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Politics & Society Institute

Report on two workshops about  
**Palestine and the Jordanian National Security:**  
**“Endgame” responsibilities. The day after the**  
**failure of the peace process**



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**Reading the report:  
Moving from a two-state solution  
approach to conflict management**

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This report documents the proceedings of two closed workshops conducted by the Politics and Society Institute in Amman, in collaboration with the Masarat Center for Palestinian Studies in Ramallah. The first workshop took place on May 27-28, 2023 in Amman and included Palestinian politicians from the occupied territories, three Palestinian politicians, and a selection of Jordanian political elites. The main topics discussed during the workshop included the current political situation in Israel and the anticipated future of Benjamin Netanyahu's government in light of the protests and the strategic plans of the Israeli right regarding the Palestinian conflict. The Palestinian situation, the status of the Palestinian Authority, the emergence of new small resistance groups, and the strategic possibilities and choices available to the Palestinians in the face of

the existing situation were also addressed. Furthermore, considerations of Jordan's national security related to the West Bank, sources of threat, and strategic interests were discussed. The second workshop, held on June 22 of the same year, involved Jordanian elites, including writers, experts, and researchers at the institute's headquarters.

The two workshops, in order to allow great freedom in discussions and dialogues for participants, were subject to the Chatham House Rules. So this report was keen to avoid quotations or referral to the owners of the ideas and opinions received, and the author and editor of the report, colleague Abdullah Al-Ta'ie, was keen to "honesty" in the presentation of the ideas and opinions presented as they are, and to highlight the different, divergent and diverse trends in discussing the strategic issues raised.

Here, in this presentation, and as a participant in the two workshops, I have many personal conclusions and observations, which do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the participants in the workshop, and they are, by the way, representing some elites in Jordan and Palestine who differ in their perceptions and political trends.

## **1-Israeli Strategic Project:**

### **Isolated Palestinian Cantons**

It is true that there are some participants who believe that Israelis have entered into a major strategic dilemma, particularly concerning how to handle the Palestinian demographic realities within Israel, who have nationality with political and legal rights because of which they are in a dilemma in dealing with the Palestinian "population bloc" in the 1967 territories. Not to mention, there exist the increasing internal Israeli divisions on ideological (religious/secular), geographical (settlement residents/urban residents), and ethnic lines. Despite all this, it is essential to acknowledge that Israel, has the strength and determination to move forward within the framework of the Zionist project, which sees the entirety of Palestine as the promised land of Israel, representing a national home for the Jewish people, and the Palestinians who are present as a burden that must be dealt with, thus undermining their legitimate claims to the territory.

The idea of a fully sovereign Palestinian state to be established on the Palestinian territories occupied on June 1967 is not included in the Israeli calculations. The ideal solution for the Israeli right is to wake up tomorrow and not see any Palestinian or even the



Palestinians of the occupied interior (Israeli Arabs), and for Jerusalem to be the eternal capital of the Israelis and for the symbolic temple to be built. This is the Zionist-religious dream that still flirts with the "political imagination" of the religious and political right in Israel, and even sees it as a future strategic goal that they seek to achieve, if not completely, then at least partially.

On the other hand, the deal of the century announced by former US President Donald Trump represents the ceiling that the "Israeli concession" can reach in any possible settlement with the Palestinians, and it - that is, the contents of the deal - is not far from what the Obama administration previously proposed to President Mahmoud Abbas, and what John Kerry, former US Secretary of State proposed as the part of the American project brought by him at the time. This plan would look like a Palestinian state in some parts of the Palestinian territories, an imaginary capital in Jerusalem (i.e., taking the village of Abu Dis adjacent to Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital), incomplete sovereignty over the borders under Israeli control, non-return of refugees, and land swaps with settlements in the West Bank. Israel's strategic stakes (outside the context of a collapsing peace settlement)


are to control land and dispose of the population, in any way, which may amount to attempts at transfer or mass displacement of Palestinians.

Is the risk of transfer still possible and realistic? The answer to the question of the Palestinian and Jordanian political elite is that it is not possible and that the Palestinians cannot give up their land and that they had learned from the past bitter experiences. On the other hand, in light of the new realities in the region, another trend believes that the transfer scenario is not excluded, as there are millions of displaced Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis, and Ukrainians, which means that mass repatriation is possible, even in the 21st century. So, why do we rule out that this option will be on the table for the Israelis in the event of a conflict, war, or even an internal Palestinian crisis (internal fighting)?

In the context of the debate surrounding the transfer scenario, some participants proposed another term known as "**political transfer**," which may be the closest, for the Israeli right-wing elites, to reality. It aligns completely with the gradual and incremental project that Israelis are pursuing and betting on, namely the "Palestinian cantons." These cantons are linked to a self-governing authority with a security character and are organically connected to Israeli security and

strategic considerations. This scenario pushes many young Palestinians to look abroad as they seek to escape these oppressive conditions due to the absence of clear strategic options for struggle.

The scenario of "cantons," with its various components, is the most probable and realistic in Israeli strategic thinking. It aims to geographically squeeze Palestinians, stimulate reasons and motivations for voluntary departure, and exacerbate the internal Palestinian crisis. In the medium term, it involves restructuring "political violence" to target Palestinians by settlers in the West Bank, threatening and instilling fear and terror in them. Some participants in the workshop drew parallels between the roles of settlers today and the activities of Zionist militias in Israel before the establishment of the state.



One of the key observations drawn from the discussion session on the situation in Israel and the status of Palestinians in the 1948 territories is that **there is a consensus among participants that it is not possible to go back to Israeli society**. There has been a shift in the voting behavior of the electorate, with the increasing influence of settlements in the electoral and political process. Therefore, any Palestinian or Jordanian gamble on finding a partner different from the right-wing direction is unrealistic and illogical. Even the previous administration before Benjamin Netanyahu (Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett) did not present a different project for the Palestinians, meaning that the idea of a Palestinian state on the entirety of the 1967 territories has ended and is no longer feasible. The idea of reclaiming Jerusalem and other key issues in the final resolution is also deemed impractical. Moreover, the most dangerous aspect lies in the actions of the Israeli right-wing towards Palestinians in the occupied territories and Palestinians in Jerusalem, including attempts to uproot, annul, displace, and negate their existence.

The participants in the workshop also agree that there is a dangerous Israeli plan to immerse Palestinians in the 1948 territories in moral, societal, and cultural

problems. There has been an observed rise in family and clan disputes, acts of thuggery, robbery, and deteriorating security in Palestinian neighborhoods in these areas, with Israeli authorities turning a blind eye to it. The intended goal appears to be isolating this important social-political strategic base from the Palestinian environment and from central issues such as Jerusalem, and thwarting any attempts by certain elites to pursue a strategy known as "unity of arenas." This is particularly evident after Israelis expressed concern over the protests carried out by this base regarding the Jerusalem issue.

## **2. The Deepening of the Palestinian Dilemma and the Lack of Strategic options**

On the other side of the equation, several observations were made by the Palestinian participants. The most prominent among them is the collapse of the credibility of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the erosion of the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority. Its symbolic and strategic role as a bearer of the Palestinian liberation project or the step-by-step strategy has dissipated. The Authority has become immersed in personal calculations, whether by President Abbas or the surrounding political elite. Meanwhile, the real role of the Authority has shifted to

focus on security missions, particularly those related to Israeli considerations and conditions.

