The Assassination of Nasrallah: What of Iran’s Retaliation?
None of the experts and researchers generally anticipated that the recent escalation against Hezbollah in Lebanon would lead to the assassination of its Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah. This figure holds considerable weight, symbolism, and influence, making it widely expected that he resides in a secure and fortified location, or that Israel would refrain from escalating to the extent of deciding to target and assassinate him.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in addition to returning settlers to the north, has based his actions on a formula that justifies expanding military operations. According to this view, Tel Aviv will not wait for the threat to materialise before taking action to deter it. This rationale has led Israel to intensify its targeting of Lebanese territories and prominent military leaders within Hezbollah, ultimately culminating in the Secretary-General himself.
This event can in no way be considered anything other than a pivotal moment in the region, marking an unprecedented level of escalation in the war on Gaza and its regional repercussions as it enters its first year. The assassination of Nasrallah is politically the most significant and severe event for Iran, even surpassing the gravity of the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), near Baghdad International Airport in January 2020. Nasrallah is regarded as the second most important religious and political leader for Iran, after the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in the eyes of Iran, its allies, and supporters in the region.
Consequently, Iran found in Nasrallah, who assumed leadership of Hezbollah in 1992, the ideal man to expand and lead its influence in the region. Under his leadership, the organisation became the strongest and most significant force in confronting Israel. Nasrallah is also closely linked to Hezbollah’s obligations and battles against Israel. Thus, his assassination represents a severe blow to the party, its cadres, Iran, and the IRGC, which coordinated with Nasrallah and his military leadership, such as Ali Karaki and other commanders, and with elements connected to the “Axis of Resistance.” The ability to target Hezbollah and its Secretary-General and reduce its capabilities suggests that Israel’s task of neutralising other groups associated with the axis and Iran’s network of influence may seem more feasible.
Iran’s loss does not stop at the person of Hassan Nasrallah, but extends to the role he and the party played, both in Lebanon and the region. Following Soleimani’s assassination, especially in Syria, Hezbollah assumed broader responsibilities after Iran failed to replace Soleimani with Esmail Qaani, who often appeared incapable of managing the regional landscape in a similar manner to his predecessor. The party acts as the overseer of influence, training and creating proxies, and supporting them economically through the smuggling of prohibited goods.
It can be said that Iran’s policy towards the war on Gaza cannot be characterised as part of a “strategic patience” formula, but rather as an attempt to avoid further losses. From the outset, analyses suggested that Iran’s domestic, regional, and international circumstances compel it to avoid slipping into an open confrontation, especially after the exhaustion it endured, primarily through economic sanctions and military attacks targeting many of its leaders. This has prompted Iran to rely on its proxies and to manoeuvre their roles intermittently, avoiding a repeat of the retaliation seen during the “True Promise” operation in April 2024, amidst Netanyahu’s efforts to exploit any security or military incident to expand the scope of the war and force Iran and the United States into a confrontation. This may explain Iran’s lack of response to the assassination of Hamas political bureau chief, Ismail Haniyeh, on 31 July 2024, despite widespread expectations of a massive Iranian retaliation.
Following the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, as the Israeli aggression on Lebanon, particularly its southern regions, continues, and as the threat of a ground invasion looms alongside the possibility that Israel may broaden its targeting of regional proxies, the pressing questions arise: what are Iran’s response limits, and what options are available?
Since the beginning of the war on Gaza, Iran has displayed a high level of restraint and immense caution to avoid triggering an open regional military confrontation. However, the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah now opens the door to all possibilities and scenarios. It is reasonable to expect that Iran will react to the incident and will not shy away from doing so, especially since it is well aware that weakening an ally it has invested in for decades, one positioned in a geopolitically strategic location, means weakening its regional project and the symbolism of the axis it leads and its strategic vision. On the other hand, the new Iranian government, led by President Masoud Bezhgkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, is currently attempting to reactivate the negotiation path concerning the nuclear file, which remains a strategic project for Iran. Engaging in war or increasing regional tensions would undoubtedly hinder those talks. Yet, Iran’s predicament lies in the possibility that Israel may exploit its mild responses to further weaken the axis’s forces and potentially carry out operations deep within Iranian territory, pushing it towards the battlefield and undermining any Iranian efforts to revive the nuclear file. Thus, Iran today faces several options:
The first option is to escalate through its proxies in the region. This option would see Iran intensifying direct attacks on Israel, or simultaneously targeting Israeli and American interests to increase pressure in order to curb Israeli escalation. This may be the most likely option for Iran if Israeli escalation on Lebanon and proxy sites in other countries continues.
The second option is to continue its non-engagement and maintain a cautious policy. This approach would aim to prevent the exacerbation of the sanctions crisis imposed on Iran, given its economic exhaustion, and to avoid further harm to its interests by taking risks. This would also avoid providing Netanyahu with the opportunity he is seeking. Moreover, since the formation of its new government, Iran has sought to open dialogue channels with the West, and it seems its current conviction is that the path that best serves its interests at this stage is negotiation. Any direct escalation with Israel would push it towards scenarios it has tried to avoid for years during the war on Gaza.
The third option is to launch a direct strike on Israel. This option depends mainly on Israeli actions, especially if Israel targets Iran’s core, which would compel Iran to respond, albeit with a higher level of retaliation than in April this year – a scenario Iran has been continuously trying to avoid.
In conclusion, Israel, through a series of assassinations and strikes on Hezbollah’s brigades, has broken many traditional formulas or even perceptions that emerged after the “7th of October” incident. Initially, Israel succeeded in diminishing expectations regarding the future security role of non-state actors, primarily represented by Hezbollah brigades, which have quickly crumbled within 10 days at the leadership level and in some key military locations.
The assassination of Hassan Nasrallah has also placed Iran and its project, both in real and symbolic terms, in a genuine predicament. This is something Iran will feel the effects of for years, and it may require a long time to rebuild a new deterrence equation based on the geopolitical dynamics that govern it. Additionally, the assassination may, at any moment, open the door wide to a reality that Iran has long sought to avoid.