative sentiment and 33.8% neutral sentiment. In other words, the gender gap appears in the volume of participation rather than in the nature of the position itself, as both Jordanian men and women expressed opposition to the war at very similar rates.

This disparity can be interpreted through two complementary factors. First, discussions related to war, security, and foreign policy have historically attracted higher levels of male participation, a pattern shaped by socialization processes and prevailing structures of public interest in Jordan. Second, the number of public accounts operated by women in Jordan remains lower than that of men due to social and cultural considerations related to privacy. Consequently, women's lower visibility in the data does not necessarily indicate the absence of their views.



Taken together, these findings convey two important messages. The first is that Jordanian public opinion opposing the war represents a broad societal position that transcends gender divisions. The second is that digital data tends to overrepresent male participation relative to female participation, a factor that should be taken into account when interpreting digital indicators as reflections of Jordanian public opinion as a whole.



The Gender Distribution of Jordanian Participants in Online Public Debate on the War

7. Language in the Debate: A Local Character with an International News Reference


The data reveals an almost complete dominance of the Arabic language in the Jordanian discussion related to the war. Arabic accounted for 98.8% of the total 368.6 thousand posts, compared to only 1.2% in English. This distribution indicates that the Jordanian debate surrounding the war was fundamentally local in nature, as Jordanians absorbed the event and interpreted it within their own context and in their native language. Meanwhile, the presence of English was largely functional and primarily associated with news transmission through media platforms, such as Roya News, rather than with expressing opinions or participating in the discussion itself.

The timeline of the two languages adds an important analytical dimension. It shows that the Arabic-language curve rose sharply with the outbreak of the war on 28 February, reaching a peak of 15 thousand posts per day, and remained at elevated levels throughout the observation period. By contrast, the English-language curve remained almost flat during the same period. This pattern suggests that Arabic was not merely a linguistic choice but the natural medium through which the event was processed and reproduced within the Jordanian public sphere.



The overwhelming predominance of Arabic therefore carries implications that extend beyond language itself to the nature of the audience engaged in the debate. It indicates that the Jordanian discussion was not directed toward an external or international audience; rather, it functioned primarily as an internal dialogue, within which Jordanians exchanged concerns, interpretations, and questions among themselves. As a result, these data provide a more authentic reflection of Jordanian public opinion, largely removed from the influence of external discourse or international framing.


SHARE OF LANGUAGES



The Proportion of Arabic to English in the Debate

8. Dynamics of Jordanian Engagement Across Digital Platforms

SHARE OF MEDIA TYPES




The Proportion of Posting Intensity Across Different Social Media Platforms




The data reveals an intriguing pattern when the platform figures are examined side by side. The platform X (Twitter) recorded 325.3 thousand posts from 31 thousand unique users, generating 1.5 million interactions and an estimated reach of 25.5 billion. In contrast, Facebook recorded only 42.5 thousand posts from 237 users, yet produced 11.6 million interactions and an estimated reach of 107.7 billion.

In practical terms, this means that Facebook achieved seven times more engagement and four times greater reach despite the fact that the number of posts on the platform does not exceed one-eighth of the total posts published on X.

SHARE OF ENGAGEMENT



ENGAGEMENT OVER TIME




The Proportion and Intensity of Jordanian Engagement Across Social Media Platforms

This large discrepancy between the volume of posts and the level of engagement on Facebook reveals an important indicator: Facebook appears to function as the primary platform for Jordanians, yet most of its activity remains largely inaccessible. The core of the Jordanian digital debate often takes place within closed groups and private accounts, where Meta imposes strict restrictions on data accessibility. Consequently, the 42.5 thousand observed posts represent only the visible portion of a much broader sphere of activity. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that only 237 Facebook users generated a level of engagement that exceeded what was produced by 31 thousand users on X (Twitter). In effect, each Facebook post reached a significantly larger audience than posts on X.

The dominant presence of X (Twitter) in the data presented in this report does not necessarily indicate that it is the most widely used platform among Jordanians. Rather, it reflects the fact that X is more observable and easier to analyze. Its relatively open policies regarding data sharing through application programming interfaces (APIs) make it more visible in digital research and analytical datasets. However, this visibility does not mean that X fully represents the broader landscape of Jordanian public opinion. In practical terms, X serves as the window through which analysts observe the Jordanian debate, but it is not the room in which most of that debate actually takes place.



These findings carry an important methodological caution. What appears in this report represents Jordanian public opinion as expressed in open digital spaces, which constitutes only one segment of a much larger discussion that largely unfolds behind the privacy barriers of Facebook. As a result, any interpretation of Jordanian public opinion based solely on data from X risks overrepresenting a specific category of users while overlooking the broader audience that engages more quietly on Facebook, yet often with deeper and more influential interaction patterns.



Types of Jordanian Interactions Across Social Media Platforms

9. Analysis of Hashtags and the Most Frequently Used Words

The word map reveals the structure of the Jordanian debate surrounding the war more clearly than numerical indicators alone. The term “Iran” appeared at the top of the map as the most frequently mentioned word, followed by “war,” “Israel,” and “the Gulf.” This pattern indicates that Jordanians did not approach the conflict from the perspective of a single actor, but rather viewed it through the interaction of its three principal parties simultaneously. This observation aligns closely with the sentiment analysis presented in this report, which shows that Jordanian opposition to the war extended to all parties involved rather than reflecting alignment with any particular side.

The prominent presence of the names Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu further confirms what was identified in the section analyzing the American role in the conflict. Jordanians frequently linked the escalation to specific political actors and leadership decisions. In other words, the Jordanian debate did not revolve around abstract policies alone, but around individuals perceived as directly responsible for developments in the region. This dynamic helps explain why negative sentiment toward the American role reached 64.4%.