The second aspect agreed upon by the participants is the exclusion of Palestinian reconciliation and the lack of expectation for Palestinian elections (although all participants agreed that elections are a crucial prerequisite for reviving the Palestinian national situation). There is also the absence of a Palestinian strategic project to embrace the cells of the new resistance, which the Palestinian Authority is trying to contain and undermine due to significant American and Israeli pressures. Therefore, despite the inclination towards the existence of a new generation of angry Palestinians dissatisfied with all factions, the current situation, and the Palestinian Authority, all while searching for a new horizon, the realistic conditions and current pressures are moving towards solidifying the status quo and preventing the ability to achieve a breakthrough in political struggle or what some participants referred to as "smart resistance."

When options such as elections, reconciliation, restructuring the PLO that have become useless and meaningless, or even changing the function of the PA and reviewing its course are presented, signs of disappointment appear on the faces in light of the

current situation, and the absence of indications of the existence of political forces capable of penetrating the scene, even in terms of naming political elites, there is an inability to see figures capable of forming a symbolic consensus state in the street.

There are other dynamics that require attention and consideration parallel to the emergence of forms of armed resistance by disgruntled youth due to the prevailing conditions, weakness of the authority, internal divisions, and other tragedies. Palestinian academic Dr. Ahmad Jameel Azem refers to it as "the privatization of occupation and its digitization." This involves the integration of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into economic activities with Israelis. There has been a constant growth in the number of Palestinians working in Israel, reaching up to 250,000, particularly in the private sector, especially in the field of information technology.

This new socio-economic reality has significant political dimensions and repercussions that are currently invisible but are likely to be an important variable in thinking about the future and possible Palestinian prospects.

Entrapment in light of the current realistic readings leads to frustration and adherence only to the option of

the minimum Palestinian level, which is to stay in the land and rely on the demographic factor and the internal Israeli crisis, and perhaps - as we will discuss later - jump from the approach of the "one-state solution" to the "human rights approach" of Palestinians within the framework of one state, which means the "dissolution of the Palestinian Authority" and its end, which is a far-fetched scenario, in the short term, and rejected by Israel.

The project of **“Smart Palestinian Resistance,”** whether military or peaceful, proposed by participants in the workshop, requires a greater degree of "political imagination" that encompasses the conditions of struggle and the Palestinian national spirit while simultaneously understanding the harsh realities and their constant changes. This scenario relies on the fulfillment of key conditions in order to be productive and allow Palestinians to shape their role in the conflict. Firstly, the Palestinian Authority must be aligned with the project and its governing values, which necessitates Palestinian national consensus. However, there are currently no indications of such consensus. Secondly, there needs to be a regional environment of Arab powers that embrace and support this resistance, particularly Jordan and Egypt or either of them.



Perhaps considering radical solutions in the long run and invoking the discourse of rights and the concept of the apartheid state in the Palestinian political discourse, with Arab support, while focusing on the protection of Jerusalem and its sanctities from the ongoing Israeli symbolic, demographic, and political encroachment.

Regarding the solution or approach to Palestinian rights, which in **turn necessarily calls for the concept of the "one-state solution"**, it is an old-new proposal adopted by a group of intellectuals, during the previous decades, but it did not receive attention from any of the parties. Then, it was a "fantasy scenario", but today this discourse is gaining great momentum, and enjoys supporters and promoters from Palestinians, Americans and Westerners, and a group of American academics and scholars have issued a specialized book in this regard "One State reality" in Foreign Affairs which also published special articles to clarify this approach, its dimensions, and the solution it offers to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This approach is based on several convincing assumptions. Firstly, the proponents argue that the two-state solution has become unattainable due to the presence of settlements in the West Bank and noticeable shifts in the Israeli electoral and political landscape.


Secondly, they point to the "structural crisis" within the Israeli project itself, highlighting its clash with Palestinian demographics and Israel's entanglement in the quagmire it has created by insisting on holding onto the land and being bound by the human rights of the Palestinian population. Thirdly, they emphasize the danger and effectiveness of the term "apartheid state" and its resonance in Western ears, making it easy to apply to the Palestinian-Israeli situation. Consequently, there are strong legal, human rights, and humanitarian foundations that Israel cannot easily circumvent as it does with the Palestinian issue. Fourthly, such discourse can be marketed in humanitarian, religious, and cultural terms to avoid a clash of civilizations and promote coexistence among diverse identities, religions, and historical narratives in a place filled with symbolic identities and historical narratives.

On the other hand, this proposal faces fundamental criticism and major problems, most notably two.

First, it is unacceptable to Israel, because for the right-wing center in Israel, which is completely dominant, it represents political suicide and contradicts the essence of the theses of this ideology. Additionally, if it is not adopted by Israel, it will be useless no matter how much it gets promoted because Israel at the end of the

day is one of the poles of the conflict, as well as the Zionist lobby and Israeli influence in American and Western policies.

Second, this scenario requires a major precondition which is the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority and the involvement of Israel in the West Bank politics, which requires a strategic decision from the PA and the Arab regional system. This is actually far from expected, in addition to that such a solution may give Israel an opportunity to activate the settlement process and take more lands. The Palestinians should gamble that this measure will be linked to marketing the idea of apartheid if they can overcome the economic and legal problems, the security problems, and internal conflicts that may erupt with such a vacuum as happened in Gaza in 2014.



### **3. Jordanian National Security and the End of the Peace Process: Moving from a two-state solution approach to conflict management**

In light of the above, it seems that the Jordanian position and calculations are more complex today than before, and it is known that the Jordanian strategic approach towards the Palestinian issue has witnessed fundamental transformations. The decision to separate and disengage from the west bank in 1988 was a major turning point, and later with the era of King Abdullah strongly clarified that there are no Jordanian intentions for any unitary relationship with the Palestinians, in the short term. Therefore, since the beginning of the reign of King Abdullah II, Jordan adhered to the two-state solution and devoted a large part of His diplomatic rhetoric to this solution, and King Abdullah has titled his only book, "The Last Chance," signaling its strategic importance to Jordan.

Despite all the attempts and their failures and setbacks, the decision-making kitchen in Amman has insisted on holding onto this diplomatic discourse, even though it now appears to be outdated and out of touch with the evolving realities on the ground. Some politicians even argue that persisting with this discourse is a

waste of time and merely gives Israel lip service. It seems that Jordan is not inclined to explore scenarios or options beyond the peaceful process, even though Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi admitted in his recent statements that the two-state solution is eroding, and its feasibility is diminishing.

It is clear that there are multiple trends in looking at the Palestinian question, even within the official elites, but before talking about these trends and their views, it is necessary - first - to identify the main questions: First, how do we define the relationship of Jordanian national security with the Palestinian and Israeli sides? What are the strategic and vital interests? On the other hand, what are the possible sources of threats and their degree of severity? These questions branch out of a map of sub-questions that help define and frame the "equation" of interests and security and the Jordanian conceptual framework towards Palestinians and Israelis, and what is happening "west of the river."

