Jordan and the Second Trump Era: A Major Challenge

In Amman, there is considerable interest in the return of Donald Trump as President of the United States, reflected in open and closed political and media discussions about its potential impact on Jordan. These discussions are split between two main viewpoints. The first argues that it is premature to pass judgment, exaggerate, or be alarmed about the potential outcomes, particularly concerning Jordan’s strategic interests. The second viewpoint contends that Trump’s regional agenda does not bode well for Jordan. Instead, its likely implications, especially in terms of his approach to regional security and peace, suggest a reduction in Jordan’s political role and influence.

    To begin, it is essential to note that during a closed session at the Politics and Society Institute in Amman in mid-September 2024, an American guest who held a significant diplomatic position in Trump’s administration did not hide that Trump’s administration tends to downplay Jordan’s strategic importance and its regional role compared to other U.S. administrations and the longstanding alliance between the two countries. Although the guest emphasized that the team working with Trump on foreign affairs, security, and diplomacy would not be the same as in his first administration—including his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who had a tense and unfriendly relationship with Jordan—he noted that the incoming team would likely hold similarly right-wing and hardline positions, favoring Israel’s interests and national security.

Although a meeting between King Abdullah and Trump could not be arranged (for logistical reasons) during the King’s last visit to Washington, D.C., in September, there were communications between Jordanian officials and prominent figures in Trump’s election campaign during that period, which Jordan was keen to maintain. Despite the King’s relationship with Trump, marked by significant stagnation and coolness during the last two years of Trump’s first presidency with no direct personal meetings, the King extended congratulations to President-elect Trump to affirm Jordan’s “good intentions” in dealing with the new administration.

    Returning to the Jordanian debate, those who argue that Trump’s return would not spell disaster for Jordan base their view on three assumptions. First, they point to the robust, institutionalized relationship between the two countries, which they believe is not affected by changes in ruling parties or personalities in Washington, D.C., noting that U.S. aid to Jordan increased during Trump’s presidency despite the coolness at the leadership level. Second, they emphasize the need to distinguish between Jordan’s strategic interests and its support for the Palestinians, cautioning against conflating the two issues, as this would harm Jordan’s interests, security, and regional relationships. Third, they argue that Trump is not a predictable figure; his behavior in a second term could differ significantly from the first, as he is a dealmaker rather than a leader inclined toward wars and conflicts, often escalating only to achieve favorable outcomes.

    On the other hand, the opposing viewpoint, which sees Trump’s return as a genuine issue to Jordan’s national security and strategic interests, is based on several key assumptions. First, Trump does not view Jordan as a prominent partner and instead favors the wealthy Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as key allies. Trump might also harbor a vengeful attitude toward leaders and officials whose stances appeared to contradict him after he left office. Second, they argue it is impossible to separate the Palestinian issue from Jordan’s national security, requirements, and strategic interests. It is well known that Trump’s perspective—whether he revives or modifies the “Deal of the Century”—is rooted in a pro-Israel right-wing ideology. His first term was detrimental to the Palestinian question, with cuts to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the “Deal of the Century,” “regional peace,” and the relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, among other hidden actions that especially affected Jordan’s interests.

In all scenarios, Jordan faces a significant challenge and a crossroads in this new Trump era—whether in terms of its strategic importance and regional role, the Palestinian question and its substantial impact on Jordan, or the reshaping of regional alliances and the balance of power within them.