The appearance of Lebanon, Gaza Strip, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, alongside Jordan, corresponds with the findings related to the strikes on the Gulf region. Jordanians did not treat the war as a



distant event; rather, they placed themselves within the broader regional equation. The presence of the word “Jordan” itself within the map indicates that participants in the discussion were asking where their country stands in relation to the conflict and what potential repercussions it might face. This concern helps explain why anger reached 66% of recorded sentiments, while economic anxieties became dominant within the debate.

A deeper symbolic meaning emerges from the simultaneous presence of the words “Allahumma” (a supplicatory invocation) and “#Breaking” within the same discursive space. Together, they encapsulate the broader Jordanian mood captured in this report. The hashtag “#Breaking” reflects the vigilance of citizens closely monitoring developments in the war in real time, with anxiety and anticipation—a pattern evident in the sustained high level of discussion over more than five consecutive weeks. By contrast, “Allahumma” reflects a sense of powerlessness in the face of a conflict perceived as exceeding the capacity of ordinary individuals to influence its course. This sentiment corresponds with the limited level of positive sentiment, which did not exceed 6.9%.

Taken together, these two expressions provide a condensed summary of the Jordanian condition during the war as revealed by this report: an anxious vigilance accompanied by a sense of limited agency, expressed most clearly through supplication.

نتنياهو
الشرق
دولة
صواريخ
دول المنطقة
حزب
ان الخليج
وزير
اسرائيل
صاروخ
اللهم الأردن
الأمريكية لبنان الأردن #عاجل
الإيرانية
عاجل

Finally: Interpreting the Findings - Between What the Data Reveals and What It Conceals

The data presented in this report reveals a notable pattern in the way Jordanians engage digitally with the war. Yet its true value does not lie merely in the figures themselves, but in what they signal about deeper structures shaping Jordanian attitudes toward regional conflicts.



One of the most significant findings is that Jordanians generally avoid aligning themselves with any side in this war. Approximately 54.1% of participants rejected the war as a whole without expressing support for Iran, while the proportion of Jordanians expressing positive engagement toward any party did not exceed 6.9%. This pattern is not new within Jordanian public opinion. Rather, it reflects a well-established tendency in the way Jordanians interpret regional conflicts. Historically, Jordanians tend to assess such events primarily through the lens of their impact on daily life, economic stability, and humanitarian consequences, rather than through ideological alignment or political mobilization. This perspective explains why Jordanian anger—reaching 66%—extended simultaneously to all parties involved, and why Iranian strikes on the Gulf were immediately interpreted in Jordanian discourse through concerns about fuel prices, employment opportunities, and financial remittances, rather than as an abstract political position.

Another finding that merits particular attention is the absence of Sunni–Shiite sectarian conflict as a driving force within the Jordanian debate. Although the war could have provided fertile ground for sectarian polarization, the analysis indicates that Jordanians expressed sympathy toward Iranian civilians from a broad humanitarian and Islamic perspective, without this sentiment translating into sectarian or political alignment with Iran. This pattern raises important questions about the nature of Jordanian political identity and its capacity to separate humanitarian empathy from political allegiance—a distinction that many Arab societies have struggled to maintain in earlier periods.

For diplomatic decision-makers in particular, the data carries several clear signals. The fact that 64.4% of engaged Jordanians expressed rejection of the American role and skepticism toward its intentions does not appear to be a temporary reaction produced solely by this war. Instead, it reflects a broader Jordanian attitude toward U.S. policy in the region, which in this conflict was reinforced by the unpredictable political profile of Donald Trump and by perceptions that the American military presence failed to shield Gulf states from Iranian strikes despite billions of dollars spent on security cooperation. At the same time, the fact that 60.8% of Jordanians rejected the Iranian strikes on the Gulf and expressed solidarity with Gulf states points to a significant Jordanian–Gulf social and emotional capital that could be diplomatically reinforced. This capital does not emerge in a vacuum; it is rooted in the deep social ties created by hundreds of thousands of Jordanian families working across Gulf countries.

Yet interpreting these findings requires attention not only to what the data reveals, but also to what it may obscure. Jordanian digital engagement unfolds under the framework of the 2023 Cybercrime Law, whose Article 7 criminalizes digital content considered harmful to national unity or capable of inciting discord, with penalties that include a minimum of three months' imprisonment and financial fines. Article 13 also authorizes prosecution for publishing content



deemed harmful to relations with friendly foreign states. The law has been applied in cases related to political expression online, which likely contributes to a widespread culture of self-censorship, where users carefully weigh their expressions before publishing them. This raises an important question: does the marginal figure of 6.9% expressing positive sentiment toward Iran truly represent the real proportion of Jordanians who might sympathize with Iran or the so-called “axis of resistance”? Or does part of this sentiment remain concealed behind constraints on expression and concerns about accountability?

This margin becomes even wider when considering that Facebook, the most widely used platform in Jordan, generated 11.6 million interactions compared with only 1.5 million on X (Twitter), despite producing only 42.5 thousand posts compared with 325.3 thousand posts on X. This suggests that Jordanians discuss the war far more deeply within closed Facebook groups and private messaging applications, while what this report captures primarily reflects the publicly visible layer of the debate rather than its full scope.

The central conclusion, therefore, is that this report does not claim to present a comprehensive picture of Jordanian public opinion in all its complexity and contradictions. Rather, it offers an analysis of what Jordanians chose to express publicly within open digital spaces during an exceptional regional moment. Even this partial view, however, clearly indicates that Jordanians tend to approach regional wars not through the logic of alignment or ideological mobilization, but through the logic of survival and protection. Understanding this logic remains essential for shaping effective diplomatic communication and public engagement strategies with Jordanian society.