Three main Jordanian political trends can be identified in answering the above questions:

**The first approach is represented by a conservative elite that believes Jordan's security, strategic interests, and vital interests lie with the Israeli side rather than the Palestinian side.** Even if the peace process is buried and the two-state solution ends, it

does not mean a revolt against Israel because Israel is a powerful regional party and a security buffer for Jordan's national security. Jordanian interests align with Israeli interests, and therefore it would be a grave mistake for Jordan to rely on the Palestinian side given the current balance of power. This approach may not speak with such clarity in its terminology and political discourse, but its essence leans in this direction at the end of the day, to varying degrees. Some take it to the extreme by strengthening the relationship with Israel, engaging in the Abraham Accords and economic peace, aligning with the Arab countries, avoiding obstinacy or succumbing to populist rhetoric, and understanding Jordanian interests on the international and regional map within a correct and realistic assessment of power dynamics.

**The second trend is characterized by caution and self-distancing. It represents a choice embraced by some Jordanian political elites who believe that Jordan today is different from what it used to be.** They argue that protecting Jordanian national identity, and strategic interests, and maintaining internal stability require minimal involvement in what is happening "west of the river" (referring to the West Bank). This approach asserts that Jordan has already taken a clear

stance on the necessity of establishing a Palestinian state and that Jordanian national interests are tied to that. If there are tangible changes in the positions of Arab states towards the Palestinian issue, the Jordanian position would be to support the Palestinian Authority and the rights of Palestinians without getting involved in internal matters there.

This perspective is based on not assuming an organic connection between Jordan's national security and the situation in Palestine. While historically the Palestinian issue has been part of Jordan's national concerns, this does not mean that developments in Palestine will necessarily impact our strategic interests and national security. On the other hand, this approach acknowledges that Jordan is a resource-limited and small country. Realistic policies require refraining from undertaking burdensome and costly roles in a region riddled with crises and problems, both to the East, North, and West.

**The third trend - as seen by its proponents - argues that the separation between Jordan and what is happening "west of the river" contradicts many historical, geographical, and political facts.** Jordan's geopolitics necessitate a vital role for Jordan in the Palestinian equation. This approach believes that Jordanian national interests are interconnected and

intertwined with Palestinian interests. Jordan's national security is inherently linked to what is happening on the other side for various reasons. The strategic value of Jordan is tied to geopolitics, and the Palestinian issue is at the heart of this consideration. Events in Palestine affect Jordan's domestic situation and its symbolic dimension. While the decision to disengage may have ended the historical political unity between the two sides, it does not mean the end of the popular, political, and strategic interconnection, nor does it deny the realities of history and geography.

As someone who aligns with this third approach, I believe that the Palestinian issue, realistically, surpasses regional considerations and has profound implications for Jordan's internal and external policies. Jordanian strategic interests are interconnected with Palestinian interests in terms of demographics, culture, politics, and even the economy. It is not possible, given national, nationalist, historical, and geographical considerations, to accept the discourse of the first approach or the retreat implied by the second approach in the face of an imminent threat to Jordan. While acknowledging the impossibility of a two-state solution within the current Israeli equation, what is happening directly affects Jordan's security, particularly since Jordan is internally



and diplomatically entwined with refugee issues, borders, and Jerusalem. This prompts a reevaluation of the concept of Jordanian national security and the recognition that what happens in the West Bank is organically or strategically linked to it.

Based on the above, the question arises: What is required of Jordan? Before delving into the discussion of this important strategic question, it is necessary to note that the concept of the "Jordanian role" is negatively perceived by the Jordanian public, as it has been presented by American and Israeli circles attempting to solve the Palestinian issue at the expense of Jordan and its interests. This is especially evident with the stalling of the "peaceful solution" and the emergence of right-wing Israeli ideas that seek to connect Palestinian population centers to Jordan while absolving Israel of its legal and political responsibilities, essentially taking the Palestinian demography without the geography.

Recognizing the legitimacy of these concerns, the solution is not to retreat and fear the Jordanian intervention in the west of the river, as nature refuses a vacuum, and it is required that Jordan think seriously about restructuring the concept of the role required by Jordan, in a way that serves the strategic interests of Palestine and Jordan together, in the case of what

has become known as the "hour of truth" and the collapse of the peaceful solution, which requires Jordan to abandon its conservation from intervening into Palestinian affairs and launching new concepts in dealing with the scene there on national security and strategic interests.

This leads us to the fundamental idea of shifting from the concept of "**conflict resolution**" (currently not possible), recognizing the continuity of the status quo "west of the river" to "**managing the conflict**" with the Israelis there, and playing a more effective role in strengthening the Palestinian situation and engaging with it and help build Palestinian understandings and promote the concept of "popular diplomacy".

It is necessary to acknowledge here as well, that one of the biggest problems that Jordan suffers from is the weakness of communication, internally and externally, which contributed to the lack of understanding of Jordanian policies or even the lack of coordination with the various Palestinian parties, especially with the weakness of the Palestinian Authority and the emergence of the important question of the post-Mahmoud Abbas phase. It is related to Jerusalem and the management of the conflict with Israel, and dealing with the data of the conflict there, beyond the traditional discourse of

focusing on calming and reducing tension, which are American terms for an American path towards helping Israel in the "cantonal scenario" or what will become of the current course of events in the West Bank.

The time has come to expand the base of Jordanian strategic thinking on what is happening west of the river and to reach conclusions, results, and consensus among Jordanian political elites and forces, which is something sought by the two workshops held by the PSI and included in this report through dialogue between the Palestinian elites in the 1967 and 1948 territories with the Jordanian elite, on the one hand, and discussing Jordanian strategic options on the other. It is necessary for this dialogue to be strengthened and expanded, and that there to be readings based on coherent hypotheses and a study of the different scenarios and the many variables that occur. To the proceedings of the two workshops...

*Proceedings of the two workshops and political trends:  
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Jordan's  
Strategic Interests*

**Introduction:**

For more than two decades, the most optimistic people about the final solution no longer expected a consensus on a real two-state solution, in accordance with international resolutions. This coincided with a remarkable successive shift of the electoral political trends in Israel towards the far right, the extreme right, and the extremist religious forces, with a noticeable and significant decline of the leftist forces from the scene.

This coincided and also paralleled collapses in the Arab strategic depth, which symbolically represented a source of Palestinian power, and things ended up leading to regional normalization processes with Israel by the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, and serious Saudi discussions with the Americans and Israelis in this regard, putting the Palestinians in front of a new state of strategic exposure.

This seemed to have served the Israeli project to a large extent, especially with the term of former US President, Donald Trump, who moved the US embassy

to Jerusalem and pressed towards accepting the deal of the century by Arabs and Palestinians, in addition to attempts to reduce the work and even end the role of the (UNRWA), which was a dangerous development that did not end with the end of the Trump era.

It is clear today that it represents the only path available, whether it goes quickly or slowly, there are no realistic and logical alternative plans presented before the Palestinians, or even the Jordanians who are very interested in the Palestinian internal situation because of the intertwining of Jordanian strategic interests with Palestine.

On the other hand, Jordanian, Palestinian, and even Western and American elites have begun to propose the Palestinian rights approach, which finds its main incubator in the one-state solution, an alternative to the two-state solution, considering that this scenario represents greater pressure on the Israeli side, is more realistic and serves Palestinian interests to a greater degree.

