Parliamentary Electionsin Jordan, a step forward or backward? 

The recent parliamentary elections in Jordan finally represented the first major exam of the political modernization plan, which was initiated a few years ago. Everyone was anticipating what itwould result in, either as an endorsement and a model of gradual political development, which was designed by the political modernization plan (with its resulting constitutional amendments, election laws, and new parties) or as a repetition of previous experiences in attempts at political reform that have not been completed.

While some politicians rushed to obituary the party experience early after the elections, immediately after the results were published and revealed that the opposition-IAF party gained 31 seats (represents a minority out of 138 seats in the parliament), especially after they got nearly half a million votes from thenational constituency votes. On the other side, other political parties (especially those that have received support or sponsorship from official institutions) were affected by a significant decline in terms of the National List. 

On the other hand, a group of reformists viewed the results as confirmation of the seriousness of the state and the credibility of moving forward with the new party experience, giving credibility to the elections and the will to change toward parliamentary party governments within a time frame (not exceeding 10 years). 

Moreover, there is still a state of uncertainty that dominates the political elites’ debates on what the new partisan experience might lead to. In light of those results, will there be a decline or move forward? This situation is linked to deeper doubts, raised by previous governors about the eligibility or compatibility of Jordan’s social, cultural, and political structure, and perhaps geopolitical reality with a democratic and partisan experience of power…

Away from prejudgments and impressionism, a recentlypublished book entitled “Democratic Transition in Jordan: The Experience of Political Parties and Parliamentary Elections2024” (written by the author of this essay with the young non-resident researcher at the Politics and SocietyInstitute, Mohamed Amin Assaf, and a group of field researchers, was recently published in cooperation between the Institute of Politics and Society (PSI) and the King Abdullah II Fund for Development (KAFD)), sought to build a scientific and systematic approach in studying the behavior of Jordanian political parties during the parliamentary elections and before, since the parties corrected their situations in accordance with the new Parties law (the institute had previously published a book on the case of political parties on the eve of the correction entitled: “On The Threshold of Transformation“.) 

The book examines the party experience within a theoretical framework of the experiences of democratic transition and its theories worldwide, both with regard to the conditions and requirements of democratic transition (by reviewing theories of modernization, transition, and constructivism of democratic transition), and the development of political parties in global democracies, and the influence of various factors, including the role of electoral laws (electoral engineering). to explore whether Jordan is approaching or similar to one of these models? 

The behavior of political parties in the elections was studied through a set of key indicators: the framing of political identity for political parties and their relationship with the social base; internal governance; youth and women’s wings and media discourse; electoral programs, election campaigns, and candidate selection. The final chapter of the study then came to discuss the future of political modernization in Jordan in the post-parliamentary elections phase.

It can be said that the political parties’ experience is still in the early stages of transformation in Jordan. Despite the long history of the party experience (dating back to the early days of the emirate, the People’s Party in the 1920s), the intersections in the party experience (and the long period of prohibition from 1958-1992), in addition to the marginal role of parties in the political process, and the state-Muslim Brotherhood dualism that has dominated the internal political game since the return of parliamentary life in 1989… all of these factors have caused the weakness and incapacity of the party experience, as well as fragility in the political and intellectual structure of most existing parties, which is something that could not be overcome within two years , after the political modernization outputs were introduced and legislated , also no political party could build its crews, capacities, and bridges with its social base in such a short time.

The gaps in the new party experience have clearly emerged in the study’s features, in terms of building party identities and their relationship to the social base, compared to the ancientparties in the world that were founded from a social base and reflected their political and economic interests and social identity. While in Jordan’s case, party identity is still lost external from the calculations of the rules and interests that represent the main dynamic of the success of the experiment.Despite the increase of the percentage of youth and women involvement and the development of media discourse compared to the party experience in the pre-political modernization stage ; many problems appears in the processes of attracting women and youth and media discourse within the process of party building. However, the study showed important indicators of the potential success of the party experience if it takes serious tracksand the modernization process develops. One such indicator is the significant approximation in the identity of most parties on several fronts related to the controversy  of the relationship between the state and religion, or in terms of economic policies, such as the state’s role in the economy. It is clear that there are no major differences among political parties of various colors and spectrums regarding the definition of the state’s relationship with religion. In general, most of them view religion as an important factor in the social and cultural realms and in protecting morals and family. This view is shared by a national party on the right of the political spectrum (center-right) as the “Mithaq” party, a center-left party, the national Islamic party (center-right), and the Islamic Action Front (IAF), which forms the main opposition in the country. The IAF has moved beyond traditional slogans (such as “Islam is the solution”) and has advanced its intellectual and political discourse toward political, economic, and practical concerns. The term “political Islam” no longer exists in the traditional ideological sense (with the classical concepts of an Islamic state), and the rhetoric of the IAF hardly differs from other parties that are close to the state in this regard.

In terms of economic policies and the role of the state in the economy, and the choice between liberal and social policies forthe state, it is clear that the preferences of most parties, including the Islamic Action Front, Irada Party, and others, lean towards social liberalism — meaning both the private sector and the social market economy. In the Islamic Action Front’s detailed economic vision, there is a significant alignment with the propositions of the social left, similar to those of social democrats, and to a large extent Irada Party and many other political parties. This economic identity positioning may stem from the public’s skepticism of the International Monetary Fund’s policies and the desire of a large social segment for more protective economic policies for society, the poor, and the middle classes.

Given these considerations, it is clear that there is significant approximation in the identity of political parties. This may lead readers and analysts to question why the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ has gained such a large base of support, while other political parties have failed to achieve the expected results, especially those that were anticipated to have built a broad social base.

The book answers this by framing five key dynamics. Firstly, is the war on Gaza and the popularity of Hamas movement, which benefited the Muslim Brotherhood. Secondly, is the identical factor with its both sides ; the religious (the Brotherhood is more popularly known for its religious discourse than others) and the social (Jordanians of Palestinian origin mostly voted for the Brotherhood on the national list). The third dynamic involves teachers, as the Islamists included several teacher leaders on their list, which led to a large number of teachers voting for them. The fourth dynamic is the protest vote; other parties, which presented themselves as representing the state and government, fell into the trap of the government’s low popularity and public dissatisfaction, why would people vote for the current rejected reality? The fifth and final dynamic is the Brotherhood’s organizational, administrative, and electoral expertise, which was clearly demonstrated in their electoral campaigns, candidate lists, and effective election management.

One could also add another important dynamic to the book: favoritism, paralysis, poor planning, failure in institutionalization, and dependency—issues that plagued many parties that had hoped to win many seats and compete with the Islamists.

What about the future? How can we read it through the lens of the book? The book discusses several future scenarios, but these are tied to more than one factor, including political will, the determination to proceed with the modernization plan, and resisting the growing calls from skeptics of the experiment, in addition to the ability of the Islamists as the largest opposition political player, to adopt a rational and moderate approach, as well as the external conditions affecting a country like Jordan in a turbulent region.

As for the internal momentum from political parties, according to the book, an important condition is linked to independence, institutionalization, and party identity, along with building a social base—all of which are pillars for any successful party activity.