Jordan has adhered to the two-state solution in the past and also informally expressed reservations about the "Deal of the Century." It has rejected the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem and participated in

meetings in Aqaba and Sharm El-Sheikh to address the heightened tensions in Jerusalem and the West Bank. However, it is evident that this approach requires review, scrutiny, and discussion, especially if it does not align with the realistic calculations of the Israeli government after significant changes that have occurred.

A senior Jordanian official responded, questioning the shift towards any alternative approach. Who said that the Palestinians accept a one-state solution and have given up on the two-state solution? Furthermore, what guarantees can the Palestinians obtain from the international community if the two-state solution, bolstered by international decisions, treaties, and conferences, is not viable? Will another option succeed, which still represents ideas unsupported by power balances, and international and regional agendas?!

Are there other scenarios?! Some also propose isolated Palestinian cantons, and is it the only option that the Israeli side believes in? Is there really a "Jordanian option" on the table by the Israeli right and some American circles to get rid of the Palestinian demographic problem?

On the other hand, the ideal scenario is to end the occupation and achieve independence for the State of

Palestine through multilateral efforts to achieve this goal by focusing on changing the balance of power and changing the facts on the ground. They desire to do what is required to end the Palestinian division, achieve national unity and fruitful resistance, revive the PLO and restore the Arab depth of the Palestinian cause but also within the framework of the United Nations and through the format of an effective and fully-fledged international conference aimed at implementing the resolutions of international legitimacy rather than negotiating them.

This approach stems from the fact that the illusion of the theory of solutions at hand has fallen, as the two-state solution is not possible and it was not possible through negotiations only, and it seems that the one-state state of equal rights is also not possible, and is indeed much more difficult than the two-state solution. Thus, what is happening on the ground is the reality of the one state that is by nature a colonial-settler-Jewish-apartheid state, which may, if not stood against, culminate in the displacement of large numbers of Palestinians to Jordan, Sinai, and other countries, especially after the collapse or dissolution of the PA and the spread of chaos in the occupied Palestinian territory, as influential circles in the government seek.

These are the issues that have called for and prompted the holding of two discussion workshops;

The first workshop came over two days on May 27 and 28 this year, hosting a group of Jordanian and Palestinian researchers and experts from the West Bank and Palestinians from the occupied interior, and the workshop divided its work into four axes:

First, what is happening in the West Bank and Jerusalem?

Second, what is happening in Israel?

Third, national security, Jordan's strategic interests, and the relationship with the Palestinians.

Fourth, Strategic Approaches: The Two-State Solution, Palestinian Rights, Cantons, Jordanian Options

The second workshop, it was held at PSI headquarters (on June 22) to evaluate the outputs of the first workshop, which included a group of Jordanian researchers, academics, and experts, and we included the facts and results of the two workshops together in the following report.



## **1. New government triggers a crisis in Israel**

Israeli cities witnessed massive demonstrations on the eve of Benjamin Netanyahu's assumption as the prime minister of a cabinet made up of the most extreme right-wing coalition in Israel's history. These demonstrations came after the prime minister announced his intention to make changes to Israel's judicial system. By reading the map of the coalition ruling today in Israel, it appeared that all the forces forming it are from the right and the extreme right, which reinforced their sense of power and the existence of a historic opportunity for them to change the Israeli political system.

Two basic schools in the construction of the Zionist project emerged in Israel.

The first is geography, which espouses the Greater Israel project and is represented by the Likud party.

The second is demography, to which the Labor Party belongs, which seeks to withdraw from the regions in order to preserve the demography of the state.

But today a right-wing current emerges that denies the two schools of thought with a point of view that opposes the previous two points of view, as the current came to power believing that the obstacle lies in

Israeli democracy, international law, and international legitimacy. These current wants to seek a resolution and reach an occupation government that oppresses the Palestinians, and this faces the belief of many Israelis that they actually live in a democratic state.

With its victory, the extreme right-wing movement no longer focuses solely on the issue of decisiveness among Palestinians, but rather the goal of decisiveness has shifted to the Israeli domestic scene, which historically witnessed and continues to witness a religious-secular divide. For nearly two decades, religious individuals have been dominating the state's institutions, leaving only the Supreme Court as their remaining hurdle. Additionally, Netanyahu, intentionally allied with religious Zionist parties and formed an alliance with religious Jewish forces (Haredim) that have traditionally opposed Zionism. However, they now align with Netanyahu's direction after he resolved their housing-related issues by providing them with settlements. This move has caused a shift to the right among them, altering the political equation and posing a demographic shift as well.

The importance of controlling the Supreme Court lies in the fact that Israel as a state does not have a constitution, and there is no separation of powers

between the legislative and executive powers, and therefore the Court is the only active element capable of achieving a balance, which the extreme right-wing current rejects and seeks to abort this equation and attack what is left of the state.

The state of instability in Israel dates back to 2019, when Tel Aviv seemed incapable of settling its problems over the course of five electoral battles under an electoral law through which no party can obtain a majority except through an alliance, which enabled all groups (even smaller ones) to obtain representation in the Knesset, which also puts the future of Netanyahu's government at stake, leaving the door open to all scenarios.

In this context, two different opinions emerged from the participants regarding what is happening, **between those who believe that Israel is in a strategic impasse and those who believe otherwise.**

**First, it is believed that Israel, in light of its accumulated crises, is not able to progress further in its project even after its occupation and settlement, as there is a real crisis facing the unity of Israeli society and the Jewish national consensus after the main forces clashed between each other. Therefore, it is not expected that the Jewish situation and the state of consensus will return**

to what it was before, except in temporary cases such as launching a war on Gaza or other external threats. Thus, what reflects the situation in Israel is a sustained internal crisis. The Israeli project, which is now led by extremists according to the current equation, indicates the failure of the Israeli project.

**As for the second opinion,** it believes that there is an exaggeration regarding what is happening in the Israeli arena, and Israel is not on the verge of a civil war. The postponement of the decision on Netanyahu's judicial coup may have been a source of strength when the conflicting parties took to the streets in Jerusalem and demonstrated peacefully without any aggression between them. Furthermore, the Israeli economy continues to progress and compete with first-world countries. The second opinion justifies its stance by stating that the only project being proposed today is the one put forward by Israeli settlers, aiming to establish an Israeli state on all the 1967 territories. This project is a tacit agreement and has not been objected to by any Israeli leader from various political orientations. The only discussions held among the political parties in Israel revolve around settlements. The right-wing supports settlements for religious and ideological reasons, while the left-wing also supports settlements

but sees them as a demographic obstacle. Therefore, all right-wing and left-wing forces seek to remove the Palestinian issue from the negotiation table, and their disagreements are limited to internal affairs. Consequently, betting on Netanyahu's departure or staying in power is a waste of time.

## **2. Deep Palestinian Division, Absence of Authority, Anticipation of Rebellion**

In contrast to the crisis in Israel, the gap continues to widen inside Palestine and deepen, specifically between the main forces (Fatah/Hamas), in addition to the existing rift within the Palestine Liberation Organization itself; the Executive Committee of the PLO seemed to not represent the entire Palestinian forces, such as the General Command or the Thunderbolt Organization and the Popular Front. In addition to the large divisions within Fatah itself, the PA seems to be going through its worst situation in light of the state of anger, the most important reasons for which are:

- 1- The political project failed.
- 2- The abolition of elections, the dissolution of the Legislative Council, the abolition of any form of separation of powers, and the decline of the international status of the issue.

3- Internal division in light of the urgent need for a united front.

Participants argued that a sharp split is unlikely to be enabled, but rather sustainable, and expandable, for several reasons:

- 1- Because it sits on a geographical separation, different interests have been created based on this separation (West Bank, Gaza).
- 2- The PLO no longer exists on the ground; the factions no longer exist, there is a complete Palestinian collapse, there is irreparable corruption, a failed political system, and an outdated political project, and reconciliation is no longer possible.

### **Changing PA functions does not dissolve PA:**

Most of the participants believed that the basic idea demanded today in many circles is not to dissolve the PA but to change its functions, and to remove the PLO from the mantle of the PA (because it has turned into a balancing item in the PA's agenda). As Yasser Arafat relied on PLO and the PA, the authority today under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas does not rely on either.

The PA needs to focus its efforts on building a good service sector because many Palestinians are evacuating Palestinian land in search of services, and although there are views that believe Israel cannot expel Palestinians as it has previously done, the current situation may lead to this. Therefore, the absence of a political solution, with the ineffectiveness of the authority in managing the conflict and the increasing intensity of division, requires the creation of an alternative on the ground. Strengthening the PA's management of the services provided will also enhance its legitimacy, as it is responsible for 150,000 Palestinian employees and thus maintains the legitimacy of spending. In addition, the PA must go beyond its role as a barrier between Palestinians and Israelis, especially since security coordination is one of the most common causes of the crisis of mutual anger between the PA and society.

### **Keeping the cause alive is the next challenge, under the signs of an Intifada**

These proposals come in a context in which the Palestinian territories are witnessing a trend of the Palestinian youth generation towards a state of rebellion against the reality that seems to be gradually escalating and will take a different form, especially since the current Palestinian generation is more solid,

more severe and more adherent even if it does not have historical experience, and the belief in the ability to control the resistance of the new generation is a failed choice. Today, there is talk of Palestine entering into a violent third intifada led by disorganized groups of people who have lost confidence in the leadership, which creates a possible scenario of mutual chaos between historical leaders and disorganized new generations, which Israel may be pushing to promote.

The current stage, as participants saw it, requires the Palestinian cause to remain alive, support solidarity, and adopt a strategy of struggle based on a set of points:

- 1- Support resilience and survival.
- 2- Resistance in all its forms, the non-resistant human presence does not provide any benefit.
- 3- Strengthening the boycott and sanctions movements at the international and Arab levels.
- 4- Achieving unity and creating a unified Palestinian leadership, and this is not only about Hamas and Fatah but also about Palestinians inside and outside the West Bank and Jerusalem.
- 5- Reintegration between Palestinian components at home and abroad.



6- Confronting normalization and breaking through its ranks.

7- The need to hold legislative elections.

### **Refugees and the Palestinian Diaspora: A Possible Playing Card to Keep the Palestinian Cause Alive**

The issue of refugees and their fates has always been one of the biggest dilemmas of the Palestinian cause, and the matter may have been complicated recently after attempts to reduce the work and even end the role of the (UNRWA), a dangerous development that did not end with the end of the era of former US President Donald Trump.

The refugees' file is dealt with from two aspects, namely return or compensation, and therefore this file should be invested in favor of the cause;

**Regardless** of Israel's position, in line with the Jordanian national interest and in order to strengthen Palestinian steadfastness, the Palestinian Authority must grant passports and citizenship to every Palestinian in the world and grant them the right of political return by allowing them to exercise their right to Palestinian Authority elections. Jordanians of Palestinian origin must also have Palestinian citizenship and exercise their

political rights as in Jordan, and everyone decides what he wants to impose facts on the ground and support the steadfastness of Palestinians inside Palestine on the one hand, and on the other hand, the participation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin is always low in Jordanian elections; thus, we can give them a kind of political representation somewhere else.

This proposal comes from the premise that there are at least one and a half million people who do not have a Jordanian national citizenship, and these must be Palestinian citizens in Jordan, and even if they have full civil rights in Jordan, they also must have political rights in Palestine.

**Another critical view of this proposal emerges**, stating that there are many obstacles, for Palestinians in any country as they have not been able to play a political role, because the Palestinian defined by the rule of the Palestinian Authority is the Palestinian as defined by Israel, and this is not inclusive of all Palestinians in the diaspora, and therefore there is no way to participate in the elections, but it is possible to participate if there are elections for the PLO or different Palestinian frameworks. As for civil rights exercised in Jordan, on the ground Civil rights are curtailed, refugees are not allowed to own property or take a driver's license

(except with security approval and complicated procedures) and the costs of their university studies are not the same as Jordanian citizens although less than other international students.

### **3. Jordan's Role in the Palestinian Cause: The Imperative of Engagement in a Complex Geopolitical Context**

Although the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship was rooted and intertwined before the unification of the two banks, it was influenced by a number of stations, especially with the emergence of Palestinian movements after 1967 leading to the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

In the context of this relationship, there is no single trend among **the Jordanian elites toward the situation in Palestine**, but they are divided into different trends:

**First, Jordan believes that Jordan is important and necessary to** have a major and pivotal role in what is happening in Palestine, politically engaged and present. What is happening in the West Bank and Palestine is part of Jordan's national security, for various reasons, including what is related to Jerusalem, sovereignty, and refugees, and therefore Jordan cannot be outside the scope of the table on which the process of

discussion and dialogue takes place and it is necessary to strengthen its cards and tools in its management of geopolitics.

**The second trend** calls for a complete and decisive separation between Jordanian and Palestinian affairs, the relationship of the issue to national security and the Jordanian relationship with the Palestinians should be limited exclusively with the PA. Jordan's interest lies in strengthening the boundaries between Jordanian and Palestinian affairs, not rushing to play roles.

**The third trend** believes that the only scenario facing Jordan today is to adapt to the outcomes of what is happening west of the river without being effective in what is happening, after the impossibility of negotiations and the impossibility of the two-state solution, which the Jordanian decision-maker is still betting on or even the one-state solution.

### **Between hostility and stability: The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship**

Within the framework of the Jordanian relationship with Israel, different trends emerge among the Jordanian elites in the delineation of the relationship between the two parties:

**The first trend:** sees the need to have a stable Jordanian relationship with Israel, and no matter how severe the differences between the two sides, Israel is a historical stabilizing factor for Jordan and therefore it is wrong to enter a strategic conflict with it, and Jordan may differ with Israel tactically because it will not differ strategically. This trend distinguishes between the deep state and Israeli governments.

**Second,** it is believed that there have been profound transformations in Israel that have changed the strategic value of geopolitics for Israel, and therefore it is necessary to re-read and redefine the equation of the relationship.

Thus, the relationship with the Israeli side is summarized in a twofold track:

- A thorny relationship with Israeli governments over the Palestinian issue.
- The relationship is good and stable, and mutual understanding is well-founded on the security side.

Participants believe that Jordanian normalization with Israel was not an option, unlike the Arab countries that entered the path of normalization from premises that may go beyond the Palestinian issue. Jordanian

normalization comes in the context of strategic necessity. Jordan also paid a political price as a result of the peace treaty with Israel without achieving gains, and it would have been more useful for Jordan to search for its interests through this treaty, and some argued that Jordan should have benefited from the treaty in terms of water and gas away from the "constructional" discourses put forward popularly.

### **The Jordanian-Palestinian Relationship: Problematic and Determinants**

Participants believe that the most important challenge facing the relationship with the Palestinians is the lack of agreement on the Palestinian national objective of the Palestinian forces, but there are goals in several directions, especially since ambitions had declined from full liberation to the 1967 borders to the situation today, and therefore requires redefining the Palestinian goal.

From the point of view of participants, the basis of the problem in the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship began to represent the issue, before the Jordanian army's battle against the Palestinian factions appeared in the events of September 1970. After the announcement of the representation of the Palestinians and the events of

the Rabat conference, three trends emerged among the Jordanian elites, among which King Hussein ranged between:

- A bureaucratic trend which saw an opportunity for the Jordanization of the state, for reform and strengthening national security.
- A trend called for moving away from any agreement with Israel and settling for a relationship with the PLO, and what the PLO wants, Jordan wants remotely without allowing the PLO to return or interfere in Jordanian politics.
- A trend that saw the possibility of Jordan having a strong presence in the West Bank.

Participants saw that the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship has four determinants:

- The relationship is organic and is more than “strategic”.
- There is a paradox in the Jordanians' view of Jordan and its role, and the irony is that it is a small country and this leads to adaptive policies while Jordan talks simultaneously about the big role it plays and this leads to a different active policy.
- Geopolitical reality (the logic of a small state) compels Jordan to be pragmatic.

- The nature of the Jordanian role, and this role requires Jordan to take into account four parties:
  1. The international community (the United States), and that is managing a conflict, not resolving it.
  2. The region and its role are undefined, and today it has witnessed a state of competitiveness between regional powers.
  3. Israel, which plays a role as if it were the main influencer and factor.
  4. The Palestinians, who do not have a single project or a clear goal.

As a result, each party among these four parties tries to manipulate the other parties according to its own interests, which means that there is no consistent policy of sitting down and engaging in dialogue to reach a solution. Instead, the policy followed is to persuade the other parties to adopt the solution proposed by each party individually, thereby keeping the issue within the framework of conflict management rather than seeking its resolution.



## **Intensive engagement in the Palestinian scene from the standpoint of Jordanian national security**

An important debate arises regarding Jordan's presence on the Palestinian scene, the degree of its involvement in Palestinian affairs and the time it will call for intervention.

Experts believe that Jordan is affected by the developments of the Palestinian scene to the extent that the Palestinian people are affected. The Palestinian issue for Jordan is not only an external issue, but an internal/national issue, and some have even argued that the three tracks of modernization in Jordan today are unresolved and even dependent on the fate of the Palestinian cause. Therefore, if there is a Jordanian trend that has reservations about the total Jordanian involvement in Palestinian affairs, there is another trend that believes that Jordan has no choice but to engage with the issue, and requires intensifying the Jordanian role with the need to overcome previous historical feuds and realize that parties in the Palestinian Authority may fear intensifying this role.

Jordan sees itself as a logical, rational, pragmatic player with limited capabilities, from the standpoint of (the geopolitical reality of the small state) and therefore

when talking about national security, the talk is about priority in the logic of realistic politics and the logic of the complex situation in a rough environment, and therefore the current Jordanian foreign policy focuses on containing the current situation to minimize any effects on it and tries through this containment to be able in a certain context to create certain conditions that change the status quo. Foreign policy also considers that more important than the role is the sustainability of this role, and what determines what the role is are the potential and variables on the ground.

**There is a trend of the participants to notice a blurriness in the** Jordanian role, as it talks sometimes about custodianship, sometimes about a special role, and at other times about strengthening the Palestinian Authority. This requires redefining the Jordanian role in accordance with Jordanian interests. Jordan should present itself as one of a group of players and not a single player in the Palestinian cause in order to avoid raising expectations in its ability to make a difference and to avoid Jordan being alone in bearing the increasing burden and pressure.

Jordanian interests also require engagement with all Palestinian social and political forces, as Jordan's role requires that the relationship not be limited to the

Palestinian Authority, but is supposed to expand to include other parties such as Hamas. If, according to Jordanian memory, Hamas has sought a foothold inside Jordan, this raises the question of the extent to which Jordan wants to have a foothold alongside the regional parties related to Hamas (Turkey, Iran, Qatar). Besides the clash with the Palestinian forces, the Jordanian position requires that there be a permanent clash with the Israeli side, regardless of the nature of the clash (engagement does not mean consent). This clash comes out of the need for Jordan to create the event and not to remain waiting for the event to be created by Israel for Jordan to interact with it. In addition to clashing with the Palestinian and Israeli sides, Jordan is also required to engage regionally and internationally and to be familiar with the dialogues and negotiations that take the Palestinian issue into place. For example, the Saudi-American-Israeli dialogue taking place today, which according to participants is taking place at a higher level than the proposal presented by Jordan. Such engagement helps to reproduce Jordan's role in line with its interests. Especially since the Palestinian issue in the context of Jordan's strategic interests is an existential issue in terms of demographic, political, economic, and security interests, as the Jordanian

position needs a broader umbrella through which it can put its positions on the table.

Another opinion of the participants believes that the Jordanian role is not characterized by ambiguity. While some data may change, the general framework of the Jordanian position is clear. Jordan is working to complete the disengagement from the West Bank by demanding a Palestinian state and establishing it to achieve its interests and to evaluate the Palestinian state, and therefore Jordan deliberately deals with the PA as a state because it does not want the weak nucleus of the state. This is evident in the official reception of the Palestinian Authority, to name a few. In a parallel track, the issue of the basic rights of the final status emerges, as, in the course of positions and principles towards Palestine, including the Hashemite custodianship, Jordan is concerned that its position remains firm and clean even if it pays the price for its position.

This trend also believes that the Jordanian relationship with Hamas will not be feasible, as the movement had previously exploited its presence in Jordan in order to have a foothold. the movement today has security, political and financial alliances apart from Jordan, and all the bitter experiences in the Palestinian file are present in the Jordanian memory. Therefore, it is

enough that the level of the relationship is abhorrent on the security side.

### **Jordanian Custodianship: Challenges Continue**

The issue of custodianship is one of the most complex files in terms of legal frameworks and challenges; the decision to disengage from the West Bank did not include endowments in the West Bank, which means that the guardianship is not limited to holy sites in Jerusalem but to all of the west bank. Despite Jordan's attempts to exploit international pressure, there is still a limitation in what it can do, assuming that Jerusalemites support the Jordanian custodianship. Although there are Palestinian voices critical of the Jordanian role.

Participants believe that there are three main factors influencing the guardianship issue:

- . The treaty with Israel on the one hand.
- . The Jordanian agreement with Mahmoud Abbas.
- . International support, that is divided between timidly supporting and directly supporting the custodianship.

In the face of these factors, there are 5 challenges related to Jerusalem and the Palestinian issue that Jordan is trying to deal with:

- . Turkey, with its peaceful actions and fear that it will constitute competition and the relationship with Hamas and that its president, Erdogan, according to opinion polls, is the most popular political figure there.
- . Iran and the Axis of Resistance, its competition with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and its relationship with Palestinian armed factions.
- . Qatar, and its active role in the cause and the relationship with Hamas.
- . Saudi Arabia, during the deal of the century, said that it began to compete over the issue of guardianship of holy sites.
- . Morocco, whose king chairs the Al-Quds Committee, creates a state of competition, but this rivalry does not mean replacement.

### **Palestinians in the Occupied Interior: Searching for an Outlet**

The Arab community in the occupied interior after the second intifada faces the danger of disintegration by allowing criminal gangs to grow in society significantly, and there seemed to be a conviction that the Israeli government allows these gangs to operate and condone their crimes by political decision in its

quest to dismantle Arab society from within, as the Israeli government and Israeli society as racists do not accept the presence of non-Zionists or Jews inside Israel.

Participants consider the Knesset as a platform where Arabs receive and confront Israeli policies. Therefore, there is a commitment to participation to demand equality in national and civil rights. The forces also seek to propose an alternative that contradicts the Israeli strategic project by ending the occupation. However, Arab forces there face a crisis of agreement on the political project or agreement on a marginal policy, especially with the participation of factions from these lists in governing coalitions. This happened with the alliance led by Mansour Abbas, which adopts a discourse that is not different from the Arab Zionist parties from the perspective of participants. It seems that the Islamic call is more important than the Palestinian issue. It may be noteworthy that Abbas's participation, who had recognized the Jewishness of the state, had unintended consequences, as Israeli youth leaned towards extremism in their attitudes towards other components within Israel.

Until 1995, Jordan's relationship with the occupied interior was described as scarce, but after that date,

it witnessed remarkable openness and development. Perhaps one of Jordan's strengths is that it is able to deal with Palestinians from all lands of the world and all their orientations, and not limited to what the Palestinians are limited to. especially since the issues, in general, are intersecting and there is no solution to a specific issue that is addressed without working on the other next to it, as the circle of conflict is not only Israeli-Palestinian.

Participants believe that the relationship between Jordan and the Palestinians of the occupied interior is abundant. But without a strategic vision or a clear political project, and also the presence of thousands of students from the occupied interior in Jordan and a continuous kinship, it is necessary to think about what the two parties want politically.

Participants believe that the continued support of Palestinians in Jordan for Palestinians in the occupied territories is the best Palestinian national project and the most contradictory to the Israeli project. There should be facilitation of communication by allowing Jordanians of Palestinian origin to enter the occupied territories. It should not be considered normalization as long as those coming from Jordan to the occupied territories are Palestinians. This step has dimensions that



support the elements of Palestinian resilience. On the other hand, Palestinians in the occupied territories are experiencing positive economic progress, but they face restrictions from the Israeli government. Consequently, this presents an opportunity for Jordan to become a destination for investment and the development of an independent free economy outside of Israel.

Participants from the occupied interior noted that the small size and large size of Jordan's geography are relative; Jordan in the region where it is geographically and demographically present is very large, and compared to Palestine, it is a superpower.

#### **4. The two-state solution or the one-state solution, or maintaining the status quo**

It seemed clear that the tracks of the case are lost and no one has a magic recipe, and the parties concerned with the issue do not agree on a clear goal and vision. This justifies why some say that things will remain suspended without a solution and Jordan is required to remain in the field of conflict management until new variables are imposed on the ground.

A solution to the issue will be at the expense of its strategic interests and the return of the Palestinians will not necessarily be in Jordan's interest. Jordan faces the

risk of exporting the population burden to it with Israeli measures and the risk of emptying the Palestinian lands if there is a solution to the Palestinian issue, which may make Jordan pay a heavy demographic and economic price. But there are those who have gone against this trend by saying that the imminent danger to Jordan and the Palestinians is the idea of transfer, which seemed to be rooted in Israeli elites and Israeli society as well, as demonstrated in the recent elections. In addition, Jordan is required to move to studying options and alternatives and evaluating strategies to avoid any sudden scenarios.

### **The two-state solution: The Expired Option**

The Jordanian national goal is the two-state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Ironically Jordan had huge reservations about the Oslo Treaty and reserved the transitional phase and the separation between population and land, and did not bet at the time on the option of the two-state solution but today, there is a risk of demographic burden. The expansion of settlements may make Jordan stick to this solution, although King Abdullah II in 2004 stated that the absence of the establishment of a Palestinian state within two years means that a Palestinian state will not be established.

After 75 years of the Nakba and 56 years of occupation, the change in the Israeli structure today is strategic and not transient; Israel is no longer a replacement and colonial occupation, but rather an apartheid regime, which is against the Palestinians in the occupied interior, Gaza and the West Bank what the issue is witnessing today is the rise of an Israeli force that wants to carry out ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people. Today, settlers are repeating what used to be done. The plan today is an ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Area C, which constitutes 62% of the area of the West Bank, the number of settlers has reached 750,000, and they have 15 members of the Knesset and two ministers in the Israeli government, and this means that they have turned into a political force in the state, achieving advanced steps that are irreversible, and a demographic bloc that will turn more scales on the ground.

The settlers' intentions today are to fill the West Bank with settlements, leaving Palestinians with three options:

- to leave.
- To submit to the Israeli regime.
- to die.

There is also talk today of the intention of the Israelis to build 70 settlements and add 500,000 settlers, which necessarily means ending the Palestinian and Arab illusion that talks about the possibility of reaching a compromise. Therefore, based on these variables, participants believed that developments on the ground mean the end of the two-state solution and not going toward supporting it.

Thus, participants argue that the constant call and adherence to the two-state solution is in fact inclined to normalize the Palestinians with the status quo since according to the international situation and international powers there is no real supporter that allows the formation of a Palestinian state. The two-state solution did not address basic problems and did not take into account many components. Led by Palestinians in the occupied interior, if the first state was Palestinian, the fate of the country's original inhabitants in the occupied interior would be in danger, especially with the recognition of the Jewishness of the state, considering that there are no guarantees that everyone will be dealt with according to the foundations of citizenship or considered a minority whose rights are guaranteed. Participants also warned of the danger of a demographic upheaval; after Palestinian demography was a trump

card for many Palestinian parties, the dramatic increase in births, especially among religious Jews, puts the possibility of losing this card for Palestinians.

### **Is there a solution in a one-state solution?**

There are many questions raised by participants hovering around the option of a one-state solution and different interpretations of this solution, and the requirements for dealing with the current stage and the next stages, in addition to the fact that the one-state solution has many problems that must be addressed, many questions have emerged among participants that may represent fears or find in the solution a blurry vision, including:

- Doesn't the demand for equal rights within a single state means legislating equal rights for settlers?
- Doesn't the one-state solution require the dissolution of the PA?
- How will the legal, political, and economic consequences of the two-state solution be dealt with?
- Whoever recognizes the Palestinian state, will he be asked to recognize rights within a single state?
- Isn't it Israel and its settlement enterprise that killed the two-state solution, shouldn't we think about how to punish it before the transition to a permanent solution

takes place and it must be held responsible?

- Should Israeli facts always be recognized?
- What are the rights of the Jews in this state? Will it be considered recognition of the rights of the colonizer?
- As long as we talk about one state, one army, and one economy, does this mean seeing Palestinian factions alongside IDF units?

Four trends emerged in the context of talking about the requirements of the current and future stages and in the framework of talking about the one-state solution:

**The first trend is that the** issue today is not in a phase of resolution in light of the phase of struggle and engagement led by the Palestinians, and more important than the search for solutions in a closed tunnel is the search for a strategy to confront the conflict, because the Israelis do not look for a solution before the balance of power changes. The Israeli dilemma today is the Palestinians' survival on the ground, and the demographic dilemma is a card of power that pushes the Palestinians to talk from the standpoint of struggle and strength because today it is the one that prevents the announcement of the end of the Palestine project. What is presented by the Israelis as a mandatory and executionist reality for the Palestinian cause must be

presented today as a solution to the struggle and not a regressive and defeatist solution, which is the project of a democratic Palestinian state on all territory.

In the same direction, participants saw that there is a "romanticism" in the one-state solution: a one-state solution means a painful blow to the general framework that unites Zionism from the far right to the far left, and the one-state solution will either strike the state's Jewishness or democracy, two pillars that are not overwhelmed by the trends of Israeli society and elites.

While a **second trend** believes that the current task of the Palestinians and the Arab world is to remove Israel from the system of democratic states, the next battle should not be over rights or the form of the state, but rather over the apartheid regime, as the conditions are favorable today to work on this with the current Israeli government led by Netanyahu, who cannot provide an explanation of what is happening in Israel or the racist Israeli actions towards the Palestinians.

A **third trend**, which is close to the second opinion, argued that the current stage is the stage of demanding rights and not a stage of solutions, as there is no balance of power that allows this. The demand for legitimate rights, such as the right of return and self-

determination, must be driven by the fact that there is a historical injustice that must be corrected and on the basis that the Palestinians live in an apartheid regime and must be eliminated by giving the Palestinian people their legitimate rights.

**A fourth trend** supports the option of demanding rights within the framework of the one-state solution, arguing that adhering to the two-state solution has become an unintended pretext for Israel to do what it wants to fail the solution continuously and even establish an apartheid regime. Although the Arab-Jordanian international political position believes that the death of the two-state solution will impose difficult choices, alternative options must be studied and put on the table, and the current reality points to a set of alternatives:

1. The status quo continues, which is not fixed but is moving for the worse, and therefore an Israeli minority will rule over a Palestinian majority, under an apartheid regime, and now Palestinians live under an apartheid regime by legal definition.<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) Apartheid system: It is the application of two independent judicial systems to the same group of people. Inside Israel today, there is the Jewish Nation-State Law, passed in 2018, which treats Israeli Jews differently than Palestinians with Israeli citizenship. A separate law within the West Bank and East Jerusalem treats Palestinians under occupation separately from settlers living in the West Bank.



2. The Jordanian option, which expresses Israel's intention that it does not want to establish a Palestinian state and does not want to end the occupation, has declared this explicitly. Therefore, if it does not want the state and does not want the Palestinian majority, there is nothing left but to try to get rid of the largest number of Palestinians, and get rid of it not necessarily by expulsion to Jordan, but forced and mass displacement, and this has become a possible scenario and has recently been seen in Syria and Ukraine. Either Israel creates the conditions or takes advantage of the conditions to get rid of the Palestinians, or it asks Jordan to govern the large Palestinian communities in Ramallah, Jenin, Tulkarem, Hebron, and Nablus that are connected in one line, a scenario regardless of the Jordanian position but on the table.
3. If neither of the above two options works, a one-state solution becomes more realistic. The one-state solution has several scenarios and is not limited to one scenario only, which is one vote for every citizen in one state, this solution will not be accepted by Israelis and will not meet the aspirations of Palestinians seeking an independent Palestinian identity. It is even possible to talk about

a federal solution (Swiss or Belgian, etc.) in which the Palestinian side exercises all its Palestinian rights and preserves its identity within a certain federal vision. There are several solutions that can be decided by the Palestinian and Israeli sides, for example:

- Binational state.
- A sovereign shared state.

Over the past years, the focus has been on the form of the solution and the (complete) Palestinian rights have been ignored, and the prevailing belief was that the form of the solution is important, and once the two-state solution is reached, it is possible to talk about Palestinian rights. Especially since after 30 years of negotiations, the form of a solution has not been reached for Palestinians, who live in the worst conditions. Therefore, a popular and official political approach must be adopted, from now on insisting that any solution must be based on the principle of equal rights for both sides. Then if the matter is adopted internationally, then the form of the solution is called, and this is a reversed approach, which is to focus on rights and then form. Equal rights must include all levels and the pretext of the existence of the occupation is not to give rights under occupation, a pretext that

should not continue to exist after more than 70 years of reality imposed by Israel. What is needed today is how the regime can transform from apartheid to a democratic form, and this approach in this direction is more successful than continuing to adhere to a failed approach (the two-state solution).

As for the recognition of Jewish nationalism, there must be recognition of Palestinian national rights, in addition to the fact that the right to self-determination for Jews only according to the 2018 law is incompatible with equal rights (national rights). Equal rights do not mean legitimizing settlements; settlements are illegal under international law and therefore there may be a mechanism to address the one-state solution.

The one-state solution, from the point of view of the fourth trend, talks about the dismantling of Israel and its reconstitution on democratic foundations, as Israel from the beginning did not accept a two-state solution. What is confirmed by the speech of "Rabin", the most engaged prime minister in peace processes, presented in the Knesset before his death, "that all the Palestinians can get is more than autonomy and less than a state", which is what the Israeli administrations followed and Also under Reagan, Secretary of State Baker and then Bill Clinton, who never talked about a two-state solution.

With regard to the approach that discusses the need not to leave a solution that entails international laws (the two-state solution), the current believes that the solution resulting from an international law does not work today, whether with or without law, as the solution did not exceed its theoretical framework and did not reach application on the ground. Also, one of the gaps in the two-state solution does not talk about the refugee dilemma, which weakens this file, while the one-state approach gives equal rights to those who want to return to the two-state solution.

The next phase requires approaching the new Palestinian generation with the absence of legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and its non-recognition. The issue of new Palestinian elections has become very necessary, because if we talk about representatives of the Palestinians, we must talk to a legitimate representative, and he can only come through elections.

From a Jordanian perspective, there are areas where Jordan is not taking action but rather insisting on a conciliatory approach with the Israeli side and clinging to the two-state solution. However, the economic cost does not outweigh the existential costs, and it is not in Jordan's interest to keep the issues of energy and water in Israel's basket. Maintaining a long-term commitment

to the two-state solution means losing more Palestinian land, with the number of settlers reaching 750,000. On the other hand, in the one-state solution, the situation is not stable either, but it would move in a direction contrary to Israeli desires. Therefore, the option of conciliation in order to achieve gains on the ground is no longer viable. Moreover, Jordan today needs to play a role in unifying Palestinian factions amidst the state of stagnation in relations between the parties and the administrative separation between the West Bank and Gaza.